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INTRODUCTION:
“Complete victory is when the army does not fight, the city is not besieged, the destruction does not go on
long, but in each case the enemy is overcome by strategy.”1
 
“Coming up against corners means that when you push something that is strong, it hardly gives way
immediately, just like that.”2
A broad range of literature in the field of international security studies defines drug
trafficking as a new global problem and a national security problem.  It was recognized as such
within the framework of the United Nations and the Reagan and Bush administrations declared,
for the first time, that illicit drug trafficking was a national security concern for the United
States. Since then, militarized solutions to the problem have been applied and supported in
South America. The policies pursued have largely failed. They contributed to generating or
feeding a spiral of violence in the producer countries, and to provoking a spillover effect in drug
production, traffic and related violence towards neighboring transshipment countries.
The basic question that will guide my dissertation is: what are the consequences of the
policies implemented by the governments of the South American cocaine-producer
countries against the illicit drug trafficking industry for the national security of their
neighboring transshipment countries?
The cases studied in this work are Venezuela and Argentina as neighboring transshipment
countries of Colombia and Bolivia, respectively. The question is important because both the
unlawful character of this economic activity, and the fact that drug trafficking has been defined
as a national security concern, justify a set of enforcement policies in South America. These
policies, this dissertation will argue, contribute to worsening threats to drug producer countries
and their neighbors, rather than solving the problem.
This work is an attempt to bring to the attention of decision-makers in South America and
the United States (as the hegemonic power in the region) the dangerous consequences of
militarized enforcement against the different actors involved in drug production and
transportation in South America.  At the same time, I suggest non-enforcement strategies for a
long-term solution to the problem through a reorientation of resources and the utilization of the
existing, drug trafficking control structures of the Organization of American States and the
United Nations.
Most work on the South American drug industry is concentrated either on the
problematique of the producer countries or criticizing the U.S. international drug control
                                                          
1Sun Tzu, The Art of War, London, Shambala, 1991, p.20
2Musashi, Miyamoto, The Book of Five Rings, London, Shambala, 1994, p. 101
2policies.3 Although this dissertation will discuss these topics, its originality lies in its focus on
the regional dimension of the problem because it analyzes the security problems for the
neighboring transshipment countries caused by the drug industry per se, and by the repression
against the actors that participate in this illegal activity.
This dissertation will contribute to knowledge in the field because it addresses a problem
that most authors that deal with drug trafficking as an aspect of security avoid: an appropriate
definition of national and regional security, military and non-military aspects of national
security and an explanation of why drug trafficking is a national security problem.4 An
exception to this “avoidance” of a definition of both the concept of national security and of the
national security dimensions of drug trafficking is Ivelaw L. Griffith, a political scientist whose
(excellent) work is concentrated in the analysis of security problems in the Caribbean region.5
It should be stated that I discovered the work of Dr. Griffith in early 1998 after reading
his book, “Drug and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege.”6 Previous work
carried out by Dr. Griffith was discovered while going through the bibliography listed in that
book. At the same time I was already at a very advanced stage of the writing of this dissertation
which is based on the theoretical approach I used in my M.A. dissertation.7 Any possible
similarity with Griffith’s work stems from the fact that we have both chosen the same
theoretical framework in order to analyze drug trafficking as a problem of security. In that
sense, aside from testing a working hypothesis, this dissertation is fulfilling an extra (and
unplanned) task: it proves that coincidences exist. The goals and purposes of both works,
however, are different. While Griffith puts the emphasis on drug trafficking as a threat to the
                                                          
3See for example: Lee III, Rensselaer, W. The White Labyrinth. Cocaine and Political Power, Transaction
Publishers, London 1989,xvi-263 p.; MacDonald, Scott, Dancing on a Volcano. The Latin American
Drug Trade,  Praeger, New York, 1988, xi-166 p.; Call, Charles; Youngers, Coletta and Walsh, John,
Peligro inminente?: Las FF.AA. de Estados Unidos y la guerra contra las drogas, Bogota, CEI/Instituto de
Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales/Tercer Mundo Editores, 1993, 250 pp. (Translation of
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Clear and Present Dangers: the U.S. Military and the War
on Drugs in the Andes, Washington DC, WOLA, 1991, 154p.); Tokatlián, Juan Gabriel, Drogas y
Seguridad Nacional: La Amenaza de la intervención?, Comisión Sudamericana de Paz, Santiago, 1989,
40 p.
4See for example: Dziedzic, Michael, “The transnational drug trade and regional security,” Survival,
November/December 1989, pp. 533-48; Seccombe, Ralph, “Troublesome Boomerang: Illicit Drug Policy
and Security,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 28 (3), 1997, pp. 287-299; Jamieson, Alison, Terrorism and drug
trafficking in the 1990’s, Dartmouth, Brookfield, 1994, xv-285 p.
5See: Griffith, Ivelaw L., From Cold War geopolitics to post-Cold War geonarcotics, International
Journal, Volume XLIX, Nº 1, Winter 1993-4, pp. 3-36 and same author, Drugs and Security in the
Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, 314 p.
6See footnote Nº 5
7Dreyfus, Pablo G., The illicit drug traffic as a non-military aspect of security in South America. Issues
and Policies of a transshipment country: Argentina (1989-1994), Geneva, The Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, September 1995, 126 p.
3sovereignty of the small island states of the Caribbean,8 my work focuses on the spillover
consequences of militarized enforcement in drug producer countries in South America, as well
as on the threats posed by drug trafficking activities per se. Chapter I shows the ways in which
this dissertation differ from Griffith’s work.
This dissertation also innovates the state of the field in the sense that it is focused on an
analysis of the cognitive maps of the bureaucrats in charge of drug control and security policies
of one of my case studies, namely, Argentina. This allows me to accurately test my hypotheses
concerning the consequences of enforcement in Bolivia as a producer country.
The following theoretical assumptions guide this dissertation:
* The security of nation-states does not only stem from the increase in power capabilities
or the existence of a lasting peace through the establishment of international organizations, as
the realist and idealist theorists would argue, but also from the absence of threats to the
institutions, territory, and the population of a state.  These threats stem from the particular
vulnerability of each state.
* Non-state actors can pose these threats.  They can also be non-military threats in the
sense that they do not include the “...use of physical force in inter-state relations...”9
* Threats to national security stem from both the security environment of a state and its
own vulnerability. They can be caused by internal or external actors, and by processes.
This position could be named as “broadened security studies”, and shares the view of
authors such as Barry Buzan, Max Manwaring, Dietrich Fischer and Joseph Romm.10
Following these criteria, I consider drug trafficking as a national security issue for South
American states, and maintain that the nature of this problem varies according to the role played
by each of these countries in the process of production and transportation of illicit drugs.
This dissertation analyzes the security problems of Venezuela (1978-1994) and Argentina
(1983-1995) as neighboring transshipment countries of two coca-cocaine producer countries:
Colombia, in the first case, and Bolivia, in the latter.
                                                          
8I am referring here to “Drugs and Security in the Caribbean” in a previous article (“From Cold War
geopolitics to post-Cold War geonarcotics-see footnote Nº 5 ) Griffith set the showed the theoretical
framework he was using in is project “Sovereignty under Siege” that turned into his book).
9Fischer, Dietrich, “Nonmilitary Aspects of  Security. A Systems Approach,” UNIDIR/Dartmouth,
London, 1993, p. xi
10Fischer, op.cit. ; Barry Buzan, Peoples, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security in the
Post-Cold Era, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991, 393 p.; Manwaring, Max, Beyond the Cold
War: Toward a Theory of Engagement to Confront the Gray Area Phenomenon in Manwaring, Max (ed.)
Gray Area Phenomena. Confronting the New World Disorder, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993, pp.63-76;
Manwaring, Max, The Umbrella of Legitimacy, in Manwaring, Max (ed.), op.cit., pp. 77-92; Romm,
Joseph, Defining National Security .The Nonmilitary Aspects,  New York, Council on Foreign Relations
Press,1993, v-122 pp. For a very recent example of this broadened conception of security see: Matthew,
Richard A. and Shaumbaugh, George E., “Sex, Drugs and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and
National Vulnerabilities,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 29, Nº 2, 1998, pp.163-175.
4In the case of Venezuela the spillover effects of enforcement against the cocaine industry
in Colombia represents an overt threat since the early 1980s. For this case study I empirically
linked indicators of the level of enforcement in Colombia to indicators of threats to national
security in Venezuela stemming from my theoretical framework. These include: military clashes
between both states caused by the movement of drug traffickers, guerrillas, and para-military
groups across the borders in territories where the sovereignty is contested by both states; the
establishment of laboratories and para-military defense groups in Venezuelan territory; an
uncontrollable flow of immigrants as a result of the violence in Colombia; and the rise of drug
consumption as a result of the increase of the utilization of Venezuela as a transit route.
In Argentina, with the exception of the increase in cocaine trafficking and consumption,
most of the threats caused by the level of enforcement applied against the illicit drug industry in
Bolivia remain latent. This is why for this case study I will compare the views and perceptions
of senior bureaucrats in charge of the Argentine Drug Control Policy in two historical periods
(the Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín presidency and the first term of President Carlos Saúl Menem). Both
periods are characterized by increasing levels of militarization of drug trafficking control
policies as well as drug trafficking-related violence in Bolivia.
For the case of Argentina I use the Cognitive Mapping Approach to illustrate how the
Argentine bureaucrats make a causal link between the level of enforcement and drug-related
violence in Bolivia and the existence of national security problems during the two periods under
analysis.  The cognitive mapping approach assumes that policy-makers perceive and believe
political issues to be causal relationships between phenomena, and gives a set of rules to code
and measure these causal relationships through the analysis of documentary sources, policy
statements and interviews.
For this latter case, I combine primary sources (speeches, memos, cables, and newspaper
declarations, verbatim) and secondary sources (interviews, documents, memoirs, and archive
materials) as sources of data.
The drug trafficking problematique is dynamic. The illicit drugs industry is constantly
modeled by four forces: consumer preference; drug prices; the modalities and intensity of
enforcement; and the (variable) weakness of the South American states that make them very
vulnerable in view of the high adaptability and mobility of transnational criminal organizations.
For this reason the dissertation only covers the period from the late 1970s--when the cocaine
industry arose and consolidated in the Andean countries--to 1995, the year I started research for
this dissertation. The fact that the major players in the cocaine industry no longer existed at the
completion of this work in January, 1999--the Medellín cartel was dismantled in 1993 and the
Cali cartel was dismantled during 1995--not mean that the threat has disappeared. On the
contrary, it is continually mutating. The number of important transnational actors has increased
and the illicit drug industry is more decentralized in the sense that it is less and less controlled
5by Colombia-based organizations. However, as explained above, these facts exceed the time
frame of this work.
This dissertation is divided into eleven chapters. The first chapter explains the meaning of
the concepts “national security,” “regional security,”” and “non-military” aspects of security.  It
also explores international perceptions concerning this problem from the point of view of the
South American states, the United States, and within the framework of the United Nations
(UN), as a universal organization. Finally, the chapter will articulate the set of hypotheses that
structure my work. The second chapter delineates South America as a differentiated region in
terms of drug trafficking patterns and also in terms of the spillover of drug trafficking-related
violence and drug trafficking activities from drug producer to neighboring transshipment
countries. The third chapter analyzes security problems caused by drug trafficking and by the
spillover effects of the militarized enforcement approach of the United States as an extra-
regional hegemonic actor. This chapter explains the social, political, and economic roots of drug
trafficking in South America, and also analyzes the structure of the illicit drug industry in the
region. The chapter also empirically analyzes the security dimensions of drug trafficking as
defined in the first chapter.
The fourth chapter focuses on the evolution of drug control policies in Colombia and its
consequences for this country in terms of drug trafficking-related violence caused by both the
cocaine industry and by militarized enforcement. It also analyzes the changes in drug production
patterns (in both the techniques and the physical location of production) that occurred as a
reaction to drug control policies. In that sense, this chapter studies Colombia as the security
environment of Venezuela in terms of drug production, and drug trafficking-related violence.
 The fifth chapter analyzes the national security problematique of Venezuela in terms of
the threats posed by drug trafficking. The chapter studies threats stemming both from
Venezuela’s vulnerabilities vis-à-vis drug trafficking activities in South America, and the
spillover effects of militarized enforcement against drug trafficking in Colombia (threats that
are, of course, reinforced by Venezuela’s vulnerabilities). The sixth and seventh chapters repeat
the scheme followed in the two previous chapters for the case of Bolivia (Chapter VI) as a
producer country and Argentina (Chapter VII) as a neighboring transshipment country. Chapter
VIII analyzes the cognitive maps of officials involved in the formulation of Argentina’s drug
control and security policy.  The analysis will reveal whether these officials saw a correlation
between the increase of militarized enforcement in Bolivia and the spillover phenomenon that
could have national security consequences for Argentina.
Chapter IX proposes a multilateral and non-military answer to the drug trafficking
problem in South America. This chapter also explains the importance of alternative
development strategies as a means to contain drug trafficking and reduce its scope. Chapter X
explains the approach used by two multilateral agencies: the Interamerican Drug Abuse Control
6Commission (OAS-CICAD) and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme
(UNDCP). The chapter suggests a shift in economic resources towards the implementation of
alternative development efforts through these two agencies. Chapter XI evaluates the progress
of UNDCP’s alternative development activities in the Tropic of Cochabamba (or Chapare) in
Bolivia, the third largest coca (and coca paste) producing region in South America. I choose the
Chapare region because conditions there (i.e. road infrastructure, access to international and
local markets, absence of armed groups controlling the territory) facilitate the implementation of
alternative development projects, which in turn may encourage private investment as well as the
development of an alternative legal economy.
In order to avoid confusion or misunderstandings, it is also useful to state what this work
does not attempt to do:
First, this is not a dissertation about drug trafficking as a so-called “new” or post-Cold
War security problem. Although some authors present the topic as a post-Cold War issue, illicit
drug traffic has been a clear threat  to the South American states since the early 1980’s. The fact
that this matter was overshadowed by the East-West confrontation does not mean that the
problem was non-existent or irrelevant before.
Second, this is not a dissertation on drug trafficking as a security problematique of the
“Third World,” “Southern,”” or “developing” countries. Although the drug industry is
concentrated in non-developed areas as South America and South Asia, this problem does not
affect all of the so-called “South” in the same way nor with the same intensity.
My work focuses on South America as the only region where the cocaine industry is
located, and analyzes the specific security problematique that this activity (and the methods to
control it) poses to the states of the region. At the same time it considers that the threat to nation
states posed by organized criminal activity stems from the (weak or strong) nature of the state,
and not from the level of economic development. The territorial control and political and
economic power of the Russian mafya in the ex-Soviet Union and criminal organizations in
Italy illustrates this point.
Third, the research presented here is not specifically about U.S. drug control policy in
South America (the so-called “War on Drugs”). Although, as we will see, this policy played a
major role in enhancing and spreading the threat that the cocaine industry poses to the South
American nations.
Fourth, this is not a dissertation about the action of the United Nations and the
Organization of American States on international drug control issues.  The utilization of drug
control structures of these organizations (among other strategies) will, however, be proposed as
an alternative solution to the problem in South America.
This research required extensive travel and field research. In early January 1997 I
traveled to Vienna where I spent ten days doing research and conducting interviews at the
7offices of the Latin America and Caribbean section of UNDCP. I also spent three months in
Argentina (June, July, and August, 1997) carrying out interviews and research required for the
analysis of the cognitive maps of law enforcement, drug control, and defense officials in that
country. During the first ten days of August 1997, I traveled to Bolivia in order to interview
UNDCP officials posted at La Paz and Chimoré (Chapare region) and to observe the UNDCP’s
alternative development activities in the Chapare region. Further, I was able to interview
Bolivian government officials as well as coca growing peasants and local coca-growing trade
union leaders. These research trips (as the major part of my Ph.D. studies) were funded by a
scholarship provided by the Graduate Institute of International Studies.
Chapters V and VI were written while I was a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Matthew
B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies (The Graduate School of International and
Public Affairs, University of Pittsburgh) from September 1997 to September 1998. In February
1998 I spent ten days in Caracas conducting interviews and gathering primary and secondary
sources for chapter VI. During the academic year 1997-1998 I also made several research trips
to Washington D.C. in order to gather information about CICAD’s activities and statistical
information on U.S. government international drug control budgetary allocations. My activities
at the Ridgway Center were funded by a fellowship of the National Swiss Science Fund. The
Ridgway Center also provided travel funding for my trip to Venezuela as well as transportation
facilities for some of my research trips to Washington D.C.
8CHAPTER I:  DEFINITIONS AND HYPOTHESIS
A- INTRODUCTION
This chapter explains the meaning of the concepts “national security,” “regional
security,” and  “non-military” aspects of security. It also explores international perceptions
concerning this problem from the point of view of the South American states, the United States,
and the definition of the problem within the United Nations (UN) framework. Finally, the
chapter will articulate the set of hypotheses that structure my work.
B- ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFIC
“Crime refers to the fact that the behavior of such organizations is defined within the jurisdiction
of at least one of the involved nations as a violation of its criminal code...”11
a)  Definitions and international views of drug trafficking as a security issue
The World Heath Organization defines the term “drug” as any substance with the
potential to enhance physical or mental welfare and any chemical agent that alters the
biochemical or physiological processes of tissues or organisms. 12 If we consider this
definition, there would be nothing wrong with the production, transportation, and distribution of
all kind of drugs in the market as well as the generation of profits from these activities.
However, the core of a cornucopia of political, social and individual health problems is that the
use of certain drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, is terribly harmful for an individual’s health
and their production, transport, sale, and consumption have been forbidden by law or limited to
medical and pharmaceutical uses.13 This last fact has, among other factors, led to the rise of
criminal organizations that produce and transport these drugs outside legally sanctioned
channels.
Strictly speaking, it is not the drugs (i.e. heroin or cocaine) that are illicit but their
production, sale or use in particular circumstances in a given jurisdiction. As a matter of fact,
the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs signed in 1961 establishes a
framework for the provision of adequate supplies of drugs such as heroin and cocaine for
medical and scientific purposes and of measures to prevent diversion into the illicit market.  For
                                                          
11 Martin, J. and Romano, A. , Multinational Crime: Terrorism, Espionage, Drugs & Arms Trafficking ,
London, Newbury, 1992, p.15
12World Health Organization, Lexicon of Alcohol and Drug Terms, World Health Organization, Geneva,
1994,p  34
13 The World Health Organization Defines harmful use as “ A pattern of psychoactive substance use that
is causing damage to health. The damage may be physical or mental,” see: World Health Organization,
op.cit. , p.7
9this reason, within the scope of this dissertation, the terms “illicit drugs” and “controlled
substances” will be used as synonyms. 14
The production, trade, and consumption of harmful drugs is not a new international
concern; it is an old problem that began with the worldwide spread of opium consumption at the
beginning of the 20th century. Between 1912 and 1988, several worldwide treaties were signed
with the goal of controlling the production of the increasing diversity and quantity of harmful
drugs.15 It was recognized in the framework of the UN that drug production and consumption
had became a global health problem and a world order problem in the sense that no state could
solve it by itself.  In the 1960s and 1970s an international regime was set up in the framework of
the UN in order to consolidate most of the earlier international agreements. In 1961, the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs was drafted with the goal of codifying all existing multilateral
drug control treaties, including the cultivation of plants that were grown as raw material for the
production of narcotic drugs.16 The 1961 Convention also established or maintained certain
monopolies for the production of drugs for medical and scientific purposes and introduced
guarantees for the treatment and rehabilitation of addicts.17
The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances was passed in 1971, following concern
about the harmful effects of hallucinogens such as LSD and mescaline, stimulants such as
                                                          
14On this issue see: World Health Organization, op.cit., pp. 25 and 41. Also see: United Nations Drug
Control Programme, World Drug Report, Oxford University Press, 1997, p.168.
15The Hague Opium Convention (1912), the Second International Opium Convention (1925), the
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs (1931), the
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (1936), the 1946 Protocol (under
which the  United Nations was given the power to carry on the League of Nations functions under the
various narcotic treaties), the 1948 Paris Protocol (which granted the WHO the authority to control all
addictive drugs), the 1953 Opium protocol ( which restricted the use of opium to scientific and medical
needs), the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, the 1972 Protocol to the 1961 Convention, the
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the United Nations Convention against illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). In the case of the 1925, 1931 and 1936 conventions,
the League of Nations was the framework for the signature of the conventions and the establishment of
organs for the monitoring of their implementation. The 1961 (and Protocol), the 1971 and the 1988
conventions were discussed and signed within the UN framework and also established UN bodies in order
to monitor their implementation.  The United Nations drug control system will be discussed in Chapter
VIII of this dissertation.
16See: Bettati, Mario, La lutte de l’ONU contre la drogue, in Bettati, Mario, L’ONU et la drogue, Paris,
Association Française pour les Nations Unies/ Editions A. Pedone, 1995, p.14  The only previous
convention that was not incorporated into the 1961 Single Convention was the 1936 Convention for the
Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs. This convention signed in Geneva on June 26, 1936
attempted to tighten the loopholes used by offenders to escape prosecution by facilitating the extradition
of offenders. This convention however was never fully implemented. On this issue see:Rolley, Robin,
United Nations' Activities in International Drug Control, in MacDonald, Scott and Zagaris, Bruce (eds.),
International Handbook on Drug Control, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1992, p.416
17The 1961 Convention has been amended by the 1972 Protocol to the Convention that “calls for
increased efforts to prevent illicit drug production of, traffic in, and use of narcotics. It also highlights the
need to provide treatment and rehabilitation services to drug abusers, stressing that treatment, education,
after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration may be considered instead of, or in addition to
imprisonment in cases involving individuals who have committed a drug offence” see: UNDCP, World
Drug Report, p. 168
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amphetamines, and sedative-hypnotic drugs such as barbiturates.  In view of the wide variety of
substances and the risks arising from the abuse of these substances and their addictive
properties, the necessary control measures were categorized in four separate “Schedules.”
These schedules were annexed to the Convention; parties to the Convention are obliged to abide
by their restrictions. The World Health Organization (WHO) was designated as the agency
responsible for deciding, on a medical basis, if a new substance should be included in the four
schedules of illicit drugs. The criteria are:
“(a) That the substance has the capacity to produce
  (1) A state of dependence, and
   (2) Central nervous system stimulation or depression, resulting in hallucinations or 
disturbances in motor function or thinking or behavior or perception or mood;
(b) That there is sufficient evidence that the substance is being or is likely to be abused so as to 
constitute a public health and social problem warranting the placing of the substance under 
international control...”18
If the issue of illicit drug abuse and illicit traffic is not new, what certainly is new, as put
forth in the next section of this chapter, is the incorporation of the illicit drug trade in the mid-
80s in the international security agenda and as a national security problem.  It is true that the
increasing consumption of illicit drugs represents a global problem, but consumption must be
distinguished from the production, transportation, and distribution of these drugs and the
generation of profits from these activities. The 1961 and 1971 conventions deal with the control
of the licit drug trade and their goal is to prevent the diversion of controlled substances into
illegal markets.19 As the production, transportation, and distribution of illicit drugs became a
serious global problem during the 80s, a set of instruments was developed in the UN framework
in order to control the expansion of this activity.
“ By the early 1970s, then the work begun with the Shanghai conference and the 1912 
convention was largely brought to its culmination. The resulting system of estimates, 
statistics, authorizations, and controls has made diversion from licit international shipments 
extremely difficult. Legitimate trade has been rather effectively safeguarded, and 
trafficking for the purposes of drug abuse has been forces into patently illicit channels.  The 
drug problem has nonetheless continued to intensify. An international drug control regime 
based primarily on controlling the production of and regulations of legal trade in dangerous 
drugs has proved valuable in safeguarding medical and scientific uses. It has increased the costs 
and difficulties of illegal trafficking. It also provides a firm basis for further forms of 
                                                          
18United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971, Vienna, 1993, p.9
19 Both the 1961 and 1971 conventions consider as licit the production of cocaine in limited amounts for
medical uses. Their purpose is to assure the availability of these drugs for medical uses and to prevent
their leakage to the illicit market. For this purpose  the International Narcotics Control Board ( INCB)
was established by the 1961 Convention to monitor  the illicit cultivation, production, manufacture and
utilization of drugs for medical and scientific purposes. Governments are required to report annually on
licit and illicit production and the INCB will advise, assist or propose sanctions if countries default.
Sanctions consist of recommending that involved parties stop importing or exporting drugs, or both, from
or to the country or territory concerned, either for a designated territory, a designated period or until the
Board is satisfied as to the situation in that country or territory. On this issue see: United Nations, Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna, 1993, Article 14, paragraph 2, p.24 and UN Convention on Psychotropic
Substances 1971, Article 19, paragraph
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international cooperation. Alone, however, it is completely inadequate to the problem-in large
part because of its conceptual narrowness.”20
The issue of illicit drug traffic is briefly addressed in very general terms in articles 34
(Action against the illicit traffic), 36 (Penal Provisions), and 37 (Seizure and confiscation) of the
1961 Convention, and articles 21 (Action against the illicit traffic) and 22 (Penal Provisions) of
the 1971 Convention. In so doing, both conventions retain only the general principles stated in
the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, the first
international treaty to specifically address the issue of drug trafficking and the first to call for
the severe punishment of illicit drug traffickers.
The main goal of the 1936 convention was to establish equally severe penalties in all
countries, to determine measures for extradition of traffickers who escaped from one country to
another, and to promote the adoption by the parties of central offices for the supervision and
coordination of measures to suppress the illicit trade.21 However, for a variety of reasons, this
convention was never fully implemented—in fact, it would be possible to say that the
convention was “politically dead” since the convention came into force on October 26, 1939.
The outbreak of the Second World War interrupted the normal process of ratification and the
application of articles concerning international cooperation. Of the forty-two governments that
participated in the conference for “the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs”,
only twenty-six signed the convention and only twenty-two states ratified this document.22 As
stated by an analyst,
“vingt-deux Etats seulement ont ratifié le texte à la veille de la seconde guerre mondiale et la vingt-et-
unième ratification, celle de l’Espagne a été acquise le 5 juin 1970, la vignt-deuxième, celle du Chili,
le 21 novembre 1972, soit avec trente-quatre ans de retard. Les Etats-Unis, l’U.R.S.S. et la Grande
Bretagne ne l’ont pas ratifé. De fait la convention de 1936 s’est révélée inacceptable pour un grand
nombre d’Etats et seuls ses principes généraux ont été retenus dans la convention unique de 1961.La
première contient 25 articles consacrés au traffic illicite, la seconde n’en contient que trois.”23
 The development of a universally accepted legal framework that specifically addresses
the issue of illicit drug trafficking would have to wait fifty-two more years and the issue would
be raised in fact by the upsurge of the cocaine industry in South America. Beginning in the mid
1980s, both the major drug consumer (U.S.) and the major cocaine producers  (the South
                                                          
20Donelly, Jack, The United Nations and the Global Drug Control Regime, in Drug Policy in the
Americas, Smith, Peter, H., Boulder, Westview Press, 1992, p.287
21Renborg, Bertil, International Drug Control. A study of International Administration By and Through
the League of Nations, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1947, p.26.
22 See: Stares, Paul, Global Habit. The Drug Problem in a Borderless World, Washington D.C.,
Brookings Institution, 1996,p.20
23Bettati, Mario,  “Le contrôle international des stupéfiants,” p.23, The U.S. government for example
refused to ratify the Convention on the grounds that it did not go far enough and contained too many
loopholes. See: Stares, Paul, Global Habit, p.20
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American states, especially the Andean States of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia), have considered
this criminal activity as a national security problem.
In 1986, through a secret directive, President Reagan declared illicit drug traffic a
national security issue and authorized the utilization of the armed forces in interdiction and
eradication, and also the disruption or organized criminal activities.24 As reported by an
analyst,
“ The Third World also threatens American interest in ways that are not usually thought of in 
terms of security. As evidence by a secret presidential directive in 1986, the massive drug 
trafficking to the United States (most of which originates in the Third World) has become a 
national security threat. ”25
The stance was maintained under the Bush administration, which increased military
involvement in drug interdiction activities, and, like its predecessor, supported and encouraged
the involvement of South American Armed Forces in this type of activity. This view is evident
in the following strategy statements put forth during the Bush administration:
 “ While most international threats are potential, the damage and violence caused by the drug 
trade are actual and pervasive. Drugs are a major threat to our national security.”26
" Traffic in illicit drugs imposes exceptional costs on the economy of the United States, 
undermines our national values and institutions, and is directly responsible for the destruction 
and loss of many American lives. The international traffic in illicit drugs constitutes a major 
threat to our national security and to the security of other nations."27
President William Clinton’s administration did not change this position. Though the bulk
of the effort and budget was directed toward the control of domestic consumption, during that
administration, the American government supported interdiction, militarization and eradication
as the main component of supply control in South America. 28
                                                          
24  As stated by two analysts, “ [t]he rhetoric of the war on drugs was formalized in April 1986, when
President Reagan issued National Security Decision directive 221 stating  that drug trafficking constituted
a lethal threat to U.S. security interests and authorizing an expanded role for the U.S. military in the
antinarcotics fight.”  See: Bagley, Bruce M. and  Tokatlián, Juan G., “Dope and Dogma: Explaining the
failure of U.S.-Latin American drug policies,” in Hartlyn, Jonathan, Shoultz, Lars and Varas, Augusto,
The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War, Chapel Hill, The University of
North Carolina Press, 1992, p.225
25Steven R. David, Why third world matters, International Security, Vol. 17, Nº 3 (Winter 1992/93).p167
26National Security Drug Control Strategy, The White House, January 1990,p60
27Bush, George, National security strategy of the United States, 1990-1991, Brassey’s, Washington,
1990, p.23
28“...Despite encouraging (though lukewarm) signs of change in this area, President Clinton’s
administration reinforced the policy of employing a coercive anti-drug strategy abroad even as he opened
a second front at home at the same time in an effort to resolve, albeit incipiently, the enormous problems
generated by the high demand for drugs through education and rehabilitation rather than relying on
enforcement alone. Nevertheless, the principles and foundations of Washington’s domestic and
international drug strategy have not been rectified. Neither has an alternate debate been initiated
nationally that might indicate an eventual arrangement of gravitating social and political forces in the
United States which could give rise to a strategy different from the one in place...”Tokatlián, Juan
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Before continuing with the analysis it should be made clear that the author partially
agrees with the position of Joseph Romm (who analyzes the non-military aspects of U.S.
national security) on the following point: if there is a threat for the United States related to illicit
drugs, this threat does not necessarily stem from the traffic of these drugs but from their
consumption.29 Whereas growth in U.S. consumption of South American cocaine (and crack
and, more recently, heroin) may pose a threat in the long-term to the integrity of the social
fabric of that nation, it is the South American states that bear the brunt of the political,
economic, social, environmental and military consequences of drug traffic. This is due to two
factors.  An obvious one is that drug production in all its stages is localized in South America.
The second factor (and this will be fully explained in the rest of this chapter) is that the weak
nature of the South American states makes them particularly susceptible to the adverse
consequences of the illicit drug industry.
It is drug consumption, which is generated by internal societal causes in the U.S., and not
drug trafficking that poses a direct threat to the U.S. social fabric. Drug trafficking is, of course,
part of the problem, but is not the cause of consumption in the U.S. As stated by Romm,
“Domestic drug consumption is a societal ill that is not usefully defined as a national security 
problem [and here is where we disagree]. International drug trafficking, insofar as it supports 
terrorism and threatens the stability of nations that Washington considers to be of strategic 
importance, does fall within the realm of traditional security problems, although is not one of 
the first rank such as nuclear proliferation or the stability in the Persian Gulf. Such a distinction 
is particularly justifiable since it appears that efforts to destroy or interdict drug supplies will 
not significantly affect drug use in this country (either because the efforts fail directly or 
because alternative supplies replace those that are squelched). Drug trafficking should not be 
seen as the cause of domestic drug consumption and its concomitant problems and, therefore, it 
should not be viewed as a significant threat to the nation’s [the United States] security.”30
                                                                                                                                                                         
Gabriel, “The Miami Summit and Drugs,” Journal of  Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 36,
Nº 3, Fall 1994,p.83.
29Romm, op.cit., p.14
30Romm, op.cit, p.14. One main departure from Romm’s view is that, in this dissertation, expanded drug
abuse of harmful drugs can be considered as a national security problem because it threatens the integrity
and quality of the human resources of a nation. One has only to walk around in some European, U.S. or
even Latin American cities to see the effects that the use of drugs such as cocaine (or its smokable
versions, crack and bazuco) and heroin can have on the person.  To put it coldly, cocaine (and crack and
bazuco) and heroin dependent people can become “out of circulation” in terms of their productive and
creative potential. Not to mention the fact that in the case of  pregnant women the baby can develop a
dependency on the drug before birth and the fact that the intravenous use of cocaine and heroine (when
needles are shared) contribute to the expansion of  AIDS and other infectious diseases. At the time Romm
published his book (1993) it was estimated that there were 30 million users of  illicit drugs in the U.S.
spending an estimated $28 billion per year on cocaine, $10 million to $12 billion on heroin and $68
billion on marijuana. On this estimate see: Romm, op.cit. p. 9
The same year it was estimated that there were 2,738,000 dependent users (weekly users) of cocaine and
heroin in that country. Between 1988 and 1994 drug-related mortality (illicit drugs with or without
alcohol) ranged from 6,000-8,500 cases annually in the metropolitan areas included in the survey. The
highest number of drug-related deaths were recorded in New York and in Los Angeles. The most
important single substance was cocaine, mentioned in 49% of all cases in 1994 and the biggest drug
group was opiates, which were mentioned in 68% of the cases (one case may involve several drugs). The
drug-specific trends in mortality were rising in 1991-1994, especially for amphetamines, cocaine and
opiates. 10.4 percent of drug related death cases were less than 25 years old. See:  UNDCP, World Drug
Report, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 312-332
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Two years before Reagan’s secret directive, some South American countries declared
drug trafficking a national security concern as these states were beginning to suffer an
increasing political instability derived from cocaine trafficking. The governments of drug
producer countries and their neighbors stated their concern in the Quito (1984) and New York
(1984) declarations against illicit drug traffic. In both documents this illicit activity is defined as
a threat to the state and as a crime against humanity. 31
 “ Whereas there is ample evidence that the traffic in narcotic drugs is closely linked to plans and 
activities aimed at subverting the legal order and social peace in our countries, for the 
furtherance of ignoble mercenary aims [...] Whereas it has been clearly demonstrated that the 
traffic in drugs is using means of corrupting the political and administrative structures of 
producer and consumer countries...”32
“[s]ince it [drug trafficking] seriously affects people’s lives, health and welfare, has negative
impact on the economic and social system and poses a danger to the stability of democratic
processes in Latin America…”33
These declarations are significant because they were formulated without the direct
influence of the United States.34 An international conference in the UN framework was also
asked to deal with this problem.
“ The special conference should consider declaring drug trafficking to be a crime against 
humanity, since it seriously affects people’s lives, health and welfare, has a negative impact on 
the economic and social system and poses a danger to the stability of democratic processes in 
Latin America. ”35
The conference was held in Vienna in 1987. At that international meeting, illicit drug
traffic was defined as threat to the stability, security, and sovereignty of the states.
                                                          
31 The Quito Declaration Against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs was signed on August 1984  by the presidents
of Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama a member of the Governing Junta of National
Reconstruction of Nicaragua and a representative of the Government of Peru.  See: A/39/407, United
Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Economic and Social Council International Campaign Against
Traffic in Drugs, Letter dated 14 August 1984 from the  Representatives of  Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,, 17
August 1984. The  New York  Declaration against Drug Trafficking and the Illicit Use of Drugs was
signed on October 1, 1984, by the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, the ministers
for Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs and Worship of Argentina. See: A/39/407, United Nations, General Assembly,
International Campaign Against Traffic in Drugs, Letter dated 2 October 1984 from the Permanent
Representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary General, October 10, 1984.
32United Nations, General Assembly,  document A/39/407, p. 3
33 United Nations, General Assembly, document, A/39/551, p. 2
34 It is worth noticing that “bearing in mind” the Quito and New York declaration the General Assembly
of the United Nations requested ECOSOC through its Commission on Narcotics drugs to initiate, as a
matter of priority, the preparation of a draft convention against illicit drug traffic in narcotic drugs. This
was in a sense the beginning of a process that would end up in 1988 with  the elaboration of the UN
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. On this issue see:
United Nations, General Assembly, resolution 39/141, International campaign against traffic in narcotic
drugs, December 14, 1984 and United Nations, Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, United Nations, New York, 1998 , p.3
35United Nations, General Assembly, document A/39/551, p. 2
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“Aware of its effects on State’s economic, social, political and cultural structures, and its threat to
their sovereignty and security...” 36
The principal product of this conference was the elaboration of a Comprehensive
Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control (CMO), which had a
chapter (Chapter III) on policy recommendations for the suppression of drug trafficking. After
that conference, the road was paved for the elaboration and signing of a convention on illicit
drug traffic. In 1988 the United Nations convened a Conference of Plenipotentiaries which led
to the adoption by 106 states of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.37 As a matter of fact, the 1988 Convention attempts to
give force to the recommendations of the CMO, which were formulated with the working draft
of the Convention in mind.38 The 1988 Convention also refers to drug trafficking as a national
security problem. As stated in its third paragraph, the parties to the Convention recognize,
“[t]he links between illicit traffic and other related organized criminal activities which undermine
the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of states ...”39
The 1988 Convention is based on the 1961 and 1971 documents mentioned above, and
“illicit traffic” is defined in the following terms:
“The production , manufacture ,extraction , preparation. offering, offering for sale, distribution,
sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport
importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance contrary to the
provisions of the 1961[...]or the 1971 Convention [...] the cultivation of opium poppy, coca
bush or cannabis plant for the purpose of the production of narcotic drugs contrary to  the
provisions of the 1961 and the 1961 as amended [...]The possession or purchase of any narcotic
drug or psychotropic substance for the purpose of any of the activities enumerated above[...]
The manufacture, transport or distribution of equipment, materials or substances [chemical
essentials and precursors] knowing that they are to be used in or for the illicit cultivation,
production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances; the organization,
management or financing of any of the activities enumerated above. ”40
The conversion or transfer of property with knowledge that it is derived from any of the
offenses mentioned in the preceding paragraph as well as public incitement to these activities,
and aiding and abetting the commission of them are considered part of illicit drug trafficking.
                                                          
36United Nations, Division of Narcotic Drugs, Declaration of the International Conference on Drug
Abuse and Illicit Trafficking and Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline for Future Activities in Drug
Abuse Control, United Nations, New York, 1988, p.1
37The Convention came into force on November 11, 1990.  137 states where party to the Convention in
1997. Among the signatories are Italy, the UK, USA, Sweden, Japan, Germany, the European
Commission, France, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, Spain, Austria, Netherlands and
Belgium. These countries alone provided  96% of the total voluntary funding of the United Nations
International Drug Control programme in 1995. See: UNDCP, Drug World Report, p. 169.
38Donnelly, op.cit.p.291
39 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, document E/CONF.82/15, United Nations Conference
for the Adoption of  a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
December 19, paragraph 3.
40E/CONF.82/15, Article 3, pp. 5 and 7. See also Article 1 subparagraph (m), p.4
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Through the 1990s in almost every UN document referring to the issue of drug
trafficking, this activity is referred to as a security problem.  Such is the case of the February
1990 Special Session of the General Assembly, whose main product was a Political Declaration
and a Global Plan of Action.41  This global plan of action was stated in order to coordinate both
the reduction of demand in the consumer states and the decrease of illicit drug production.42
“ The session dealt with tightening legal and practical cooperation among member states. The 
urgency highlighted by Colombia’s mortal struggle with its drug barons…”43
 “In the spectrum of international action plans, The Global Programme of Action represents the 
most comprehensive statement of the action that needs to be taken by individual countries and 
collectively through the system of international organizations. It provides a framework and 
guidelines to the international community.”44
A new United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the drug
problem was celebrated in New York from 8 to 10 June 1998, for the 10th anniversary of the
1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances.45 This conference resulted in a Political Declaration and a Resolution to reassess,
update, strengthen and follow-up the commitments and strategies adopted in 1990 and set
guidelines for the multilateral efforts in the next century. As its predecessor, this political
declaration also defines the “drug problem” as
“[a] grave threat to the health and well-being of all mankind, the independence of States,
democracy, the stability of nations, the structure of all societies, and the dignity and hope of
millions of people and their families.”46
                                                          
41 In its second paragraph the Declaration states that the States Members of the United Nations are
“Deeply alarmed  by the magnitude of the rising trend in the illicit demand, production, supply,
trafficking and distribution  of  narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which are a grave and
persistent threat to the health and well-being of mankind, the stability  of  nations, the political, economic,
social and cultural structures of all societies and the lives and dignity of  millions of human beings...” See:
United Nations, General Assembly, resolution  S-17/2, Political Declaration and Global Program of
Action by the General Assembly at its seventeenth special session, devoted to the question of
international co-operation against illicit production, supply, demand, trafficking and distribution of
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, February 23, 1990.
42 Also in April 1990 a World Ministerial Summit (in association with the United Nations) was celebrated
in 1990 in London to deal with the specific issue of cocaine trafficking and consumption. This shows the
global relevance of the illicit traffic of a drug which production is based in South America. See:
Declaration of the World Ministerial Summit to Reduce the Demand for Drugs and to Combat the
Cocaine Threat, held in London from 9 to 11 April 1990, in UN  General Assembly document  A/45/262,
International Action to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, May 2, 1990,p.2-10
43Lamond, Tullis, Handbook of  Research on the Illicit Drug Trade,p.99
44UNDCP, Drug World Report, p.175
45 See: United Nations General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/S-20/4, Measures to enhance international
cooperation to counter the world drug problem, [on-line].Available on the internet at
http://WWW.UNDCP.ORG/resolution_1998_09_08_3.html and Political Declaration [on-line]. Available
on the internet at http://www.un.org/ga/20special/poldecla.htm. The organization of this conference had
been suggested by the government of Mexico two years before.
46 Political Declaration [on-line]. Available  internet http://www.un.org/ga/20special/poldecla.htm
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At the same time, in resolution S-20/4 the General Assembly recommended a series of
international strategies that comprise an “Action plan against illicit manufacture, trafficking and
abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants and their precursors,” “Measures to promote judicial
cooperation” “Countering money laundering,” and an “Action plan on international cooperation
on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development.” The principle of shared
responsibility on drugs was clearly reflected in the agenda of the UNGASS. The suggested
strategies emphasized a balanced approach between supply and demand and the responsibility
of the developed world to reduce drug use, control supplies of chemical inputs, and tackle
money laundering. The organization and results of the 1998 UNGASS far exceeds the historical
period covered by this dissertation and therefore they will not be analyzed here. However a
critical review of some of the suggested strategies and approaches will be discussed in the last
two chapters of this work, which  deal with multilateral drug trafficking control policies.
The UN conventions have been defined earlier in this chapter as part of an international
drug control regime. Although this is not a dissertation on regional or global drug control
regimes, for the sake of clarity in the use of terms, it is necessary to briefly define the use of the
term “regime” within the context of this dissertation. As stated by Jack Donnelly, who wrote on
the issue of the United Nations global drug control regime,
“An international regime exists when states and other relevant international actors, in order to 
avoid the costs of uncoordinated national action, agree (more or less explicitly) on normative 
or procedural constraints on their sovereign freedom of action in an issue area -and (at least in 
part) conform to these norms or procedures. Regime norms may range from binding 
international standards that are generally accepted to international guidelines that are 
commended in word but rarely heeded in deed.” 47
The strength of a regime depends, according to Donnelly, on the extent of its decision-
making powers, that is, the range of activities available to relevant international institutions. In
this sense regimes may range from full international decision-making bodies with the power to
enforce rules, to procedures that amount to little more than international verbal encouragement
of sovereign national action.48  Donnelly then elaborated five types of regimes according to
their strength (in ascending order where promotion is the weaker and enforcement is the
stronger):
“ * Promotion: encouraging national implementation of international norms by such mechanisms 
as public information activities and the adoption of hortatory resolutions.
* Assistance: providing support for national implementation of international norms, typically 
through financial or technical assistance.
                                                          
47Donnelly, op.cit., p. 282 Donnelly´s definition is based on Stephen Krasner widespread concept of
international regimes as “principles norms , rules and decision-making procedures around which actor
expectations converge in a given issue-area”. Krasner, Stephen, Structural causes and regime
consequences: regimes as intervening variables, in Krasner, Stephen (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca,
Cornell University Press,p.1
48Donnelly, op.cit. pp. 262 and 263
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* Implementation: playing a direct international role in putting regime norms into practice-for 
example, through systems of international information exchange, policy consultation or 
coordination, or (unenforceable) international monitoring of national compliance with regime 
norms into practice -for example, through systems of international information exchange, 
policy consultation or coordination, or (unenforceable)  international monitoring of national 
compliance with regime norms or recommended policies.
* Enforcement: binding an enforceable international implementation of regime norms in which 
the principal role of states is to give national force to supranational decisions.”
For completeness I should add a fifth type, declaratory regimes, which involve international 
norms but have no international decision making powers [actually from a weak to strong order 
this one should figure at the top of the list].”49
Strictly speaking, whereas the 1961 and 1971 conventions can be considered a strong
“implementation regime” for the regulation of only the licit trade of dangerous drugs, the 1988
Convention could be considered to be a weak  “declaratory regime” for the control of illicit drug
trafficking.
In fact as stated in its article 4, the central principle of the 1961 Single Convention (and
of the 1971 Convention, which is explicitly intended to be implemented in conjunction with the
1961 Convention) is the obligation “to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the
production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use, and possession of drugs.”
As is very well described by an analyst this regime is,
“[s]upervised by the International Narcotics Control Board [INCB, created by the 1961 
Convention]. Each party is required to submit estimates of legitimate (medical and scientific) 
needs for narcotics in a standardized form. In addition, parties must provide standardized 
statistical returns on actual annual production or manufacture, consumption, imports, exports, 
seizures and stocks. Each party is then limited to the estimated amount in its manufacture and 
net import of drugs. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is given extensive 
supervisory powers over this system of binding estimates and statistical returns. The board may 
make estimates for parties or non-parties that fail to report. It may even challenge estimates 
provided by governments. If the INCB is not satisfied with the performance of any government-
whether or not it is party to the convention- it may initiate consultations, call upon that 
government to adopt remedial measures, bring the problem to the attention of the international 
community, or even recommend that parties stop trading in drugs with the country in question. 
Furthermore, if statistical returns reveal that estimated needs have been exceeded, the board 
may require parties to the convention to halt further exports to that country.”50
“Il [the INCB] peut demander des explications à un gouvernement. Il gère les mouvements licites 
de drogues en limitant les cultures, la production, la fabrication et l’usage des drogues aux 
besoins médicaux. Il peut demander des explications à un gouvernment en cas de violation de la 
convention et recommander aux États de cesser toute transaction commerciale de drogue avec 
les pays défaillants. Il ne l’a jamais fait, mais comme dans d’autres domaines, la seule menace 
d’une telle recommandation consiste un bon moyen de pression. Il peut également proposer une 
assistance technique et financière aux pays en difficulté dans l’application des conventions”51
On the other hand the 1988 Convention is only a “declaratory” regime in the sense that it
involves international norms (the Convention itself) but does not establish decision-making
powers. Although (as it will be shown later) the United States apparently would like to play this
                                                          
49ibid. p. 263
50ibid., p. 286
51Bettati, Mario, L’ONU et la drogue, p.17
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role de facto in the Western Hemisphere, there is not an equivalent of the INCB that can
monitor the implementation of the 1988 Convention. States that ratified the 1988  Convention
are bound to adopt it as part of their national legislation, however the convention does not
establish an international or a supranational body capable of monitoring or enforcing its terms.
As noted by Mario Bettati, the 1988 Convention was built upon strict reading of the principle of
respecting the territorial integrity of the states and the principle of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of the states.
“La convention de 1988 a pour objet de doter la communauté internatioanle de moyens 
répressifs efficaces. Mais il lui fallait aussi respecter l’integrité territoriale des États et le 
principe de non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de ces derniers. C’est donc sur le respect
de ces principes que la convention organise la répression, aussi bien dans la phase de 
déclenchement des poursuites que dans celle de la sanction”52
The declaratory character of the UN illicit drug traffic control regime has been very
accurately described by an analyst who said that,
“the norms of the regime are coherent, well developed, and widely commended by state and non-
state actors alike. However, implementation of the norm that trafficking must be controlled has
remained the responsibility of national and not international actors. In as much as governments
are beginning co-operate in the exchange of information on trafficking, the declaratory regime
may be evolving into a promotional regime.”53
If we stick to the definitions given above, the Political Declaration and Global
Programme of Action of 1990 and the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) (which
will be fully discussed in chapter VIII), could be defined as part of an assistance and
promotional regime since they “ encourage[s] the implementation of international norms by
mechanisms such as public information activities,” and (especially in the case of UNDCP)
provide technical and financial support for the implementation of international norms
(particularly the implementation of the 1988 Convention). 54 If we examine the 1988
Convention, the Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action, and UNDCP together,
we come to the conclusion that from 1991 on (when UNDCP was created), the United Nations
illicit drug traffic global control regime has evolved into an assistance regime.
Let us return to the issue of defining drug trafficking and illicit drugs. Only the effects of
illicit trafficking of cocaine will be considered in this dissertation because of the threat that it
generated for the security of the South American states, mainly through the development of
transnational criminal organizations. To a lesser extent this work also discusses the rise in
heroin trafficking because of the slow diversification of the Colombian traffickers in the
production of this drug  in the last six years, due to a saturation of the North American cocaine
                                                          
52op.cit. p.21
53Bentham, Mandy, The Politics of Drug Control, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p.177
54 UNDCP is an executive UN programme, which coordinates all drug control activities of  the
organization and also manages the implementation of  UN technical assistance in both the demand and
the supply sides. UNDCP is a result of the 1990 Program of Action which required the creation of a more
centralized and effective drug control system.
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market and an increase in the demand of heroin in the U.S.55 As explained by academic and
law enforcement analysts,
“Moreover, in recognition of the fact that the U.S. cocaine market is approaching its saturation 
point, Colombian traffickers developed an alternative source of income heroin production.” 56
“Over the past several decades the appeal of heroin was largely held in check. Two factors
stigmatized heroin and limited its popularity. First, due to the low purity of heroin available at
the retail level, the only effective method of administration was through injection, a method that
most drugs users found unpalatable. Secondly, an increased awareness of the AIDS virus
developed in the 1980s, many drug users chose to abuse cocaine, crack, and most recently,
metamphetamine rather than risk contracting the virus through shared heroin needles. Heroin
was also pushed from the spotlight of public concern by the emergence of cocaine in the late
1970s and crack cocaine in the mid-1980s.  [...] Current estimates of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) place the hardcore heroin user population in the 600,000-800,000
range. The total heroin user population (including those who use heroin for “recreational”
purposes) is now estimated at 2 million. Last year alone, there were 141,000 new heroin users,
most of who were under the age of twenty-six. [...] Today, the rapid increase in heroin’s
popularity is being generated in part, by the purity of the supply. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, the average purity of heroin at the retail level averaged between 2% and 7%. According
to the Domestic Monitor Program, the average purity for retail heroin in 1997 was 38.4% , over
5 times higher than it was just a decade ago. In fact, it is not unusual to find 80% pure heroin in
some East Coast cities. At this purity level, heroin can be administered effectively through
several methods, including smoking -called ‘Chasing the Dragon’- and snorting heroin like
cocaine. These methods of ingestion are preferred by first time and causal users who find
injecting heroin unglamorous and who want to avoid sharing dirty needles. However, as drug
users gain tolerance, addicted snorters and smokers are forced to turn to injection which quickly
leads to hard core addiction [....] In 1996, the annual number of heroin-related emergency room
mentions increased from 34,000 in 1990 to 70, 500. The Cornell University Hospital reports the
number of middle class people requesting treatment for heroin addiction has increased tenfold
since 1994.”57
In South America, however, production of  opium poppy (the raw material) and heroin is
localized in Colombia, and has not resulted in the rise of a vertically integrated transnational
industry as has happened in the case of cocaine trafficking.58
“Today, the U.S. is seeing increased heroin availability from South America and Mexico.
According to the 1995 results of DEA’s Heroin Signature Program (HSP). South America was, for the
first time, the predominant source area for heroin seized in the United States. It accounted for 62% of the
total heroin analyzed. Recently released results for 1996 show that heroin produced in Colombia represent
52% of the heroin seized and analyzed in the United States, a significant increase over the market share
previously controlled by Colombian traffickers. In the 1980s, while Colombian drug syndicates focused
                                                          
55See: Uribe Ramírez, Sergio, Los cultivos ilícitos en Colombia , in Thoumi, Francisco, Uribe, Sergio,
Rocha, Ricardo, Reyes Alejandro, Garzón, Edgar, López, Andrés, Tokatlián, Juan and Hernández
Manuel, Drogas Ilícitas en Colombia. Su impacto económico y social, Bogotá, Ariel Ciencia Política,
UNDP and Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes, 1997, p. 103
56Clawson, Patrick and Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry, New York, St. Martin´s Press, p.12
57Drug Enforcement Administration, The Flow of Heroin into the United States, DEA Congressional
Testimony, Statement by Donnie Marshall, Before the House of Representatives (Committee of
International Relations), June 24, 1998 [on-line]. Available internet http:// www.
usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ctlist.htm
58Although reportedly the Colombian traffickers are encouraging Ecuadorian, Peruvian and Venezuelan
peasants to grow opium poppy  there is no evidence of a vertical integration between for example
Peruvian and Colombian traffickers for the production of  heroin. On this particular issue see: Koutozis,
Michel (coordinator),Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 1997, pp. 6 and 82.
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on cocaine trafficking, Southeast Asia heroin dominated the American market. To compensate for their
late entry into the heroin trade and to establish themselves in the marketplace, Colombian traffickers
provided high quality heroin (80-99% pure) to a fiercely competitive U.S. market. To entice customers
further, they offered their product at cut-rate prices.[....] At this time, virtually all the heroin emanating
from South America is grown and manufactured in Colombia. Opium poppies are grown in the higher
altitudes of the central Andean mountain ranges [...] Since 1994, the Colombian National Police has
dismantled 38 heroin laboratories. The CNP has also seized 26 kilograms of heroin/morphine base and
120 kilograms of opium gum from heroin laboratories last year. U.S. estimates placed Colombia’s heroin
production at approximately 6 metric tons in 1997”59
Opium poppy is mainly grown at high altitudes (between 600 and 3,000 meters) in the
departments of  Tolima, Huila and Cauca.60 Some opium cultivation has been detected in the
Perijá Highlands in the border with Venezuela.61 The whole process of production, from the
extraction of the opium gum from the poppy to the refinement and transport of heroine, is
controlled by criminal groups that belong to the Cali cartel, a criminal coalition based in the
Cauca river valley, close to the areas of poppy production. The main heroin trafficking
organization is believed to be the North of Valley Cartel, which has become more independent
and powerful after the arrest of the main leaders of the Cali coalition in 1995.62 As explained
by two analysts,
“At least four Cali organizations currently refine or distribute heroin. The traffickers finance 
the cultivation of the opium poppy , disseminate the technology for producing morphine base 
to the farm level, refine the base into heroin, and distribute the drug though their cocaine 
sales networks in the United States.”63
 In any case, the production of cocaine remains the main activity of the so-called
Colombian cartels as well as the Bolivian, Peruvian, and Brazilian traffickers who have
developed consolidated markets in the U.S. and Europe.64 The reason this dissertation only
focus on these two drugs is that, as noted by an analyst,
“ [c]ocaine and heroin [...] are more harmful than marijuana and more widely used than designer
drugs. Drug trafficking is a transnational phenomenon. While TDC  [transnational drug cartels]
are nationally based (as with the Medellín ‘Cartel’ in Colombia),their operations involve
transactions that regularly flow across national boundaries. These include the production,
processing, transportation and distribution of drugs, and the laundering of the profits derived
from this activity ”65                                                                                                                                                             
                                                          
59DEA, The Flow of Heroin into the United States,  http:// www. usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ctlist.htm
60Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.17 and  Betancourt, Darío and García, Martha,
Contrabandistas, Marimberos y Mafiosos. Historia social de la mafia colombiana (1965-1992), Bogotá,
Tercer Mundo Editores, 1994, p.246
61Uribe Ramírez, op.cit., p.108
62See: Betancourt and García, p.244
63Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.12
64For a detailed analysis of  the illicit trafficking of all drugs not only in South America but in Latin
America see: Dreyfus, Pablo, “El lado oscuro de la globalización: pasado, presente y futuro del tráfico de
drogas en América Latina,” SER 2000, (Buenos Aires), Nº 11, May 1999, pp. 30-41.
65Dziedic, The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security, Survival, November/December 1989, p
533
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The production of marijuana is also common across South America, but it has not
resulted in the same type of criminal organization accompanied by the same corrupting and
destabilizing power as the coca/cocaine complex. Moreover, it does not play the same role in
shaping the pattern of inter-American relations in terms of the involvement of the United States
as an extra-regional actor. As another analyst notes,
“ Marijuana traffickers are the least globally organized (even though marijuana is more widely 
used) which coincidentally, is associated with marijuana’s world-wide production geography 
(‘anybody can grow it’) and with what looks to be marijuana traffickers relatively reduced power
against and threat to societies that have criminalized their  work.”66
Before analyzing the effects of illicit drug trafficking on the security of the South
American region, the main features of both cocaine and heroin should be defined and described.
As the coca-cocaine complex is the illegal activity with the most important dimensions in terms
of the security of the countries in the region, illicit drug traffic, drug trafficking, and the cocaine
industry will be used as synonymous terms here. Heroin trafficking will be considered a
“commercial” diversification of cocaine trafficking organizations that respond, as stated before,
to a recent rise in the demand for this drug in the United States.
b)  Coca and Cocaine (and Crack and Bazuco):
“...I will read a paragraph from a true representative of the national folklore, ‘Cuchi’ 
Leguizamón, this paragraph is extracted from a interview made by a Buenos Aires journal: 
‘We have to clarify that coca chewing is a wise [Northwestern] Argentine tradition and we 
have to differentiate it from cocaine consumption. Whereas coca leaf is part of the cultural 
and scientific patrimony of our America, cocaine is a flaw that hurts humankind and therefore 
must be combated with maximum rigor. [...] How can you compare [coca with cocaine] ? It 
makes me laugh.  It is like calling ‘drunk’ someone that eats grapes.’ ”67
Cocaine, or cocaine hydrochloride (CHCL), is a psychoactive alkaloid processed from the
leaves of the coca shrub. Coca leaves have been chewed by the Andean population for centuries
to help combat hunger and to overcome fatigue and exhaustion caused by the high altitude, as
well as for traditional and religious practices. The use of coca is deeply embedded in the culture
of the Andean countries. 68 The practice is particularly widespread Bolivia and Peru where
Indian groups comprise a far larger percentage of the total population than in Colombia. There
is no evidence that coca chewing results in the development of tolerance, physiological
dependence, or any acute or chronic harmful effects. As pointed out by an analyst,
“The coca leaf has played an important role in the lives of South American Indians for thousands of years.
Its use as a masticatory persist today in many parts of the Andes, from northern Colombia, south to
Bolivia and Argentina, and in the western part of the Amazon Basin. Coca leaf is used as a mild stimulant
                                                          
66Tullis, Handbook on illicit drug traffic, Greenwod Press, London,1991,p.54
67 Statement by the Representative of  the Province of Jujuy, Mr. Fernando Enrique Paz, 65th meeting of
the Representatives Chamber of the Argentine Congress, “Repression and Fight against the illicit
narcotics traffic,” March 15, 1989,p. 7181
68 As a matter of fact, during my research work in La Paz, in every government or international office I
visited I was offered mate de coca (coca leaves tea) in order to counter the effect of  high altitude.
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and as sustenance for working under harsh environmental conditions by both  Indians and mestizos alike.
It also serves as a universal and effective household remedy for a wide range of medical complaints.
Traditionally, coca also plays a crucial symbolic and religious role in Andean society. The unifying and
stabilizing effects of coca chewing on Andean culture contrast markedly with the disruptive and
convoluted phenomenon of cocaine use in Western societies [....]The widespread intranasal use of cocaine
hydrochloride or smoking of cocaine base produce quite different psychological and pharmacological
experiences than the traditional chewing of coca leaves [....] There is no evidence that coca chewing
results in tolerance or physiological dependence, or any acute or chronic deleterious effects. […]Even
though cocaine is the principal and most powerful constituent of coca leaves, the complex effects of
chewing the leaves cannot be equated with the comparatively straightforward effects of cocaine. Whether
in the high Andean Altiplano (high plateau region) or in the Amazonian lowlands, the principal use of
coca is for work. Workers will take several breaks during the daily work  schedule to rest and chew coca,
not unlike the coffee break of Western society. Coca chewers maintain that coca gives them more vigor
and strength and assuages feelings of hunger, thirst, cold and fatigue. Coca is chewed by rural people in
all kinds of professions that require  physical work, especially by farmers, herders and miners in the
highlands and by farmers, fishermen and hunters in the lowlands. Coca is especially highly regarded for
making long journeys on foot whether in the high Andes or Amazonian forests.”69
Leaving the physiological effects of coca aside, it is necessary to understand that in
Andean societies, and particularly in Indian communities, this plant plays a cultural role similar
to the one played by coffee, tea, or wine in western societies.70 In Andean communities coca
plays a central role in marriages, funerals and baptisms.71 Coca is also a powerful symbol of
ethnic identity as stated by Alejandro Camino:
“This integration of the individual with his [her] family, his community, his [her] culture and 
his [her] and his [her] sacred [mystical] environment through the use of  coca turns this plant 
into a true symbol of ethnic identity. Using coca leaves is a synonym of participating in the 
Andean culture [...] its use according to the established [social] rules consecrates the Andean 
cultural character which differentiates the Indian from the non-Indian...”72
In Argentina, for example, where with the exception of the northwest region (especially
the provinces of  Jujuy and Salta) there is not a widespread Andean Indian population and
culture, coca use is a very strong symbol of local identity of that region vis-à-vis the rest of the
country, especially  Buenos Aires. Chewing coca is, then, symbolic of being a norteño
(northerner) as opposed to the Europeanized and cosmopolitan resident of the capital city.73
Coca is a perennial shrub with several subspecies. Two loosely related South American
species of coca (Erythroxylum coca and Erythoxylum novogranatense) and varieties of these
species are the primary sources of cocaine. Coca is cultivated in the Andean countries of South
                                                          
69Plowman, Timothy, Coca chewing and the botanical origins of coca (Eythroxylum spp.) in South
America,  in Pacini, Deborah and Fraquemont, Christine (eds.),Coca and Cocaine. Effects on People and
Policy in Latin America, Cultural Survival Report 23, Cornell University, 1985, pp. 4 and 5.
70Ambos, Kai, Control de Drogas. Política y Legislación en América Latina EE.UU. y Europa. Eficacia y
Alternativas, Bogotá, Comisión Andina de Juristas, Ediciones Jurídicas Gustavo Ibañez and Universidad
del Litoral (Argentina),1998, p.52
71Camino, Alejandro, Coca: del uso tradicional al narcotráfico, in García Sayán, Diego (ed.), Coca,
Cocaína y Narcotráfico. Laberinto en los Andes, Lima, Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1989, p.97
72Camino, op.cit., p.97. Original in Spanish. Italics as used in the original source.
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America, generally at an elevation below 2,000 meters. After planting, the bush grows 12 to 18
months before the first crop of leaves can be picked, and 3 to 4 years before full production is
reached, when the bush is 3 to 5 feet high.  The bush has a short flowering and fruiting period
(the plant can be harvested from three to six times per year) and produces for 10 to 25 years
depending on the level of care it receives. The potency of coca leaves with respect to cocaine
content also depends on the variety of the plant and on the growing site.74 Table 1 below
provides information about the main features of the species (and their varieties) of coca grown
in South America.
                                                                                                                                                                         
73 See: Rabey, Mario; Ozcoidi, Margarita; González, David and Sánchez Proaño, Mario, Legalidad e
ilegalidad del coqueo en Argentina, in Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, La Coca...Tradición, Rito,
Identidad, México, 1989, pp. 35-78
74Lee III, Rensselaer and Clawson, Patrick, Crop Substitution in the Andes, Washington D.C., Office of
National Drug Control Policy, December 1998, p. 17 and  : U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA),Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region , 1993, pp. 189 and 190
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Table 1. Species and varieties of coca75
Species Varieties Main features
Erythroxylum coca E.coca var. coca
(Bolivian or Huanuco coca)
* Source of most of the world’s cocaine.
*Believed to be the ancestral taxon of all
cultivated coca.
*Cultivated and found in the wild.
*Restricted already to narrow zone of moist
tropical forest located in the foothills of the
Oriental Peruvian and Bolivian Andes.
* Little known outside South America.
E.coca var. Ipadú
(Amazonian coca)
* Restricted to western Amazon, and
geographically isolated from other coca
varieties.
* Cultivated for its leaves by a few isolated
Indian tribes of Brazil, Peru and Colombia.
*Cultivated only, unknown in the wild.
* Probably a recent derivative of E. coca
var. coca; the two varieties share
morphological characteristics.
Erythroxylum
novogranatense
E. novogranatense var.
novogranatense (Colombian coca)
* Found as a plantation crop only in
Colombia, where it is cultivated in drier
mountain areas by a few isolated Indian
tribes that harvest the leaves for chewing.
*Tolerant of diverse ecological conditions.
* Figured prominently in world horticultural
trades in the early 20th century, and
continues to be grown in many tropical
countries as an ornamental plant.
E. novogranatense var.truxillense
(Trujillo coca)
* Grows today only in the river valleys of
the north coast of Peru and in the arid upper
Río Marañon valley.
* Leaves are highly prized by chewers for
their excellent flavor.
* Due to difficulties of extracting and
crystallizing pure cocaine, it is a minor
contributor to the illicit drug market.
*Trujillo coca is used primarily in the
manufacture of de-cocainized extracts for
soft drink flavoring.
Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Alternative Coca Reduction
Strategies in the Andean Region, 1993, pp.28-32
 The main active ingredient of the coca leaf is the alkaloid cocaine, which may be
extracted from its leaves by a chemical process.76
                                                          
75See, Plowman, op.cit., pp. 9-33 for an excellent and complete analysis of the botany of coca.
76 As explained by an expert,  “Cocaine is obtained from coca leaves using a relatively simple method by
which it is extracted from the leaves with an organic solvent (often kerosene); the alkaloids are passed
through an acidic acquous solution based on hydrochloric acid; the solution is neutralized and the cocaine
extracted by recrystalization” See: Mannaioni, P.F., The cocaine risk: toxicity, dependency and treatment,
in Bruno, Francesco (ed.), Cocaine Today: Its Effects on the Individual and Society, Rome, UNICRI,
1991, p.56. The industrial process required to obtain big amounts of cocaine is described in Chapter III of
this dissertation.
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“Coca leaves on average contain about 1 percent cocaine, but typical values range between 1.02
percent for E.novogranatense var. truxillense, and 0.11 to 0.41 percent for Amazonian coca
(E.coca var. ipadu). Average values for E. coca. var. coca and E. novogratatense var.
novogranatense are intermediary (0.23 to 0.93 percent).  The potency of coca leaves with respect
to cocaine content also depends on the plant’s growing site. The E. coca var. coca leaves with
the greatest cocaine content were found in Chinchao, in Huánuco, Peru, among the highest
elevations where coca is grown. Plants grown in the montañas [high jungle region of the Andean
slopes and foothills] generally are thought to produce more potent leaves than plants at lower
altitudes”77
Cocaine is a powerful central nervous system stimulant used non-medically to produce
euphoria or wakefulness; the repeated use of this drug produces dependence.78 As explained by
an analyst,
“Unlike heroin, cocaine is not physically addicting. That is, people who cease use do not 
suffer withdrawal symptoms such as ‘the shakes, nausea, and other physical symptoms that 
occur in heroin addicts when the level of heroin in their bloodstream falls below a 
threshold level. Despite the fact that cocaine is not physically addictive, it has addictive 
characteristics. Higher doses of the drug will yield increased mood-altering effects, and thus, 
while cocaine does not produce physical dependence akin to heroin, the high the drug 
produces encourages pursuit of more intense intoxication, thereby producing a form of 
psychological addiction.”79
The drug is sold as a white, translucent, crystalline flakes or powder frequently
adulterated with various sugars or local anesthetics. The powder (cocaine hydrochloride) is
sniffed and produces effects within 1-3 minutes that last for about 30 minutes. Cocaine can be
also be ingested orally, often with alcohol, and it is also injected intravenously.80 Another form
of consuming cocaine is by “freebasing” it. This process refers to increasing the potency of
cocaine by extracting pure cocaine alkaloid (the free base). Cocaine salt is heated together with
                                                          
77OTA, op.cit., p. 190
78 The World Health Organization defines drug dependence a “cluster of cognitive, behavioral and
physiologic symptoms that indicate [that] a person has impaired control of psychoactive substance use of
the substance despite adverse consequences” See: World Health Organization, Lexicon of alcohol and
drug terms, p.24 This term has been introduced in 1964 by a WHO Expert Committee to replace
‘addiction’ and ‘habituation’.
While psychological or psychic drug dependence refers to the experience of impaired control over drug
use and physiological or physic drug dependence involves the development of tolerance and physical
withdrawal symptoms upon cessation of use of the drug, as a consequence of the body’s adaptation to the
continued presence of the drug. See: United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Terminology
and Information on Drugs [on-line], available internet,
http://www.undcp.org/adhoc/terminology_and_information_on_drugs/glossary.htm and WHO, Lexicon
of Alcohol and drug terms, p.29A defined by the WHO,
“Tolerance,” as defined by the WHO, is a reduction in the sensitivity to a drug following its repeated
administration, in which increased doses are required to produce the same magnitude of effect previously
produced by a smaller dose. This increase in dose may be necessitated by changes in the metabolism of
the drug, or a cellular, physiological or behavioral adaptation to the effects of the drug. See: World Health
Organization, WHO Technical Report Series, 836, WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence,
Twenty-eight report, Geneva, WHO, 1993, p.5
79Riley, Kevin, Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking, Transaction Publishers,
New Brunswick, 1996, p.5
80World Health Organization, Lexicon of Alcohol and Drug Terms, p. 23
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baking soda and the vapors are inhaled through a water pipe. This form of cocaine consumption
is commonly known as “smoking crack.”
Cocaine can induce euphoric excitement and hallucinatory experiences. It creates a
feeling of great muscular strength, mental clarity and a sense of being “superpowerful.” The
effects of the drug rapidly dissipate once the drug enters the body and this usually induces a
desire for repeated administration at shorter and shorter intervals, which can turn the life of a
user into a constant and expensive search for cocaine. Studies have shown that laboratory
animals will time after time select cocaine over their favorite food, until they eventually die of
an overdose or starve.81 As observed by an analyst,
“Cocaine’s addictive potential is in part the result of its effects on the neurochemistry of the
brain. Recent laboratory research has established that cocaine acts directly on the so-called
reward pathways. These pathways are indirectly activated by pleasurable stimuli from other
activities, including eating, drinking, and sex. So powerful is the direct stimulation provided by
cocaine that sleep, safety, money, morality, loved ones, responsibility, even survival become
largely irrelevant to the cocaine user. In a sense, cocaine ‘short circuits’ the process by which
people normally achieve gratification and security”82
The likelihood that a person will become addicted to cocaine largely depends on the
method, frequency, and duration that a person uses the cocaine. Medical studies have
demonstrated that cocaine is more addictive when it is smoked.
“The effects of the drug come on very quickly; only 8 to 10 seconds pass before the user 
experiences the high. The peak concentration of the drug in the brain also occurs more rapidly 
when smoked, resulting in greater behavioral effects for a shorter period of time. Also 
contributing to the reinforcing and addiction potential of crack is the fact that the effects of 
the drug last only 8 to 10 minutes. After the high is over, the crack user feels anxious, 
depressed, and paranoid. Such a rapid shift between positive and negative effects of the drug 
make users crave another “hit” of the drug to restore the euphoria they felt just moments 
before”83
Another form of abuse is to smoke the coca paste, which is the product of the first step in
the process of extracting cocaine from coca leaves. Coca paste contains 50-90 % sulfate and
toxic impurities such as kerosene and sulfuric acid. The consumption of coca paste is
widespread in South America where it is smoked with tobacco, marijuana or alone. The mix of
coca paste and marijuana and/or tobacco is known as bazuco.84
Bazuco is a highly toxic mix that generates a very strong dependency. According to a
study of the World Health Organization, most of the coca paste abusers end up being
compulsive abusers of the drug.85 As pointed out by an analyst, bazuco abusers,
                                                          
81UNDCP, The United Nations and Drug Abuse Control, UNDCP, Geneva, 1992, p.22
82Gold, M.S., Cocaine (and Crack) in Bruno, Francesco, op.cit., p.81
83ibid., p.80
84ibid., p. 24 and  Arif , A., Adverse health consequences of cocaine abuse, World Health Organization,
Geneva, 1987, p. 12
85Arif. A, op.cit., p. 13
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“[l]ose interest in work, friendships, recreation, sports, sex, family and conjugal relationships. At
this point their overriding concern becomes the smoking of coca paste as frequently and
intensively as possible.”86
The following table describes the sought-after effects and the short and long-term effects
of cocaine consumption:
Table 2. Pharmacological effects of cocaine abuse
Sought-after effects * feelings of physical and mental well being,
exhilaration, euphoria
* increased alertness and energy
* postponement of hunger and fatigue
Short-term effects * loss of appetite
* faster breathing, increased heart rate and blood
pressure, increased body temperature, sweating
* dilation of pupils
* bizarre, erratic, sometimes violent behavior
* with larger doses: hallucinations, talkativeness, sense
of power and superiority, restlessness, hyperirritability,
irritability which can lead to panic and paranoid
psychosis (disappears if discontinued)
* excessive doses may lead to convulsions, seizures,
stroke, cerebral hemorrhage or heart failure
Long-term effects * destruction of tissues in nose if sniffed
* respiratory problems if smoked
* infectious diseases, abscesses, if injected
* disorientation, apathy, confused exhaustion due to
lack of sleep
* development of tolerance (*)
* strong psychological dependence  [there is no
scientific evidence of physical dependence] (**)
* the use of the drug during pregnancy may provoke
malformations in the fetus and health problems in the
newborn child
* with continued use a state similar to paranoid
psychosis may develop
* after stopping, there usually follows a long period of
sleep and then depression; during the crash, death from
respiratory failure may occur
Source: United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Terminology and Information on Drugs
[on-line], available internet, http://www.undcp.org/adhoc/terminology_and_information_on_drugs/coca-
3.htm; E. Paroli, Clinical effects associated with cocaine use, in Bruno Francesco (ed.) Cocaine Today: Its
effects on the Individual and Society, Rome, UNICRI, 1991, pp. 73-75 y Gold, M.S. Cocaine (and
Crack), in Bruno, op.cit., pp.79-85
Since the late 1970s, by far the highest consumption in the cocaine/crack market is in the
United States. Nevertheless, the number of cocaine users appears to be declining in the United
States (which is still, however, cocaine’s principal market).87 This decrease may be due to a
natural saturation and oversupply of the American market, which was reflected in a decrease in
                                                          
86ibid.
87Tullis, Handbook on illicit drug traffic, p8
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the quality (purity degree) of cocaine.88 To a lesser extent,  interdiction measures (interception
of shipments, antidrug laws, seizures)  may also have contributed to a decrease in the level of
consumption.
As reported by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC),
“The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse for 1992, the latest survey, showed that the number of
past-year and past month users of cocaine has decreased significantly since the peak year of 1985. During
1992, nearly 5 million Americans ( 12 years of age and older were reported to have used cocaine in the
past year compared to 12.2 million in 1985. Nevertheless  frequent or more intense use of cocaine has not
shown a statistically significant change during the past several years. Among the 5 million people who
used cocaine in the past year, 642.000 used it once a week or more in 1992 compared to 625.000 in 1991
and in 1990...”89
“ Results for 1995 show that, while cocaine use has declined over the past decade, the rate of use has
stabilized at high levels. These rates are driven largely by ‘crack’ cocaine use, which has reached the
saturation point in large urban areas throughout the country”90
c) Heroin:91
Opium, the raw material from the elaboration of heroin, is extracted from the poppy plant
(Papaver somniferum) with origins in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The poppy plant can be
grown in altitudes ranging from 500 to 2,000 and is very adaptable to temperature changes
(frosts). The plant is not indigenous to the South American region, nor does it have any
traditional or cultural use there. Colombian drug traffickers imported seeds of the poppy plant in
the early 1990s from Southeast Asia. The traffickers distributed the seeds (along with money) to
the peasant communities of the Colombian western Andes, who started growing the plant with
the sole purpose of extracting opium for heroin production.92 In that sense, the Colombian
traffickers are competing with the ethnic Chinese organized crime, which in the 1980s
controlled the traffic of heroin from Southeast Asia towards the United States.93
The main active ingredient of opium is morphine. This alkaloid can be extracted either
from opium or directly from poppy straw. Morphine produces a physical dependence that
develops quickly and increases in intensity with increased dosage. When the body’s supply of
morphine is withheld, withdrawal symptoms occur within a few hours. Moreover, the drug
produces a rapid tolerance level, a desensitization that requires increasing dosages to achieve the
desired effect. Increased dosages produce a greater physical and psychological dependence,
                                                          
88Hargreaves, Snowfields. The War on Cocaine in the Andes, Zed Books, London, 1992., p8
89National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), The NNICC Report 1993: The
Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States, Drug Enforcement Administration, Washington D.C., 1994,
p.1
90 NNICC, The NNICC Report 1996: The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States, DEA, Washington,
D.C., 1997,p.1
91Information about the main features of heroine has been obtained in: UNDCP, The United Nations and
Drug Abuse, pp. 22-25
92On this issue see: Betancourt and García, op. cit. p. 228
93DEA, The Flow of Heroin into the United States,  http:// www. usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ctlist.htm
30
resulting in addiction. Heroin (diacetylmorphine) is obtained from morphine by a simple
chemical process.94 Heroin produces a very strong dependency.
The table below summarizes the main short and long term effects of opioid drugs (opium,
morphine and heroin – the latter is up to 10 times more potent than morphine):
Table 3. Pharmacological effects of  heroin abuse
Sought after effects * sense of well being by reducing tension, anxiety
and depression; euphoria, in large doses
Short-term effects *sometimes nausea and vomiting
* constricted pupils
* drowsiness, inability to concentrate, apathy,
lessened physical activity
* acute overdose can result in death due to
respiratory depression
Long-term effects *  rapid development of tolerance and physical
and psychological dependence
* constipation
* menstrual irregularity
*infectious diseases, abscesses if injected
*damage of structures in nose if sniffed/snorted
* respiratory problems, if smoked
* decreased appetite leading to malnutrition,
weight loss
* chronic sedation, apathy leading to self-neglect
*abrupt withdrawal results in moderate to severe
withdrawal syndrome which is generally
comparable to a bout of influenza (with cramps,
diarrhea, running nose, tremors, panic, chills, and
sweating, etc.)
Source: United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Terminology and Information on
Drugs [on-line], available internet, http://www.undcp.org/adhoc/terminology_and_information_on_drugs
According to a report prepared by ECOSOC´s Commission on Narcotic Drugs, global
illicit drug use clearly increased in the 1980s and 1990s, and this upward trend is likely to
continue for some time yet.95 This kind of conclusion is based on the observation of various
indicators such as emergency room visits, substance abuse related mortality cases, arrests of
                                                          
94 Michael Smith describes the production of  heroin in the following terms: “The farmer collects the
opium by scraping it off the bulb with a flat, blunt knife [...] In further refining stems, the opium gum is
turned into a more potent extract. This process requires a level of standardization and quality control. The
chemist begins by heating water and dropping in raw opium until it dissolves. By adding ordinary lime,
organic waste is precipitated out, leaving the morphine suspended in the chalky white water. Once this is
done, there is a second round of heating, in which concentrated ammonia is added to solution, causing the
morphine to solidify and drop to the bottom. The liquid is then filtered through flannel, leaving chunky
white kernels of morphine usually weights about a tenth of the weight of the raw opium from which it
was extracted. Then follows a five-step process, in which morphine molecules are chemically bound with
acetic acid and refined into heroin. This is a more sophisticated operation requiring heating, filtering and
crystallization. The compound at the end of the process is a fluffy white powder, 80-90% pure, known as
Nº 4 heroin.” Smith, Michael , The Gordian Knot: The connection between narcotics and development, in
Smith, Michael et. al, Why People Grow Drugs. Narcotics and Development in the Third World, London,
The Panos Institute, 1992, p.10
95Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, E/CN.7/1995/3, Economic and Social
Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit drug Trafficking: an Interim Report, p.14
31
drug abusers and number of countries reporting rising consumption levels.96 These trends are
illustrated by Graphic 1 and table 4 below.
Graphic 1. Global development of substance-abuse-related mortality in the early 1990s
 (officially reported *)
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(*)Because of the lack of adequate reporting in a large number of countries, there is bias towards under
representation in those figures. The World Health Organization estimates is 200,000 deaths a year in the
drug injecting population (heroin and other opiates are commonly injected and cocaine can also be abused
intravenously).
The United Nations Drug Control Program estimates that heroin is the leading drug responsible for
substance abuse related mortality and emergency room episodes.
Source: E/CN.7/1995/3, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking: An
Interim Report p.30 and UNDCP, the World Drug Report, p.31
Table 4. Estimated number of drug abusers (annual prevalence)* in the 1990s-WORLD
Drug Estimated total (million people) in % of total population
Heroin and other opiate-type
substances***
8.0 0.14%
Cocaine ** 13.3 0.23%
Cannabis** 141.2 2.45%
Hallucinogens*** 25.5 0.44%
Amphetamine Type Stimulants
(ATS)***
30.2 0.52%
Sedative-type substances*** 227.4 3.92%
*Annual prevalence means that consumption has taken place at least once within the last twelve months before a survey.
**Conservative estimates; results obtained through information from UNDCP’s annual reports questionnaires; UNDCP mission
reports; UNDCP annual field reports; UNDCP Country Programme Frameworks; data compiled in UNDCP’s country profiles; data
compiled by WHO; data compiled by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and the United States Department of State,
complemented by UNDCP estimates.
***Estimates obtained through extrapolation of average prevalence rates obtained from a sample of countries (replies to UNDCP’s
annual reports questionnaire) representing, respectively, 21% (ATS; sedative type substances) and 11% (hallucinogens) of the world
population. The application of the same methodology to cannabis (sample of countries representing 27% of global population) and
cocaine (sample representing 21% of the world population) would increase the total estimate of cannabis users to 180 million and of
cocaine users to 30 million. Such high numbers of cannabis consumers -given a frequent bias towards underreporting- is possible;
given strong regional differences in the levels of abuse of cocaine, particularly the very low levels in Asia, the estimated total
number of cocaine abusers resulting from simple extrapolation, however, is likely to be too high. While estimates for hallucinogens
and ATS are reasonable, the extrapolated estimate for sedative-type substances (given the sample of countries providing figures) is
likely to be on the high side.
Source: UNDCP, The World Drug Report, p.32
                                                          
96UNDCP, World Drug Report, p.29
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 The largest single consumer in the world is the United States with some 12.8 million-
drug abusers (those who have consumed drugs at least once in the last month) out of a total
population of 260 million.97 Europe follows in second place.98 Even the reported rise in heroin
consumption in the United States since 1992/93 will not change this distribution substantially.
The abuse of cocaine  (and crack) in the United States is much more common than in Europe, it
is the most widely abused illicit plant-based drug after cannabis.99 Heroin abuse seems to be
marginally higher in Europe than in the United States.100 Since the late 80’s cocaine
consumption in Europe has grown steadily.101 This was pointed out by the Declaration of the
World Ministerial Summit to Reduce the Demand for Drugs and to Combat the Cocaine Threat,
held in London form 9 to 11 April 1990 which noted that:
“[t]he sharply rising trend in seizures of cocaine by law enforcement authorities, not only in
Western European Countries but in may other countries also, which suggest that determined
efforts are being made by ruthless criminal organizations to develop new markets for cocaine to
add to the continuing problem of heroin and other drugs.”102
The spread of social consumption of illicit drugs is directly related to a rise in criminal
activity in big cities, either because of gang wars for the control areas of distribution or just
because drug users literally will do anything to obtain enough drugs to satisfy a habit. In the
United States, for example, almost 60 per cent of all federal prisoners in 1992 were drug
offenders. Another study found that almost 50 per cent of the total value of theft in 1993 in
England and Wales was drug-related. 103
The next session will provide a definition of national security and will explain why and
how can drug trafficking became a national security problem.
                                                          
97 UNDCP, Economic and Social Consequences of  Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking [on-
line].Available internet http: //www.undcp.org/…/technical_series_1998-01-01_pdf, p.8
98 ibid.
99UNDCP, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, p.8
100ibid.
101 This issue will be particularly addressed in Chapters VI and VII of this dissertation.
102 United Nations General Assembly document A/45/262, p.3
103United Nations ECOSOC document, E/CN.7/1995/3, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug
Abuse and Illicit drug Trafficking: an Interim Report. p 35
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B- ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFIC AS AN ASPECT OF NATIONAL SECURITY.
DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
“ Market: An arrangement whereby buyers and sellers interact to determine the prices and 
quantities of a commodity. Some markets ( such as the stock market or a flea market) take 
place in physical locations; other markets are conducted over the telephone or are 
organized by computers ”
“Industry: A group of firms producing similar or identical products ”
“ Firm: The basic, private producing unit in a capitalistic or mixed economy. It hires labor 
and buys other inputs in order to make and sell commodities ”
“ Cartel: An organization of independent firms producing similar products that work together 
to raise prices and restrict output ”104
“Becoming the opponent means you should put yourself in an opponent’s place and think from the
opponent’s point of view”105
a) National Security
The illicit drug trade is part of a market. The core of the problem is that production and
trade of the product, as well as the industry behind its supply, is illegal. Therefore, this
economic activity is driven by criminal organizations.106 In the period under study the industry
was vertically integrated and composed of firms, labor, raw materials, and intermediate goods.
As it is an illegal market, the firms were transnational criminal organizations such as the so-
called Medellín and Cali “cartels,” mainly based in Colombia, although from the early and mid
1990s on the Bolivian and Peruvian organizations  have managed their own production of
cocaine without being subordinated to the Colombian organizations.107 At the same time, there
                                                          
104 Definitions from, Paul A. Samuelson & William D. Nordhaus, Economics, Fourthteenth Edition, New
York, McGraw-Hill, 1992, pp.729-748
105 Musashi, op.cit., p.92
106 For the scope of this dissertation a criminal organization will be defined as a group of  people
associated for the purpose of engaging in criminal activity on a more or less sustained basis. This group of
people engage in the enterprise crime, namely the provision of illicit goods and services, or of licit goods
that have been acquired through illicit means, such as theft or fraud. Criminal organizations have a
significant degree of cooperation and organization to provide the illicit goods and services. This includes
entrepreneurial skill, specialization, capacity for coordination and when necessary the use of violence and
corruption to facilitate the conduct of activities. The structure of criminal organizations may range from
formal bureaucratic and highly cohesive structures  to fluid and informal networks.  This conception of
criminal organization has been developed by Phil Williams and Ernesto Savona, in The United Nations
and Transnational Organized Crime, London, Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 3 and 4.
107 The term ‘transnational’ is used here to refer to “ the movement of information, money, physical
objects, people, or other tangible or intangible items across state boundaries, when at least one of the
actors involved in this movement is non-governmental [and I should add is not a state]” See: Williams
and Savona, op.cit., p.5. See also:  Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph, “ Transnational Relations and
World Politics: An Introduction,” in  same authors (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press,1976, p. xii.
‘Transnational criminal organizations’ refers here to “organized crime groups that have a home base in
one state but operate in one or more host states where there are favorable market opportunities. These
organizations have become major players in global economic activity and they are the key players in
illicit industries, such as drug  production and trafficking…” See: Williams and Savona, op.cit. p.6. See
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are also independent groups in Brazil that receive managerial support and advice from
Colombian traffickers.  These organizations buy raw material (coca leaf) from the coca growing
peasants, hire labor (the Peruvian and Bolivian peasants, chemist, pilots, bodyguards etc.) who
participate in the different stages of the cocaine refinement, and provide transportation and
security. The criminal organizations also purchase intermediate goods (chemical inputs:
acetone, ether, sulfuric and chloride acid, kerosene) used in the production of cocaine
clorhydrate (CHCL). There were also intermediary firms (the Bolivian trafficking
organizations) who either buy or process the coca paste and base (PCB). The final step was the
distribution of cocaine in the big consumer markets (mainly the U.S.), by the Colombian
organizations and by local organized crime.
This industry economics had (and currently has) lethal results for the political stability of
the South American democracies and even more so (to a different extent for each particular
case) to the survival of the state. As an illegal activity, drug trafficking implies the application
of enforcement policies, which in turn generate violence and corruption as the criminal
organizations struggle to protect their territories (Colombia), and as the peasants organize
themselves against the state in order to protect their source of labor (Bolivia, Peru). Moreover,
both workers (Peru) and “entrepreneurs” (Colombia) accept the aid of guerrilla groups or even
foreign or national mercenaries (Colombia). The situation is made worse when there is foreign
pressure or even military intervention, and when support (the U.S.) is given to the governments
of the source countries to enhance interdiction and eradication. As will be shown later, this
increases the level of “reactive” violence and contributes to the spread and overlap of the
problem to neighboring countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela).
In light of these considerations, why can this criminal activity be defined as a matter of
national security, particularly in the case South America? In order to answer this question, it is
necessary to clarify the meaning ascribed to the concept “national security.”
National security will be defined as the situation of freedom from harmful threats to a
given state. This includes freedom from military attack or coercion, from internal subversion,
and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values, which are essential to
                                                                                                                                                                         
also:  Williams, Phil, “Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security,” Survival, Vol.
36, Nº 1, 1994, pp. 100 and 101.
Just as a marginal comment, it should be clarified that, although the term “cartel” it is currently used in
law enforcement and academic circles , the use of this term is not correct in a strictly economic sense. As
pointed by The Economist:  “One of the things that makes analyzing  Colombia’s  drug industry difficult
is that America’s policy-makers and journalists  are too  fond of the term ‘cartel’. The DEA coined it,
applying it first to the Medellín traffickers and now to their counterparts in Cali. Economics, evidently, is
not among the DEA’s strengths. A cartel is a coalition of producers acting together to restrict supply and
drive up the price of their product. Yet as Francisco Thuomi of Bogota’s University of the Andes argues,
the cocaine “cartels” have increased production probably threefold over the past 15 years, allowing the
average wholesale price in the United States to fall by 75%.” See: “Colombia’s Drugs Business,” The
Economist, December 24th 1994-January 6th 1995, p.24
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the quality of life.108 In the context of this dissertation the terms “state” and  “nation-state” will
be used as synonyms. In that sense the concept used here goes beyond the Weberian concept of
state, in which the state is defined in politico- institutional terms as a “central government.”109
Instead of considering the state and society as two separate phenomena, the state is defined here
as a complex socio-political sovereign entity that includes a territory, governing institutions, and
a population.110 This conception of state draws on Buzan’s definition of states:
“[t]erritorialy defined socio-political entities. They represent human collectivities in which 
governing institutions and societies are interwoven within a bounded territory [...] this nexus of 
territory, government and society is what constitutes the state.”111
In that sense the definition of state used here resembles the classic legal definition stated
in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. That is: a permanent
population, a defined territory with a government capable of maintaining effective control over
its territory and of concluding international relations with other states.112  The term “national
security” refers then to the security of the state, and more specifically, to the absence of threats
to the main attributes of the a state, namely:113
• The “idea of the state” or the degree of recognition and identification of the population with
their state.114
• The physical base of the state (the population and the territory).
                                                          
108The second part of this definition draws on a definition of national security given in the course
documents of the National Defence College College of Canada. Barry Buzan quotes this definition  in
People, States and Fears, p. 17
109 A clear example of this concept is given by Joel Migdal who defines the state as “[a]n organization,
composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) that
has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the
parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to
have its way”. See: Migdal, Joel, Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State
Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, p.19
 110 It is common in Political Science and Sociology to consider society or (civil society) as the ensemble
of individual, group and class relations that take place outside the political the state institutions and
political power relations. Society is then represented as the realm of economic, ideological, social, and
religious conflicts and the state as the entity with the task of solving them through mediation or
suppression. Also in this usual state/ society division, society is viewed as the source of demands that
have to be satisfied by the political system and as the arena of various forms of mobilization, association
and organizations that compete to either conquer or influence the political power. See, Bobbio, Norberto,
Sociedad Civil, in Bobbio, Norberto and Matteucci Nicola (directors), Diccionario de Política, México,
Siglo XXI, 1988, p. 1575
111Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.60
112See: Evans, Graham and Newman, Jeffrey, The Dictionary of World Politics. A Reference Guide to
Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, New York, , 1992, p.306 and also Article 1 of the Montevideo
Conventions on Rights and Duties of States.
113Barry Buzan has broadly defined this concept in People, States and Fear, pp. 57-145.
114 As stated by Buzan, "[t]here must be some idea of  the state, which establishes its authority in the
minds of  its people..." See: Buzan,People,State and  Fear .p. 66
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• The institutional expression of the state. That is the government and the political regime of a
state or, as stated by Barry Buzan,
“the entire machinery of government, including its executive, legislative, administrative and
judicial, and the laws, procedures and norms by which they operate ....”115
• Sovereignty in terms of
“self-government [and] denial of any higher political authority, and the claiming by the state of
supreme decision-making authority both within its territory and over its citizens...”116
A matter of national security implies then a threat to any of these state attributes. These
elements can be discussed as objects of security in their own right (they can be threatened
individually), and at the same time the interaction between them determines the national
security problematique. If one of them is harmed the other three will become more susceptible
to threats. A government is necessary in order to grant the security of the population against
internal or external threats. If the capacity of the institutional component of the state is
constrained by either limited internal or external threats or, even worse, if the institutions of the
state collapse because of internal or external threats, the integrity of the population, the territory,
and sovereignty of the state will be more susceptible to threat. At the same time, a healthy and
productive population as well as a productive territory are necessary in order to grant the
economic viability of a state as a whole and to assure that the state will be able to extract
resources for the implementation of policies. The interaction between the attributes of the state
is represented in Figure 2.117
Figure 1. Attributes of the state
THE IDEA OF STATE
      SOVEREIGNTY
PHYSICAL BASE INSTITUTIONAL
OF THE STATE EXPRESSION OF 
THE STATE
As represented in Figure 3 below, the national security problematique of a state is determined
by the interplay between three factors, namely:  the security environment of a state, the nature of
                                                          
115Buzan,People, State and Fear .p82
116 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p 67
117 Adapted from figure orginally developed by Barry Buzan in Peoples, States and Fear, p.65
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the state (how vulnerable it is to internal and external threats?), and the existence of latent or
manifest internal or external threats.
Figure 2. Components of the National Security problematique
SECURITY   ENVIRONMENT
    NATIONAL
             SECURITY
THREATS      NATURE OF THE  STATE
The security environment refers to the pattern of interaction of nation states within an
anarchical framework (characterized by the absence of a centralized form of political structure),
with special emphasis on their interaction with dominant or hegemonic powers (in terms of their
military capabilities and their degree of political influence in the region).  For the purposes of
this dissertation, the definition also encompasses the interaction of the state with non-state
actors across national boundaries. The issue of the security environment can be characterized by
the following questions: Which states are your state’s neighbors? Are they militarily powerful?
Are they politically and socially cohesive? Are they developed? Does your state have any
pending conflict with them? Which transnational players operate within and between the
borders of your neighbors? Are they also operating within your state? Could they spill over into
your country?  What kinds of problems have your neighbors that could spill over into the
territory of your state? Which national, transnational, and international players can strongly
influence the policies adopted by your neighbors and the way transnational actors behave?118
The issues of the nature of the state and the meaning of threat have to be defined before
answering the question of why drug trafficking is a national security problem in South America.
These issues will be addressed in the following sections of this chapter.
                                                          
118This definition has been summarized and adapted from the concept of security environment developed
by Barry Buzan in “People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World” in Azar,
Edward and Chung-in Moon, National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and
Externa Threats,  London, Edward Elgar, 1988, , pp.27-39
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b) Threat:
“There is fright in everything. This means being frightened by the unexpected.”119
Threat is defined as a danger to the attributes of the state; this potential or actual danger
means that there exists “an indication of something undesirable coming...” because of an actor
or a process that is a “likely cause of harm....”120 This threat can be overt in the sense that real
harm is being done, or latent  if harm has not yet manifested. Threats can be specific or diffuse
depending on what is posing them. Specific threats “have a clear focus and source,” that is they
are posed by a particular state or non-state actor, object, or policy.121 For example: the
Medellín Cartel is an identifiable non-state actor as are the Shining Path or the ELN or the
FARC guerrilla movements in Peru and Colombia. “Cocaine” or “heroin” or “drugs” are objects
that can pose a threat. Militarized enforcement is a policy that can pose a threat to neighboring
countries because of its spillover consequences, and illicit drug production as a policy by a
corrupt government is also a threat. More clear examples of specific threats are:  Germany in the
case of France during the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, the
U.S. and Soviet arsenals during the Cold War for one another (and for the all the other states of
the world). Diffuse threats arise from processes, rather than from a particular actor, object, or
policy.122 As argued by Barry Buzan,
“Thus the spread of communism (or capitalism), nuclear proliferation (both weapons and civil
power technology), terrorism, economic depressions and the green house effect are all examples of
broad processes which are frequently identified as threats.”123
Drug trafficking, then, is an economic process that can threaten the state to varying
degrees, and can reach the proportions of a national security issue. A threat becomes a national
security issue depending on the intensity with which the threat operates in relation to the
particular vulnerabilities of a given state and also (but not necessarily) according to the beliefs
of the policy makers of a state over a given time period. This means that, as will be shown in
my case studies (Argentina and Venezuela), the fact that policy makers are not assessing a threat
does not necessarily mean that the threat does not exist. Assessment by policy makers is a
sufficient--but not necessary--condition for a threat to exist within the framework of this
dissertation. The intensity of a threat can be higher or lower depending on several factors:124
                                                          
119Musashi, Miyamoto,op.cit., p.99
120The Oxford Concise Dictionary, p.1271
121Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.134
122Buzan,People, sates and fear, p.134
123 ibid.
124See Buzan, People, State and Fears, p. 134
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• its nearness in space;
•  its nearness in time;
• the probability that a given latent threat could become an overt threat;
•  the weight of its consequences;
• and whether or not the threats are amplified by historical dimensions or circumstances.
Depending on each particular case, the more intense a threat the more likely it will be
defined as a national security issue. According to their intensity, threats can then be typified as
low intensity threats, high intensity threats and lethal threats (when they put into question the
existence of one or all of the attributes of the state). These attributes are displayed in Table 5
below.
Table 5. Typology of threats according to their intensity
LOW INTENSITY
THREATS
HIGH INTENSITY
THREATS
LETHAL THREATS
Range (space) (*) Very Distant Distant Close
Range (time) (**) Distant Close Current
Consequences Low High Suppressive
Probability (**) Low High Sure
Historical precedents Historically neutral Historically amplified Historically amplified
(*) Very Distant = located in a country in a non-neighboring country that belongs to the same
region; Distant = located in a neighboring country but in an area far away from the border; Close =
located in an area near the national border.
(**) Depends on the assessment of policy makers when the threats have not taken place yet.
The three types above are an adaptation and modification of the classification of threat
intensity given by Barry Buzan in his book “People, States and Fear”125. Buzan constructed
only two types (Low Intensity and High Intensity) based on the variables listed above
(diffuse/specific, distant/close in time or space, low/high probability, low/high consequences,
historically neutral/amplified). There are two main differences from the original idea that served
as an inspiration for this classification. First: in this dissertation the specificity of the threat
(diffuse/specific threats) is not taken as a variable that determines the intensity of a threat. True,
an object or an actor or a policy are always more concrete dangers; however, as this dissertation
will show, “diffuse” processes such as drug trafficking (that is, an industry conformed by
several players and objects) are not only believed to be a national security issue, but also (with
different degrees of intensity) a clear and present national security problem for some of the
states in the region. Paradoxically, some of the policies adopted to cope with the threat increase
the intensity of it even more.
Threats can also be typified according to their nature depending on their intensity and
their latent or overt status.  These dimensions tell us if the threat is or is not already taking place
and to what degree or intensity. Six types result from the combination of intensity and status
                                                          
125Buzan,Peoples, States and Fear, p. 140 table 3.2
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(the order of appearance presupposes an ascending order in terms of their relevance to national
security): Remote, Significant, Clear, Clear and Present, Alarming, and Crucial. The way in
which these types are obtained is summarized in Table 6 below.
Table 6.Type of threats according to their intensity and open/latent status
STATUS
OVERT LATENT
LOW Significant Remote
INTENSITY HIGH Clear and
present
Clear
LETHAL Crucial Alarming
For the scope of this dissertation only the four latter types of threat (that is “clear and
present,” “clear,” “crucial,” and “alarming”) will be considered as national security problems.
Drug trafficking has military, political, economic, societal and ecological implications that with
different intensity may threaten the South American states. Threats to the state stemming from
drug trafficking can be classified then in the following way: military threats, political threats,
societal threats, economic threats and ecological threats.126 At the same time each class of
threat can be “measured” or “typified” according to the typologies elaborated above. This
“typification” of threats stemming from drug trafficking will be made in the chapters concerning
the two neighboring-transshipment case studies (Argentina and Venezuela).
An example of a typification of a threat could be expressed in the following terms:
“ The rise in cocaine consumption stemming from the drop in the prices of the drug caused by
the rise of cocaine trafficking through the national territory of Argentina is a clear and present
societal threat to that country.”
or for example,
“ A further loss of the legitimacy of Venezuela’s political institutions caused by drug trafficking
related corruption is a clear political threat to that country.”
Concrete examples of military, political, economic, societal, and ecological threats will be
given in the rest of the dissertation. By now, this chapter provides the reader a descriptive
definition of each kind of threat.
Military threats: Military threats mean the use (or the threat of use) of armed force by
another state. They imply an attack or coercion of a state (or group of states) against another
state(s). They can also mean the attack or coercion by a state (or a group of states) against non-
state actors operating in the territory of another state without the consent of the government of
the latter. As stated by Barry Buzan this kind of threat,
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“[o]ccupy the traditional heart of national security concerns. Military action can, and
usually does, threaten, all the components of the state” 127
The illicit drug industry is a non-military problem of security in the sense that it does not
involve per se  the “use or threat of physical force in inter-state relations....” 128 However the
cross border activities of non-state groups involved in drug trafficking activities may catalyze
pre-existent territorial disputes into armed conflict between two neighboring states. Also, U.S.
attempts to curb drug trafficking overseas through the use of military force might pose a threat
to some South American states.
Some examples of military threats that might be either catalyzed by drug trafficking or by
attempts to suppress it are: 129
• Military intervention by extra-regional powers (especially the U.S.);
• Invasion of territory by foreign military forces;
• Occupation of territory by foreign military forces;
• Full scale air, naval, or land battles;
• Intermittent shelling or clashes;
• Small scale interception or sinking of ships;
• Mining of territorial water;
• Limited air, sea or border skirmishes;
• Border police acts;
• Imposing blockades;
• Breaking diplomatic relations;
• Increasing troop mobilization;
                                                                                                                                                                         
126This threat classification is inspired by a general typology of threats given in : Barry Buzan, Peoples
States and Fears, Chapter 3.
127Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.116
128 Dietrich Fischer, NonMilitary aspects of  security,” pxi.
129Those indications of  military/traditional threats have been adapted from the indicators used by
Edward Azar in order to elaborate the Codebook of the Conflict and Peace data Bank (COPDAB)
international scale. See: Azar, Edward, The Codebook of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank, Department
of Political Science, University of  North Carolina, 1980. This computer-based library of longitudinal
daily international and domestic interactions was used by Abdul- Monem  M. Al-Mashat to construct a
“tranquility index” for Third World countries . Tranquility is defined by Al-Mashat as  “ the state of
harmony internally and internationally through which the consensus-formation process unfolds. This
variable indicates the net behavioral attribute of states that is calculated by utilizing both cooperative
behavior, [.....]  Operationally, tranquility measures the ability of states to exhibit more domestic and
international cooperation than domestic and international conflict. Tranquility , then, measures the
behavioral aspect of a state’s security. The higher the tranquility level attributed to any state, the higher
the prospects for its security relative to another state, the higher the prospects for its security relative to
another state with a lower tranquility level,” Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, Westview
Press, Boulder, 1985 p. 50.
 For the scope of  this dissertation these  concepts are used as indicators of threats, it is not my goal to
either develop or use the concept of tranquility.
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• Closing borders and blocking free communications;
• Recalling ambassadors for emergency consultations;
• Warning retaliation for acts;
• Condemning strongly specific actions or policies (with the threat of the use of
military force).
In the analysis of case studies (chapters V, VII and VIII), the reader will notice that in
fact some of these events happened between drug producer countries and their neighboring
countries as well as between the United States and drug producer countries.  The reader will
also notice that some events were provoked or worsened by the drug trafficking activities going
on in bordering areas or as an attempt by United States to curtail the flow of drugs towards its
territory by the use of military force.
Political Threats: Political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state.130
This includes all activities that can weaken the effective control of a government over its
territory and its citizens as well as the stability and legitimacy of the political regime of a
country. Some examples of political threats stemming from drug trafficking are:
• Use of the national territory as a safe-heaven by guerrilla groups that finance their
operation through their interaction with drug traffickers and coca-growing peasants.
• Control of the national territory by criminal organizations (based abroad or within the
national territory).
• Lack of subordination of the armed forces to the political power caused by drug
trafficking related corruption.
• Armed strikes by coca-growing peasants.
Societal Threats: These kinds of threats are aimed at the integrity of the human resources
of a country as well as at the “idea of the state” or the national identity of a country. This
concept has been adapted from the definition given by Barry Buzan who refers to societal
threats as threats against the national identity and the national culture of a country.131 In
Buzan’s view these kinds of threats are caused above all by massive migration from one
geographical/cultural zone to another.132  For the scope of this work the concept of societal
threats will be enlarged to threats to the social fabric of the nation caused by a massive and
widespread consumption of harmful illicit drugs. In the case of drug producer, transshipment
                                                          
130Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.118
131Buzan,People, States and Fear., p. 122 and by same author, Societal security, state, security and
internationalism, in Waever, Ole et.al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe,
London, Pinter, pp. 41-58
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and neighboring transshipment countries the threat is caused by a sudden availability of the drug
stemming from production and increasing transit across their national territories. These are
some examples of societal threats that may be caused by drug trafficking:
• Rise of illicit drug consumption and dependency.
• Spread of  AIDS and infectious diseases due to intravenous drug use (IDU).
• Rise of drug related violence due to increasing trafficking across the national 
territory.
• Threat to national identity because of the increase of illegal immigrants and refugees
across the border due to drug trafficking-related violence in their countries of origin.
A huge inflow of illegal immigrants or refugees could also overwhelm the capacity of
the recipient state to provide basic services to its own citizens thus reducing the
quality of life of the population.
Economic Threats: These kinds of threats curtail access to the market that is necessary to
sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.133 In this case the list is not long.  In
terms of economic threats, the basic problem of the South American countries, particularly the
Andean countries, is that a large sector of their economy is absorbed by an illegal activity which
is basically export-oriented and based on the transformation of an agricultural product: coca. On
one hand, this reproduces an already existing pattern of dependency on a single product export.
Eventually, a synthetic form of cocaine might be discovered in the U.S. or Europe and an
economic collapse might occur. As a matter of fact, this dissertation will show that the “coca-
boom” in Bolivia was in part provoked by the collapse of the export oriented mining sector after
the international drop of tin prices in the 1980s. On the other hand, the activity is illegal and
strongly dependent countries such as Bolivia are subject to strong economic pressures that,
following the definition above, may seriously curtail access to markets for legal products. The
problem of large sectors of the work force involved in the illicit drug industry is also growing in
transshipment countries. The consequences of this economic “cocaine dependency” of countries
or areas of a country will be analyzed in further detail later in this work.
Another threat caused by drug trafficking is the utilization of some South American
countries as money laundering centers. The purchase of land at inflated prices has suddenly
proliferated in the last ten years. Also the foreign investment in the services sectors of countries
such as Chile and Argentina has mushroomed since the early 1990s. This was favored and
attracted by the policies of structural adjustment implemented in these countries that have
                                                                                                                                                                         
132Buzan, Barry, Societal security, state, security and internationalism, in Waever, O. et. al., Identity,
Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London, Pinter, 1993, pp. 41-58
133This definition is adapted from the definition of “economic security” given by Barry Buzan. See, same
author, People, States and Fear, p.19
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granted economic stability and relatively strong currencies. However, the legal origin of all
these investments is not always clear. Lax banking laws in these countries worsened the
situation. This phenomenon may be considered a blessing in the short term but can certainly be
a curse in the long term. The purchase of real estate at inflated prices (a typical way of
laundering money) can generate an unwanted inflationary spiral in the real estate sector. At the
same time the uncontrolled influx of foreign currency may generate an undesired devaluation of
the local currency, thus threatening the success of anti-inflationary policies due to a sudden
abundance of liquid assets. Also,  if national banking institutions are suspected of involvement
in money laundering operations, the reputation of the country could be damaged, causing legal
investment to head to other countries. There is also a relation with political threats due to the
corrupting effect of money laundering activities, which may reduce the legitimacy of the
recently inaugurated democracies.
Ecological threats: Ecological threats harm the biosphere, which is the essential support
system on which all human enterprises depend.134 Ecological threats stemming from drug
trafficking damage the physical base of the state. The production of cocaine involves the use of
industrial quantities of chemical inputs such as kerosene, acetone, lime, and sulfuric acid and
the waste generated by the process of cocaine distillation is diverted into nearby rivers. This
poses a threat to the local ecosystem and, in the long term, to human survival due to the
pollution of potable water sources. Also, the extensive and persistent use of land for coca
production produces large-scale soil erosion that renders this land unusable for the production of
legal crops, not to mention the deforestation of tropical forests, cleared for coca cultivation by
coca-growing settlers. The same can be said about the recent phenomenon of opium poppy
growing in the high mountain forest regions of Colombia.
The harmful effect of these different kinds of threats is mutually reinforced. For example,
environmental threats may worsen the effect of economic threats, which in turn may worsen the
effect of political threats, which at the same time may reduce the capacity of the state to cope
with the traditional / military dimension of drug trafficking. The intensity of these threats will
grow of course depending on the security environment of each state and on the weakness or
strength of their nature.
How does this classification apply to the case of South America? The cocaine industry
does not imply a direct military threat to the state, but in South America as well as in other drug
producer regions of the Third World (such as South Asia in the case of heroin industry), it can
be a catalyst of latent inter-state conflicts. At the same time the threat of foreign military
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intervention is always present (the case of Panama--even if it is outside of the region under
analysis--is an example).
South American states are particularly vulnerable to political threats because of their
recent history of political instability and military intervention in politics, and because their
democracies are in the process of consolidation.135
The ways in which illicit drug traffic affects security in South America varies from
country to country. Political threats go from the loss of effective control of part of the national
territory (which comes under control of the traffickers) to the corruption of the executive,
legislative, and judiciary powers or the violent resistance of the peasant trade unions against the
coca-eradication measures. In the case of societal threats, the increase of illicit drug production
can lead to a rise in drug consumption in producer and transit countries as prices drop. Another
aspect is that enforcement against the drug industry and the violence generated by this illegal
activity are likely to generate a wave of refugees and illegal immigrants to neighboring
countries, increasing the probability of societal conflict.
As for economic threats, some South American producer countries (Peru and Bolivia in
particular) have a low level of diversification of their economies. The cocaine industry certainly
means a threat to their economic security since a big part of the national product depends on an
illegal activity. This fact not only prevents further development in other areas (coca and coca
paste production is five or six times more profitable for peasants than other crops) but also
generates international pressure from developed countries.
The ecological dimension is not in the short and medium term the most important, but it
is worth mentioning because both coca and cocaine production cause a process of deforestation
and erosion of the soil and rivers in the producer countries. This phenomenon is worsened by
the use of herbicides to eradicate coca fields.
As this dissertation will show, the South American states have, or in the recent past have
had, at least one of the following problems,making them particularly vulnerable to the action of
actors involved in the cocaine industry:
• Weak or non-existent presence of the government in large parts of the national territory.
• Already existing high levels of political violence stemming from deep social differences and
ethnic divisions or the existence of a closed and restrictive political regime.
• Strong guerrilla movements.
• Major recent changes in the structure of political institutions.
• Major political conflict over what ideology will be used to organize the state.
                                                          
135 Venezuela and Colombia are an exception to this fact; nevertheless, Venezuela suffered failed military
uprisings in 1992, and in Colombia the constitutional guarantees have been almost permanently
suspended in the last twenty years because of the existence of several strong guerrilla groups. At the same
time, the party system and restrictive democracies in both countries come into question .
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• Danger of U.S. intervention in their internal affairs.
• Dependent and underdeveloped economies without adequate access to the international
market.
• Indebted governments tied to austerity plans for the payment of debt services and incapable
of extracting economic resources for the modification of the socioeconomic structure.
As a result of this particular set of characteristics, threats to the political stability and
sovereignty (military and political dimensions) are at the core of the security concerns of the
South American states. Nevertheless, the societal, economic, and ecological dimensions will
also be analyzed in this dissertation work.
The issue of the weak/strong nature of the state will be conceptually defined and
discussed in the following section.
c) The nature of the state
As argued by Edward Azar and Chung-In Moon, it is possible to say that the national
security problematique has a “hardware” and a “software” side: 136
The “hardware” side comprises traditional security concerns, such as the security
dilemma of the military balance of power and the economic capabilities of the states to build
and keep a military structure. It concerns military readiness, or what a state needs to confront
military threats posed by another state. It also concerns economic power, which is necessary to
maintain that military readiness. It refers, then, to military power.137 The “software” side in the
context of this dissertation refers to the nature of the state in terms of the following
characteristics: sociopolitical cohesion (legitimacy and integration), the policy capacity of the
institutional part of the state, the degree of socioeconomic development, and the functional and
territorial penetration of the state in the whole of the national territory or “Territorial
centralization.”138 All these are variables that indicate the weak or strong nature of the state
                                                          
136 See: Azar, Edward and Moon, Chung-In, Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The ‘Software’
side of Third World National Security, in Azar, Edward and Moon, Chung-in, National Security in the
Third World. The Management of Internal and External Threats, Center for International Development
and Conflict Management, University of Maryland/ Edgard Elgar Publishing, 1988, pp.77-101.
137 “The hardware side of  security management involves physical capabilities (e.g. military and
economic power) and tangible policy infrastructure comprising strategic choice and so on.” Azar and In
Moon, The ‘Software’ Side of  Security of  Third World Security, p 77.
138The definition of “software side of security”  given by Azar and in Moon (see supra), has been adapted
for the purposes of this dissertation. Azar and Moon define the software side in terms of only three
variables: legitimacy, integration, and policy capacity (which will also be utilized and defined in the
context of this dissertation). Another difference is that Azar and Moon put an emphasis on the capacity of
Third World states to implement national security policies (security management). While Azar and Moon
refer to the software side of security in terms of the margin of policy action of governments to confront
threats, this dissertation will refer to the hardware and software sides of security as a set of characteristics
that make the state more or less vulnerable to internal and external threats. See: Azar and Moon, op.cit., p.
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and will determine in the end how threats can affect a state. While the hardware side refers to
the military and economic capabilities of the state as a power in an anarchic context, the
software side refers to the weak/strong nature of the state in dealing with domestic matters and
non-state actors. This thesis will concentrate almost exclusively on the soft side of security
because it analyzes how an illicit activity such as drug trafficking can threaten the South
American states.
The definition of the characteristics of the software side of security will be given now in
abstract terms. Concrete examples for the case of South America will be given in detail in the
following chapter.
Sociopolitical cohesion will be defined by two dimensions:139
• The legitimacy of the “idea of the state” in terms of the identification of the
population with its nation state and the acceptance of its central government, as well
as the legitimacy of the institutional base of the state (political regime). 140
• Integration in terms of the fragmented/unified character of the society along ethnic,
social, or political cleavages.
“[d]omestic class structure, particularly the extent and intensity of disaffection between élites 
and masses, is an obvious factor in assessing the strength or weakness of a state. When added to 
the nationality factor [and ethnic one], class divisions suggest the kind of political, threats 
whether domestically or externally mounted, to which specified states will be particularly 
sensitive.”141
                                                                                                                                                                         
By ‘functional presence of the state’ I refer here to the reach of the state in terms of the presence and
respect of recognized institutions, and in terms of a legal system. By ‘territorial presence of the state’ I
refer here to the reach of the state in terms of the physical presence of its armed forces, security forces,
schools, and other governmental agencies. Both concepts have been defined by Guillermo O´Donnell in
“Estado, Democratización y Ciudadanía,” Nueva Sociedad, Nº 28, Nov/Dec, 1993, pp.63-8
139 The concept of the weak/strong nature of the state used in this dissertation draws on the work of Barry
Buzan. One main difference with Buzan's work however is that whereas he utilizes only the
“sociopolitical cohesion” variable in order to determine the nature of the sate, in this dissertation I am
using three more variables (policy capacity, territorial centrality and socioeconomic development) in
order to define this concept. Another difference is that whereas in this dissertation “sociopolitical
cohesion” is defined in terms of two variables ( legitimacy and integration), Buzan  very vaguely defines
“sociopolitical cohesion” by using the following indicators: high levels of political violence; conspicuous
role for political police in the everyday lives of citizens; major political conflict over what ideology will
be used to organize the state; lack of a coherent national identity or the presence of contending national
identities within the state; lack of a clear and observed hierarchy of political authority and a high degree
of state control over the media. Some of this indicators are used in this dissertation to determine the
degree of legitimacy and integration of a given state (see Table 5, infra).
For Buzan’s definition of weak and strong states and “sociopolitical cohesion” see: Buzan, People, States
and Fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era, pp.96-107 and
140The legitimacy of the political regime will be defined here in the Weberian sense of  the existence of a
legitimate order when the ruled believe that the rulers have the right to rule. For a discussion of the issue
of the legitimacy of the state (as a territorial sociopolitical community) , the government and the political
regime as used in this dissertation see: Levi, Lucio, “Legitimidad” in Bobbio, Norberto; Matteucci,
Nicola and Pasquino, Gianfranco (eds.), Diccionario de Política, Volume II,,  Mexico D.F., Siglo XXI
Editores, 1988, pp.890-896 (Spanish edition of: Dizionario di politica, Torino, UTET, 1976, xi-1097 p.9)
141Buzan, People,States and Fear, p 241
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For the purposes of this dissertation it is important to notice that the vacuum left by the
absence of broadly accepted and respected institutions could promote the replacement of the
state by codes and practices of criminal groups or insurgent organizations. In that sense the
population could follow and obey para-state authorities and legal systems imposed by non-state
actors that challenge the state in terms of the use of armed force and the control of territory and
population. Also the absence of legitimate and representative institutions could favor and even
justify the emergence of insurgent groups that may attempt to change the political system. This
could be certainly reinforced under a situation of massive social exclusion and deep social
differences. Also a fragmented society along ethnic divisions can be in the absence of strong
and unifying political institutions, a cause for civil war and state disintegration.
Policy Capacity refers to the effective capability of the government of a state to
implement policies and extract resources from society (i.e. taxation) with this goal in mind.
Capacity in the context of this dissertation will be equated with what Michael Mann calls the
“infrastructural power of the state” (as an institution) as opposed to the “dominative or
coercive” power of the state. As he argues,
“Infrastructural power [is] the capacity of the [institutional base] of the state to penetrate civil 
society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.”142
A strong state, then, is a state that has the capability to extract, penetrate, regulate, and
appropriate resources from society.143 This variable is of course strongly linked to the degree
of legitimacy held by the state and the obedience of the population to the established
government. A state with a weak policy capacity will be less able to implement policies to
assure the security of the population and the territory. It will be also less able to reduce
weaknesses in all other variables mentioned here.
It is worth noting that a high degree of corruption will be considered as an indicator of a
low policy capacity.144  As explained by an analyst, a situation of widespread political
corruption weakens the state in the sense that it hinders its capacity to raise taxes (extract
resources) and enforce the law. Moreover, corruption hinders the socioeconomic development
of a country, leading to a misallocation of resources from government to private hands.145
                                                          
142Mann, Michael, “The Autonomous Power of  the State: Its Origins Mechanisms and Results,” in Hall,
John (ed.), States in History, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986, p.113.
143Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, p.15
144 For the scope of this dissertation, corruption will be defined as a “[b]ehavior which deviates from the
formal duties of a public role because of  private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique)
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding
influence”. See:  Nye, Joseph S., “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis” in
Heidenheimer, Arnold J., Johnston, Michael and Le Vine, Victor, Political Corruption: A Handbook, New
Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1989, p.966. Also for the scope of this dissertation the terms:
“corruption,” “political corruption” and “administrative corruption” will be used as synonyms.
145 Grondona, Mariano, La Corrupción, Buenos Aires, Planeta, 1993, p. 66
49
Socioeconomic development  is defined in terms of the living standards of the population,
the capacity of insertion of the economy in the international market, as well as the
characteristics of the productive sectors of the country. A weak socioeconomic development
will be associated with both the concepts of underdevelopment and of dependence.
Underdevelopment refers to a type of economic system with a predominant primary sector, a
high concentration of income, little diversification in its production system, and an external
market that far outweighs the internal one.146 Dependency refers to a situation in which the
accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic inside the system.147
Weak socioeconomic development will strongly condition the policy capacity of a state in
terms of the range of choices it has to solve problems that may cause strong social divisions and
political violence. Robert Rothstein for example affirms that,
“ The political process is thus heavily influenced by basic resource constraints that narrow the 
range of choice, no matter what the intention or the ideology.”148
Barry Buzan also affirms that,
“[w]eak states may find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and 
political power which leave them underdeveloped and  politically penetrated, and 
therefore unable to muster the economic and political resources necessary to build a stronger 
state”149
Territorial Centrality refers to the degree of monopoly of the armed forces by the
government of a state over the whole national territory, as well as its territorial and functional
presence and control over the entire territory and population without being matched by non-state
groups. As defined by Michael Mann,
“Centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a center to cover a 
territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-
making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.”150
Areas of territory out of the direct control of the government could, of course, favor the
rise and establishment of groups that could challenge the authority of the state.
Finally, we can bring all these elements together: a weak state will be defined in terms of
a low sociopolitical cohesion, a low policy capacity, a low territorial centralization and a low
socioeconomic development. For instance, states that are weak in the four variables will be
weaker than states that have only a low economic development but a high territorial
                                                          
146Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Faletto, Enzo, Dependency and Development in Latin America,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979, p. 17
147ibid., p. xx
148Rothstein, Robert, The Weak in the World of the Strong, New York, Columbia University Press, 1977,
p.187
149Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.99
150Mann, The Autonomous Power of the state, p. 112
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centralization and a high level of sociopolitical cohesion. At the same time there are several
ways in which these variables can be combined. For example, a state can be fragmented along
ethnic or social lines. Sometimes these two factors coincide. The poorest and more oppressed
sectors of society are also part of a separated and dominated ethnic group. In that sense a state
divided along both ethnic and social lines will be weaker than a state divided by strong social
differences, or one without strong social fragmentation and so on. In a weak state, deficiencies
in the software component of security are mutually reinforced (a dependent and underdeveloped
state will have, for example, fewer choices in terms of policy capacity). The vulnerability of the
state increases and also the variety and number of internal and external threats to the state.
Strong powers that are simultaneously strong states will care less about non-military threats than
weak states. The latter will have a far more complicated security dilemma in dealing with
traditional and non-traditional threats at the same time. In that sense, as Barry Buzan correctly
states, several powers that are strong in the hardware side of security can at the same time be
weak states in terms of the software side of security. As pointed out by Buzan,
“[w]eak  or strong states will refer to the degree of sociopolitical cohesion; weak or strong  powers
will refer to the traditional distinction among states in respect of their military and economic
capability in relation to each other […] Strength as a state neither depends on , nor correlates with,
power. Weak powers, like Austria, the Netherlands, Norway and Singapore, are all strong states,
while quite substantial powers, like Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia and Pakistan are all
rather weak as states.”151
It is not necessary to look only at the developing world to corroborate this fact; take for
instance the case of Russia or Italy, with their fragmented societies in ethnic and/or social terms,
and the presence of strong organized groups and armed bands in their territories.
While the term “power” (weak or strong) will refer to the military and economic
capabilities relevant for a military buildup, the term “state” (weak or strong) will be used in
terms of the social, political and economic cohesion of the state as well as the degree of
efficiency of state institutions.
Of course , an accurate measurement of the indicators of the variables listed above is very
difficult, if not impossible. This dissertation will combine several indicators in order to
elaborate two polar types (the weak state and the strong state). States can be closer to one or
another pole depending on the number of indicators they accumulate. Table 5 below shows the
two polar strong and weak state types. The South American states could be placed on a
continuum that ranges from strong to weak states. The indicators listed below could be used as a
                                                          
151Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War
Era, p.97-98 As we have seen before, whereas Barry Buzan defines the weak/strong nature of a state
along the sociopolitical cohesion dimension, in my work the weak/strong nature of a state is determined
by three other variables.
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cumulative index. The more conditions of weakness a state accumulates, the closer it will be to
the “weak state” pole. This continuum would not be static; states can move along it depending
on the increase or decrease of the variables listed in Table 5. States that are closer to the “weak”
pole are more vulnerable to military, economic, political, societal, and ecological threats. As this
dissertation will show, the emergence of threats is facilitated by the vulnerability of a given
state and, at the same time, these threats can contribute to deepen or even perpetuate the weak
nature of a state.
52
Table 7. Nature of the State: Polar Types
WEAK STATE STRONG  STATE
SOCIOPOLITICAL
COHESION
LOW HIGH
A-Fragile Political Legitimacy:
* Incomplete Nation Building
* “Weblike societies” (autonomous   communal groups)
(*)
* Strong loyalties to communal, ethnic and religious
groups.
* High levels of political violence
*  Major recent changes in the structure of political
institutions
* Conspicuous use of force by the state in domestic
political life
* Conspicuous role of political police in everyday lives of
citizens
* Major political conflict over what ideology will be used
to organize the state
* High degree of control over the media
B- Fragmented Societies:
* Presence of contending national identities within the
state
* Coexistence of several ethnic, religious and linguistic
groups within a state
* Highly unequal distribution of wealth
A-Strong Political Legitimacy:
*  Complete Nation Building
*  Pyramidal societies (recognized central authority)
* Common shared loyalty to the nation-state.
* Low levels of  political violence
* Stable and long lasting political institutions
* Rare or  non existent use of force by the state in
domestic political life
* Rare or non existent role of political police in everyday
life of citizens
* Absence of ideological polarization and major political
conflict
* No control over the media
B- Unified Societies:
* Coherent national identity and absence of contending
national identities within the state
* Absence substantial, ethnic, religious and  linguistic
differences within a state.
* Even distribution of wealth
POLICY CAPACITY LOW HIGH
* Rigid Policy Capacity
* Inefficient state apparatus
* High level of political corruption
* Flexible  Policy Capacity
* Efficient state apparatus
* Low of political corruption
SOCIOECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
LOW HIGH
* Low  level of industrialization
* Low level of per capita income
* Low level of productivity
* No access to major markets
* Dependence on foreign capital flows
* Dependence on export earnings
* Unequal  distribution of incomes
* High  level of  industrialization
* High level of  per capita income
* High level of productivity
*Access to major markets
* Local conditions for the reproduction of capital
* Large domestic markets
* Equality in the distribution of incomes
TERRITORIAL
CENTRALITY
LOW HIGH
* Weak presence of the state in frontier zones and areas
outside the major cities.
* Strong non-state organized armed groups
* Strong presence of the state in  frontier and areas
outside major cities.
* Absence of strong non-state organized armed groups
(*) The concept “Weblike societies” is used  here to refer to countries where there are autonomous communal groups and authorities
which compete with the authority of the state in the sense that there is parallel network of  institutions whose legitimacy is stronger
than the legitimacy of the state’s institutions and symbols. The concept draws on Joel Migdal who describes this kind of situation in
the following terms: “The ineffectiveness of state leaders who have faced impenetrable barriers to state predominance has stemmed
from the nature of the societies they have confronted -from the resistance posed by chiefs, landlords, bosses, rich peasants, clan
leaders, za’im, effendis, aghas, caciques, kulaks (for convenience, ‘strongmen’) through their various social organizations” and also
“ Weblike societies host a mélange of fairly autonomous social organizations.” The term “Weak Societies” is used here as opposed
to “Pyramidal Societies” understood as societies in which the central authority of the state is recognized and is not in competition
with any other form of authority. 152
This typology differs substantially from the one elaborated by Michael Handel in his
book “Weak States in the International System.”153 Handel elaborated two polar types (Weak
and Strong) following traditional military and economic variables. What Handel calls “strong”
                                                          
152Migdal, op.cit., pp.33 and 37
153Handel, Michael, Weak States in the International System, London, Frank Cass, 1981, p.52
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and “weak” states are, in the framework of this dissertation, strong and weak powers. Handel´s
typology is then a typology of strong and military powers in the traditional sense.
Another important comment on the typology is that the closest conceptual image to the
“weak state” polar type could be identified with what has been recently denominated as “failed
states” or  “collapsed states ”:
“[a] disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of sustaining
itself as a member of  the international community. Civil strife, government breakdown, and economic
privation are creating modern debellatios.” 154
“State collapse  is a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup or riot. It refers to a situation where
the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart and must be
reconstituted in some form old or new.”155
“[c]ollapse means that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed, as analyzed in various
theories of  the state [...] as the decision making center of government, the state is paralyzed and
inoperative: laws are not made, order is not performed and societal cohesion is not enhanced. As a
symbol of identity, it has lost its power of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their
social action. As a territory, it is no longer assured security and provisionment by a central sovereign
organization. As the authoritative political institution, it has lost its right to command and conduct
public affairs. As a system of socioeconomic organization, its functional balance of inputs and outputs
is destroyed,; it no longer receives support from nor exercises control over its people, and it no longer
is even the target of demands, because its people know that it is incapable of providing supplies.
No longer functioning, with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy
it has lost the right to rule.”156
It should be stated neither however that neither was the “weak state” polar type inspired
by the two concepts quoted above nor were they used as part of the definition. The images of
the “failed” and “collapsed state” seem to the author to be fairly illustrative of a state placed at
the weak extreme of the weak/strong continuum.
d) What poses the threat?
“  [d]rug trafficking appears to involve: 1) innumerable actors organized into private and public
economic networks or systems; 2) a rather well defined division of  labor on a multinational basis; 3)  a
complex set of attitudes , values, and behavioral norms; 4) avenues for laundering the flow of large cash
profits; 5) often a high level of violence; 6) a complex set of relationships with governments of various
nations that, in one way or another, find themselves related to , and sometimes profiting from , the traffic
in drugs. ”157
In the case of illicit drug traffic, non-state actors and non-governmental processes and
organizations threaten the state.158  The threat is not posed by the drug cartels, coca-growing
peasants, or the guerrillas as isolated actors but by the whole coca/cocaine complex. The threat
                                                          
154Helman, Gerald B. and Ratner, Seteven B., “ Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy, Nº 89,Winter
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stems from a transnational illegal activity that involves political as well as economic dimensions
and is driven by powerful non-state actors.
It is important to understand that the threat to security exists because of several particular
vulnerabilities of the nations of South America. Illicit drug traffic stems from several factors:
the lack of economic development in the Andean region, the fall in the prices of the exports of
these countries, the traditional utilization of coca-leaves in some of these countries, and the
vulnerabilities of the countries (Bolivia, Peru and Colombia), which are in the periphery of the
main producer countries. As Max Manwaring points out,
 “ Nonetheless, as important as instability might be in a national or transnational threat
environment, it is only a symptom-not the threat itself. Rather, the threat stems from a lack of
understanding and/or failure to alleviate the various manifestations of political, economic, and
social injustices that are at the root causes of instability. A related threat stems from a lack of
understanding and/or failure to deal properly with the conflicts that are the consequences of
instability. ”159
It is possible to argue that, in the case of drug trafficking in South America, the threat to
the state stems from a complex non-state actor, the cocaine industry. This criminal activity has
several political dimensions. In first place, the “firms” of this industry have control over the
entire production of cocaine with the exception of the growth of coca and the retail of the
product (United States/Europe/Japan). Further, they have developed a capacity to bribe
governmental officials, control areas of national territory, establish sporadic alliances with
guerrilla groups, and maintain their own private para-military groups  (the paradigmatic
example of these characteristics is Colombia).
At the other extreme of the industry are the coca growers--the peasants--who are
organized into strong trade unions (federaciones) and have a high capacity for resistance against
governmental attempts to eradicate illegal crops. Another dimension is U.S. pressure over the
main producer countries; this contributes to enhancing the enforcement against the traffickers,
eradicating illegal crops, and to causing a rising spiral of violence and instability. At the same
time, enforcement in one country only provokes the spillover of the problem into neighboring
countries in terms of production, transit, or legitimization of illegal profits.
As this dissertation will demonstrate, approaching the problems with military means only
worsens already existing security problems in producer countries and provokes a spillover of
some of these problems to neighboring countries. Augusto Varas, a Chilean security analyst
warned about the possibility of a worsening security problems because of the utilization of
military means for drug trafficking control. Varas stated that,
                                                                                                                                                                         
158This kind of non-traditional challenges to the states has been has been called by some authors as “Gray
Area Phenomena”  see for example: Max Manwaring ,The Umbrella of Legitimacy p.77
159Max Manwaring, ibid.
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“ The United States perceives narco-traffic and terrorism as the most important issues in the
territorial field. From a Latin American perspective, these issues should be handled by police
institutions instead of military ones. In order not to repeat errors of previous decades, it should
be necessary to emphasize the fact that these problems do not have a military nature [these
problems] are produced by local social and economic conditions as well as by the absence of
domestic political compromises. To deal with them form a military perspective could be
counterproductive, activating the problem instead of  providing effective solutions ”160
Military power is not always fungible from one issue area to another, above all when this
issue area is a market and there still exist a strong demand for the product, and an economic
incentive for the production of the goods. As correctly stated by Georges Lamazière, former
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil,
“ The fact is , however, that non-military threats by their very nature are more amenable to non-
military responses.[...] The so-called ‘new global problems’ require a cooperative and
multilateral approach more than a ‘realist’, power politics one. As Joseph S. Nye wrote in a
recent book, ‘ if military power could be transferred freely across economic and ecological
issues, then different structures would not matter, and the overall  hierarchy determined by
military strength would accurately predict outcomes in world politics [...]’ This complexity and
subtlety of the more serious non-military threats to security  make them intractable through the
use of  traditional power resources.”161
Cocaine trafficking became a source of serious concern at the beginning of the 1980s
because of a curious coincidence of two factors.  On one side, the debt crisis in the South
American states led to a fall in the prices of the main export products of the Andean countries
such as tin in Bolivia and coffee in Colombia.  On the other side, a sudden rise in cocaine
consumption occurred in the United Sates  (the major peak was 12 million consumers in 1985).
This resulted in a “coca/cocaine boom” in the Andean countries.  Bolivia and Peru-- where the
coca leaves were already produced for traditional consumption--generated an illicit parallel
economy based on the production of  raw material for cocaine. In certain regions of Colombia,
such as Antioquia, where other types of illicit trade and smuggling already existed, the final
manufacture and shipping of cocaine developed.
In the case of Peru and Colombia, this activity, linked with parallel developments such as
the emergence of guerrilla movements originated what an analyst has described as a.
“ ‘[f]eudalization’ process that imperils the very concept of a centralized nation-state. A number of
self-sufficient sectors have emerged, including guerrillas, drug traffickers, corrupt police forces,
bandits, the business/elite sector, and the peasantry each of whom manages its own parallel
economy of survival as well as its own parallel security. They have all learned to survive if not to
thrive in the chaos.”162
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In the case of Bolivia, the problem derives from the involvement of a large part of its
peasantry in the production of coca and coca paste.  As a matter of fact, this illegal activity
contributed to a major component of this country’s GNP. This induced growing social
instability because the resistance of the highly organized peasants to the eradication of coca
fields and to strong international pressure (the U.S.), enhanced social tensions that could
degenerate either in the rise of guerrilla movements or civil strife.
In the rest of South America, illicit drug traffic means a threat because of three factors:
First, because of the transnational nature of this activity, the groups involved in drug
trafficking activities link up with the counterparts abroad. The prospect of a spillover of drug
trafficking activities would aggravate already existing political, economic, and social problems
in countries that are struggling to consolidate their democracies.163 As the second chapter of
this work will explain, since the mid-1980s the clear division of labor delineated above began to
disappear. All South American countries, in one way or another, became involved in the cocaine
industry and began to suffer different kinds of threats to their national security.
Second, the routes of transit and production centers shift abroad as enforcement increases
in producer countries and transit areas. It is becoming more and more difficult to identify an
“Andean Core center” and an immediate periphery. As pointed by Virginia Gamba,
“Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay must cope with alarming situations in neighboring
countries that threaten to spill over into their territories. ”164
Finally, during the Reagan and Bush administrations, the United States  (an extra-
regional actor) defined drug trafficking as a matter of national security, holding that the rise in
cocaine consumption constitutes a threat to that country’s social fabric.165 As will be
demonstrated in this dissertation, the U.S. military approach to the problem worsened the
situation in South America, where the illegal drug traffic effects the sovereignty of these states
and the effective political control over their own territories.
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C- HYPOTHESIS
From this theoretical framework the following set of hypotheses will structure this work:
• An increase in the level of militarization of enforcement policies applied against the actors
involved in drug trafficking activities will lead to a reactive increase in the paramilitary
capabilities of these actors or to a reactive formation by these actors of non-state armed
groups.
• Whether or not there is a preexisting situation of drug trafficking-related violence against
the state by the actors involved in drug trafficking activities, an increase in level of
militarization of enforcement policies applied against these actors will generate a reactive
increase in such violence.
•  An increase in the level of militarization of enforcement policies applied against drug
trafficking activities will lead to a shift of these activities towards the borders with
neighboring countries.
• An increase in the level of drug trafficking-related violence will lead to a reactive
movement across borders by refugees as well as non-state armed actors seeking sanctuary in
neighboring countries.
• A shift of drug trafficking activities to the borders, coupled with a movement of refugees
and non-state armed actors into neighboring countries, will increase threats to these
neighboring countries.  This includes threats to the population, territory, and political
stability, and will generate national security problems in these countries.
• An increase in the level of militarization of enforcement policies against the actors involved
in drug trafficking activities will lead the governments of the neighboring countries to
believe that drug trafficking activities will spread from border regions into their national
territories, thus threatening their states.
• An increase in the level of drug trafficking-related violence in the producer countries will
lead the governments of neighboring countries to believe that drug trafficking activities,
refugees, and armed non-state actors will spread to their national territories and that this will
threaten their states.
It is important to notice that within the scope of this dissertation,  “enforcement” is used
as a synonym of “imposition by force.” That is, enforcement policies make reference to the
control of drug trafficking activities by the threat of the use of force and the use of force.166
                                                          
166 For the sake of simplicity the terms “enforcement policies against the cocaine industry”,
“enforcement,” and “enforcement policies” will be used as synonyms and interchangeable terms. Both
terms of course must be differentiated from “peace enforcement,” which for the purposes of this
dissertation exclusively refers to a collective security mechanism implying the threat or use of  military
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Within the scope of this dissertation, two types of drug trafficking control policies are analyzed:
enforcement policies and non-enforcement policies. The second type of policies implies the
curtailment of drug trafficking activities through policies that do not imply the use of force.
Table 8 gives a classification of enforcement and non-enforcement policies.
Table 8. Classification of drug trafficking control policies
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES NON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES
*Interdiction (Disruption of criminal organizations
and Destruction of laboratories)
*Forced eradication of plantations
*Alternative development programs
( encouragement through economic incentives for
the production of alternative legal crops)
*Voluntary eradication (positive monetary
incentives to encourage the voluntary destruction
of illegal crops.
*Reduction of condemnations/ amnesty for
traffickers in exchange for a reduction in their
illegal activities.
Militarization of enforcement policies refers to a series of policies that range from the
utilization of police forces organized along military lines (that is, with military training,
equipment, and chain-of-command) at the bottom to the intervention of a multinational drug
control military force. Higher degrees of militarization involve higher use of firepower against
the actors involved in drug trafficking activities and therefore higher levels of force. Table 9
illustrates the levels of militarization that will be used as analytical tools in this dissertation. The
classification below follows the pattern of evolution of the means employed by both the
governments of the producer countries and by the United States since the early 1980s, when the
parallel increase in cocaine production in South America and the cocaine/crack consumption in
the United States began. In that sense, the process of militarization does not start with the direct
involvement of the armed forces in enforcement activities against drug trafficking, but with the
militarization of the counter-drug units of the police. In countries like Peru, Bolivia, and
Colombia, these units operate under the same training and with the same equipment as the army.
                                                                                                                                                                         
force in order to restore international peace and security as stated in article 42 of the UN Charter. A
similar mechanism is established in Chapter 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Río
de Janeiro, 1947) which establishes the measures and procedures that must be adopted according to
Article 29 of the Charter of the Organization of American States if  “the inviolability or the integrity of
the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an
armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extra continental conflict or
by a conflict between two or more American states, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger
the peace of America…”
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Table 9. Level of militarization of enforcement policies against drug trafficking
POLICE MATTER (LOW) MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
(HIGH)
FOREIGN INTERVENTION
(TOTAL)
*special para-military police
forces
*special para-military police
forces in cooperation with D.E.A
agents
*special para-military forces
supported by U.S. military
advisors
*Armed Forces
*Armed Forces with U.S.
military advisors
*Armed Forces with U.S.
military personnel
*U.S. military intervention by
request of the producer countries'
government
*U.S. blockade
*U.S. unilateral military
intervention
*Multilateral military
intervention
Concrete examples of these processes of militarization will be given in the chapters
corresponding to the evolution of enforcement policies in Colombia and Bolivia.
Finally, for the scope of this dissertation “drug trafficking-related violence” is defined as
the use, the display, or the threat of physical force by actors directly or indirectly involved in
drug trafficking activities.167 Several types of drug trafficking-related violence are developed
in chapters IV (Colombia) and VI (Bolivia) of this work. These types are constructed based on
who perpetrates the violence, his (or her) motivations, who is victimized, and where the
violence takes place.
D- POINTS OF DIVERGENCE WITH SIMILAR WORKS ON THE TOPIC OF DRUG
TRAFFICKING AND SECURITY
The goal of this section is not to make an extensive critical review of all the academic
work dealing with the issue of drug trafficking and national security. That would certainly be a
diversion from the original scope of this dissertation, analyzing the national security
problematique caused by the spillover effect of militarized enforcement policies and by drug
trafficking in South America. This section will instead focus on the work of Ivelaw L. Griffith,
who approached the relation of drug trafficking and security from a similar theoretical
framework to the one used in this dissertation. As an expert on the Caribbean region, Griffith
focuses his work in that region on the goal of showing how what he calls in general terms “the
problem of drugs” can affect the sovereignty of the Caribbean nations.  As stated by Griffith,
                                                          
167By “indirectly related to drug trafficking activities,” I refer to actors that do not form part of drug
trafficking chain but who temporarily collude with drug traffickers or coca producing peasants. This is the
case for example of guerrilla groups operating in coca/cocaine producing areas, right wing para-military
groups, corrupt members of the armed forces or police/security forces at the service of drug traffickers,
and foreign mercenaries at the service of drug traffickers.
The definition of violence used here is inspired from the definition given by Harlod Nieburg: “Violence
can be unambiguously defined as the most direct and  severe form of physical power. It is force in action.
Its use is a continuation of bargaining by other means, whether it is used by the state, by private groups,
or by persons.” Nieburg, H.L., Political Violence. The Behavioral Process, New York, St. Martin’s Press,
1969, p. 11.
60
“There is thus , need for a comprehensive study of drug operations, their security 
implications, and efforts to combat them. The first task in this endeavor is to understand the
nature of the problems that place the sovereignty of the states in the Caribbean under siege.”168
There is already a point of divergence between this dissertation and Griffith’s work in the
definition of the problem, which is at the source of a security problem.
Whereas this dissertation specifically addresses the issue of “illicit drug traffic” (as
defined above in this chapter), Griffith refers to the “problem of drugs” in general terms
including consumption and abuse.
“What is often called ‘the drug problem’ is actually a multidimensional dilemma with four 
problem areas: production, consumption and abuse, trafficking and money laundering.”169
In that sense, Griffith includes not only the industry, but also the market for the industry,
as a security problem. Within the scope of my dissertation, however, the problem of
consumption is only analyzed as a consequence of increasing production in a producer country
and traffic through a transshipment or neighboring transshipment country, that is, as a collateral
dimension of drug trafficking and not as a problem as such.
The use of the term “security” is also different in both works. Griffith refers to “drugs” as
a problem of  “security” without referring to the object of security. It is difficult to grasp in
Griffith’s work what the object of security is and why. Within his work, security could be a
problem of “individuals,” or “ institutions,” or “the civil society,” or “the economy.”  As
defined by Griffith security is defined as,
“protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from external military attack and 
coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosion of cherished, political economic and 
social values.”170
A main difference, then, between Griffith’s work and this dissertation is that my work
clearly refers to drug trafficking as a problem of  “national security,” that is, as a problem of the
security of the state as defined above in this chapter. Also, security is defined as a result of the
interrelation between the (strong/weak) nature of the state, existent or latent threats, and the
security environment of a state.171 Whereas an analysis of the meaning of  “threat” and the
                                                          
168Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean, p. 22
169ibid., p. 2
170ibid., p.5
171 Prior to “ Drugs and Security in the Caribbean,” Griffith analyzes the security problematique of the
“small” Commonwealth Caribbean states in terms of the security perceptions of their political elites, their
security capability, and the geopolitical environment of these countries. The analysis and the definition of
terms used by Griffith is, however, substantially different from the one made in this dissertation. He does
not refer to weak/strong states but to “small states” without defining this term. By  “security capabilities”
he refers to the geography, human resources (basically the population), material resources (natural
endowment), political regimes, military resources, and alliances and international and political
agreements of these nations. As far as the security perceptions of Caribbean elites are concerned, no
particular methodology is used. Griffith describes which are the concerns of these elites in military,
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development of a typology of threats is present in this work, it is absent in Griffith´s work. Also
Griffith neither analyzes in depth the problematique of the nature of the state nor does he
develop a means of observing the weak/strong nature of the state. In that sense the typologies of
threat and states developed in this dissertation represent (I hope) an innovative contribution to
the field of security studies.
A major similarity between the two works is that we have both drawn on basically the
same authors, particularly Barry Buzan, in order to analyze drug trafficking as a problem of
security within a given region. In addition, we are both using a “broad” definition of security
that goes beyond military threats and we are also both analyzing security as a multidimensional
problem with military, economic, political, societal, and ecological dimensions.172
However, there is a difference in the way these theoretical tools are used. In the case of
Griffith in the introduction to his book “Drugs and Security in the Caribbean,” there is a brief
definition and general analysis of military, political , economic and ecological concerns caused
by “drugs.”173 This general analysis refers to a collection of examples taken from cases all
around the world. However when he does his analysis of drugs and security in the Caribbean
(his case study) Griffith does not strictly apply the conceptual tools developed in his
methodological introduction. On the contrary, he uses vague categories such as “Crime, Justice,
and Public order,” “Arms Trafficking, Corruption, and Governance,” and “Economic and Public
Policy” to refer to the chapters analyzing the problematique of security stemming from “drugs”.
It is up to the reader to realize which one of the numerous examples given in these chapters
correspond to the categories mentioned in his methodological introduction.174 This points to
another difference with this dissertation, which, in the chapters concerning Venezuela and
Argentina, assesses the national security implication of each kind of threat (military, political,
economic, societal and ecological) according to their (overt \ latent) status and to their intensity.
Instead of giving the reader several problems to classify in different categories, here the
                                                                                                                                                                         
political, and economic terms. On this issue see: Griffith, Ivelaw Lloyd, The Quest for Security in the
Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1993, pp. 3-85
172Actually, the societal dimensions of security are not analyzed by Griffith as a separate category. They
are not mentioned in his work.
173Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean, pp.4-13
174 In my view Griffith makes a more clear analysis of the “drug problem” political and military security
dimensions for the Caribbean nations in two previous works, namely:  Drugs and Security in the
Commonwealth Caribbean, The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Volume XXXI,
March 1993, Nº 1, pp. 70-102 and The Quest for Security in the Caribbean, pp. 243-275. In both works
Griffith makes a “by (political, military and economic) security dimension” analysis of  “drugs” as a
security problem in the Caribbean. Along similar lines to this dissertation, “drugs” have a political
security dimension because “Drug corruption” undermines the credibility of governments, impairs the
ability of government agencies to protect the public interest, and can warp the ability of politicians and
bureaucrats to adequately define national interest.  The military dimension, on the other hand, is
associated with gun running, the decrease of security agents due to corruption, and the rise of “vigilante”
groups due to government incompetence. See: Griffith, The Quest for Security in the Caribbean, pp. 225-
265 and same author, Drugs and Security in the Commonwealth Caribbean, pp.84-93
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problems are already classified by category. Let us take the analogy of educational toys for
children: in this dissertation, similar objects are already in the same box so the reader can take
them out and observe them instead of having to place them into different “boxes” according to
their shape and color.
Finally, there is a difference in the way military implications of drug trafficking are
defined in Griffith’s work and in mine. While Griffith attributes a military character to the
armed capabilities of subnational actors,175 this work considers that military threats are only
posed by other state actors.176 In this sense,  the military threats posed by drug trafficking stem
from its potential to indirectly worsen or catalyze already latent inter-state conflicts. For the
scope of my work, the armed capabilities of subnational actors is categorized as a political threat
in the sense that it challenges territorial centrality, the capacity of a state, and may ultimately
challenge the survival of the institutional component of the state itself.
The next chapter will delimit South America as a security complex in terms of the shared
threats and vulnerabilities of a group of states vis-a-vis the cocaine industry and vis-a-vis the
consequences of enforcement policies by the United States as the as an extra-regional
hegemonic power. The weak/strong typology developed in this chapter will be used in order to
identify the shared vulnerabilities of the South American states. The following chapters of this
dissertation will deal with the analysis of the security dimensions of drug trafficking in South
America as previously defined in this chapter.
                                                          
175 “Military security is concerned with violence and the instruments used to prosecute it, whether for
offense or defense, and whether by states or subnational groups,” Griffith, Drugs and Security in the
Caribbean, p.5
176In that sense, following the definition given by Buzan, military threats in the scope of this dissertation
concerns “two level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states’
perceptions of each other’s intentions,” Buzan, People, states and Fear, p.19.
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CHAPTER II:  SOUTH AMERICA, A REGION OF WEAK STATES
A- INTRODUCTION
The title of this dissertation makes reference to “drug trafficking and national security in South
America.” This suggests the idea that there is a group of states that can be collectively identified
as a particular region of the world called “South America.” This particular set of states can at
the same time be differentiated from other set of states in the Western Hemisphere such as
“Central America,” “North America” and “the Caribbean.” The criteria used in this dissertation
for establishing such a regional division is the existence of common and shared national security
problems. “Region” in the context of this work will be used as a synonym of  “security
complex” defined as:
“ A group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their
national securities  cannot realistically be considered apart form one another. The name has the
advantage of indicating both the character of the attribute that defines the set ( security), and the
notion of intense interdependence that distinguishes any particular set from its neighbors ”177
The regional security problematique stems from the fact that security is a relational
phenomenon in the sense that,
“ one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the
international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded” 178
A  “region” will be not analyzed as an object of security or as an entity that can be
threatened as such, but as the result of the interaction of a group of states which share the same
security environment as well as a similar pattern of vulnerabilities and threats.  The boundaries
of the region will be defined by shared patterns of interstate relations as well as shared patterns
of  “intermestic” relations in the sense that domestic problems in one state can threaten the
national security of its neighbors. 179
Drug trafficking has a transnational dimension because the non-state actors that
participate in the cocaine industry act across the national borders and establish relationships
with their counterparts in other countries without taking into account the sovereignty of the
states. At the same time, this illegal activity shifts across the borders when it is repressed in one
state. The cocaine industry represents also a threat to the regional security as all states share a
                                                          
177Barry Buzan, People, State and Fears, p.190
178 “Because security is relational, one cannot understand the national security of a given state without
understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which is embedded,” Buzan, op.cit.
p.187
179Hirst and Rico, Latin America’s Security Agenda, p.257
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security concern towards the same phenomenon. A security complex is then a region primarily
defined in conflict and security terms. 180
This chapter delimits South America as a differentiated region or “security complex” in
terms of the nature of the South American states, the drug trafficking patterns in the region, and
also in terms of the spillover of drug trafficking-related violence and drug trafficking activities
from drug producer to neighboring countries.
Xavier Raufer, defines “Gray Zones” as areas in some regions of the planet where nation
states can impose neither their authority nor exert the monopoly of violence.181 Criminal
organizations, guerrillas, and warlords dominate zones such as the Golden Triangle between
China, Laos, Thailand and Burma or the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. As South America produces
80% of the cocaine consumed in the world, this region has at least four Gray Zones (or perhaps
they should be renamed white like cocaine):  the southeast part of Colombia, the Peruvian
oriental Andes (especially the Upper Huallaga Valley), the Beni region in Bolivia, and the
Brazilian Amazon. Also, powerful non-state actors linked directly or indirectly to the cocaine
industry control large areas in the border between Venezuela and Colombia.
Drug trafficking will be analyzed as a common threat and a national security concern of a
group of countries that share a similar pattern of vulnerabilities, a common security
environment and a similar pattern of interaction with the United States as an extra-regional
hegemonic actor. All these elements define a security complex. In this case South America is a
security complex vis à vis the cocaine (and increasingly the heroin) industry. A similar approach
could be used for the security problematique of East Asia (the “Golden Crescent”- Pakistan and
Afghanistan-) and South East Asia (the “Golden Triangle”- Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia
and South West China-) vis à vis the opium-heroin industry.
In this dissertation the region will be delimited by two aspects. The first aspect is a
traditional geopolitical division between South America, Central America, the Caribbean, and
Mexico, which will take into account patterns of conflict-cooperation between these countries as
well as their relations vis-à-vis the United States as the hegemonic actor in the Western
Hemisphere in the Post-World War II era. The term “geopolitics” will be used here in two
senses.  First, geopolitics is a method of foreign analysis which aims to understand, explain and
predict international political behavior primarily in terms of geographical variables, such as
location, size, climate, topography, demography, natural resources, and technological
development and potential and by which political identity and action is seen to be (more or less)
determined by geography. The second sense is “geopolitics” as the study of situations of power
                                                          
180Ayoob, Mohammed, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the
International System, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995, p.59
181Raufer, Xavier, Les superpuissances du crime: Enquête sur le narco-terrorisme, Paris, Plon, 1993, p.
35
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rivalries, power relations, and patterns of cooperation and conflict between states at a global or
regional level. 182
The second delimitation (and the most relevant one for the scope of this dissertation) is a
"drug trafficking geopolitics" division. Drug trafficking geopolitics refers in the context of this
work to the role of each country in the production or transport of illicit drugs and also in terms
(and this is the more important aspect) of patterns of conflict, cooperation and power relations
between: 183
a) non-state actors directly or indirectly involved in drug trafficking activities (e.g.
peasants, traffickers, guerrillas) and states;184 and
b) Between states and particularly between illicit drug producing countries and their
neighbors and illicit drug producing countries and the United States as an extra-regional
hegemonic power with a particular interest in curtailing the supply of illicit drugs.
The concept of drug trafficking geopolitics as used in the context of this dissertation also
includes patterns of interaction between the common vulnerability of a particular group of
countries and the threats posed by drug trafficking activities.
While Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean are linked to the production of heroin
(Mexico and Guatemala) and marijuana (Caribbean Islands/Mexico), South America is the core
of the cocaine industry. If it is true that Mexico and the other two regions are linked to the
cocaine industry through money laundering activities  (Caribbean) and transshipment (Mexico
and Caribbean) towards the United States, from a security perspective South America
constitutes a “security complex” in terms of the illicit drug traffic problem, because of the
spillover of these activities from the Andean countries to its periphery, and because of a set of
vulnerabilities of the South American countries that will be discussed later in this chapter.
B-THE REGION
a) Traditional geopolitical delimitation of South America
Traditionally South America has been divided into two main groups of states:  the
Andean countries and the Southern Cone. The first group is formed by Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Colombia and Venezuela. These countries share similar geography, a high percentage of Indian
                                                          
182 See: Evans, G, The Dictionary of World Politics, p. 136 for the first meaning and Lacoste, Yves,
Dictionaire de Géopolitique, Paris, Flammarion, 1993, p.3, for the second meaning.
183This concept draws on Rosa de Olmo, “La geopolítica del narcotráfico en América Latina,”  in Centro
de Estudios de las Relaciones Internacionales y el Desarrollo, CERID, El impacto del capital finaciero del
narcotráfico en el desarrollo de América Latina, Simposio Internacional, La Paz, Ediciones CERID, 1991,
especially pp. 37-58.
184By non-state actor I refer here to groups or entities that are not states or are not acting on behave of a
state.
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population (in the case of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia), and a particular configuration of
historical rivalries and territorial disputes between them (e.g. Ecuador and Peru over their
Amazon border and Venezuela and Colombia over their territorial waters in the Caribbean sea).
With the exception of Bolivia and Venezuela, they all share a coastline in the Pacific Ocean.
The more important indicator of their common identity is that this group demonstrated their
joint economic and political will through the signing of the Andean Pact in 1960.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay form the Southern Cone. Argentina,
Chile, and Uruguay have in common a high degree of European immigration as well as a strong
middle class and long democratic experiences (albeit with military interruptions). Argentina and
Chile have traditionally had geopolitical ambitions over the same areas (the Patagonian
Channels and the access to Antarctica). Argentina and Brazil have been traditional rivals since
the last century; nevertheless, a process of economic integration and political cooperation has
been in progress since the early 1980s, a process that is being accelerated by the consolidation
of their democracies. Moreover in 1991, after an Argentine-Brazilian process of integration
initiated in 1985, Paraguay, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil agreed to form a Common Market
(for the moment the process of integration has resulted in a customs union –MERCOSUR).
In a previous work I did not include Guyana, Suriname and French Guyana as part of the
region because these countries and overseas dominions (in the case of French Guyana) are
generally considered part of the Caribbean from both a classical geopolitical point of view and
from their role in drug trafficking.185  Moreover, neither are these countries are particularly
relevant for the region from a traditional regional security perspective nor do they play an
important role in drug trafficking activities.186
This dissertation will assume the risk of defying existent literature and consider Guyana
and Suriname (French Guyana will only be considered for the analysis of its interaction as part
of France with Suriname in security terms. I will not go in depth here about the French security
                                                          
185I am referring to my M.A. dissertation “The Illicit Drug Traffic as  a Non Military Aspect of Security
in South America. Issues and Policies of a Transshipment Country: Argentina (1989-1994)” (see supra.)
As examples of geopolitical and security works that consider the three Guyana’s as part of the Caribbean
see: Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, Boulder, Westview Press,
1989,421p. ; Heine, Jorge and Maginat, Leslie, The Caribbean and World Politics: Cross Currents and
Cleavages, London, Holmes & Meier, 1988, 385p.; Salkin, Yves, “Regard, stratégique sur les Guyanes,”
Defense Nationale, July 1989, pp. ; Griffith, Ivelaw, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty
Under Siege, supra.
As an example, for operational purposes UNDCP officials consider Guyana, Suriname and French
Guyana to be part of the Caribbean. Interview with a UNDCP official of UNDCP´s Latin America and
Caribbean Section, Vienna, January 1997.
186 As will be shown later in this dissertation, Suriname is, since the early 1990s, becoming an important
cocaine transshipment point towards Europe, particularly to the Netherlands.
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concerns in terms of the interest of this state in French Guyana) as an overlapping sub-complex
within South America. 187
Traditionally Guyana and Suriname have been considered as part of the Caribbean
because they are geographically isolated from the rest of South America by the Amazon rain
forest at the Rondônia mountain chain.  In addition, they share a common colonial past with the
rest of the Caribbean islands and are culturally attached to the Dutch and British ex-colonies of
the Caribbean. Both states perceive themselves as Caribbean countries and participate in the
political, economic and security arrangements of the region such as the Caribbean Community
and Common Market (CARICOM).188 At the same time, the United States considers Guyana
and Suriname as part of a broad concept of the Caribbean Area.189 On the other side there
exists a pattern of territorial disputes and security concerns between Guyana and Suriname and
other South American states and between Suriname and France (because of the D.O.M of
French Guyana).
Venezuela and Guyana have a territorial dispute over the territory of Essequibo (almost
half of Guyana), which Venezuela claims as a province. The situation escalated in 1982 when
political pressure from Venezuela increased; there were fears in the region of a possible military
solution to the problem following the example of the Argentine landing in the
Malvinas/Falklands Islands the same year.190 Suriname and Guyana have an old territorial
dispute over 9,000 square miles of land in the remote and uninhabited interior area of the “New
River Triangle” formed by the Corentyne - Kutari Rivers and the New River. French Guyana
and Suriname have a territorial dispute over a remote and uninhabited area of the border, but the
most important and serious problem between France and Suriname occurred between  1986 to
1992. During these years the government of Suriname was facing the challenge of two ethnic
guerrillas groups (which, at the same time, were fighting one another):  the Surinamese
Liberation Army (SLA) or Jungle Commando (made up boschnegers, a Dutch term that refers
to the descendants of fugitive slaves who inhabit the interior jungle) and the Tucayana guerrillas
                                                          
187The idea of  identified subcomplexes within a security complex as subgroups with particularly high
local security interdependence has been suggested by  Barry Buzan in:
"Third World Regional Security in Structural and Historical Perspective,” in Job, Brian (ed.), The
Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of  Third World States, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1992, p. 175;
Peoples, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p.l99
and “A Framework for Regional Security Analysis” in Buzan, Barry and Rizvi, Gowher and Foot,
Rosemary (eds.), South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers, London, McMillan, 1986, pp. 9 and 12.
188See:  Salkin, Regard, stratégique sur les Guyanes,p.128; Anouilh, Dominique, La France,la  Guyane et
la guérrilla (1986-1992): implications de la crise surinamienne en Guyane Française, Toulouse, Groupe
de recherche en histoire immediate,1995, p.27, Heine and Maginat, The Caribbean and World Politics,
pp. 3 to 5 and Atkins, Latin America in the international political system, p.32
189See: Portales, “ South American Regional Security and the United States,” in Varas, Augusto (ed.),
Hemispheric Security and U.S. Policy in Latin America, Boulder, Westview, 1989, p.144
190See: Child, Jack, Geopolitics and conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors, New York,
Praeger,1985, p.160
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(Amazon Amerindians who had originally been armed by the government to fight the Jungle
Commando).191 The brutal repression against the boschnegers caused a major influx of
refugees into French Guyana and the Jungle Commandos started to use refugee camps in French
Guyana as logistical bases and sanctuaries. These cross-border activities of armed groups were
seen as a threat to a spatial launching base in Kourou.  They were also seen as a threat to the
internal political stability in the dominion because of the danger of ethnic conflicts and violent
reactions against the influx of refugees (the economy of the dominion is extremely weak and the
refugees were perceived as a cause of unemployment by the local population).192 The
insurgency finished in 1992 under an agreement signed with the boshnegers, the Tucayana, and
the new democratic government (after elections in 1991). The former rebels recognized the
government’s authority over the entire territory while the government committed to
guaranteeing the territorial autonomy of the Tucayanas and boschnegers (and their security from
the incursions of the other group).  The former guerrillas were also granted the right to serve in
the army, to participate in public administration, and to engage  in forestry and gold
prospecting.193
Because of its evident military and political importance in the region, Brazil has
attempted to play the role of mediator in the conflicts between Guyana and Venezuela and
Guyana and Suriname. As pointed out by an analyst,
“Brazil, the one country that shares a border with all of these nations (Colombia, Venezuela,
Guyana and Suriname) and yet has disputes with none of them, has watched these various
conflictual strains with considerable interest […] One theme in Brazil’s geopolitical writing is that,
as the United States begins its inevitable decline as a Caribbean power, Brazil must be prepared to
fill part of the power vacuum that the United States will leave behind. With typical Brazilian
discretion, Brazil’s actions with regard to several of these states have begun to fill some of this
perceived power vacuum. Thus, Brazil has offered military assistance and arms to both Guyana
and Suriname […] Brazilian military sources have also expressed concern that, if Venezuela does
make any military move against Guyana, such a move could involve Venezuelan military
incursions into Brazilian territory. For all these reasons, the creation of a Brazilian ‘rapid
deployment force’ and the strengthening of Brazilian garrisons along the northern borders have
been interpreted as manifestations of increasing concern.”194
During the Cold War period there were also Brazilian concerns when the military regime
of Desi Bouterse in Suriname allied itself with Cuba and Libya. Brazil saw the possible
“cubanization” of Suriname as a clear political threat at that time.195
                                                          
191 See: McDonough, James, “Suriname: History,” in  South America, Central America and the
Caribbean, 1999, Seventh Edition, London, Europa Publications, 1999,p. 619
192See: McDonough, op.cit, p.619. For an excellent analysis of this cross border problem see Anouilh,
op.cit., entire.
193 See:McDonough, op.cit., p.620
194Child,Geopolitics and Conflict in South American, p.162
195 See: Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America, p.164. Lieutenant Colonel Desi Bouterse
(president 1980-1987 and current ‘strong man’ behind the scenes) started to change his position after the
invasion of Grenada in 1983 by the U.S. and finally expelled Cuban and Libyan advisors and changed the
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Guyana and Suriname are party to the Amazon Pact and participate actively in the
consultation mechanisms established by the pact.196 Together with representatives from
Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia, members of the governments of
Guyana and Suriname participated in 1989 in two ministerial summits (held in Manaus and
Quito) that attempted to revitalize the Pact. At the meetings, representatives also attempted to
adopt a common position against some international moves to denominate the Amazon rain
forest as “common heritage of humankind.” All these governments agreed to cooperate to keep
the ecological integrity in the region and restate their sovereign rights over the Amazon portion
of national territory. In this way, Guyana and Suriname are linked to the other South American
states by institutional arrangements and common shared concerns.
South America is clearly differentiated from Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean
as a security complex. South America has a different conflict-cooperation dynamic among
members of the region and, more importantly, has a different type of interaction with the United
States as the hegemonic power in the Western Hemisphere. 197 Mexico, for example, shares its
northern border with the superpower and stands apart in the Western Hemisphere because of the
special structure of bilateral relations it shares with the United States, in addition to its inter-
American and other international relations. Also as noted by G. Pope Atkins,
“Mexico has always been of significant interest to one or another or the world’s great powers, but
the United States has long been the principal foreign presence in Mexico (and the foreign menace,
in the eyes of many Mexicans). As a consequence, the Mexican-U.S. relationship is largely
divorced from the greater inter-American arena. Many of the issues are ‘North American’ in
content and closely associated with the domestic concerns in each country; the relationship has
been determined primarily by territorial proximity and increasingly integrated economic and social
structures.”198
                                                                                                                                                                         
orientation of the regime in 1987 under constant political and economic pressure from the U.S. and the
Netherlands (which cut the substantial economic aid to the country).
196 The Amazon Pact is a treaty of economic cooperation and development signed by all the states that
share the Amazon Basin. The pact was signed in 1978.
197The term “Latin America” is generally used to refer to all the geographic area of the Western
Hemisphere located at the south of  the Río Grande. The term may be useful to refer to a geographic area
with common cultural patterns, and social, political and economic problems. However, the term Latin
America will not be used here to refer to a region in security terms. This area comprises the Caribbean
Basin, Central America, South America and Mexico--three set of states that, in terms of shared security
problems (including different degrees of U.S. influence and direct intervention), have different
problematiques and can be considered as separate security complexes. In that sense there are several
security complexes which overlap within a cultural and linguistic area. Mexico, then, could be viewed as
a “buffer” state between North American (the United States, Canada and Mexico) and Caribbean and
Central American security complexes in the sense that, as defined by Buzan, it  “ define[s] and occup[ies]
the boundaries of indifference between the self-contained dynamics on either side of them,” See: Buzan,
People States and Fear, p.196.
198 Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, p.31
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 This differentiated pattern of interaction has become more evident since the recent
process of economic integration between Canada, the U.S., and Mexico (the NAFTA
agreement).
Central America and the Caribbean, on the other hand, have been in the U.S. sphere of
influence increasingly since the end of the 19th century. The United States is seen as the
international policeman in the area. Also, most of the area is part of a U.S. bilateral trading
system. Whereas U.S. military intervention in South America is a potential danger, in Central
America and the Caribbean it is a current and common historical fact. As explained by a group
of analysts,
“Toute la zone composée du Mexique, de l'Amérique centrale et des Caraïbes présente une forte
spécificité, par la proximité des Etats Unis, le caractère des conflits qui s’y déroulent, la présence
d’un pays appartenant au bloc soviétique [Cuba during the Cold War] , le phénomène
d’atomisation surtout propre aux Caraïbes et même l’importance de la couverture médiatique qui
lui est accordée. Cette spécificité est encore renforcée par l'évolution récente qui lie de plus en plus
l'économie du  Méxique a celle du reste de l'Amérique du Nord....”199
Since the beginning of the century, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean are a first
security perimeter of the United States, particularly because of the Panama Canal and the
geographical proximity to its territory.  Moreover, the Caribbean and Central America still
coexist with an “old” aspect of the regional security agenda because of the Cuban regime. 200
The invasion of Panama in 1989 in the final phase of the Cold War and  U.S. efforts to
internationally isolate Cuba show that U.S. interventionism in Central America and the
Caribbean seem to be a persistent historical trend.
b) Drug trafficking geopolitical delimitation: a deadly international division of labor
From the point of view of the role of the region in drug production (as well as the pattern
of conflict and cooperation between state and non-state actors stemming from this activity),
South America is the main cocaine producing area in the world.201 The industry principally
                                                          
199André, Catherine, Couderc M. and Grandi, J.., L'avenir d'un continent : puissances et périls en
Amérique du Sud, Fondation pour les études de défense nationale : Diffusé par la Documentation
française, Paris, 1989, p. 8
200Alejandro Deusta, Sur America: La seguridad regional frente al 2000, in Opciones para el logro de una
seguridad común el Sudamerica, Centro Regional de las Naciones Unidas para la paz , el desarme y el
desarrollo en America Latina y el Caribe, Lima-Peru, 1991, p.326
201 As stated in Chapter I, although it is true that since the mid-1990s heroin production is increasing in
Colombia, neither is this production integrated with the so called-Mexican Cartels nor has heroin
production resulted in a vertically integrated industry across the Andean countries as it happened with the
cocaine industry. The heroin industry is then localized in Colombia and controlled by the Norte del Valle
Cartel. Moreover, while Mexican cartels produce a low quality heroine called “Black Tar” the Colombian
traffickers are competing with South Asian criminal organizations in the production of  a highly pure and
snortable kind of heroin. Colombian traffickers have also shifted to the East Caribbean (mainly the Virgin
Islands, Puerto Rico and the British Caribbean) as a traffic route in order to avoid the control of
trafficking routes by Mexicans who had previously acted as “transporters”. In that sense, there is no
connection between the Mexican and the Colombian heroin industries. On this issue see: U.S. Department
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comprises three Andean countries: Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia.202 The first two have a large
Indian population, which has grown the coca leaf for traditional uses for centuries. Local
traffickers purchase coca paste (the first stage in cocaine production) from the peasants,
transform it into coca base (the second stage), and sell it to Colombian organizations who finish
the production process and manage transportation as well as the first steps to sell the product in
consumption centers (U.S. and Western Europe). All of these groups have a big quota of
political power and have a pattern of conflict and cooperation with other non-state actors such
as the leftist guerrillas (although this is not the case in Bolivia).  Venezuela, Ecuador, the
Southern Cone countries, Guyana and Suriname form the periphery of this producer core. All of
these states--with the exception of Uruguay, Guyana and Suriname--share long, porous, badly
controlled borders, whose conditions can vary from tropical forests to desert, with the main
producer countries.  Brazil shares its entire Amazonian border with Colombia, Ecuador, Peru
and Bolivia. Argentina shares a long and porous border with Bolivia and Paraguay. Ecuador is
virtually surrounded by Colombia and Peru. Chile shares its northern borders with Peru and
Bolivia, and Venezuela shares its western and southern borders with Colombia and Brazilian
Amazonia.
The process of refining coca into cocaine can be divided into three stages. An analyst
describes this process in the following way:
“The first [stage] takes place near the fields. Growers gather their crop and place it in maceration pits;
large containers made out of plastic sheeting, The dried leaves are mixed with kerosene and
potassium carbonate, which separate the alkaloid from the organic matter. After the waste material is
removed, the product is mixed with sulfuric acid. This gooey paste is dried into balls […]: cocaine
paste or cocaine sulfate. This initial processing reduces the bulk, cutting down the volume by a
factor of 10, and making the product easy to store or transport. The next stage makes cocaine base, a
purer cocaine alkaloid without other alkaloids. This process requires more equipment (filters, dryers,
centrifuges) and chemicals (alcohol, kerosene, sulfuric acid and potassium permanganate).
Traffickers set up their labs or “kitchens” in the middle of the rainforest, with portable diesel power
generators, plastic sheeting and elaborate logistical support for supplying the chemicals. Finally,
                                                                                                                                                                         
of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, The NNICC Report 1996: The Supply  of Illicit Drugs to
the United States [on-line], available internet http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/nnicc97.htm and
Dreyfus, Pablo, El lado oscuro de la globalización: Pasado, Presente y Futuro del Tráfico de Drogas en
América Latina, Revista SER 2000, pp. 38 and 39.
In its 1995-1996 on-line report, the Paris based NGO Geopolitical Drug Watch warned of the possibility
that criminal organizations based in Mexico could be attempting to process cocaine from coca-paste and
coca base imported from Peru. However, more recent reports, such as that of the NNICC discredit that
theory. This was confirmed by an e-mail interview in late 1997 with a high ranking official of the
UNDCP section in Latin America, who dismissed the possibility that cocaine production could be taking
place in Mexico.  In his view, this was more an isolated case or an experimental attempt than a trend for
the future. No recent evidence has been found on cocaine production in Mexico. See: Geopolitical Drug
Watch (OGD), The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995/1996. Annual Report[on line], September 1997,
available internet http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP14_1_MEXIQUE.html and U.S. Department of
Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, The NNICC Report 1997: The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the
United States [on-line], November 1998, available internet
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/nnicc98.pdf , p.14.
202As a matter of fact around 98 percent of the (illegally) produced cocaine consumed in the world are
produced in these three countries. See: United Nations International Drug Control Programme, World
Drug Report, p.18.
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trained chemists turn the cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride (HCL). This stage requires more
sophisticated laboratory techniques and industrial volumes of ether or acetone so the semi-processed
material can become the crystalline salt necessary for inhaling….”203
The division of labor required to transform the raw material (coca) into massive amounts
of the final product (cocaine) gave way to a sophisticated and vertically integrated transnational
industry. Different stages of cocaine production take place in different countries and the process
of production implies the interaction of criminal groups that operate across national boundaries.
In this thesis South America will be divided into five types of countries depending on the role
they play in the coca-cocaine complex. Each one of these types presents a different security
problem. The five types can be labeled as follows: “upstream producer” countries, “downstream
producer” countries, “full cycle” countries, transshipment countries, and neighboring
transshipment countries.204
The terms used to define these types of countries are non-standard in the existing
literature and in the framework of international organizations that deal with drug trafficking
control. Different agencies (national and international) use different types of scales to measure
the amount of coca and cocaine produced in each country, and anyway the amounts of
production are merely estimates, since completely reliable registers for the production of illicit
crops and drugs cannot, by virtue of their illegality, exist.205 Another important factor is that
countries can shift from one type to the other over different periods of time as consumption
patterns change and as production relocates as a result of the repression of coca-cocaine
production. The same phenomenon is happening in the case of the recent development of a
poppy heroin industry in Colombia.
In defining of these four types of countries three variables are used:
• the estimated production of coca leaves, coca paste, cocaine base and CHCL (cocaine) and
the percentage in the GNP of the country;
• the estimated number of workers employed in the coca-cocaine production and the their
percentage of the EAP (Economic Active Population);206 and
• the presence of criminal organizations specialized in the production and traffic of coca
paste, cocaine base and CHCL in the national territories of these countries.
                                                          
203 Smith,Michael, op.cit, p.14. No bold letters in the original.
204 The  terms  “upstream” and “downstream” sides of the cocaine industry have been coined by
Rensselaer W. Lee III . See: Dimensions of the South American Cocaine Industry, Journal of
Internamerican Studies and World Affairs, Special Issue on Drug Trafficking, Vol. 30, Nº 2 and 3,
Summer-Fall 1988, pp.88-89.
205For instance, whereas the DEA and the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotic Matters
measure in metric tons the amount of coca produced in each country, UNDCP and the governments of
Bolivia, Peru and Colombia measure this amount in hectares.
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This thesis does not develop an accurate set of indicators to measure each one of these
variables, 207 but rather typifies South American countries according to the information given
in the existing literature on the subject and the statistics provided by the national and
international research and enforcement agencies.208
Drug trafficking,  like any other industry, involves several steps from production to retail.
This thesis focuses on the breakdown of this process among different countries, including
determining the location of  firms (criminal organizations specialized in cocaine traffic),
workers (peasants), and where production of raw material (coca bush) occurs.  It also examines
which part of the conversion process is carried out  in each of the countries under study as a
variable for distribution between types.
Upstream producer countries:
These are the countries where the bulk of the coca leaf production is located. Up to the
mid 1990s Peru was the first coca leaf producer followed by Bolivia. In these countries a high
percentage of the peasant labor force is engaged in coca production and harvest (growers),
transport of leaves to the maceration pits (zepes, or ants in Aymara language) and production of
coca paste (stompers). The territories are used then for the production of the first two stages of
cocaine production. In general terms, Bolivians and Peruvians manage the production of cocaine
base and sell it to the Colombians. This distinction became fuzzy, however, in the late 1980s.
First, the increase in the enforcement policies against the traffickers in Colombia during the
                                                                                                                                                                         
206This includes qualified and non-qualified labor hands, such as growers, buyers of paste, carriers of
leaves, paste refiners (chemicals), stompers (of coca leaves), security personnel, chemists and traffickers.
207According to the U.S. legislation the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
U.S. Department of State for example, utilizes an arbitrary criteria for the classification of  countries in
the following terms:
“Major Illicit Drug Producing and Drug-Transit Countries
A major illicit drug producing country is one in which: (A) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy
are cultivated or harvested during a year; (B) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca are cultivated or
harvested during a year; or (C) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis are cultivated or harvested
during a year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly
affect the United States. FAA [Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended] §481(e)(2). A major illicit
drug-transit country is one: (A) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs
or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or (B) through which are
transported such drugs or substances. FAA §481(e)(5).[…] Major Precursor Chemical Source
Countries […]have been determined to be major sources of precursor or essential chemicals used in the
production of illicit narcotics[…]Major Money Laundering Countries ‘A major money laundering
country is defined by statute as one whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving
significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking. FAA §481(e)(7)…”See:  U.S.
Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department
of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1998[on line] ,Washington D.C., February 1999,
available internet http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_report/legis98.html
208Such as for example the reports elaborated by UNDCP, the International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB), the US Department of  State (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs),
the DEA Intelligence Division Reports, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), NGOs and the
national drug control offices and law enforcement agencies of  Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia and
Venezuela.
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Betancur and Barco administrations led to a relocation of CHCL laboratories in Bolivia. At the
same time, the Bolivian traffickers began to manage their own CHCL production as the
Medellín coalition was weakened by  enforcement measures taken after the assassination in
August 1989 of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán by members of the Medellín
“cartel.”209 Second, Europe started to grow in importance as a consumption market.210 Since
the mid-1980s there was an increase in cocaine consumption and crack in Western Europe.211
At the same time, because of the saturation of the U.S. market for cocaine, the drug trafficking
organizations based in South America started to increasingly look to Europe to sell their
product.212 The traffickers were attracted the general prosperity of western Europe, by higher
retail prices and by the decision of the European Community to progressively lower internal
customs controls.213 While the Colombian traffickers started to expand to the new market and
maintain control over the U.S. market, the Bolivian traffickers concentrated their activities in
export operations to Europe .214 Moreover Ecuador and Venezuela became coca producers at
the end of the 1980s as the coca eradication campaigns were intensified in Peru and Colombia
and as the economic situation in these countries deteriorated with a decrease in oil prices
(Venezuela’s main export and Ecuador’s second export).215 However, these two countries do
not produce the same amount of coca leaves as do Bolivia and Peru, nor do they employ as high
                                                          
209This issue will be fully explained in chapters IV and VI of this dissertation.
210 This issue will be more deeply analyzed in chapters VI and VII of this dissertation.
211See:Kendall, Raymond, “La cocaïne ‘drogue de l’année’ en Europe,” Revue Internationale de la Police
Criminelle, May-June 1989, pp. 23, 24 and 25; Mage, Tristan,  Les Nouvelles routes du trafic de la
drogue dans l’espace de Schengen et dans le monde. Vol. I, Paris, T. Mage, 1994, p.49; Hartnoll, R.,
Avico, U., Ingold, F.R., Lange, K., Lenke, L., O´Hare, A. And de Roij-Motshagen, A., “A Multi-city
study of drug misuse in Europe,” Bulletin on Narcotics, Vol. XLI, Nos. 1 and 2, 1989, pp. 7, 9 and 11;
South, Nigel and Ruggiero, Vincenzo, Eurodrugs: drug use, markets and trafficking in Europe, London,
UCL Press, 1995, pp.14, 15 and 17 and United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention,
ODCCP Studies on Drugs and Crime, Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999 [on-line], New York, 1999,
available internet http://www.undcp.org/pdr/report-1999-06-01_1.pdf, pp. 109, 110 and 118.
Since the late 1980s cocaine consumption grew in Western Europe and became widespread to the point
that this region became the second largest consumption market for this drug (after the United States).
However there are analyses and reports that agree on the fact that in Western Europe there were no signs
of a cocaine epidemics on the scale seen in the United States. See for example:  Stares, Global Habit, p.
37 and ODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999, p.110
212See: Institute for European-Latin American Relations (IRELA), Cooperation in the Fight against
Drugs: European and Latin American Initiatives, Dossier Nº 55, Madrid, IRELA, 1995, p.29
213 Stares, op.cit.,p. 39
214See: Hargreaves, Clare, Snowfields: The War on Cocaine in the Andes, London, Zed Books/Holmes &
Meier, 1992, pp. 53-83
215See: MacDonald, Scott B., Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine and Power in the Andean
States and Panama, New York, Praeger, 1989, pp. 83-94 and Páez, Alexei, “La inserción ecuatoriana en la
dinámica Andina del narcotráfico,” in La Economía Política del Narcotráfico: el caso ecuatoriano, in
Bruce, Bagley; Bonilla, A. and Páez, Alexei, (eds.), 1991, pp. 145 and 146
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a percentage of the peasantry.216 In the context of this thesis, these countries will be considered
as in the process of shifting from transshipment countries to upstream producer countries.
Downstream producer countries:
The paradigm case is Colombia. In this type of country the management of the final stage in the
production of cocaine is located with the coca base imported from Bolivia and Peru. Colombia
is the largest cocaine producer in the world. As the production of CHCL is capital-intensive the
percentage of labor engaged in the coca-cocaine complex is lower than in Peru and Bolivia;
moreover coca chewing is not a millenary tradition among the Colombian peasants and Indian
tribes. Because of this the production of coca bush is not as widespread as in Bolivia and Peru.
As explained in the last chapter, the major criminal organizations, which deal with the final
processing and retailing of the product, are located in Colombian territory. Table 8 below
illustrates the importance of the coca-cocaine industry in the Andean countries in the early
1990s. It is possible to see that the percentage of workers employed in the coca-cocaine industry
in Colombia as compared to the total active economic population is significantly smaller than in
the cases of Peru and Bolivia.
                                                          
216See: “Reassessing coca Business,” Latin American Weekly Report , August 11, 1994,p. 355;
MacDonald,Scott, Dancing on a Volcano, p.124 and  Drug Enforcement Administration, Intelligence
Division, Worldwide Cocaine Situation, Drug Intelligence Report, DEA-93048, October 1993, pp.42 and
48.
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Table 1.  The Coca-Cocaine Economies in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia
Bolivia Peru Colombia
Hectares under cultivation
(1990)   50,300 121,300 40,100
Production of coca
(1990 metric tons) 116,000 138,000 32,000
Total value added
(US $ millions) 659-911 498-1,219 1,127
Value added as percentage
of GDP 15.6-20.5 1.5-3.7
 2.9
Income remaining in the
country
(US $ Millions)  179-216 382-942 645
 Income as percentage of
legal exports   19.4-23.5 14.3-35.4       16.8
Workers employed in
coca-cocaine   207,000 165,000-279,000   40,000
Workers as percentage of
EAP      6.7-12.0 2.7-4.5         0.4
Source: Painter, James, Bolivia and Coca: A study in dependency, Boulder, Lynne Rienner,1994, p.51
Transit countries and neighboring transshipment countries:
Of the four types, the transit countries are the least difficult to define. In fact, this kind of
country is defined in Article 1 of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances:
“ ‘Transit State’ means a State through the territory of which illicit narcotic drugs, 
psychotropic substances and substances in Table I and Table II are being moved, which is 
neither the place of origin nor the place of ultimate destination thereof. ”217
Transit countries function as “pit stops” for traders. A particular state may serve as a base
for operations to set up a deal, for aircraft or ship refueling, and for recruitment of personnel
required for such activities and protection. Some of these countries also play a major role as
financial havens for the legitimization of “drug money” through the banking system, for
purchases or investments in commercial and industrial activities, or as suppliers of the chemical
inputs required in the production of cocaine. Argentina and Chile play this last role. Suriname is
the main South American conduit for the cocaine that penetrates into Europe via the
Netherlands.218 Even if there is no evidence of cocaine production in Surinamese territory,
because of its geography and the weak presence of the state it could be used as a base for
Brazilian or Colombian traffickers operating in the Brazilian Amazon.
                                                          
217United Nations, Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, p.39 Also see, ibid., p. 231 and 232.
218 See: EUROPOL, European Situation Report on Drug Production and Drug Trafficking, The Hague,
September 1996, p.27 and Labrousse, Alain, La drogue, l´argent et les armes, Paris, Fayard, 1991, p.405
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“Neighboring transshipment” countries are those countries that share all the
characteristics mentioned above but also share borders with the producer countries. Therefore,
these countries have a particular problematique concerning the possibility of spillover of drug
trafficking activities to their territories and, consequently,  the spillover effects of  enforcement
against the actors involved in drug trafficking activities in the producer countries.
Full cycle countries:
Only Brazil fulfills this type. Full cycle countries refer to those countries where the raw
material is produced and completely processed. Another requirement is that these countries have
local or foreign criminal organizations that manage all the stages of production (alone or
through cooperation among them) and retail of the product. These countries do not depend on
the importation of chemicals inputs  (Brazil is a major producer of acetone and ether in South
America). They also have their own channels for money laundering and their own big centers
for the distribution, retail, and consumption of the final product (cities such as Rio de Janeiro
and Sao Paulo). Brazil also became the major route of traffic going to Europe.219
As enforcement grew in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia in the early 1980s, traffickers in
these three countries moved part of their refinement laboratories to the Brazilian Amazon.220
In the case of Colombia the traffickers moved their operations to Brazil also to be out of range
of areas controlled by the guerrillas. The Bolivian traffickers started to use Brazil as an
alternative route and as a zone for refinement far from the influence of the Colombian
traffickers. The Peruvian peasants at the same time moved the growing areas towards the
frontier with the Brazilian Amazon to escape from the eradication programs. And the traffickers
started to encourage the Amazonian Indians to grow the ipadu (a native variant of the coca
                                                          
219 The term “Full cycle country” was defined by the Argentine analyst Rubén Heguilein, interviewed in
Buenos Aires, February 1995. For an excellent explanation of the potential of Brazil as a major player in
the drug trafficking industry see: Velez de Berliner, María and Lado, Kristin, “Brazil: The Emerging
Drug Superpower,” Transnational Organized Crime, Vol.1, Nº 2,Summer 1995, pp.115-141 for an
excellent analysis of the drug trafficking situation in Brazil see: Geopolitical Drug Watch (OGD), The
World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995/1996. Annual Report[on line],
http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP12_4_BRESIL.html. This as pointed out by this report:
“ the number of laboratories manufacturing chlorhydrate out of base paste has increased not just in
Amazonia but also in urban areas, which has had a major impact on internal consumption. Interpol
estimates that in Rio de Janeiro alone, 3 t of cocaine are used annually in the form of chlorhydrate for
sniffing and base paste for smoking. Crack has also made a breakthrough, especially in Sao Paulo. The
amount seized rose from 10 kilograms in 1995 to 18 kg during the first half of 1996. The internal market
plus exports produce substantial profits, which are recycled through the economy. By boosting crime in
the favelas, drug trafficking also plays a major role in the conflict between the state and organized crime,
as well as in fighting between gangs of criminals for control of urban territory.”
220On  this issue see: International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the International Narcotics
Control Board for 1985, p.43; for 1986, p. 31; for 1988, p.25; for 1989, p.28; for 1990, p.34; for 1991,
p.38; for 1992, p.44;  Quellet, Ricardo Luis, “Narcotráfico y su relación con los movimientos subversivos
en latinoamérica,” Geopolítica,Nº 39, 1989, pp.44-45 and Colonel (R) Pipet, Hector A., “Narcotráfico y
narcoterrorismo en las relaciones internacionales, Cuarta Parte,” Revista de la Escuela Superior de
Guerra, Nº 516, January-March, 1995, pp.19-21.
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bush, which contains a lesser degree of alkaloids and is less productive than the Andean
species). Manaus, located in the heart of the Amazon, became a center for the exit of cocaine
and the traffic of cocaine paste towards the laboratories in the jungle.221
Table 2 maps the position of each South American country in relation to the cocaine
industry.  Table 3 indicates which transshipment (including neighboring) countries play a
significant role in the supply of chemical products used in the manufacture of cocaine and those
which play a significant role in the legitimization of illegal capitals generated by drug
trafficking (money laundering).
Table 2. Role of  the South American countries in the cocaine industry
Country Arg Bol
(4)
Bra Col
(2)
Chi Ec Gu Par
(1)
Per Sur Urg Ven
(3)
Upstream
producer
 X  X
Downstream
producer
  X
Full Cycle  X
Neighboring
Transshipment
X X X X
Transshipment X X   X   X
(1) Paraguay is the major South American producer of marijuana.
(2) Colombia is increasingly becoming a producer of opium poppy and heroin. Some experimental small
opium plantations have been detected in Ecuador and Peru.
(3) Rapidly turning into an upstream producer since the late 1980s.
(4) In fact since 1989 can be considered the second world producer of CHCL.
Abbreviations:  Arg., Argentina; Bol., Bolivia; Bra., Brazil; Col., Colombia; Chi.; Chile; Ec., Ecuador;
Gu. Guyana;  Par., Paraguay; Per., Peru; Sur., Suriname; Urg., Uruguay; Ve., Venezuela.
Table 3 . Transit and Neighboring Transshipment Countries. Division of  Labor
Country Argentina Chile Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Suriname Venezuela Uruguay
Production of
chemical inputs
  X   X X
Money
Laundering
X X X   X   X
 It is worth clarifying that none of these types are static. The role of countries may change
depending on changes in the patterns of enforcement and changes in the market like drug
                                                          
221See: Kaplan, Marcos, Aspectos  Sociopolitícos del Narcotráfico, México, Cuadernos Incapié, 1989, p.
108; Colonel Pipet, “Narcotráfico y narcoterrorismo en las  relaciones internacionales,” Revista de la
Escuela Superior de Guerra, Nº 499, July-September, 1990,pp.46-47 and Narcotráfico y narcoterrorismo
en las relaciones internacionales,Cuarta Parte, supra;Quellet, op.cit., supra;  Velez de Berliner and Lado,
op.cit., supra;OGD, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995/1996,supra and United Nations International
Drug Control Programme, Annual Field Report: Brazil-1993, UNDCP Field Office, Brasilia DF, July
1994, 62p.
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consumption patterns.222 Many changes occurred while this dissertation was being written; to
explain each in great detail exceeds the timeframe of this work. However it is worth noticing
that since the mid-1990s, it is increasingly  difficult to talk about pure “downstream,”
“upstream,” “transit,” “neighboring transit,” or full cycle states. As a result of enforcement in
the Andean countries roles are constantly changing. As an example, since 1991 the Peruvian Air
Force has been participating in the interception of illegal flights from the Upper Huallaga Valley
in the Peruvian Amazon forest to Colombia. This “air bridge” denial strategy provoked a rise in
local coca production in Colombia. Since the Colombian traffickers were confronted with rising
costs of coca paste from Peru, they started to demand coca and coca paste from the local market.
As stated in a recent report,
“The severing of the air link with Colombia is undeniable. But Colombian traffickers have found two
solutions. They have greatly increased the production of coca leaves in their own country; and they
have forced Peruvian growers to return to river transport (directly to Colombia), or by sea and by land
(via Ecuador).”223
 The settlers of the Amazon departments of Guaviare, Caquetá, Vaupés, Meta, and
Vichada increased the production of coca and coca paste attracted by higher prices. In Caquetá
and Guaviare coca and coca paste is produced under the protection of the FARC, which (under
coercion) taxes the production.224
From 1995 onwards it is possible to say that Colombia occupies the second place in coca
production after Peru, followed by Bolivia.
“With 60,000 to 70,000 hectares dedicated to illicit crops, Colombia has become the world’s
second coca leaf producer over the past two or three years-a ranking previously occupied by
Bolivia.”225
At the same time, and as a consequence of the disruption of the Medellín “cartel” in the
early 1990’s and the disruption of the Cali cartel in 1995, the local production of cocaine has
reportedly been increasing steadily in Bolivia and Peru.226
                                                          
222See: Dreyfus, Pablo, El Lado Oscuro de la Globalización, Pasado Presente y Futuro del Tráfico de
Drogas en América Latina, pp. 30-41 and DEA, The South American Cocaine Trade: An “Industry” in
Transition, [on-line], June 1996, available internet http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/cocaine.htm
223 Geopolitical Drug Watch, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1997-98, [On line]. Available internet
http://www.ogd.org/rapport, p.186 (pdf version)
224See, Dreyfus, El Lado oscuro de la globalización,p.38 ; Drug Geopolitical Watch (OGD), The World
Geopolitics of Drugs 1995-96,http//www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP1_2_1_COLOMBIE.HTM
225See: Geopolitical Drug Watch, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995-1996 [On-Line], Available
internet http://www.ogd.org/rapport,gb/RP2_1_COLOMBIE.html
226See: DEA, The South American Cocaine Trade an Industry in Transition, supra ; U.S. Department of
State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report,1997 [On-line], Washington D.C.,March 1998, available internet
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1997_narc_report/samer97.html and OGD, The World
Geopolitics of Drugs 1995-1996 [on-line], http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP12_3_BOLIVIE.html and
http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP12_2_PEROU.html
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In that sense the difference between upstream and downstream producer countries has
become blurred. From 1995 on, for example, Colombia started to suffer some drug trafficking-
related violence similar to that in Peru:  regions controlled by guerrilla groups that protect coca-
growing peasants from eradication teams.227 Strictly speaking, if the Brazilian criminal
organizations become major players in cocaine production, the distinction between transit and
neighboring transit countries would also become blurred because nearly all the South American
States share borders with Brazil.
 The security environment in terms the illicit traffic of cocaine is highly hostile in the
South American states, because enforcement in one country implies a geographical shift in
production across borders as well as a shift of traffic routes. This is quite disturbing considering
that the cocaine traffickers develop their own paramilitary forces and their own intelligence
networks, have a high corrupting power, and can control a part of the national territory where
the state presence is weak. The threat originated in the security environment and stemming from
the cocaine industry is enhanced, for both the core producer countries and their periphery, by
another phenomenon: the weak nature of their states.
C-THE WEAK NATURE OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN STATES
 If we use the variables defined in Chapter I, it would be possible to affirm that no South
American state could be defined as strong. This section will make a brief analysis of the
characteristics of the state described in the last chapter. However this part of the dissertation will
not proceed with a country-by-country study. Only the more representative cases of weak states
will be briefly described. Also, not all the indicators of the nature of the state will be analyzed
here. Importance will be given to those considered most relevant in the sense that either they
contributed to the rise of the cocaine industry in South America or that they contributed to
reinforcing the operation of threats stemming from drug trafficking. Some important
phenomena for the sociopolitical cohesion of some countries, therefore  (the peaceful (1990,
1991) and armed (1994) Indian uprisings in Ecuador or the violence stemming from the
problematique of land distribution in Brazil are two examples), will not be analyzed in this
work. 228
                                                          
227 See: Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD), Géopolitique des drogues 1995: Rapport annuel
de l´OGD,Paris, Éditions la Découverte, 1995, pp. 216 and 217 and “Colombia: Coca Clashes,” The
Economist, August 17, 1996, pp.37 and 38.
228In Ecuador, the issue at stake was the claim for a better political representation, the right to the
possession of  land, the official recognition of the Indian culture and a claim for better conditions or trade
and transport of good produced by Indian communities. See: Van Cott,Donna, “ Indigenous Peoples and
Democracy in Latin America,” in  Van Cott, Donna (ed.), Indigenous peoples and democracy in Latin
America ,New York , St. Martin's Press in association with the Inter-American Dialogue, 1994,
p.12
81
Since this is not a dissertation on the nature of the state in South America, emphasis will
be put on the actual problems and not on their historical origins. A more detailed illustration of
the historical origins of state weakness will only be given in chapters V and VII for the analysis
of Argentina and Venezuela as cases of neighboring transshipment countries. Let us then
proceed to the analysis of the dimensions of the weak-strong nature of the state:
a) Sociopolitical cohesion (Legitimacy and Integration)
States such as Peru and Bolivia never finished the process of consolidation as nation-
states. Peru can be separated into three regions: the coast, the mountains (la sierra) and the
jungle (Amazon). In the two last regions, the presence of the central government is almost non-
existent and the communal and tribal identities among the Indian population lead to a
sometimes-stronger loyalty towards non-state actors such as the mining and coca-grower trade
unions. In both countries, ethnic differences in the case of the Indian population are a clear
indication of social class. Indians are assimilated into the poorest sector of society.229
Ecuador shares similar characteristics in terms of a large and highly organized Indian
population but does not share the problematique of being a coca/cocaine producer country. The
analysis in this case would be based on speculations of what would happen if the conditions for
Ecuador to become a coca-cocaine producer country appear. The country did not suffer the
phenomenon of colonization and migration to potential coca producing areas as did Peru and
Bolivia, and it is not a coca dependent country like Bolivia.230
As stated previously, this problematique is shared and enhanced in Suriname because of
the recent process of nation-building and because the state is more deeply divided along
religious and ethnic lines. These divisions are evident in the rise of ethnic guerrilla groups such
as the Jungle Commando and the Tucayana discussed earlier in this chapter.
There is one country where the fragmentation of society does not run along ethnic or
cultural lines but stems from radical social differences in income and property distribution:
Brazil.231 The idea of nation is strong among the population and there are no strong communal
identities (with the exception of a minority of the Amazon Indian communities).  However, the
lack of access to land and the extreme poverty of the majority of the population are a permanent
source of potential and spontaneous societal violence. Moreover, the difference between the
black and white populations is not relevant for problems stemming from poverty and disparities,
                                                          
229On this issue see: Eckstein, Susan, “Power and Popular Protest in Latin America,” in Eckstein, Susan
(ed.), Power and popular protest : Latin American social movements, Berkeley ,University of California
Press, 1989,
pp. 23 and 24
230 On this issue see: Páez, Alexei, op.cit., pp. 148,152, 158 and 159.
231On this matter see:  Flynn, Peter, “Brazil: Conflict or Conciliation?,” Conflict Studies, Nº 265, October
1993,33p.
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though it is true that the black population suffers from an even greater degree of social
exclusion. As explained in the previous chapter, such an absence of ethnic or cultural divisions
can be considered less fragmentary than situations in countries that have multiethnic and
pluricultural non-integrated societies. Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Argentina, suffer from
the same kind of social fragmentation. The relevant problem caused by this fragmentation is the
phenomenon of formation of labor hand in the big cities for criminal organizations (not
necessarily specialized in drug trafficking activities) that have established linkages with their
counterparts in neighboring countries. This is the clear case of the favelas (shantytowns) of Sao
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and the shantytowns (barrios) of Caracas. This point will be stressed
in the next sections of this chapter.
Nine countries are in the process of consolidating their democratic regimes after long
periods of military dictatorship: Argentina (1983>), Bolivia (1982>), Brazil (1985>), Chile
(1989>), Ecuador (1979>), Uruguay (1985>), Peru (1981>), Paraguay (1989>), and Suriname
(1991>). For some, such as Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay and Suriname, a high degree of
institutional power and the participation of the armed forces in internal political affairs pose a
serious threat for their democracies, as the authoritarian self-coup de main (autogolpe) of
President Fujimori in Peru (1992) clearly illustrates.
The cases of Suriname and Paraguay are explicit in the sense that factions of the armed
forces directly involved in drug trafficking activities could easily overthrow a government and
change the type of regime if there were attempts to prosecute or dismiss their leaders by the
political power.
A common characteristic of all the South American countries is that their democratic
institutions are not fully developed. The only strong and fully legitimate institution is the figure
of the elected president. They all share the same pattern of democratic institutionalization
known as " Delegative Democracies,” defined by Guillermo O’Donnell as a regime in which
" The president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation and the main custodian and definer of  its
interests. The policies of his government need bear no resemblance to the promises of  his campaign
[...] In this view, other institutions-courts and legislatures, for instance are nuisances that come
attached to the domestic and international advantages of  being democratically elected president" 232
For these reasons, grave cases of corruption caused by illicit drug traffic matters could
cause a lack of legitimacy of the political establishment and of the democratic regime. This last
fact is particularly disturbing because of the almost endemic problem of corruption in South
American societies and political and military elites. 233
                                                          
232O' Donnell, Delegative, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, Nº 1, January 1994,
p.59
233Grandi et al., L' Avenir d'un Continent, p.24
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Colombia and Peru are the only two South American countries where strong guerrilla
movements are still in existence. Both states are facing guerrilla organizations that propose a
radical change in the type of society and state or the kind of political regime. This contributes to
the worsening of the problems posed by cocaine trafficking.
b) Policy Capacity
In terms of policy capacity it is possible to make a generalization not only for all the
South American  states but also for the rest of Latin America. No matter what differences exist
in the capacity to extract resources from society and apply policies, since 1982 the policy
capacity of these states has been strongly affected by the foreign debt crisis. In countries as such
Bolivia and Peru, the debt crisis did two things.  It accelerated a coca/cocaine boom in response
to the increase in consumption in the U.S. by the end of the 1970s. It also reduced even further
the capacity of these states to implement economic development and law enforcement policies
aimed at arresting traffickers and supporting the legal economy in the face of a rising illegal
industry.
Table 4. Total Disbursed External Debt
(balance by years in millions of dollars)
Country 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Argentina 27162 49326 58473 63 314 62 233 58 413 59123 70600 79455 89719 99701
Bolivia   2340   3294   4043   3492   3768   3582   3784   3777   4216   4523   4366
Brazil 64 000 105 126 113 469 115 096 123 439 123 910 135 949 145 726 148295 159256 178131
Chile 11207 20403 18960 17520 18576 17319 18964 19665 21768 21736 23049
Colombia 6805 14063 17935 17586 17993 17335 17277 18942 21954 25050 28497
Ecuador 4167 8111 10669 11533 12222 12802 12795 13631 14589 13934 14586
Guyana 449 1308 1778 1801 1812 1873 2054 2062 2004 2058 1499
Paraguay 861 1772 2002 2027 1695 1666 1279 1254 1272 1361 1372
Peru 9595 13721 16493 18356 19996 20787 21409 26370 30214 33443 33643
Suriname Nd nd nd nd nd nd Nd nd nd nd nd
Uruguay 1165 3551 4239 4313 4472 4141 4136 4293 4959 5193 5367
Venezuela 26963 31238 35876 33812 35528 36000 38447 40836 41160 38460 35277
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook, various years.
Between 1982 and 1985, net capital income had exceeded net payment of profits and
interest giving rise to a real transfer of resources from the rest of the world to Latin America, of
around US $ 15 billion per annum. From the second half of 1982 onward, these flows changed
to real transfers from Latin America to the rest of the world, amounting to US $ 30 billion per
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annum in the four-year period that followed, remaining between US $ 20 and 30 billion per
annum during the 1990s.234 As explained by an analyst,
“Between 1982 and 1985, the real transfer of resources from Latin America abroad was made possible
through an adjustment, by reducing domestic demand, which for the brief period of time in which it
had to be made , widely exceeded the extent of the transfer itself [...]The adverse trends caused by the
external debt could not but have negative social consequences too. First, the per capita product
contracted 85% between 1980 and 1989, with very significant drops of over 20% in Argentina,
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela [...]On the other hand, very high unemployment rates up to
20% of the  working population  reappeared, and in some cases appeared for the first time. For Latin
America as a whole, unemployment rates increased  by 30% between 1980 and 1984. The financial
problems of the State led to cutbacks in social spending, which had been disproportionately affected
owing to the reduction in tax revenues and to greater interest payments by the State. Thus there was a
reduction in the satisfaction of basic education, health care , social security and housing needs...”235
This economic crisis acted at once as a cure and a disease. In some ways it contributed to
reducing the legitimacy of military governments that were unable to cope with the control of
recession and hyperinflation as in Argentina, Brazil and Peru. On the other hand it created a real
crisis of governabiltiy in the sense that the new democratic regimes were unable to cope with
the increasing demands of their populations nor even provide the most basic social services. 236
The extreme cases were countries such as Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia where the capacity and
even the infrastructure of the state were almost already non-existent in some areas. The
following tables give some economic indicators that illustrate some of the effects of the foreign
debt crisis suffered by the South American states in the early 1980s.
Table 5. Growths of per capita gross domestic product, at constant market prices
Country 1980-
1985
1985-
1990
1980-
1990
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Argentina -2.9 -1.4 -2.1 -1.9 8.5 8.1 4.3 6.1 -6.2 2.2
Bolivia -3.8 0.1 -1.9 2.3 2.8 -0.8 1.8 2.1 1.3 1.5
Brazil -1.2 -0.1 -0.7 -6.3 -1.5 -2.6 3.0 4.3 2.5 1.8
Chile -1.8 4.5 1.3 1.6 5.4 8.7 4.2 2.5 6.5 5.6
Colombia 0.5 2.7 1.6 1.8 -0.4 2.0 3.8 4.1 4.0 0.5
Ecuador -0.9 -0.8 -0.9 0.8 3.0 1.4 0.3 2.5 0.5 -0.1
Paraguay -0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -1.1 1.3 0.2 1.8 -1.6
Peru -2.8 -3.8 -3.3 -7.1 0.9 -2.6 4.0 11.9 6.0 0.7
Suriname Nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd
Uruguay -4.1 3.1 -0.6 0.1 2.6 7.2 2.7 5.8 -2.9 4.2
Venezuela -6.4 0.0 -3.2 4.4 7.1 3.6 -1.6 -4.8 1.3 -3.5
Guyana -4.0 -2.8 -3.4 -5.2 7.3 10.2 7.4 8.4 3.6 2.0
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook,
various years.
                                                          
234See: Davrieux, Ariel, “External Debt, Social Cost and Democratic Governance,” in Albala-Bertrand,
Luis (ed.), Democratic Culture and Governance: Latin America on the Threshold of the new Millenium,
UNESCO/Hispamerica p111
235Davrieux, op.cit. p.112
236 This concept of  crisis of gobernability that refers to the incapacity of the rulers to govern draw as on,
Pasquino, Gianfranco, “Gobernabilidad” in Bobbio, Norberto, Mateucci, Niccola and Pasquino,
Gianfranco, Diccionario de Ciencia Política, Suplemento, México, Siglo Veintiuno Editores,1988,
pp.192-199
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Table 6. Per capita gross domestic product at constant market prices
(Dollars at 1990 prices)
Country 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Argentina 7363.2 2908.8 4345.7 4713.4 5093.4 5312.4 5636.4 5287.5 5401.9
Bolivia 936.3 1105.3 795.7 818.1 811.7 825.9 843.3 854.6 867.4
Brazil 1950.7 1562.5 3145.9 2675.9 2606.4 2684.1 2799.7 2870.7 2921.3
Chile 2030.5 1857.8 2319.6 2443.9 2656.0 2767.8 2836.1 3021.2 3190.4
Colombia 1052.2 1081.4 1235.6 1230.8 1255.5 1303.3 1356.7 1411.4 1417.8
Ecuador 1275.6 1218.0 1041.0 1119.2 1178.3 1302.6 1479.9 1565.4 1627.5
Paraguay 1428.6 1259.4 1247.9 1439.9 1445.3 1500.9 1664.2 1860.3 1936.6
Peru 1192.7 925.1 1675.3 1941.0 1873.3 1769.5 2147.4 2503.5 2524.3
Suriname 2515.7 2602.6 4428.3 5214.2 7082.0 15223.8 1176.5 1265.7 1816.7
Uruguay 3477.6 1568.9 2690.4 3211.2 3765.4 4360.8 5095.2 5607.4 5899.5
Venezuela 3923.7 3615.8 2492.0 2676.8 2955.9 2871.8 2732.7 3542.7 3161.7
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook,
various years.
Table 7. Public Sector balance sheet at current prices
(as a percentage of the Gross National product)*
Source: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), América Latina y el Caribe
Quince Años Después: De la década perdida a la transformación económica,1980-1985, Santiago de
Chile, Fondo de Cultura Económica,1996, p.49
NNFPS= national non-financial public sector; NFPS: non-financial public sector; HS: without computing
the accumulated income generated by privatization (hypothetical situation); CPS: consolidated public
sector.
Moreover, the policies recommended by international institutions such as the IMF, the
World Bank, and the Club of Paris ended the hyper inflationary crisis but did not increase the
capacity of the state since they were based on radical cuts in public expenditure. At the same
time the extractive capacity of the state (taxes) in all these countries is very weak. As explained
by an analyst,
“ La crise de l’endettement et les “recommendations” du FMI ont eu pour effet, à des rythmes divers
selon le pays, de mettre partout en oeuvre  le  même type de recettes pour vaincre l’inflation qui
rongeait ces pays: diminuton drastique des déficit budgétaires, privatisation des entreprises publiques,
abandon de soutiens publics à certaines productions on a donc assisté a un abandon spectaculaire par
l’etat des tâches qu’il remplissait traditonellement...”237
                                                          
237Couffignal, Georges, “La question de l’état en Amérique Latine,” Cahiers des Amériques Latines, Nº
16, 1993,p. 66
Level** 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Argentina NNFPS
HS
-5.5 -9.6 -10.6 -10.5 -8.3 -4.3 -3.3 -5.3 -2.2 -3.7 -3.8 -1.6 -0.1
-0.9
-0.1
-0.3
-0.4
-0.7
Bolivia NFPS -7.8 -7.6 -14.2 -17.9 -26.6 -10.9 -3.1 -7.3 -5.8 -4.8 -3.9 -3.7 -4.8 -5.8 -4.2
Brasil CPS -1.6 -3.2 -4.1 -4.1 -3.4 -4.2 -3.6 -5.7 -4.8 -6.9 1.2 -0.2 -2.8 -1.3 1.2
Chile CG 6.5 2.8 -3.4 -2.6 -2.9 -3.8 -0.8 1.9 1.7 2.8 3.5 2.4 2.8 2.0 2.0
Colombia NFPS -2.6 -5.3 -6.0 -7.6 -6.3 -4.0 -0.3 -1.9 -2.2 -1.9 -0.6 0 -0.2 0.3 2.6
Paraguay CG 0.3 -2.2 -0.1 -2.0 -2.5 -1.2 1.0 -0.2 0.7 1.5 3.0 4.4 -0.1 -0.7 0.8
Peru CG -2.4 -4.0 -3.2 -7.5 -4.4 -2.2 -3.7 -5.7 -2.5 -4.2 -2.5 -1.4 -1.4 -1.6 2.1
Uruguay CG
CPS
0.0
1.1
-1.5
-1.8
-9.1
-11.1
-3.9
-4.0
-5.2
-4.5
-2.9
-2.3
-1.2
-0.7
0.1
-0.7
-2.0
-0.9
-3.4
-4.5
-0.1
-6.1
0.4
-0.0
0.3
0.5
-1.1
-1.5
-2.3
-3.0
Venezuela CG
NFPS
-0.2 2.8 -1.1 -2.0
-2.4
2.5
6.8
2.3
3.2
-0.5
-5.3
-5.0
-4.4
-6.2
-8.6
-1.0
-1.1
-2.1
0.2
2.8
0.2
-3.6
-5.8
-3.4
-3.5
6.5
-13.8
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Colombia stands as a case apart in the fact that it is the only country in the region that did
not have a debt crisis.238 In fact the country profited from an export boom in both legal and
illegal agricultural exports. On the legal side Colombia benefited from a rise in coffee prices in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. However the country also benefited from the rise of marijuana
trafficking during the 1970s and from the beginning of the cocaine boom that started to take
place in the late 1970s.239
According to an analyst, the weakness in the policy capacity of the Colombian state stems
from the historical lack of legitimacy of its close, restrictive, and clientelistic political regime.
This fact has led people to a lack of respect for the legal system, of the national institutions and
also to resort to violence as a way for satisfying social demands. As noted by an analyst,
“Colombia’s economic development has a dark side reflected in the country’s deep and continuous
socioeconomic problems. Indeed, Colombia has experienced a growing institutional crisis in which
old political and legal frameworks have become increasingly unable to cope with social conflicts and
economic change, and the political regime has suffered an erosion of its legitimacy....The growing
erosion of the Colombian regime’s legitimacy has caused a growing  gap between the legal norms of
social, political, and economic behavior, and socially accepted  behavior; that is, a gap between the de
jure and de facto social norms. This deep institutional crisis has symptomatically manifested itself in
several ways such as an extremely high levels of violence, the growth of a large informal economy,
widespread rent-seeking and predatory economic behavior and an increasingly weaker and more
ineffective state.”240
Colombia, then, presents a paradoxical case. In the rest of South America the debt crisis
precipitated in a sense the fall of authoritarian political regimes but also reduced the capacity of
the state and made the transition to new democratic regimes difficult. On the other hand,
Colombia as an “island” unaffected by the debt crisis could not however transform its economic
wealth into development due to the lack of capacity of the state stemming basically from the
fact that its type of democratic regime lacked legitimacy.241 As explained by the Colombian
economist Francisco Thoumi,
                                                          
238See: Thoumi, Francisco, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, Boulder, Lynne Rienner,
1995, pp. 1 and 2.
239Thoumi, op.cit. pp. 36 and 45
240Thoumi, op.cit.pp.36
241After almost 20 years of bloody civil war between the two main parties Liberal and Conservative
reached an agreement (the National Front) that established a profoundly restrictive regime in terms of
representation and participation. As described by Thoumi,
“This was a 16 year-agreement to alternate the presidency between the two parties and to give an even
share of all government jobs to each of them. Thus, one half of the ministers, senators, representatives,
governors, mayors, and so on down the government bureaucracy had to be filled with members of each
party. In cases of an uneven number of jobs, a military official would be appointed. The National Front
agreement was equivalent to the legalization of a two-party cartel to control political power.  Since the
parties remained controlled by the elites, the National Front guaranteed that political power remained in
the same old hands and excluded from effective political participation nontraditional parties and political
extremists on both the left ant the right....The National Front ended in 1974, but it had been such a cozy
arrangement for the political establishment that it was extended by a constitutional amendment requiring
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“The growing complexity and size of the state increased in the incentives and payoffs of clientelistic
and other rent-seeking behavior in Colombia. Economic policies, laws, and regulations with
redistributive implications promoted the growth of rent-seeking organizations that succeeded in
getting the government to formulate policies that clearly benefited narrowly defined economic
interests. Since many of these policies are perceived by a large proportion of  the population as
benefiting small groups rather than society at large, breaking the rules and regulations [like paying
taxes for example] imposed by the government is considered by most Colombians as a legitimate
action, greatly contributing to weakening the state.”242
This lack of state capacity, as cynically (but accurately) analyzed by Thoumi, was not
only one of the conditions that allowed the cocaine industry to rise in Colombia, but also
restricted the government’s ability to effectively deal with the problem.
“[t]he government cannot really try to eliminate the industry through repressive measures or
confiscate assets accumulated by those involved in the business, because the state is too weak, the
level of violence required is too high, and so much of the industry’s capital  is invested outside
Colombia. Moreover, the large amount of ‘clean’ hidden capital in Colombia cannot possibly be
separated from the ‘dirty’ capital that the government might like to confiscate.”243
c) Territorial Centrality
In all South American states (with the exception of Chile and Uruguay) there is a weak
territorial and functional presence of the state. The governments of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia
have never exercised full control over their national territories. Vast sections of eastern and
southeastern Peru, and southern Colombia have always been a political no-man's land. The same
can be said of the Venezuelan, Ecuadorian and Brazilian Amazon regions and practically all the
territory of  Suriname and Guyana.
All these states dealt with guerrilla movements during the 1960s and 1970s.244 Two
countries still coexist with insurgent groups:245  Peru since the early 1980's and Colombia since
the 1960's. In Chile and Ecuador, too, there still exist weak leftist urban guerrilla organizations:
respectively, the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez, formed during Pinochet's military
                                                                                                                                                                         
that the party in power give a fair share of power and bureaucracy to the opposite one.”Thoumi,op.cit., p.
87
242Thoumi, op.cit., p. 89
243Thoumi, op. cit., p.110
244On this matter see: Gandolfi, Alain, Les Luttes Armées en Amérique Latine,Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France,1991,254p., especially chapters,5,7,8 and 9 and Pereyra, Daniel, Del Moncada a
Chiapas: historia de la lucha armada en América Latina, Madrid, Los Libros de la Catarata, 1994, 254p.
245In the case of Peru the active guerrilla groups are Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and the
Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru –MRTA-). In
Colombia the active groups are: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC-); the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional-
ELN-) and the Popular Liberation Army ( Ejército Popular de Liberación-EPL-). Another group, the M-
19, abandoned the armed fight in 1990 after a peace agreement with the government and became a left
wing political party called Alianza Democrática (Democratic Alliance). A small dissident  fraction of this
movement called the Jaime Bateman Group continues with armed activities in the department of Cauca.
On this issue see: Balencie, Jean-Marc and de la Grange, Arnaud, Mondes rebelles: acteurs, conflits et
violences politiques, Vol.1,Amériques, Afrique, Paris, Éditions Michalon, 1996, p.110.
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dictatorship, and the Alfaro Vive Carajo! Movement, which arose during the mid 1980s. 246
Especially in Peru, Colombia, and Chile (during the military dictatorship), the formation of
rightist paramilitary organizations (Colombia) and high levels of state repression and human
rights violations characterize the repression of these guerrilla movements. 247
In all of the Southern Cone--but in Argentina in particular the early 1980's--military
dictatorships were characterized by massive human rights violations and high levels of
repression even if, as in the case of Argentina, the existent guerrilla movements had been
crushed by the late 1970's.248
The strength of guerrilla movements is measured in terms of the nature of the territorial
centrality of the state. In this way a guerrilla movement will be considered strong or not
depending on the amount of people and territory under its control. The larger this control, the
lower the monopoly of authoritative binding rule making, backed by a monopoly on the means
of physical violence. This means that in the areas controlled by guerrilla movements, this
monopoly will be either disputed by the state or it will be fully exercised by the guerrilla group.
Bearing these definitions in mind, only the Colombian insurgent movements and Shining
Path in Peru will be considered as relevant and strong guerrilla groups. These groups posed a
serious threat to the continuity of the political regime in each of the countries mentioned and
controlled considerable areas of the Peruvian (Huallaga Valley, Puno, Ayacucho, Apurimac
departments, shantytowns of Lima) and Colombian, (the south of the country and the border
with Venezuela) territory and population.
Minor groups which appeared in the early 1980’s and were easily crushed by the
government--such as Bandera Roja (Venezuela), Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (Chile),
Ejército Guerrillero Tupac Katari (Bolivia), Movimiento Todos Por la Patria (Argentina), and
Alfaro Vive Carajo (Ecuador)--will not be considered in this thesis as relevant for analysis.249
                                                          
246 See:Pereyra, op.cit.,pp. 243 and 245
247 See:  Sanchez Ortuzar, “Regímenes militares y política antiterrorista: el caso chileno,” in Varas,
Augusto (ed.), Jaque a la democracia: orden internacional y violencia política en América Latina, Buenos
Aires, Grupo Editor Lationamericano,1990, p.293
248See: Stepan, Alfred, Repensando a los militares en política,Cono Sur: un análisis comparado,Buenos
Aires, Editorial Planeta,1988, pp.90 and 91; Rudolph, James and Weil, Thomas, Argentina, a country
study, Washington D.C., The Studies, U.S. G.P.O., 1985, p.329 and  Rock, David,  Argentina,1516-
1987,London, I.G. Tauris, p.368
89
d) Socioeconomic Development
If we consider the second part of the definition of socioeconomic development given in the first
chapter,250 it is possible to affirm that the South American states are still, to different extents,
dependent countries since none of them has fully developed the capacity to generate the
complete cycle of accumulation and expansion of capital within their economic systems. Even
though countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia have developed
diversified economies, large domestic markets, and local industries, they still confront the
problem of being in a situation where they do not have the local capacity to enlarge the scale of
capital. They are dependent in terms of the creation of new technologies and financial support.
As explained by Cristóbal Kay,
“ Despite the increasing presence of transnational corporations (TNCs) in Latin America there has
been little technological diffusion, which has confirmed dependency theory’s critique of TNCs.
Government policy has failed to develop an indigenous technological capacity in Latin America
and could have acted more decisively to ensure that TNCs made a contribution to this process.
Nevertheless Brazil and to some extent Mexico have acquired some competitive technological
capacity largely as a consequence of a purposeful industrial policy. But with the new electronics
and communications technological revolution the more advanced economies have gained a further
competitive advantage over the less developed countries (LDCs). This has further increased the
technological dependence of most LDCs.”251
Other countries including Suriname, Ecuador, and Bolivia face a more serious
problematique since their economies are still based on the production or extraction of a single
product subject to international price fluctuations (bauxite in the case of Suriname, bananas and
oil for Ecuador and tin and natural gas in the case of Bolivia). This, combined with cultural,
climatic, and social factors was, as it will be illustrated later, a determinant fact in the rise of
coca/cocaine production in Bolivia to the level of a parallel national illegal economy.
As far as the first part of the definition of socioeconomic development as
“underdevelopment” is concerned, this aspect will be measured using the indicators used by the
United Nations Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the United
                                                                                                                                                                         
249 It is believed that some of these groups currently have dormant cells. While they were active they
never went further than isolated bomb attempts on electric lines, attacks on army barracks or urban
terrorist activities.
250This definition included both the concept of underdevelopment and dependency. Whereas
underdevelopment refers to a type of economic system with a predominant primary sector, a high
concentration of income, little diversification in its production system and an external market far
outweighing the internal; dependency refers to a situation in which the accumulation and expansion of
capital cannot find its essential dynamic inside the system.
251 Kay, Cristóbal,Relevance of  Structuralist and Dependency Theories in the Neoliberal Period: A Latin
Perspective, Working Paper Series Nº 281, Institute of  Social Studies, October 1998, p.8 also see ibid.
p.6
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Nations Conference for trade and Development.252 In order to measure the level of development
of a country, the tables included in the annexes to this work will enable the reader to compare
the relative “underdevelopment” of the South American states. These “basic indicators of
development” are divided into economic indicators and social indicators as the table below
shows. In the absence of a commonly accepted division between economic and social indicators
this has been done arbitrarily by the author.253 These indicators include at the same time those
given in Table 6 of the same chapter. The data for each country is included in a separate annex.
Table 8. Basic indicators of development
Economic: Social:
Population
Area
Density
Total and per capita GDP
Annual average growth rates of total and per capita
real gross domestic product at market prices
GDP by type of expenditure
GDP by kind of economic activity
Transport
Labor Force ( percentage in agriculture, industry
and Services)
Transport (Merchant Fleet in tons, Commercial
vehicles in use, length of railway network, length of
road network )
Population Vital statistics ( Urban Population as a
percentage of  total population, Crude birth rate,
Crude death rate, Infant mortality rate per 1000 live
births, Life expectancy at birth)
Health (Proportion of infants immunized-measles
and poliomyelitis- , Percentage of the Population
with access to water-rural and urban-, Population
per physician)
Education and Culture (Illiteracy rate, Enrollment
ratios-combined primary and secondary and Third
level, Educational expenditure as a percentage of
GNP, Number of radio receivers in use)
The following tables provide a general map of the variables that measure the nature of
the South American States (except for socioeconomic development represented in the annex).
For the variable “sociopolitical cohesion” only the years immediately preceding the 1980s are
considered and not the whole political history of each country.
                                                          
252 See: ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook, various issues and UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade
and Development Statistics, various issues.
253The same division into “social” and “economic”  indicators of  development  is for example used by
Celso Furtado in La Economía Latinoamericana. Desde la Conquista Ibérica hasta la Revolución Cubana,
Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI Editores, 1975, pp.62-69
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Table 9. Sociopolitical cohesion of  South American states
Ar. Bol. Bra. Col. Chi. Ec. Gu Par. Peru Sur. Urg. Ven.
Fragile Political Legitimacy x x X x x x x x x x x x
Fragmented Societies along
income disparities and land access
x x X x x x x x x x x x
Incomplete Nation Building x x x x x x
“Weblike Societies”254 x x x x x
Strong loyalties to communal
ethnic and religious groups
x x x x x
High levels of political violence
Conspicuous use of force by the
state in domestic political life
1976
1983
x 1967
1985
x x x x x x 1973
1985
Conspicuous role of political
police in every day lives of
citizens
1976
1983
1979
1981
1967
1985
1973
1989
up to
1979
1954
1989
x 1978
1988
1990
1991
1973
1985
Major political conflict over what
ideology will be used to organize
the state
1970
1983
1964
1970
1968
1972
x 1970
1989
x 1986
1991
1966
1973
1964
1969
Contending national identities
within the state
x X x x x x
High degree of control over the
media
1976
1983
? 1973
1989
up to
1979
up to
1999
x 1979
1988
1973
1985
Table 10. Policy Capacity
Ar. Bol
.
Bra. Col. Chi. Ec. Gu. Par. Per. Sur. Urg. Ven
.
Rigid policy capacity x x X x x x x x x x x
Inefficient state apparatus x x X x x x x x x x x x
High levels of political corruption x x X x x x x x x x x x
Table 11. Territorial Centrality
Ar. Bol. Bra. Col. Chi. Ec. Gu. Par. Per. Sur. Urg. Ven.
Weak presence of the state in
frontier zones and areas outside
the major cities
x x X x x x x x x x x
Strong non-state organized armed
groups other than guerrillas and
including them
1970
1983
x X x x x 1966
1972
1964
1965
Abbreviations and brief description:
Ar. Argentina; Bol. Bolivia; Bra. Brazil; Col. Colombia; Chi. Chile; Ec. Ecuador; Gu. Guyana; Par.
Paraguay; Per. Peru; Sur. Suriname; Urg. Uruguay; Ven. Venezuela
An “x” is used to indicate that a problem is present in a country. Bigger  “x”s are used for the more
representative cases where the problem poses serious threats against the state. Periods of time indicate the
years in which certain vulnerabilities have been present when the vulnerability is not current.
Because of their security environment and because of the nature of their states, no country
in South American can be considered a strong state. As stated in Chapter I using the indicators
displayed above, the South American states could be typified on a continuum ranging from
strong states to weak states. The indicators could be used as a cumulative index. The more
                                                          
254As defined in Chapter I, table 7.
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conditions of weakness a state accumulates, the closer it will be to the weak. This continuum is
not static; states can move along it depending on the changes in their security environment or
increases or decreases in their vulnerabilities.
A country such as Argentina, for example, evolved from a situation of high levels of
political violence characterized by the coexistence of leftist guerrillas and far right paramilitary
groups in the 70's and a highly repressive military dictatorship in the late 70's and early 80's
(and a military defeat by Great Britain in 1982) to a situation of decreasing levels of political
violence, the absence of active guerrilla groups, and a process of democratic consolidation
following the transition to democracy in 1983. Venezuela, on the other hand, evolved from a
situation of long-lasting economic prosperity and a stable (although restrictive) democratic
regime in the 1960s to a situation of political instability and economic crisis in the late 1980s.
These aspects will be deeply analyzed in the chapters concerning the country cases. Subsequent
sections will illustrate that the Andean states suffered a special combination of political and
economic factors at the end of the seventies that led them to be particularly affected by the rise
of the cocaine industry in their national territories.
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru could be placed close to the "weak state" pole. The
vulnerability of the state fostered the rise of the drug industry, which became a threat to the
state. Drug trafficking also deepened the vulnerability of the state intensifying the threat
dimensions posed by this illegal industry.
Peru and Bolivia are both examples of states with a very low sociopolitical cohesion
because of their almost permanent political instability and the fact that the Indian population is
not fully identified with the state. Neither country has had a stable legitimate regime during
their history, whether democratic or authoritarian, until the early 1980’s (1980 for Peru and
1981 for Bolivia). To use a strong example, Bolivia has seen more “coups d’état” than years of
independent political history.
Colombia moved from a period of civil war between the two main parties, Liberal and
Conservative, (La Violencia 1948-1958) to a restrictive regime characterized by an agreed
automatic alternance of both parties and an agreed distribution of all important political
positions. This assured the continuity of the political regime from 1958 but created the
conditions for the rise of guerrilla groups such as the M-19 that opted for an armed solution
since Conservatives and Liberals monopolized the peaceful competition.255
As stated previously, the problem of political violence has to be added in the case of Peru
to the other present indicators of weakness. Groups like Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)  and
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) , who
                                                          
255See: Wickham-Crowley, “Winners, Losers, and Also-Runs: Toward a Comparative Sociology of Latin
American Guerrilla Movements,” in Eckstein, op.cit.,p. 134
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exploited the historical oppression and exclusion of the Indian masses as a mobilizing factor,
were successful in their efforts to further weaken state control.
In the extreme case of Bolivia, the deep underdevelopment and dependency of the state
accentuates even more the inability of the state to cope with simple matters like the payment of
public officials’ salaries, a problem that is shared with Peru. This factor will also condition the
way in which these states are able to determine in an autonomous way the kind of policies to be
adopted to control illegal coca and cocaine production, as well as the way in which these
policies can be applied.  Another important factor is that as these states are fully indebted and
have dependent economies, they can easily be influenced by drug control policies of the United
States, which traditionally pursues the solution of the internal drug consumption by attempting
to eliminate the supply abroad. As it will be explained in the next chapters, the enforcement
measures encouraged or even demanded by the United States only worsen the problem.
D- CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has differentiated South America from the Central America, the Caribbean,
and Mexico in both classical geopolitical terms and from a drug trafficking geopolitical
perspective. It has shown that the cocaine industry is centered in South America and explained
how this illegal activity is structured in terms of the role played by each state of the region. This
chapter has shown that because of a set of shared patterns of vulnerability among its states, the
region can be considered as a security complex vis-a-vis the cocaine industry. The process here
is mutually reinforcing: state weakness allows the cocaine industry to rise and consolidate at the
same time, while drug trafficking reinforces and even perpetuates the weak nature of the
producer countries and threatens the neighboring countries.  (The extent to which they are
affected depends, as explained previously, on their placement along the weak-strong continuum.
In any case, there are structural reasons that led to the rise of the cocaine industry in South
America. These economic and social roots of drug trafficking in the Andean core and the ways
in which the cocaine industry threatens the South American states will be analyzed in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER III:   THE COCAINE INDUSTRY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY IN SOUTH AMERICA
A- INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes the security problems caused by drug trafficking and by the
spillover effects of the militarized enforcement approach of the United States as an extra-
regional hegemonic actor. This chapter explains the social, political and economic roots of drug
trafficking in South America, and explains the structure of the illicit drug industry in the region.
This chapter also empirically analyzes the security dimensions of drug trafficking as defined in
the first chapter.
B-ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ROOTS OF THE COCAINE INDUSTRY IN SOUTH
AMERICA
“ Dans les années trente, se souvient un Liménien de souche, le savoir -vivre voulait qu’un bon repas
s’achève par une pincée de ‘la sal de los señores’, ainsi qu’on appelait alors la cocaïne. ”256
As was demonstrated in the first chapter, drug trafficking is an economic activity--albeit
an illegal activity for an illegal and deadly product--that constitutes a market. The fight against
criminal organizations requires an efficient police force; the reduction of coca production
requires strong international cooperation to create conditions for the production of alternative
goods more suitable for the Andean peasants; and the consumption of cocaine requires the
development of both a conscious public health policy and an effective education campaign. As
long as there is poverty and dependency in South America and a high demand for drugs in the
developed world, the cocaine industry will continue to exist.
Although drug trafficking has important security dimensions, it is not strictly a military
security problem. As it will be argued in this chapter, and in more detail in chapters IV, V, VI
and VII, the magnitude of the problem cannot be reduced by military means. Neither can the
expansion of drug trafficking be controlled with only enforcement measures like the eradication
of coca fields, the destruction of laboratories, or the disruption of criminal organizations. As it
will be demonstrated, enforcement methods create a positive feedback in the sense that they
exacerbate the problem rather than reversing a tendency.
In order to understand the security problems that stem from the cocaine industry, it is
necessary to understand the roots of the problem. Why did the Andean countries begin to
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produce mass quantities of cocaine? How did the transnational cocaine criminal organizations
arise? When did this happen?
There are different causes in both the upstream (coca growing, coca paste, cocaine base)
and downstream (cocaine refinement and transshipment) levels of the industry. But since the
mid 1970s, a chain of events contributed to the rise of a coca-cocaine boom in Bolivia, Peru and
Colombia and by the beginning of the 1980s, the articulation of a vertically integrated and
highly organized industry was formed.
The first factor is the decrease in the consumption of heroin in the United States and
increase in the demand for cocaine since the mid-1970s. This phenomenon was characterized as
a cocaine epidemic.
“ Alors que des épidémies de consommation de cocaïne avaient déjà été enregistrées aux Etats
Unis au tournant du siècle, l’utilisation de la cocaïne n’a pris la forme d’une épidémie qu’à partir
de la seconde moitié des années soixante dix. En fait, d’ après le rapport de la Commission sur le
cannabis de 1973, 3% des adultes et 1,5 % des jeunes déclaraient avoir essayé la cocaïne au
moins une fois; 2% des adultes et 5% des jeunes n’ayant pas eu l'expérience de la cocaïne
affirmaient qu’ils auraient envie d'essayer cette drogue dans le futur. 1%  des adultes et 3% des
jeunes disaient qu’ils pourraient l’essayer si la cocaïne était légale à leur portée. Le nombre de
décès ainsi que des urgences sans issue fatale dus a l’utilisation  de cocaïne a commencé à croître
abruptement au milieu des années 70 et  a plus que triplé en 1981. Cette dramatique montée s’est
prolongée pendant la seconde moitié des années quatre vingt en 1985 l’apparition du crack a
transformé  les donnés du marché en supprimant efficacement les contraintes de prix qui avaient
servi de barrière à la consommation de cocaïne spécialement chez les jeunes .”257
On the supply side, these events happened in an almost synchronized and sequential way.
A particular set of conditions led to the rise of Colombia as the epicenter of the cocaine industry
in the mid-1970s. In a brilliant recent analysis, Rensselaer Lee III and Francisco Thoumi
identified eight underlying structural conditions that contributed to the rise of drug trafficking in
Colombia, and to the country’s role as the center of the cocaine industry in terms of the location
and control of the main sites of production as well as the routes of traffic.258 As explained by
Thoumi in another work, these factors also explain the advantage of Colombia vis-à-vis other
South American countries in terms of the minimization of the illicit drug industry risks, the rise
of the cocaine refining industry and the control of coca leaf marketing in Bolivia and Peru.259
In other terms, Thoumi and Lee III explain why Colombia offered the “best incentive package”
to the cocaine industry.260 These underlying factors are numbered and explained below. The
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reader will notice that, in fact, most of these factors correspond to the indicators of state
weakness developed and analyzed in the previous chapter of this dissertation.
The first factor is the lack of legitimacy of the Colombian political regime. According to
Lee III and Thoumi, the de-legitimization of the regime (as explained in the previous chapter)
generated a situation in which:
“The government exercised only intermittent control over large economic activities and areas of 
the country, and it never developed effective methods to protect property rights and to solve 
conflicts. A growing gap between de jure and de facto behaviors developed, legitimizing 
activities such as illegal drug production and marketing.”261
Second, the weakness of Colombia’s civil society favored a situation in which capitalism
developed without any corresponding ethic of individual responsibility. That is, the situation
was one of ‘savage capitalism’ stemming from the fact that, in the Colombian society, there are
no institutions with the capacity of imposing constraints on individual behavior.
“Colombia did not have native communities that provided a sense of belonging to their 
members; the Catholic Church emphasized ritual compliance over behavior; and families 
became increasingly weak as migrations and modernization took place. Large urban growth 
and intra-city migrations prevented the development of neighborhood organizations by which
peer groups exert social pressure.”262
Third, there is the question of the widespread tendency in Colombia to resolve disputes
through violence. This has helped the rise of drug trafficking organizations, which did not
hesitate to unleash violence against the state and potential rival groups. Violence is a
characteristic of Colombian society that has also indirectly contributed to the displacement of
peasants to coca producing areas. As stated by Lee III and Thoumi:
“[g]iven the growing illegitimacy of the regime and the lack of civil society restrictions, violence
has been a very common means of resolving individual conflicts and to capture rents and 
wealth [...] Violence has been used by Colombian traffickers to wrest control of the U.S. 
wholesale cocaine business from Cuban and organized crime trafficking syndicates. It has been 
used to settle disputes between and within Colombia’s major trafficking coalitions. The 
Medellín and Cali cartels have used violence to intimidate or to assassinate Colombian 
journalists, politicians, judges, congressmen, police, army officers, cabinet ministers and other 
possible opponents. Yet this is not the only role played by violence in the development of the 
illegal drugs industry. The violence of the 1940s and early 1950s, which was associated with 
peasant’s fight for land, displaced many peasants who fled to unsettled isolated areas of the 
country. During the last 20 years rural violence has continued to displace large peasants 
populations who have also settled in vacant isolated lands. Coca and poppy are the only crops 
that produce an income level sufficient to sustain the settlements. Thus, the failure of the land 
reform efforts are one of the main causes of the growth of illegal crops.”263
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Fourth, the geographical location of Colombia, as well as the geographical configuration
within the country, have also been conducive to the development of the cocaine industry. As
noted by the two authors quoted above,
“The country’s location between the traditional coca growing areas [located in Peru and Bolivia] 
and the main market [the United States] made the country a good transshipment site; also the 
large number of isolated, sparsely populated regions where there is very little State presence 
has made the country an excellent location for illegal drug manufacturing and smuggling. In 
such regions laboratories, clandestine airstrips and drug storage sites are relatively difficult to 
detect; also scattered central or local government representatives are extremely vulnerable to 
intimidation and bribes.”264
Fifth, the structure of the political system and parties is also an important factor. In Lee
III and Thoumi´s view, the political party structure and the traditional parties’ role in society
have been conditioned by the country’s geography. Colombia is a geographically isolated
region. This has allowed local leaders a great deal of autonomy. As pointed by Lee III and
Thoumi,
“ The two traditional parties developed with a very decentralized structure in which local leaders
could exert power without central government controls. Weak central party organizations resulted
in weak party ideologies and very pragmatic politics.”265
Politically, this facilitated localized corruption and power abuse, as well as the formation
of power fiefs. This would explain why Pablo Escobar, one of the leaders of the Medellín cartel,
and Carlos Lehder, leader of an organization associated with the Medellín cartel, attempted to
form political fiefs in the Medellín and Quindío provinces, respectively, by directly
participating in politics. This fact will be further explained later in this chapter.
Sixth, the closed nature of the Colombian regime plays an important role. As explained in
Chapter II, the nature of Colombian democracy is extremely restrictive and exclusive. Although
in 1974 the National Front formally came to an end, the system continues to operate informally
with tacit consent of the political elite.266 This fact reinforced the problems mentioned in the
previous paragraph in the sense that,
“ The system allowed for dissent within a party, but not for opposition. The party structure 
facilitated the development of relatively cheap support networks that have allowed the narcotics 
industry to operate in isolated regions; moreover, clientelism made local politics very 
vulnerable to the illegal drug industry’s penetration: once it is accepted that elections are won 
through direct or indirect vote purchases, those who have the most money to spare will control 
the political machinery.”267
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Seventh, Colombian society is characterized by a lack of social mobility; since the state
has a weak presence, this has produced a social system in which cliques and mafia groups
control business and wield political power.268 Following Lee III and Thuomi’s analysis the
consequence of this is that,
“[s]ocial mobility requires the acceptance of strangers within those groups. There is no doubt
that the success of the political system was due in part to the co-optation of some local and
student leaders who became socially mobile. However, the possible social mobility channels
where narrow to begin with, and as the level of education in the country soared, they became
clogged. For many young frustrated Colombians the illegal drugs industry was the easiest way to
achieve social status. For others, the closeness of the political system also led to frustrations that
were vented through illegal activities as a way to ‘get back at the system’.”269
Finally there is what Thoumi and Lee III call “a social acceptance of illegal income and
capital.” According to these authors, this phenomenon stems from a gap between the de jure and
the de facto behaviors of people and from the weak nature of the state.270 In fact, in Colombia,
particularly in the Valle del Cauca and Antioquía regions, there was a tradition of smuggling,
and also  illegal prospect and export of emeralds.271 The existence of an export smuggling
network is particular to Colombia in that in the rest of Latin America the problem has
traditionally been one of import smuggling. As noted by one analyst,
“ [C]olombia has been one of the few countries which also had an export contraband tradition. 
Contraband exports of manufactured products and livestock to Venezuela and Ecuador have 
been persistent through time. Coffee contraband exports have frequently taken place to bypass 
International Coffee Agreement quotas. More importantly, for a long time Colombian emeralds 
have been smuggled out of the country. Workers in government mines steal the gems and sell 
them to smugglers and smugglers have also developed illegal wildcat mining organizations. 
Emerald export smuggling provided the initial know-how to sell on international black markets 
and launder foreign exchange, and [...] it developed a close-knit organization in which loyalty 
played an important role -a structure that was transplanted to the coca and cocaine industry. 
Thus, many emerald smugglers became involved in illegal PSAD [Psychoactive Drugs] 
exports.”272
Besides these factors, another issue not be underestimated is the large Colombian legal
and illegal immigration to the United States. The large Colombian emigration, preceded by a
couple of decades of similar emigrations from the other Andean countries, contributed to the
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Colombian international advantage by providing excellent distribution channels for illegal
exports.273 As Peter Reuter explained in an article written in the early 1980s,
“The advantage of Colombia as an export source is partly that it is the largest South American
source of migrants to the U.S.”274
 This large Colombian contingent in the United States also lowered illegal export
risks.275 Another important aspect (that will be further explained in further detail later in this
chapter) is that in the late 1970s/early 1980s guerrilla organizations were selling their protection
services to the traffickers there by contributing to the safety of the cocaine industry.276
There are also cojunctural factors that triggered the rise and consolidation of the cocaine
industry in Colombia. For example, in the 1970s, after the successful eradication campaign
jointly implemented by the U.S.- Mexican governments in Mexico, Colombia became the major
Latin American producer of marijuana. This meant that some organizations involved in drug
trafficking activities to the United States were already in place.277 A small cocaine-smuggling
network was developed in the late 1960s under the control of exile Cuban criminal
organizations based in Miami. By this time, Paez Indians in southwestern Colombia and the
Western Cordillera were cultivating coca in Colombian territory in small plots.278 As demand
grew in the United States, the traffickers began to import coca paste from Bolivia and Peru to
have refined it in a limited “artisan” way.
 The rise in demand for cocaine in the United States in the late 1970s coincided with of
crisis in the main Colombian industrial sectors located in big cities such as Medellín and Cali.
As explained by an analyst,
"Pendant les années 70, l'économie colombienne a subi des transformations importantes. D’une pénurie
chronique de devises on passe à une abondance sans précédent liée à l'envolée du prix mondial du café et
au développement des exportations illicites. Cependant cette nouvelle conjoncture se conjugue avec une
perte latente du dynamisme du secteur industriel colombien. Alors que l'investissement dans les secteurs
des biens intermédiaires et d'équipement a cru à un rythme de 13% par an entre 1958 et 1977, entre 1978
et 1980 diminue de 10% et de 2% respectivement. Le vieillissement de l’appareil productif a entraîné un
ralentissement des gains de productivité et un accroissement de la participation du secteur de biens de
consommation non durables. En 1976 le boom des exportations licites et illicites a permis de compenser
partiellement cette perte de dynamisme de l’industrie et des exportations dites traditionnelles.”279
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At the same time, due to the growth of the local production of marijuana in the United
States and the intensive Colombian campaigns of eradication with herbicides, the production of
marijuana begun to decline. It was the end of the “marimba boom.”280 This caused not only a
rise in the underground economy (cocaine trafficking), but also a shift in the production of
marijuana to the production of cocaine. The new traffickers came from displaced sectors of
Medellín’s industrial middle class, from the former marijuana and emeralds smugglers and even
from the old landowner class (in the case of the Ochoa family, for example).281  Through a
"Darwinian selection process" of armed competition, by the end of the 1970s two main
coalitions of traffickers groups (based in Medellín and Cali) dominated not only the Colombian
but also the South American cocaine traffic. The firms of the industry arose and by the
beginning of the 1980s they had consolidated their position by eliminating the Cubans from the
retailing network in Miami. Paradoxically, until the mid 1970s the cocaine processing
laboratories were located in the peripheral countries, namely Chile and the Northwest
Argentina,282 where independent and weakly organized bands processed small quantities of
cocaine for exportation to the U.S. After Pinochet’s coup in 1973, Chilean chemists migrated to
Colombia but were gunned down by Colombian traffickers.283
Cocaine production required more, and increasingly more specialized, steps than required
for marijuana production. The cocaine traffickers that arose in Colombia in the mid-1970s
developed, then, stronger and more hierarchical organizations. They also developed their own
defense mechanisms against rival organizations, the government, and the leftist guerrillas.284
As argued by Bruce Bagley,
“ By the early 1980s the cocaine trade was eclipsing the marihuana traffic in terms of wealth and 
power. The distinction between the two enterprises, largely controlled by different groups, lies 
in the difference between farming and industry. Marijuana is essentially a labor intensive-
process; the employment and income multiplier effects are therefore more widely distributed. 
Cocaine requires fewer people, more capital and at least an incipient industrial process relying 
on imported chemicals. It demands financial skills to handle the much larger profits, which are 
heavily concentrated in a few hands. Cocaine syndicates tend to be more vertically integrated, 
more hierarchical and more violent.”285
If these were the economic and social factors that conditioned the rise of the industry
firms, what then were the roots for the articulation of the Colombian organizations with their
Peruvian and Bolivian counterparts as intermediary firms, and with the coca grower peasants
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(labor and row material) of this two Andean countries? How did the vertically integrated
industry develop?
Both Bolivia and Peru, the two main producers of coca leaves, have a large population of
Indians who for centuries have grown and chewed the coca leaves for traditional, religious and
medicinal uses. How did they become involved in the cocaine industry?
Three major factors determined the massive migration to the coca growing production
sites and the large-scale employment of Peruvian and Bolivian peasants in coca paste
production. Parallel to the rise of cocaine demand in the U.S. and the formation of the
Colombian criminal organizations, Peru and Bolivia started to suffer from the effects of the debt
crisis that affected the whole of South America. In the case of Bolivia, the decrease in the price
of tin (its main export) resulted in mass unemployment.  Many of those without fixed
employment were then absorbed into the underground economy and became involved in the
illegal growing of coca (that far exceeded the needs for traditional use). As the demand for
cocaine rose, the price of coca leaves started to climb. For poor Bolivian or Peruvian peasants,
the production of coca became the panacea. In regions such as the Alto Huallaga and the
Chapare in Bolivia--where no infrastructure exists to produce and transport legal crops in a
competitive way--coca leaves became the main export. The case of Peru presents similar
characteristics.286 As pointed out by one analyst,
“La crise externe du début des années 80 a affecté plus particulièrement la Bolivie, pays très dépendant
de matières premières. Sa base industrielle ne représentait que 12% du PIB  en 1985 et l'étain et le gaz
naturel constituaient 79% de ses exportations légales. L’effondrement du marché de l'étain et le poids
croissant du service de la dette (très concentré dans le secteur public) ont entraîné une profonde récession.
A la fin de l'année 1981 le ratio dette externe/PIB était 80% et la dette représentait 306% des exportations
des biens et services[...] Sur le plan social, la fermeture des mines d'étain a entraîné le licenciement de
20.000 mineurs et le chômage ouvert touchait 35% de la population active à la fin de 1988, la culture de
feuilles de coca a absorbé une partie importante de ces chômeurs. Près de 350.000 personnes vivraient
directement de cette activité selon le ministère de l'intérieur.”287
The industry became highly integrated when the two big Colombian drug trafficking
coalitions established contacts with the Bolivian and Peruvian counterparts who purchased the
coca paste and cocaine base to be processed in Colombia.
Another factor that contributed to the coca-cocaine boom was the colonization policy of
the Amazon region by the Bolivian, Peruvian and Colombian governments during the 1950’s.
Thousands of peasants were encouraged to colonize this wild territory under the promise of land
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re-distribution, and the provision of basic infrastructure (roads, irrigation, and safe drinking
water) and services (education, health, and agricultural extension) in order to make settlements
viable. These promises where never fulfilled, and by the mid-70s when the traffickers began to
encourage and demand increasing amounts of well paid coca, this product became the panacea
for the old and new colonizers of the Upper Huallaga Valley (Peru), Chapare (Bolivia), and
Magdalena Medio Valley (Colombia).288
C-THE INDUSTRY AND ITS DIRECT AND INDIRECT PARTICIPANTS:
TRAFFICKERS, PEASANTS, AND GUERRILLAS
As stated previously, the cocaine industry directly or indirectly involves non-state actors,
whose interaction threatens the security of South American states. The political power and
influence of the actors who participate in the three stages of cocaine production must be
analyzed in relation to their interaction with a third non-state actor, the (Peruvian and
Colombian) guerrilla groups.
a) Drug trafficking organizations
 In the period under study, the best-organized and stronger criminal organizations of
traffickers in South America were the Colombian and the Bolivian traffickers. Peruvian
organizations were fully subordinated to the Colombian traffickers. The Brazilian traffickers
supported the Peruvian, Bolivian, and Colombian groups who shifted their operations to the
Brazilian Amazon by acting as intermediaries. Their drug activities are generally limited to
transportation and retail. Such is the case of the Commando Vermelho (Red Command) in Rio
de Janeiro, which transports to supply the Brazilian megalopolis and is also involved in
prostitution and illegal gambling. 289
In the case of Colombia, the traffickers were organized in two loosely articulated
coalitions of criminal groups centered in the cities of Medellín and Cali. They accounted for 70
to 80 % of Colombian cocaine production. The remaining 20 to 30 % lay mostly in the hands of
independent trafficking groups based in Pereira, Bogota and the north coast of Colombia.290An
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informal division of labor existed between the leaders of each organization. In the case of the
Medellín coalition, for example,
“ Pablo Escobar specialized in security for the organization, Jorge Luis Ochoa and his brothers
took responsibility for the distribution networks in Florida and California and Carlos Lehder
assumed responsibility for air transportation into the United States.” 291
Colombia’s cocaine establishment is not monolithic. In the early 1980s a sense of
cooperation existed among the major cocaine bosses, but significant disputes began emerging in
the middle and latter parts of the decade. These disputes centered on issues such as ideology,
economic competition (turf wars), and differences in operating philosophy. A radical-
conservative split occurred between Carlos Lehder (violently anti-establishment trafficker) and
his colleagues of the Medellín coalition. A more important dispute between the Medellín and
Cali coalitions arose largely from economic factors but also reflected differences in tactics. For
example, the most significant division involved those who advocated violence (the Rodríguez
Gacha-Escobar wing of the Medellín coalition) and traffickers (including some Medellín
bosses) who favored a more conciliatory approach toward the authorities.292 These coalitions
were relatively decentralized and amorphous. These are not bureaucracies in the Weberian
sense, but rather coalitions or confederations with fluid boundaries. The coalitions are organized
through a complicated system of contracts and subcontracts or  “joint ventures” between
different organizations. There were differences in the structure of authority of the Medellín and
Cali coalitions. As stated by Rensselaer Lee III and Patrick Clawson,
“In Medellín a single kingpin-Pablo Escobar- exercised a vast sway over trafficking operations
that, Escobar’s mantle of leadership, his access to the means of violence, and his rightness
domination of smaller exporters held the coalition together and established its identity. The Cali
coalition, by contrast, is a relatively loose association of exporters; no single head or heart drives
it.”293
Because of the absence of a hierarchical and vertical structure within the coalitions, the
capture or death of one of its leaders may weaken them but is not enough to disrupt cocaine
production and traffic. Moreover, it multiplies the number of players and increases the market
share of competing coalitions (as it happened with the Cali coalition after the arrest or death of
most of the leaders of the Medellín coalition). As again pointed out by Clawson and Lee III in
reference to the death of Pablo Escobar in 1993,
“Part of the old coalition [….] continued to export cocaine as of 1995, but Medellín’s overall
market share has diminished drastically –to as little as 10 to 20 percent compared to 70 to 80
percent in the late 1980s. Also according to numerous reports, the new leaders have set about
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mending relations with the Cali cartel. Some organizations crossover from the fractured Medellín
group to Cali” might have occurred in the post-Escobar period.”294
Also according to a Drug Enforcement Administration report that refers to the major blow
against the Cali “cartel” in 1995,
“The death of Jose Santacruz-Londono[sic] and the arrest or surrender of such major traffickers as
Victor Patino[sic], Jose Castrillon Henao and Juan Carlos Ramirez Abadia[sic] (aka "Chupeta")
have disrupted some Cali drug mafia drug trafficking operations. The Cali drug mafia per se,
however, has not been dismantled in that Cali drug lord Helmer "Pacho" Herrera remains at large
and the Rodriguez-Orejuela [sic] brothers continue to manage aspects of their trafficking
organizations from prison. DEA reporting suggests, however, that a new generation of relatively
young North Coast, Northern Valle del Cauca, and Cali traffickers will attempt to exploit any
"power vacuum" created by the arrests of the Cali drug lords. The Henao Montoya brothers, for
example, appear to be seeking to increase their power and influence relative to the Cali "old
guard." One important result of this heightened competition between rival Colombian trafficking
groups has been an increase in drug-related violence.”295
 As pointed out in the previous chapter, the weakening of the Colombian based coalitions
led to a decentralization of the industry and to a proliferation of important players in the sense
that Bolivian and, to a lesser extent, Peruvian organizations started producing their own cocaine
and establishing their own transport and distribution networks.
In Bolivia, the illicit drug traffic is not managed by coalitions of criminal organizations
but by 20 to 30 organizations (often referred to as “families” due to the fact that most of the
businesses are managed by landowner families) with serious conflicts and grievances between
them.296
The common factor between the Colombian and Bolivian criminal organizations is that in
both cases the traffickers constitute private fiefs or para-welfare states and para-military
organizations. They occupy the political space left by the weak (Colombian and Bolivian) states
and win support and legitimacy among the populations by developing infrastructures (roads,
electric power, houses, etc.) Government officials are easily bought and, in this way, they are
able to secure broad control over much of the national territory. The following quoted
statements both give examples of the para-state capabilities of the drug traffickers in terms of
welfare policies and firepower:
“The narcos dispensed largesse in villages squires, installing street lighting, erecting clinics and
even building a Casa de Cultura with 5,000 books. Rivero, who was a sociable type, gave
sumptuous parties and was well liked. In 1989 he was the target of a major night-time assault on
Santa Ana by joint DEA and Bolivian police forces, but the whole town, including Rivero’s
bodyguards rose in armed resistance, prompting a shootout in which four people were killed.”297
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“Roberto Suarez paved streets and restored churches in Santa Ana and supplied electric
generators and water pumps to other small communities in the Beni. He developed a system for
supplying medical services by air to villages living in the remotest parts of the region. He
reportedly provided scholarships to young Beni residents for technical or college education
abroad. Finally, according to a foreign coca expert who regularly visits Bolivia, Roberto Suarez
and other traffickers virtually reconstructed a town in northwestern Bolivia (San Buenaventura,
in La Paz department), providing roads, a police [!!!] station, a post office and a school, as well
as a hotel and a restaurant.”298
“Perhaps the archetype of mafia civic leaders is Pablo Escobar [...] Escobar’s showpiece project
‘Medellín Without Slums’, was launched in 1982 to build 2,000 new housing units for poor
families in that city.  ‘Medellín Without Slums’, said Medellín Cívico [Escobar´s financed
newspaper], would provide a new ‘live of noble dignity’ for families that had been living in a
‘pestilential inferno of garbage’. The project was later scaled back to 1,000 units and only 450
dwellings were actually completed. Escobar’s troubles with the law- especially his implication in
the death of  Lara Bonilla- prevented the full realization of his ambitious plan. [...] Escobar also
seemed to have a special interest in sports facilities for the poor. He built, outfitted, and
illuminated 80 sport arenas in Medellín and surrounding communities in Antioquía. In another
famous project, Escobar and some relatives reportedly built an immense zoological park at
‘Napoles -a family estate located near Puerto Triunfo, 180 km from Medellín. The zoo is [was]
open to the public, and entry is free of charge.”299
“With a gross income of more than $8 billion a year, traffickers can easily afford to stockpile 
large arsenals of automatic weapons - such as AK 47, Uzis, AR-15 and Galil rifles, and M-16 
guns), grenades, rocket launchers, and ground-to-ground rifles. They also may have purchased 
ground-to -air missiles, but there is no evidence that those missiles have been deployed [ ....] 
the Medellín Mafia, at least until recently, ran several training schools for paramilitary 
operatives. Former Israeli Army and British Strategic Air Services (SAS) personnel were hired 
as instructors...”300
“Traffickers also need transport; they buy Cessna 206s from Santa Cruz or Miami for about 
$60,000 a piece, removing identity plates to make it more difficult for police to trace them. 
Others steal planes from remote ranches in Brazil, Peru or Bolivia, confident that owners 
will not risk their lives by reporting the incident. Weapons, used by bodyguards to defend the 
labs, are imported through Colombia from the U.S. or Europe. The most common are Israeli 
made Uzis, Belgian FALs and Russian AK-47s, but U.S.-made assault rifles have also been 
found. Security is backed up by a complex intelligence network made up of scores of radio 
operators and looks-outs posted in the jungle and in cities like Santa Cruz and Cochabamba.”301
In both cases the traffickers constitute a strong destabilizing political force, not because
their goal is to assume the political control of the state or to radically change the political regime
or the type of society, but because of the means of coercive violence and corruption that they
develop to protect their illegal business from the control of the state.  As such, they constitute a
major political threat to the state. 302
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In Colombia, the pattern of violence in the period under study was by far higher than in
Bolivia, where enforcement activities are centered on coca eradication instead of the disruption
of criminal organizations. Moreover, as in Peru, in Colombia there is a pattern of interaction
between drug trafficking activities and guerrilla movements.
The important point is that these organizations are transnational and therefore add a
transnational dimension to the problem, involving all the countries in the region. The
Colombian traffickers establish alliances with their counterparts in Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil;
use legal institutions to expand their criminal activities; are involved in corruption activities
concerning political officials in other South American; and involve private and national banks in
money laundering activities. These organizations purchase land in neighboring countries for use
as a base for their traffic operations or simply as an investment to legitimize their illicit profits.
They also establish alliances with or directly buy-off authoritarian leaders in order to use their
countries as transit and money laundering centers. The case of Paraguay during the Stroessner
dictatorship is a paradigm is in this sense. Also, although Panama escapes the regional scope
analyzed in this work, the dictatorship of General Noriega can also be taken as an example.
b) The myths of the “narco-guerrilla” connection
 In Peru and Colombia, the security problem caused by the illicit drug traffic is worsened
by the existence of guerrilla organizations. Both countries exhibit different patterns of
interaction between the guerrillas, the traffickers, and the coca-grower peasants. Before
explaining these patterns it is worth clarifying the meaning of the terms ‘narco-guerrillas’ and
‘narco -terrorism’.
Both terms were used by the Reagan and Bush administrations to refer to an “unholy”
alliance between drug traffickers and guerrillas against western interests and South American
democracies. However, such an alliance never existed. The relationship between both groups is
conflictive and violent, and they only establish sporadic “marriages of convenience” if their
interests overlap or when they operate in the same geographic zones.
The interests of both groups do not coincide: the traffickers pursue only the survival (and
expansion) of their business and not the destruction of political institutions  (it is a better tactic
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to corrupt them), while the guerrillas seek a change of political regime and a change in the mode
of production of their societies. 303 As stated by one analyst,
“ [m]ost narcotics traffickers are not natural revolutionaries. They seek to buy into, to manipulate, 
and sometimes to coerce the political system, but not to change it in a fundamental way. Some 
of the Mafia’s actions -for example, the murders of prominent antidrug  crusaders in Colombia- 
are destabilizing. However, the aim of Mafia violence is creating a secure environment for 
business operations, not upsetting the political status quo. Given their limited objectives, drug 
traffickers do not typically engage in terrorism; the do not, for example, target public 
buildings, military bases, industrial property, or the civilian population at large [...] In general, 
the stronger and more developed the trafficking organization, the less likely it is to collaborate 
with guerrillas [...] In Colombia, conflict has been intensified by the cocaine Mafia’s purchase 
of large estates in areas where guerrilla strongholds.”304
The term “guerrilla” is used here to refer to a type of warfare driven by an irregular army
or revolutionary group against a regular one. The objective of this combat is not military but
political: to destroy the existing institutions by provoking radical social and political changes.
“Terrorism” is the use of violence for political ends, driven by political groups. This includes
any use of violence for the purpose of causing fear in the general public or in any particular
sector. The drug trafficking organizations can participate in bombings, assassinations, armed
assaults, and kidnappings to influence the political choices of the government, but these actions
are not part of a clear political program. These activities can be defined as narcoterrorism, but
the traffickers are not a group with clear and coherent political ends, as are guerrilla
organizations. Nevertheless, the fact that they interact and operate in the same zones renders
both problems more difficult to solve.
From an etymological point of view, narcoterrorism (terrorist actions committed by the
traffickers against the government) and narcoguerrilla, (a term used to refer to a non-existent
alliance between the guerrillas and the traffickers), are terms which refer to two different
phenomena.
In Colombia, the relations between the ten Colombian guerrilla organizations--and more
particularly between the two larger ones, FARC and M-19305--and the drug trafficking
organizations are very conflictive. This is because the traffickers could be considered a “new
rising bourgeoisie.”306 As their economic wealth grew, they came to purchase and manage
large extensions of land and cattle and became targets for Colombian guerrillas. In 1981, all the
major traffickers agreed to form a paramilitary group named MAS (death to the kidnappers) in
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order to retaliate against the aggression of guerrilla groups. They received the help of the
landowners and the implicit support of the army.
FARC and M-19, as well as the Army of National Liberation (ELN), finance the purchase
of their weapons by taxing traffickers and coca growing peasants with a “revolutionary tax.”
The revolutionary tax is a mechanism of racketeering, which is broadly used in the zones
controlled by the guerrilla groups. But it is only effective against small independent
organizations. The big criminal organizations do not need the protection of the guerrillas. They
can afford large private armies to effectively retaliate against the extortion of the guerrilla
groups.
This pattern of extortion is used also against the landowners or multinational oil
companies. From this point of view, one may speak of  “cattle-guerrillas” and “oil-guerrillas.” If
there are cases of cooperation, they are sporadic and are based on pragmatic calculations. The
trafficker Carlos Lehder was suspected to have collaborated with the M-19 group in the capture
of the Colombian Supreme Court building in 1985. The army stormed the building, killing not
only the guerrilleros but also half of the Supreme Court judges (who were investigating drug
trafficking affairs), and started a fire that burned files concerning the extradition of the major
drug bosses. But this was an isolated case. With the exception of Lehder, all the kingpins shared
a common cause against the guerrillas.
In Peru, the pattern of interaction is much more complicated. Peru is the leading coca leaf
producer in the world, and thousands of Peruvian peasants in the Alto and Bajo Huallaga
valleys in the northeast Peruvian Andes are involved in the activity. The latter region and the
Peruvian Amazon is virtually divided into red zones (controlled by Sendero Luminoso) and
white zones (controlled by the Peruvian traffickers). Sendero Luminoso, a Maoist group, bases
its revolutionary strategy on the mobilization of the peasant masses. The coca industry is an
invaluable political tool for this revolutionary movement. The pattern of interaction can be
summarized in the following way:
1. U.S. pressures the Peruvian government                2. the Peruvian government uses
special units of the police (UMOPAR) and the army to eradicate coca plantations          3.
Sendero intervenes to protect the peasants against the police-army forces               4. Sendero
wins popular support            5.  Sendero members purchase their weapons by taxing the peasants
with a “revolutionary fifth” in coca paste (which is in turn sold to the traffickers) or in money
6.  Sendero extorts the traffickers by taxing them and demanding better prices for the peasants.
As the Peruvian traffickers are weakly organized, most of the time they are compelled to
pay the revolutionary taxes and in some cases they cooperate with the guerrillas by sharing
information about the police position and movements. But the most important pattern of
109
interaction here is the "Robin Hood"  role played by the guerrillas between the traffickers and
the peasants.307
The Peruvian dilemma is that the cheapest way (as well as the method imposed and
financed by the United States) to eliminate the coca production is to eradicate the plantations
(manually or with the utilization of herbicides). By doing this, the government enhances the
power and popularity of Sendero. The Peruvian army opted to avoid involvement  in eradication
activities and concentrated their activities on anti-guerrilla operations. Without stronger support
from the U.S., unilaterally or through the UNDCP, to develop alternative crops and alternative
economic activities for the Peruvian peasants, this dilemma will not be resolved. Since the mid-
1980s, enforcement in Peru has become a problem for Brazil because the traffickers switched
their activities to the Brazilian Amazon and started to pay the Indians in cash or equipment for
the production of the Amazonian variation of coca or ipadu.
c) The peasants
If there is a country where a real narco-guerrilla could exist, this country is Bolivia.
Bolivia has a historical tradition of strong and highly organized trade unions of peasants and
miners. Since the beginning of the “coca boom,” the coca growing peasants were organized into
coca-federations supported by the COB (Trade Union Central Organization).
The structure of the Chapare coca peasants’ trade unions is as such:
Around 40,000 peasant families are grouped in 600 base organizations (colonias or
sindicatos).308 The sindicatos organize the settlers’ activities, including  the distribution of
land, the maintenance of roads, and the resolution of conflicts between families. 25 to 200
peasant families form these base organizations.309 These sindicatos are grouped into Trade
Union Centrals (Centrales Sindicales). Each Central is composed of a group of 10 to 50
sindicatos. Each Trade Union Central takes care of matters concerning the administration of the
land, communal conflicts, roads, education, and sports; women are also represented as a
separate group of interest.310 There are 60 centrales that form part of one of the five
federations (federaciones) That is, the centrales of different provinces or regions within the
Chapare (formed by the provinces of Chapare, Tiraque and Carrasco) are grouped within the
federations. The five peasant federations of the Chapare are: The Special Federation of Peasants
from the Tropic of Cochabamba (FETCTC); the Special Federation of Colonizers of the
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Tropical Carrasco (FCCT), The Special Federation of Colonizers of Chimoré (FECCh), the
Single Federation of United Centrals (FUCU), and the Special Federation of the Yungas of
Chapare (FEYCh).311  The FETCTC (23,000 members) and the FCCT (8,300 members) are the
two more important in terms of the number of their members. These two federations are also
more actively opposed to the eradication of coca without the development of an alternative
economy.312 The FETCTC and the FCCT are members of the National Peasant Confederation
(CSTUCB) and the Trade Union Central Organization (COB, Confederación Obrera
Boliviana).313 A coordination committee coordinates the five federations.314 The chart bellow
represents the typical structure of a Chapare peasant federation:
Figure 1. Structure of a Chapare peasant trade union federation
Federation
Central Central Central Central Central
Colony Colony Colony     Colony Colony Colony   Colony Colony Colony  Colony Colony Colony  Colony Colony Colony
Source: Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, op.cit. p.64 (Colony is a synonym of sindicato).
Most of these peasants do not know the final destination of the coca leaves that are
processed into cocaine. What is relevant for them is that coca growing and coca paste
production secures a source of revenue higher than any other crop. Moreover, the regions where
coca is grown (Yungas and Chapare) lack the infrastructure to channel legal products into the
external market. As long as the demand for cocaine still exists the Bolivian peasant will
continue to grow coca. This tendency is reinforced by the low degree of diversification within
the Bolivian economy. The trade unions provide the essential services for peasants (health,
electricity, roads, and housing), thus assuring a high degree of loyalty towards these
organizations. A civil war could occur if the government really tried to enforce the eradication
of coca plantations. As explained by an analyst,
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“Politically, attempts at eradication are explosive in Bolivia. The coca growers are well organized 
into trade unions affiliated to the COB national labor federation, willing to take on the 
government if it tries to wipe out their source of livelihood. In 1988 at least 10 people died in 
union protest against the use of herbicides. Although guerrilla organizations have not sprung up 
in Bolivia as elsewhere in Latin America, Bolivia is a notoriously unstable political country, and 
a group such as Sendero Luminoso could well emerge if the Government went to far against the 
cocaine economy.”315
The non-state actors who participate in the cocaine industry and threaten the security of
South American producer states are now clearly identified. The next section will show how the
intervention and policy of the United States as an extra-regional state actor contributed to
worsening the situation and spreading the problem to peripheral countries. This can be defined
as a provoked and reinforced “domino effect.”
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D- TACKLING THE “WHITE PERIL”: THE UNITED STATES AS AN EXTRA-
REGIONAL ACTOR AND THE “WAR ON DRUGS”
“Upset happens in all sorts of things. One way is through a feeling of being under acute
pressure. Another is through a feeling of unreasonable strain. A third is through a
feeling of surprise at the unexpected”316
 “ The logic is simple. The cheapest and safest way to eradicate narcotics is to destroy 
them at their source...We need to wipe out crops wherever they are grown and
take out labs wherever they exist ”317
“ International Priorities:
*Disruption and dismantlement of drug-trafficking organizations.
*Reduced cocaine supply. Law enforcement, military, and economic assistance will be
provided to the three Andean cocaine-producing countries to isolate major coca-
growing areas; to block delivery of chemicals used for cocaine processing; to destroy
cocaine hydrochloride processing labs; and to dismantle the trafficking organizations.
Efforts in transit areas will be improved and Joint Intelligence Collection Centers will
be created in the Caribbean Basin. [...]
*Other international objectives:-Elevation of drugs as a bilateral foreign policy
issue.[...]-Support for the U.S. foreign aid certification process in order to achieve more
effective supply-and transit-country compliance with American drug control
objectives.[...]”318
 “ We will continue to treat the flow of drugs to this country and the operations of foreign drug
trafficking organizations as a threat to U.S. security...”319
“A colonel from Lima said, I have the opportunity while I’m here to make $70.000 by looking 
the other way at certain times. You have a family, they are protected in the United States, you 
have a proper pension plan. My family is not protected and I don’t have the proper pension plan
and I will never have the opportunity to make $70.000 as long as I live. I am going to make it… ”
320
As explained in the first chapter, in the United States, the growing consumption of
cocaine and drug-related violence in the early 1980s were defined as a threat to national
security. As this nation consolidated its position as a hegemonic power in Latin America at the
end of the Second World War, this perception had important consequences for the security of
South American states in terms of threats posed by the illicit drug traffic. 321
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All the South American countries are strongly tied to the United States in terms of
investment, trade, national foreign debt, and military supplies. This implies that these nations
are vulnerable to North American economic and political pressure. At the same time, the United
States, has the capacity to deploy military power in the region from its Southern Command
(based in Miami and until 1997 based in Panama). Military intervention was, at that time, a
current fact in the history of Central America and the Caribbean, and since the early 1980s has
become a latent threat for South America (especially the Andean States).
In February 1982, amid the rising cocaine epidemics in the United States, President
Ronald Reagan declared  ‘his’ war on drugs.322 Why was this war on drugs personified into his
war? There is a long tradition in the American Drug Control policy-making to see the problem
of drug trafficking and consumption as an evil and wicked phenomenon that is imposed from
outside, and therefore can be personalized and eliminated at the source of production.  As
pointed out by one analyst,
“One can look back to even earlier precedents for the externalization of “ the drug threat.” 
Indeed, it was the international dimension of drugs, which first led to anti-narcotics legislation 
within the United States. Active in and  the actual initiator of international conferences  to 
control narcotics trafficking in the early 1900s, the United States enacted domestic laws so as 
to have a domestic example with which to press for restrictions  in other countries....”323
A “historical model” of repression at the source can be traced back to the Narcotics Drugs
Imports and Exports Act (1922).324 This model would be fully developed and implemented
during the Nixon administration in the 1960s in order to face rising heroin consumption. In
1971, Nixon declared his war on heroin and implemented a policy of economic pressure on
Turkey to curb the production of opium. The result was successful in Turkey, but production
rose in Mexico and the Golden Triangle in South East Asia. The creation of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973 initiated a process of proliferation of federal
agencies for drug control in the United Sates territory and abroad. For example, the DEA is in
charge of the internal and external intelligence and legal enforcement operations; the Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters of the Department of State is in charge of eradication operations
and alternative development abroad (through USAID); and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
as well as the Financial Crime Enforcement Center (FINCEN, Department of Treasury) are in
charge of the control of money laundering activities. Fourteen different federal departments and
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agencies are currently engaged in international drug control efforts and six principal agencies
account for 95 %of total expenditures.  The six agencies are:  the Customs Service, Department
of Defense, Coast Guards, State Department (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs), Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.325
This policy was continued during the Ford and Carter administrations; one result was the
development of an anti-drug air force within the Department of State (the Interregional
Narcotics Eradication Wings) whose mission was to eradicate marijuana (in Mexico) and opium
poppy plantations (in Burma) through the fumigation of fields and plantations. 326  The results
were a shift in the 1970s of marijuana plantations from Mexico to Colombia and the United
States (today the largest world producer), and a moderate success in opium control in Mexico.
The same has occurred in the 1980s and 1990s with the war on cocaine. The traffic routes have
shifted southward, the laboratories and coca plantations moved across the borders towards the
neighboring countries.
The cocaine industry was relatively more problematic.
First, it involved a larger number of actors. Second, the herbicides used for the
eradication of opium and marijuana (a chemical called Pakarat) were ineffective against the
coca bush. Moreover, the governments of Peru and Bolivia resisted the utilization of herbicides,
and their use enhanced the popularity and support of Sendero Luminoso in the first country and
raised the risk of a major confrontation between the peasants and the Bolivian government in
the second.
The difference with the Reagan and Bush administration approaches is that, for the first
time, the Department of Defense was formally involved in the planning and implementation of
counter- narcotic operations.
“The Pentagon was thrust to the front lines of the drug war by the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY [Fiscal Year] 1989, which designated DOD [Department of
Defense] as ‘the single lead agency’ of the federal government for detecting and monitoring
maritime and aerial shipments of illicit drugs into the United States. DOD had played a
significant role in combating drugs since 1981 by providing such services as radar surveillance,
transportation, and communication support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
engaged in counternarcotic activities. The FY 1989 NDAA, however marked the first legislative
mandated counternarcotics mission for the Pentagon.”327
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The militarization of the supply approach to the war on drugs was enhanced during the
Bush administration. In 1989 President Bush presented his Andean Strategy;  it contemplated
military and economic aid to reduce the supply of cocaine from the Andean countries. In fact
only 30% of this aid would be economic while 70% would be military aid to the armies and the
police (equipment, construction of  “Vietnam Style bases” in the Peruvian jungle, military
advisors, satellite information, etc.)
“ In 1989, President George Bush presented his National Drug Control Strategy to the nation,
bringing unprecedented major counterdrug (CD) mission to the Department of Defense (DOD).
Reaffirming this strategy just days after its inauguration, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
assigned specific CD roles and responsibilities within DOD. During the past three years the
DOD CD program has come a long way. Today, both Active and Reserve U.S. military forces
are fully engaged in the war on drugs. Nowhere is this involvement greater or more important
than in the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)”328
“ In addition to the role played by all members of these committees, the Department of Defense 
has been designated by statute to be the lead agency for detection and monitoring, a component 
of interdiction...”329
A program to train South American armed forces in drug interdiction operations with the
participation of U.S. Army advisors was developed under the responsibility of the Southern
Command. The plan was called the Andean Initiative but was enlarged to the neighboring
countries as well (Venezuela , Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil). By this logic, the specificity of
the transit countries is not recognized. They are considered an extension of the producer
countries and therefore their armed forces must cooperate with the United States in
“containment” and drug control operations.330 As pointed out by a group of analysts,
“The U.S. drug war there has been built on the twin components of law enforcement and economic
assistance [ nevertheless the bulk of the assistance is directed to enforcement operations as the
eradication of plantations and the destruction of laboratories]. The enforcement component seeks to
cut supply by eradicating coca crops, destroying processing laboratories ,blocking the transport of
processing chemicals , and interdicting drug shipments. Traffickers are to be arrested and prosecuted,
their assets seized and their networks dismantled.
Past U.S. drug control efforts emphasized aid to Andean civilian law enforcement agencies and
judiciaries. Meager results lead to a search for ways to increase enforcement capabilities ; an early
step was to “militarize” the police. When this strategy proved ineffective, U.S. narcotics officials
turned to Andean militaries, backed by U.S. equipment and training, to do the job”331
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Moreover, since 1985 the illicit drug traffic was considered by the U.S. Department of
Defense as part of the Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine (LIC), and therefore as a threat whose
elimination could involve the use of military power. 332
In 1985 U.S. Joint Chief of Staff defined LIC as:
“ [a] limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological
objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic and psycho-social
pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a
geographic area and it is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level
of violence.”333
This broad and ambiguous definition has allowed the inclusion of enforcement
operations against drug trafficking activities within the LIC category. As accurately
stated by two analysts,
“So deliberately broad and ambiguous is the official description of low-intensity warfare that it
embraces drug interdiction in Bolivia, the occupation of Beirut, the invasion of Grenada, and the
1986 strikes on Libya. Also included a wide range of covert political and psychological operations
variously described as ‘special operations’ , ‘special activities’, and ‘unconventional warfare’.”334
Also according to Michael Klare,
“While such activities [enforcement operations against drug trafficking] have heretofore received
only scant attention from Pentagon strategists, they have become a high priority for members of
Congress and for administration officials who seek a more vigorous drive against narcotics-
trafficking. Reflecting the views of many lawmakers, Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona
declared in 1986 that ‘we must treat illegal drugs as a national security threat to the United States’.
This view was subsequently affirmed by President Reagan, who in April 1986 signed a secret
directive identifying the illegal drug traffic as a significant threat to national security and
authorizing the Department of Defense to engage in a wide range of antidrug activities[…]
President Reagan's April 1986 directive on narcotics control provided the armed services even
wider latitude in conducting antidrug operations. Specifically, the directive allows the Pentagon to
help plan strike operations against drug laboratories and processing plants in foreign countries, to
transport U.S. civilian agents and foreign police during these operations, and to conduct expanded
intelligence activities.”335
In the 1990s the LIC doctrine was renamed as “operations other than war.” Basically, the
doctrine took on a new name but maintained the same substance.336 In 1993 the U.S. Army
Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations was presented (the previous one had been edited in
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1986). This manual is considered to be the doctrinary cornerstone of the U.S. Army. In this
manual, counter-drug trafficking operations are, in fact, identified as “operations other than
war.”337
This is the core of the paradox of the cocaine “war on drugs”: trying to solve a non-
military problem by military means. The American drug control strategy in South America
(centered in the Andean Region) caused a continuous escalation in the sophistication of drug
trafficking activities. The interdiction of routes in the early 1980s led to the incorporation of
new countries (Brazil and Venezuela) as major transit routes. The eradication campaigns
supported by the police and later by the Andean armies worsened the guerrilla problem in Peru
and created dangerous political unrest in Bolivia. The localization and destruction of
laboratories created a “balloon effect” whereby traffickers reduced the size of laboratories or
moved them to neighboring countries.338 Illicit drug traffic had affected the security of the
entire region by the late 1980s. As pointed out by two analysts,
“This combination of present and potential dangers, along with growing U.S. pressures prompted
them [ neighboring countries]  to define the drug problem a national security issue. Although
more removed from drug corruption and violence, third-line states like Argentina, Brazil,
Ecuador, Venezuela  were also motivated to adopt, partially or totally, national security 
interpretations of the drug problem as preemptive measures to forestall possible 
“Colombianization.”339
The militarized drug control policies promoted by the U.S. government only contributed
to intensifying the challenges posed by the illicit drug traffic to South American countries and to
spreading the production and transit of cocaine, as well as the legitimizing cocaine profits
(money laundering) throughout the region.
The Southern Command divided its antinarcotics operations into three operational
sectors. Each sector was assigned an order of importance that, curiously, is the complete inverse
of the traditional geopolitical relevance given by the United States:
First Sector: Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.
Second Sector: Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil, and the Southern Cone.
Third Sector: Panama and the rest of Central America.340
In all the civilian or military documents of the U.S. agencies dealing with the drug control
policies, as well as in the presidential speeches, the drug problem is approached with military
logic and terminology. They discuss fronts, containment, and war. The paradox is that at the
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same time that these officials and functionaries admit that the eradication, interdiction, and
disruption strategies provoke a spillover phenomenon, they insist on more escalation, more
militarization, and the inclusion of the periphery of Andean countries in containment policies.
Thus, it contributes to a vicious cycle of a continuous domino or cascade effect.
“Drug enforcers increasingly find they are squeezing a balloon: “Successful” enforcement in 
one area causes- and even creates incentives for -production and processing to pop up in 
another. The drug strategy ultimately exacerbates the very problem it tries to solve as it 
encourages the spread of coca production, not only within the current producing countries but 
across borders: DEA agents acknowledge the increasing spread of cocaine processing and 
trafficking to Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela.”341
The South Command, for example, identifies Venezuela, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina,
and Uruguay as “transit/spillover countries,” when in fact the spillover effect is provoked by the
enforcement efforts that they encourage and support.342 Both the Reagan and Bush
administrations tried to create a consensus (first among the Andean countries and then among
the peripheral countries) on the need to increase enforcement measures against the coca-cocaine
industry and to use their armies in counterdrug operations.
The Reagan and Bush administrations used traditional channels for the diffusion of the
North American hegemony: the Organization of American States (OAS) and the annual
Conferences of American Armies. In 1986 at the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala,
member states signed the “Alliance of the Americas against Illicit Drug Trafficking,” a formal
declaration against drug trafficking and a commitment to totally eradicate it from the continent.
In 1987, the 17th Conference of American Armies was organized under the title: “Narcotraffic,
terrorism and subversion” in Mar del Plata (Argentina). Finally, the Bush administration
organized the Cartagena conference in 1990 for the presidents of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and
the U.S., and the San Antonio, Texas conference in 1992 for the same members of the
Cartagena Conference plus Venezuela and Mexico. Both conferences were organized to
inaugurate (Cartagena) and test (San Antonio) the Andean Strategy.343
Even if the South American political elites recognize that the drug trade poses a threat to
the security of their nations, both the civilian leaders and military officials refused to utilize the
military for the eradication of plantations, disruption of criminal organizations, and destruction
of laboratories. In 1987, at the Mar del Plata conference, the delegations of all the armies
refused to play an important role in counternarcotic activities in order to preserve their
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institutions from the corrupting effects of drug trafficking.344 At the same time, at the
Cartagena Conference Presidents Paz Zamora (Bolivia) and Fujimori (Peru), criticized the
military approach of the Bush administration and asked for more economic support to develop a
substitute for illicit crops and for development strategies instead of military aid.345 Moreover,
the Colombian and Peruvian armies considered the matter a police problem and put the anti-
insurgent war as a first priority. In fact, they utilized the aid earmarked for counter-narcotics for
anti-guerrilla operations instead. As explained by the Venezuelan expert Rosa del Olmo,
“ La question militaire latino-américaine est différente. Les forces du continent ne s’impliquent pas
réellement dans la guerre à la drogue, comme l’affirme Washington. On parle dans certains état-
majors d’Amérique Latine, d’une forme autochtone de combat qu’on appelle la ‘guerre sale’: les
services secrets en sont l’instrument décisif et ont carte blanche pour accomplir toute forme de
‘mission’. Tout est permis sur l’autel de la destruction de ‘l’ennemi intérieur’: séquestrations, tortures
systématiques, disparitions, massacres et assassinats. Il existe de plus une cosmovision militaire latino-
américaine, et les forces armées se prennent désormais pour des organisations anti-terroristes. Cette
situation dépase les manuels de guerre de faible intensité et ceux de la securité nationale et va jusqu’à
créer des conflits avec Washington. C’est ainsi que s’expliquent, par exemple, les protestations du
Congrès des Etats-Unis lorsqu’il apprit que le ministère de la Défense de Colombie avait utilisé, pour
l’opération Tricolor 90 contre la guérrilla, 38,5 millions des 40,3 millions des dollars octroyés par le
gouvernement des Etats-Unis pour des opérations antidrogue.”346
The Andean governments, along with some of their neighboring countries, gradually
started to yield to U.S. pressure for the utilization of their armed forces. This was mainly due to
the policy of carrots and sticks implemented by the Untied States since the enactment of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988. These Acts establish a mechanism to impose
sanctions on countries that play major roles in the production or transshipment of illicit drugs
and are uncooperative in the control effort. As explained by Raphael Perl,
“The Anti-Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988 link the cooperation of source countries (drug-producing
and/or transiting countries) with the United States in controlling this traffic to the eligibility of
those countries for U.S. foreign aid, and under certain circumstances for U.S. trade benefits. This
process commonly referred to as certification’, requires the president at the start of each fiscal year
(1 October) to withhold 50% of U.S. foreign assistance designated for the given country, pending a
determination of certification on, or after, the first of March [...] Mandatory sanctions include:
50% suspension of all U.S. assistance for the current fiscal year, 100% suspension of  U.S.
assistance for subsequent years , Voting against loans to a country in the multilateral development
banks […] Discretionary sanctions include:
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* Denial of preferential tariff treatment of a country’s exports under the Generalized System of
Preferences [...], *Duty increases of up to 50% of value of  a country’s exports to the United
States, * Curtailment of air transportation and traffic between the U.S. and the non-certified
country.” 347
The United States could not impose an Antidrug National Security Regime by generating
a consensus as that it had done in the 1960s and 1970s, without the threat of economic and
political sanctions, on the National Security Doctrine regime. 348  The doctrine stated that the
military should expand their mission to the control of internal and ideological threats and assure
the integrity of the state against external and internal enemies. This kind of doctrine justified
military intervention in politics 30 years ago.349
The final section of this chapter will analyze the way in which South American states are
threatened by drug trafficking activities in the region. As an analysis of each particular country
would require more than a volume, only examples of the countries that are representative for
each type of the threats defined in the first chapter of this dissertation will be treated.
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E- NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS
 “The destabilizing and otherwise negative effects of illicit drug production and of drug 
trafficking are becoming ever more evident. The huge profits generated by these illicit 
activities tend to undermine legitimate economies and political institutions. Trafficking 
syndicates are highly organized, and their operations are often linked to the smuggling of 
weapons and the spreading of violence and terrorism. The pernicious activities of traffickers 
are facilitated by the extensive coastlines and innumerable islands of the region, and traffickers 
take full advantage of the free ports and insufficiently strict banking controls in certain 
countries. The drug abuse almost inevitable associated with production and trafficking is 
growing rapidly throughout the region...”350
With regard to the effects of drug trafficking on the national security of these countries,
those countries that are considered more representative for each of the type of threat to national
security (as defined in the first chapter) will be analyzed. More importance is placed on the
threats that are directly related to the South American states’ effective control over their
territories, the stability of their institutions, and their monopoly on armed violence.
a)  Military/Traditional Threats
This type of threat refers to the use of armed force by a state. A military attack can threaten all
components of the state. Drug trafficking activities can, in some cases, be the catalyst of
military conflicts between states and can also provoke the military intervention of tier states
with the goal of combating transnational criminal organizations or insurgent groups linked to
drug trafficking activities.
 Military intervention by extra-regional powers (U.S. ):
There are two countries that can be considered paradigmatic in reference to the threat of
foreign intervention by the U.S. in order to reduce the production and supply of cocaine. These
countries are Bolivia and Colombia.
Bolivia set a precedent of intervention by North American troops. This intervention was
very unpopular with the Bolivian public and Congress, which declared the action anti-
constitutional and asked for the withdrawal of the troops.  In 1986, President Paz Estrenssoro
asked for the support of U.S. troops for the disruption of laboratories and trafficking
organizations (without the authorization of Congress) and thus began an eight-month operation
called “Blast Furnace.”  In July 1986, one hundred and seventy US Army personnel and six
Blackhawk helicopters were dispatched to aid the Bolivian police raid laboratories and
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clandestine airstrips in the Beni and Santa Cruz regions. While the strategy was to wipe out the
market for coca leaves, this effect lasted only for some months. The presence of U.S. troops
dropped the Paz Estenssoro´s government into political trouble, provoking bitter opposition in
Bolivia, not only from the coca grower unions but from the political elite as well. The Congress
declared the matter a violation of “national security.”351
Potential American military intervention in Colombia was perceived as an overt threat
after operation “Just Cause” in December 1989, when the U.S. military intervened in Panama in
order to capture its president, General Manuel Noriega, who had been indicted in 1988 under
drug trafficking charges by a U.S. court. 352 This perception existed because just after the
intervention in Panama, the U.S. government deployed a flotilla along the 200-mile Colombian
maritime border. The Colombian government denounced this action as a blockade and the U.S.
ordered the withdrawal of its ships.353 As reported,
“In trying to tone down the impact of an over-enthusiastic description of the USS John F
Kennedy’s role as a “blockade” Bush officials are now explaining that its intended role was that of
plotting patterns of air traffic...”354
There are also fears of an American invasion of the Colombian island of San Andrés in
the Caribbean.355
Drug trafficking as a catalyst for pre-existing international territorial/border conflicts:
There is an example that clearly illustrates this type of threat. Colombia and Venezuela
have a long-lasting border dispute over the Maracaibo Lake and the Gulf of Venezuela. Drug
trafficking has played a role in magnifying the threat of military conflict over this issue. As
stated by John Martz,
“With the spread of the narcotics industry, frontier problems shifted from precise demarcations  and
submarine mineral deposits to issues of guerrilla insurgency, threats to public security and the
potential for serious armed conflict.”356
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In June 1987, paramilitary (patrulleros) forces at the service of Colombian traffickers
attacked a unit of the Venezuela National Guard that was developing eradication operations  for
coca fields in Sierra de Perijá on the Venezuelan-Colombian border.357 The border tension
produced by these skirmishes helped magnifying a military escalation caused in August 1987 by
of the intrusion of a Colombian warship in the disputed sea zone. Both incidents caused
Colombia and Venezuela to increment their military presence along the border.358
Though a war was stopped in 1987 by the diplomatic intervention of the OAS Secretary
General and the Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín, these type of clashes have become more
frequent since Venezuela became a coca producing country, exacerbating  tensions between the
two countries.359
b)  Political threats
Political threats harm the capacity of a state to exercise the monopoly of force over the
whole national territory. These kinds of threats also include all kinds of activities that may
harm the legitimacy of the political regime of a state.
Control of the national territory by transnational criminal organizations (Gray zones):
Non-state actors coming from a neighboring state are challenging the sovereign control of
the national territory. This case is well represented by Brazil.
The Brazilian Amazônia has a surface of 1,572,000 square kilometers, covers seven
federal states and has a common border of 16,000 kilometers with Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.
Police surveillance is almost non-existent and the area is scarcely populated (only 8,000,000
inhabitants). Moreover, the Amazon forest has the biggest river system in the world. Coca
production (and zones for operation for Colombian and Bolivian traffickers) is located in two
main areas: the northeast (Amazonas, Roraima and Pará states) where ipadú is produced and
many laboratories are located, and the central region (Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul),
where ipadú is also grown and where there is intense activity by Bolivian traffickers.360  Even
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if the Brazilian military does not engage  in drug interdiction activities, they consider the
Amazon as a first geopolitical priority. Since 1985, they have been developing a project of
occupation and fortification (the Calha Norte project) of the northern Amazon border, and
stopping the incursions of drug traffickers is among the objectives of this project.361  The
Brazilian strategic plans also include covering all the Amazon with a radar system in order to
monitor and track all air traffic in the area. As explained by a UNDCP field report,
“The Secretary of Strategic Matters, under the Presidency of the Republic, decided to install a
surveillance system of the Amazon, in cooperation with the Airforce Ministry, covering the entire
Brazilian Amazon region. The vigilance system of 20 linked radar stations, a network of mobile and fixed
radio intercepting units and a network of distant satellite censoring. The vigilance system will allow the
Brazilian authorities to enhance aviation security in the region, improve the control of national airspace
and enforce control of illicit trafficking of drugs and minerals.”362
 Parts of the state under the control of locally based criminal organizations (Gray Zones):
Even if this phenomenon is also present in Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, Colombia is the
country where the traffickers have developed the highest capacity for political control over the
territory through a pattern of paramilitary violence and bribery. Although this issue will be fully
explained in the next chapter, it is worth remarking that the case of Colombia can be
differentiated from the other three countries because of the level of violence it provoked. This
violence had three origins: the fight between organizations, the fight between the traffickers,
and the guerrilla and terrorist actions against the government in response to enforcement
measures. In part, this violence began during the Betancur administration (1982-1986), when
the government started to enforce the treaty of extradition of traffickers in response to U.S.
pressure.
As noted previously, because the traffickers have control of provincial governors and city
mayors, they enjoy popular support and have paramilitary power. Thus, in the Andean
countries, traffickers constitute a “state within the state” and pose an overt threat to the capacity
of the state to exercise effective political control.363
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Drug trafficking-related corruption:
“There is infection in everything. Even sleepiness can be infection, and yawning can be infectious.
There is even the infection of a time.”364
This threat can be interpreted in two ways. The first can be illustrated by the case of
Bolivia. In 1980, traffickers had the power to literally buy a sector of the armed forces and
supported a coup d’etat against President Lidia Gueiler Tejada (1979-1980). This coup led to a
regime that allowed the traffickers to freely pursue their illegal activities. Moreover, both the
president, General Luis García Meza, and his minister of the interior, Col. Luis Arce Gomez,
participated overtly in the illicit drug traffic . As explained by one analyst,
“ There is also strong evidence to suggest [drug trafficker] Suárez Gómez helped to finance the
coup of Gen. Luis García Meza  […] in July 1980, which is widely known as ‘the cocaine coup’.
One version of events maintains that Suárez Gómez offered García Meza U.S. $1.3 million to
launch the coup as traffickers felt more protected by military governments than by elected civilian
leaders. His condition was apparently that Colonel Luis Arce Gómez, a relation of Suárez Gómez
well known for his connections with the drug business, should be made minister of the interior
responsible for antidrug operations.” 365
Also, on June 30 1984, members of the elite Bolivian police antinarcotics unit
(UMOPAR) joined army personnel to stage Bolivia’s 251st armed coup, a coup lead by three
high-ranking UMOPAR officers who were allegedly involved in drug trafficking. The coup
failed due to army opposition (in Bolivia there is a strong rivalry between the police and the
army).366
The case of Bolivia clearly illustrates the worst case of influence and the corrupting
power the traffickers possess. Another example of this type of drug trafficking-related
corruption is Paraguay, where a large number of political actors and members of the armed
forces and security forces are involved not only in drug trafficking but also in all types of
smuggling activities. This creates a threat to civilian control over the armed forces and generates
rivalries among the different security forces, which can lead to a situation of political instability.
In fact, in October 1994 the chief of the Paraguayan Anti-Narcotics Service, General Ramón
Rosa Rodríguez, was assassinated by his own aide-de camp. At the moment of his assassination,
Rosa Rodríguez was on his way to an official meeting where he was going to present evidence
about drug trafficking activities in his country.367
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This may be also the case in Suriname, where former military ruler Lt. Colonel Desi
Bouterse still the “strong man” behind the scenes, is reportedly involved in cocaine traffic to
The Netherlands and has the capacity to overthrow civilian governments at his will. 368
The other way this threat can be interpreted is that the financial crises (hyperinflation and
austerity programs) faced by all these new democracies led to a decrease in the general wealth
of the population and combined with corruption scandals in the executive branch. This could
lead to a serious crisis of governability and an institutional crisis that could be used to justify a
military revolt. This was the case in Venezuela in 1992. The nationalistic military that attempted
a military coup against President Andrés Perez used the involvement of the president in drug
trafficking activities as a cause for the revolt (in fact, it was an excuse; the coup was provoked
by the popular unrest in the middle of a serious economic crisis, and by the lack of legitimacy of
the bipartisan-restrictive Venezuelan system). As reported,
“Ulslar Pietri’s [one of the most respected writers in Venezuela] December coup warnings had
been dismissed by politicians a all parties as unnecessarily alarmist. This despite the fact that there
was evidence of considerable unease among the military over a spate of scandals that revealed
links between high ranking officers and the drugs traffic and, and suggested corruption in
procurement contracts”369
Although the coup failed, President Perez was charged with corruption and obliged to
resign.
Linkage between the illicit drug traffic and the guerrilla groups:
The political impact of fighting the U.S. drug war was further complicated in Peru by the
Sendero Luminoso insurgency. The coca-rich Sendero Luminoso of Peru effectively controlled
Upper Huallaga Valley. The guerrillas portrayed themselves as protectors of the peasant
growers, often serving as intermediaries on their behalf with the traffickers. Aggressive
narcotics control efforts focused on coca eradication increased the threat posed by the guerrillas
by driving peasants into their ranks. Drug trafficking adds to the general decline of internal
order, because its interaction with insurgent groups diminishes the ability of government, police,
and armed forces to control the Upper Huallaga Valley.  Peru illustrates very well the dilemma
of incompatibility between the impulse of the United States to utilize the armed forces in
counternarcotic operations and the immediate security concerns of drug producer countries. If
the military is used to support coca eradication, the peasants side with the insurgents. Also, the
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use of the armed forces in enforcement operations against drug traffickers generated an almost
irreversible corruption within the military ranks.370
On the other hand, we have the case of Colombia, where the FARC guerrillas control
coca and coca paste producing areas such as the Guaviare. As was the case in Peru over the
course of a decade, the FARC are able to finance their operations through the “revolutionary
tax” over coca growing and coca paste production in the territories they control. In this way the
FARC are able to affirm their territorial control and wage their war against the state.371
Risk of military intervention in politics:
This is a threat faced by all South American democracies if the military are fully
employed in counternarcotic activities. The inclusion of the armed forces in counternarcotics
operations contributed to the enlargement of their power and prerogatives to worsen a
preexistent situation of human rights violations in the Andean countries. As an example, in Peru
and Colombia, entire regions like the Upper Huallaga Valley (Peru) have been placed under
military control and rule. The indexes of human rights violations by the Colombian and
Peruvian Armed Forces are the worst in the hemisphere. For example, the U.S. State
Department report on the human rights situation for 1990 determined that some units of the
Colombian Army and police had participated in numerous and grave violations of human rights,
including summary executions, torture and massacres against leftist politicians, human rights
defenders, trade union leaders, and peasants.372 The human rights situation in Bolivia was
worsened in the last months of 1990. In the Annual Report on Human Rights the US
Department of State documented cases of torture and cruelty by units of the police and
intelligence service of the army. Some members of the Bolivian government, for example, fear
that the corruption of the army due to its participation in the antinarcotics war could became a
threat for the democratic stability of the country.373 As a high ranking Bolivian official
declared:
“When you have a corrupted Police Chief you dismiss him; when you have a corrupted military
chief he dismisses you...” 374.
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 Also as stated by two analysts,
“Involving Latin American armed forces in the drug war threatens traditional concepts of military
professionalism in the region. It pushes military men to involve themselves in activities that
advocates of democracy prefer to reserve for civilians. Within the rubric of military subordination
to civilian authority, the dangers of the drug war as a military mission are obvious. As with
military counterinsurgency activities in the 1960s, direct Latin American military involvement in
the drug war would involve the military in police tasks that are technically within the civilian
domain; it would also blur the line between appropriate and inappropriate domains for military
professional actions; it would expand the managerial roles played by the military in society; and it
would increase the role military men play in national politics and political decision making...”375
The threat of an expanded military role to a stable and institutionalized democratic regime
is a very important factor if we consider that the stability of the democratic institutions was
considered as a core value and part of the “integral security” of South American nations. The
concept of  “integral security,” which includes the political and economic vulnerabilities of
these nations, was defined and reaffirmed by the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela at the Acapulco Meeting of the Permanent Mechanism
for Consultation and Concerted Political action (Rio Group) in 1987 and at the Third Meeting of
that group organized in Ica, Peru in 1989.376
Risk of civil war:
Bolivia is another example of how potential threats are exacerbated by pressure from the
United States for the eradication of coca fields, considered the cheapest way to reduce supply.
Politically, attempts at eradication are explosive in Bolivia. The coca growers are well-
organized into trade unions affiliated to the COB national labor federation, and are willing to
take on the government if it tries to wipe out their source of income. In 1988, at least 10 people
died in union protests against the use of herbicides. Although guerrilla organizations have not
appeared in Bolivia as elsewhere in Latin America, Bolivia is a notoriously unstable political
country, and a group such as Sendero Luminoso could well emerge if the government were to
go too far against the cocaine economy.
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c)  Economic Threats
Economic threats negatively affect the state’s ability to access international markets and
to achieve acceptable levels of wealth, development, and power. The Andean countries face the
dilemma of having a large underground sector that represents a considerable fraction of their
gross national product. This basically turns these countries into  “cocaine-dependent” countries,
perpetuating a situation of international pressure and obstructing the development of legal
economic activities. This problem is particularly serious in the cases of Bolivia and Peru.
According to some estimates, in 1992 the cocaine industry in Peru generated 1.5 billion
dollars. This figure represented 3.4 % of Peru’s GNP and 53% of this country’s exports. It was
also estimated in 1995 that about 10% of the Peruvian labor employed in the agrarian sector and
4% of the total economically active population of Peru worked in drug trafficking activities.377
According to USAID (United States Agency for International Development) estimates, in
1994 the cocaine industry represented 4% of Bolivia’s GNP and was equivalent to 23% of
Bolivia’s exports. Also, according to the local consulting firm Müller & Associates, about
207.225 people (over a total national population of 8 million) were employed in the different
stages of cocaine production and transportation taking place in Bolivia.378 Under these
conditions, a swift and effective blow to the coca economy would have a devastating economic
and political impact. The livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of citizens can trigger massive
social unrest, thus reinforcing the intensity of political threats stemming from drug trafficking.
Another economic threat caused by drug trafficking is the utilization of some South
American countries as money laundering centers. This is the case of Argentina, Chile, and
Uruguay. These countries were able to stabilize their economies thanks to the application of
structural adjustment programs. The economic stability reached by these countries in the 1990s
made them attractive to foreign investment. The origin of these incoming funds, however, is not
always clear. The situation is seriously aggravated by permissive and lax banking legislation or
political and judiciary corruption.
For countries with weak economies, money laundering can be considered a blessing in
the short term. However, this blessing turns into a curse in the long run: the overrating of real
estate (a method typically used to integrate illegal money into the legal circuit of the economy)
can generate an inflationary spiral in that sector of the economy. At the same time, an
unregulated influx of foreign currency (which is the case of the integration of “dirty money”
into the economy) can cause a devaluating effect, thus harming the success of anti-inflationary
policies.
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Also, the reputation of a country can be seriously harmed if its financial institutions are
suspected of being used for money laundering activities. Therefore, legal investments could
flow towards foreign financial markets. Of course the corrupting effects of money laundering
activities must be considered as far as they concern the impact that widespread corruption can
have on the legitimacy of the political institutions of weak states.
d)  Societal threats
For the scope of this dissertation, the concept of  “societal threat” refers to the decrease of
the quality of the human resources and the integrity of the social fabric of a nation.
Destruction of the human potential of a nation:
In all of South America the consumption of cocaine grew as a consequence of the rise in
cocaine production and transit. In producer countries, the consumption of “bazuco,” a highly
toxic mixture of coca pastes, spread among the poor population (a sort of crack for the
developing world); at the same time, a decrease in prices due to the constant influx of cocaine
through the transit countries provoked a switch from marijuana and inhalants (solvents) to the
utilization of adulterated cocaine in their territories.379 This issue will be further illustrated in
the case studies in chapters V and VII.
e)   Environmental threats
Environmental threats jeopardize the integrity of the natural resources of a state and thus the
quality of life for its population. Environmental threats also reinforce the effects of economic
threats because environmental degradation may decrease the productive viability of the territory
of a state.
Utilization of  Herbicides  for the eradication of coca fields:
This is not a threat that stems directly from drug production but from attempts to eliminate illicit
crops through the use of herbicides that can harm the environment and the people living in coca
producing areas. In Bolivia, for example, the use of herbicides was ruled out by law in 1988
under the argument that the chemical control of coca could seriously harm the environment. In
Peru, the use of herbicides was stopped because the company that produced the herbicide
(Spike) decided to stop the sale of this product for eradication purposes. The director of the
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company considered that it could affect the health of the population and contaminate the rivers,
thus eliminating not only the coca fields but also legal crops. As stated by Rensselaer Lee III,
“The Bolivian Government more or less has ruled out the spraying option [in was effectively ruled
out by law in 1988]. In June 1988, the country’s Foreign Minister, Guillermo Bedregal, said, ‘
Bolivia will not be the guinea pig for experimentation with herbicides that may have adverse
effects on other vegetation and to damage to the inhabitants’ [...] In Peru, the García administration
was at one time receptive to the idea of using herbicides against coca. [...] However, Peru’s
spraying program suffered a possibly fatal setback in May 1988, when Eli Lilly announced that it
would no longer supply tebuthirion (Spike) for the program. [...] A company representative quoted
by the Lima daily El Comercio said that Spike ‘could cause irreversible harm to flora and fauna
and even affect human beings if it is not applied with extreme caution” the Peruvian press
reprinted sections of a brochure that Lilly distributed with Spike: the folder warned that the
compound could destroy the roots of trees, shrubs and other vegetables and cause vomiting and
pulmonary and heart damage in humans [...] Dr. Peter Kurtz of the California Food and
Agriculture Department Warned, ‘ The major danger of tebuthirion is that it eradicates vegetation
completely, that is, creates deserts where it is used in sufficient quantity, and that it is very
persistent’ in soils. Dr. Richard Wiles of the National Academy of Sciences warned of  “ecological
devastation” form the application of Spike...”380
Lee also argues that,
“Spraying, however, is not a panacea, even where it does ‘work’. The highly touted anti-marijuana
program in Colombia, for example, reduced cultivation on traditional growing areas in the Sierra
Nevada de Santa Marta and the Serrania de Perija, but cultivation simply moved elsewhere. The
coca bush, more likely a small tree in parts of the Chapare and the Upper Huallaga Valley, is
extremely difficult to kill. A herbicide sufficiently toxic to destroy coca form the air might also
damage other corps, harm farm animals or wildlife, and pollute the waterways. No effective and
environmentally safe herbicide for use against coca has yet been found....”381
On this particular issue, and in reference to the case of Bolivia, another analyst argues
that,
“Coca fields are found very close to the houses where farmers live, thus making it very difficult
to use herbicides or defoliants without damaging people and other crops.”382
In Bolivia and Peru the use of herbicides is also a cause of political instability.  In Bolivia
it could lead to a direct armed confrontation between the growers and the government, and in
Peru it is used by Sendero as a political rallying flag. Again, Rensselaer Lee III explains this in
the following terms,
“At the end of June [1988], there was a serious incident in Villa Tunari in the Chapare. A mob of
several thousand peasants broke into the offices of DIRECO [Coca Reduction Agency][...] Narco-
traffickers apparently had circulated reports that DIRECO and DEA were testing herbicides
against coca plantations in the Chapare. The peasants said that they where looking for evidence -
documents, equipment, chemicals and so on- that would support the rumors [...] The police
counterattacked, and in the ensuing battle, as many as 16 people may have lost their lives....”383
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“In Peru and Colombia, concerns about eradication are linked to the government’s struggles
against left wing guerrilla movements and leftist subversion. Many Peruvian military and political
leaders see eradication as generating anti-government feeling in rural areas and playing into the
hands of radical leftist groups such as Sendero Luminoso. In the Upper Huallaga Valley, such
programs reportedly provoked coca farmers and other disaffected Valley residents into joining or
supporting local Sendero forces. A high Justice Ministry official interviewed in April 1986 said
that the spraying of  Colombia’s main coca fields, located in the Llanos and the Amazon Basin,
would create serious economic and social problems in these regions . Possible consequences, said
the official, would be an increase in violent crime and an expansion of local guerrilla activity...”384
“ The spraying approach probably will not be politically acceptable in South America.
Governments fear ecological damage form the use of toxic chemicals, and current U.S. debates on
the environmental consequences of spraying, which are widely reported in the South American
press, have done much to inflame these concerns. However, governments are even more concerned
with the social effects- the prospects of massive rural unemployment and (in Colombia and Peru)
the aggravation of a festering insurgency problem...”385
Pollution of potable water sources and the soil:
The erosion of soil and the contamination of rivers produced by the culture of coca fields
and production of coca paste is a threat to the economic viability of Bolivia. The expansion of
the coca culture implies geometric deforestation of the Bolivian Amazon; at the same time, the
continuous utilization of the slopes of the tropical Andes causes a high erosion of the soil that
render this land unusable for legal crops such as coffee or citrus. After the eradication
campaigns are over, the peasants leave the fields and migrate to new growth areas, re-starting
the cycle of deforestation-erosion. At the same time, the production of coca paste requires the
utilization of tons of chemicals that are then dropped into the rivers, and this contaminates the
scarce sources of potable water in the region.
As explained by an analyst,
“[In Peru] deforestation related directly or indirectly to cultivation of the coca leaf has reached a
total of 700,000 hectares in the high jungle. This has preceded at a dizzying rate from the time of
the coca boom in the mid-1970s. When land is to be used for the cultivation of the coca shrub, the
area must be cleared, weeded, and burned for each harvest (two or four times a year), leaving the
soil prone to erosion. The fragile ecosystem, heavy rainfall, sandy-clay soils, sloping terrain,
deforestation, defoliation and so on are leading to dramatic results: at the rate that the high jungle
soils are being destroyed, it will be practically a desert in few decades [...] The chemicals used in
the preparation of basic cocaine paste in the so-called pozas (pits) are dumped into the rivers. It is
estimated that in 1986 the rivers near the pits received discharges of 57 million liters of kerosene;
32 million liters of sulfuric acid; 16 metric tons of unlaked lime; 3,200 metric tons of carbides;
16.000 metric tons of toilet tissue; 6.400 liters of acetone; and a similar quantity of toluene. These
products have caused the extinction of fish crustacean, amphibian, and river bank plants...”386
                                                          
384 ibid. p204
385  ibid.,p.233.
386 Mc Gregor, Coca and Cocaine,p.118
133
A similar situation can be observed in Bolivia where 30,000 metric tons of toxic
chemicals are being discharged each year in the rivers of the Chapare and Beni regions.387 Also
as explained by James Painter,
“Before the arrival of the colonists and timber extractors, the Chapare was believed to contain
some of Bolivia’s tallest, densest, and most diverse forest with more that 1,000 species of trees.
These primary forests are apparently still intact on the steep upper slopes, but much of the rest of
the lowland Chapare has been converted into secondary forest. Such has been the volume of new
migrants to the area that some of the lower part of the upper slopes are now being cultivated,
which is bound to cause greater soil erosion.”388
F-SOME EXPLANATIONS
Before starting with the analysis of my case studies it is necessary to explain why
Argentina and Venezuela were chosen as cases of neighboring transshipment countries.
Three other South American countries could be considered that type of state, namely
Chile, Paraguay, and Ecuador. The reason Argentina and Venezuela were chosen is that they are
closer to the ideal type of neighboring transshipment states than the other three countries. As far
as cocaine traffic is concerned, Argentina and Venezuela have been completely on the periphery
of the cocaine industry. As stated at the beginning of this dissertation, the goal is to observe how
two neighboring transshipment countries came to be threatened by spillover consequences of
enforcement in the drug producer countries. The change in consumption patterns and the rise of
new markets also played a role there. Because of their intense legal trade with the United States
and Europe, Argentina and Venezuela became the preferred routes for cocaine going into these
two markets. Moreover, both countries have excellent road and maritime infrastructures that
made them a preferred route for the drug trade in route to Europe (in the case of Argentina) and
U.S. and Europe (in the case of Venezuela).  This was not the case for Chile, Ecuador, or
Paraguay.
Chile was not chosen as a case study for the following reasons:
First, since the 1980s, Chilean foreign trade is more linked to the Pacific Rim and the
North American west coast through the export of fruits and processed food raw materials and
wine. American corporations carry out the other main economic activity, the extraction of
copper, for which the main market is the United States. This does not make Chile a suitable
preferred route for the Bolivian traffickers, whose main market has been Western Europe since
the late 1980s. The preferred route is then Argentina, where the cocaine shipments can be
disguised in containers with legal cargo going to Europe. Chile became a secondary route for
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shipments in route from Colombia going to Japan, Australia, or the West Coast of the United
States.
Second, the border of Chile with Bolivia and Peru is far from the drug producing areas
in the two latter countries. Moreover, the north part of Chile is an arid desert that is not suitable
for the installation of laboratories or for coca growing. Because of enforcement, cocaine
production has spilled over from the Beni region in Bolivia to the Paraguayan Chaco and the
Brazilian Amazon, and from the Huallaga Valley in Peru to Brazil and Ecuador.
Third, the main economic magnet for Bolivian immigration has historically been
Argentina. In the case of an increase of violence provoked by peasant resistance to coca
eradication policies, Argentina--not Chile--would suffer the humanitarian crisis stemming from
an outflow of Bolivian displaced people. Moreover, in the event of a forced drastic elimination
of illicit crops, the unemployed Bolivian labor hands would immigrate to Argentina. In the
event of a rise in armed resistance in Bolivia, the subtropical part of the Argentine-Bolivian
border would be more suitable for cross border operations than the north Chilean border. The
coca-producing region of Chapare region is also closer to the Argentine border than the Chilean
border.
Fourth, Chile was not always a peripheral country to the cocaine industry. As indicated
in the previous chapter, the cocaine industry started as a cottage business in Chile in the early
70s in response to an incipient growing demand in the North American West Coast. Chilean
chemists produced cocaine with coca paste brought from Bolivia until the military authorities
ousted them after General Pinochet's coup in 1973.
As far as Ecuador is concerned, this country was excluded because it was not as
peripheral to the cocaine industry as Argentina and Venezuela. Ecuador is in a "crossfire”
situation between two major drug producer countries, Peru and Colombia.
The unpopulated and uncontrolled Ecuadorian Amazon forest is located next to drug
producing areas in Colombia and Peru, and Ecuador has always been used by both Colombian
and Peruvian traffickers as a safe haven for production when enforcement increased on their
borders. Moreover, the local Indian population has also traditionally produced coca in
Ecuador.389 Two factors prevented Ecuador from becoming a major coca producer country:
• The pattern of colonization of the Ecuadorian Amazon was different. The phenomenon of
massive immigration to the Amazon region that occurred in Colombia and Peru in the 1960s
and early 70s did not take place in Ecuador. 390
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• The country was not severely struck by a crisis in the main economic sector, as with Bolivia
during the tin crisis, and this prevented the formation of a large coca producer peasantry.391
Still, the country can be considered a minor coca producing area and a second-best
territory for cocaine production. The reason it was included among the other neighboring
transshipment countries in the classification given in Chapter II is that it does not play a relevant
role as a supplier country in the cocaine industry. Ecuador is also a "second-best route" after
Venezuela.
Paraguay is a very interesting case because it has also played a relevant role in drug
trafficking since the late 60s. This situation does not necessarily stem from its geographic
position, its commercial infrastructure, or its pattern of international trade. The main factor that
made Paraguay an attractive country for drug trafficking operations was the corrupt nature of
the Stroessner authoritarian regime and the endemic corruption in the Paraguayan armed
forces.392
First, in Paraguay there are already routes and networks for drug trafficking since
Paraguay is the major marijuana producer in South America. The main market for this drug is
Argentina and southern Brazil.393
Second, during the 1960s and 70s Paraguay became a haven for fugitives members of
the Sicilian mafia and the "French Connection.” They counted on the protection of the
Paraguayan government and directed the transshipment of heroin from Marseilles to the United
States through Paraguay.394
Third, in the 1980s Bolivian and Colombian traffickers operating in Bolivia shifted
their trafficking operations to the Paraguayan Chaco.395 The Paraguayan Chaco (provinces of
Chaco, Nueva Asunción, Boquerón and Alto Paraguay) is an unpopulated, uncontrolled non-
patrolled area located on the western border of Paraguay. Although there is no evidence of
cocaine processing in Paraguay, the traffickers have already set air transit bases in the Chaco
and they could easily use this area as a second-best production area, depending on the pattern of
enforcement in Bolivia.
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G-CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has explained which are the economic and social factors that are at the root
of the upsurge and consolidation of the cocaine trafficking in the late 1970s and 1980. This
transnational industry was centered in Colombia and vertically integrated with non-state actors
based in Peru and Bolivia. This chapter demonstrates that there are social and economic
structural factors  (defined as indicators of state weakness in Chapter II) in the Andean
countries, which--in combination with cojunctural factors (such as the rise of cocaine
consumption in the United States, the foreign debt crisis and the drop in raw materials such as
tin in the case of Bolivia)--allowed the upsurge and consolidation of the cocaine industry in the
Andean countries. This chapter has also analyzed which are the local and transnational patterns
of interaction between the actors of the cocaine industry and with the governments of the South
American states. It has also shown examples of the different kinds of threats posed by the
cocaine industry to the states of the region. More importantly it has shown that the kind of
militarized enforcement policies suggested and even pressed by the United States have
contributed to worsening some of these threats and to provoking a spillover of drug trafficking
and drug trafficking-related violence towards neighboring countries. This analysis provides a
general view of drug trafficking as a security problem in South America. Chapters IV, V, VI,
VII and VIII will provide a detailed analysis of the consequences of militarized enforcement
policies in Colombia (Chapter IV) and Bolivia (Chapter VI) for the national security of
Venezuela  (Chapter V), and Argentina (Chapters VII and VIII) as neighboring transshipment
countries. That is, these countries will test the working hypothesis presented in Chapter I.
Chapter III also leads to the following question: Why should be it considered  effective to
use militarized enforcement policies to cope with drug trafficking if the problem has social and
economic roots? The answers to these questions will be developed in Chapters IX and X of this
dissertation.
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CHAPTER IV:   EVOLUTION OF DRUG TRAFFICKING CONTROL
POLICIES IN COLOMBIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1978-1994)
A- INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the evolution of drug control policies in Colombia and its
consequences in terms of the drug trafficking-related violence caused by both the cocaine
industry and by militarized enforcement policies. It also analyzes the changes in drug
production patterns (in both the techniques and the physical location of production) that
occurred as a reaction to these enforcement policies. This chapter, then, studies Colombia as the
security environment of Venezuela in terms of the spillover of drug production and drug
trafficking-related violence.
B- DRUG TRAFFICKING-RELATED VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA:396
a)  Assessing the problem: types of drug trafficking-related violence in Colombia
Colombia has traditionally been a violent country. The willingness of the two traditional
parties (Conservative and Liberal) to resort to violence as a means of political competition came
to an end, after the ten-year civil war period known as La Violencia (1948-1958), with the
National Front pact.397 The result was a closed, restrictive democracy with excluded groups
turning to the use of violence as a means of participating in politics. The violence of groups
such as the M-19 demanding an opening of the system was complemented by the violence
provoked by leftist guerrilla groups such as the FARC and the ELN, who proposed a radical
change of the type of society, economy, and political regime. Another problem that contributed
to guerrilla organization support in rural areas was the lack of successful agrarian reform policy.
According to official estimates, 1.3% of landowners (many of whom are actually drug
traffickers who acquired land with the profits generated by the cocaine industry) control 48% of
the best lands, whereas 68% of the of landowners (peasants) control only 5.3 % of the most
productive land.398. This situation, in addition to the rural violence that prevailed in the country
during the last 20 years, has displaced a large part of the peasant population to vacant isolated
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lands. In these areas coca and poppy are the only crops that produce an income level sufficient
to sustain the settlements.399 The violence provoked by the "green wars" for the control and
exploitation of the emerald mines in the central or Boyacá region in the 1960's and early 1970s
is also an important factor.400
The development of the cocaine industry in Colombia since the mid-1970s has added new
dimensions of violence to the country. Because of the power accumulated by drug trafficking
organizations and inter-group alliances created as part of the business, the violence unleashed by
the cocaine industry and by enforcement policies against it would surpass the other "violences.”
It is possible to talk about several types of violence stemming from the illicit drug industry in
Colombia depending on where the violence takes place and on the target of the violence. To
begin with, the more the industry grows, the more opponents and external competitors it faces.
In order to eliminate the opposition and competitors, drug trafficking organizations makes use
of violence. Violence is the result of two factors:
First, the business is illegal and because of this traffickers have developed their own
defense mechanisms against law enforcement agencies and competitors. Second, Colombia is a
weak state. The government does not control extensive areas of the country such as the Boyacá,
Meta, Guaviare and Magdalena Medio regions. In these areas, landowners, drug traffickers,
colonizing peasants (mostly coca-growing peasants), and guerrillas co-exist and state
institutions are not fully recognized. Local leadership based on clientelistic relations is stronger
and a recognized source of authority. The government does not have a monopoly on violence
over the whole territory. There has been a privatization of security in which landowners have
developed paramilitary groups against the guerrillas. Emerald traffickers did the same thing to
fight the competition and the guerrillas. Drug traffickers have also developed their own defense
groups against their rivals in the business, the state, and the guerrillas.401
Several authors agree that there exist different stages of drug trafficking-related violence
in Colombia.402 Since the early 1980s, with the consolidation of big coalitions of drug
trafficking organizations, it is possible to identify several types of drug trafficking-related
violence in Colombia, in terms of the protagonists of these violent clashes, their goals, and their
victims. 403
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The first type of violence started in 1980 when the drug traffickers began to invest their profits
in purchasing large tracts of land in regions such as Meta, Guaviare, Boyacá, Arauca and
Guaviare. As a new rising bourgeoisie, they became targets for guerrillas operating in these
areas. A clear example of this was the creation of the group “Death to Kidnappers” (Muerte a
los secuestradores-MAS-) in 1981 between the Cali and Medellín coalitions in an effort to
defend themselves and retaliate against M-19  kidnappings.404
The guerrillas also became an obstacle and even a competitor when the traffickers
became powerful enough to have their own defense groups. They no longer relied on the
protection of the FARC, who had become their competitors for  control of coca fields and coca
prices. After the legalization of the M-19 and sectors of the FARC in 1987, the legal political
left (Union Patriótica, UP) became an obstacle to the traffickers since it supported a program of
agrarian reform. Traffickers and landowners became allies in a campaign against the guerrillas
and the political left with the tacit or express support of the army. As reported this type of rural
violence continued in the late 1990s.405
A second type of violence refers to the massacres against the colonizing peasants in rural
regions. Drug traffickers wage this strategy of terror in alliance with the paramilitary groups of
the emerald prospectors, the landowners, and the army to prevent the peasants from supporting
or joining the guerrillas and voting for UP candidates. This type of violence increased after the
creation of the UP in 1987.406
A third type of violence is internal to the business and is related to turf wars between drug
trafficking organizations. A "war of cartels" started in the mid-1980s after the Medellín
coalition attempted to take over the distribution of cocaine in New York, traditionally a Cali
controlled port of entry.407 As stated earlier in this dissertation, differences also arose over the
overt use of violence against the state, which was not a preferred tool in the case of the Cali
coalition.
A fourth type is the violence against the government as a response to the repression of the
illicit business. Such violence may be preemptive or reactive. This dissertation will put more
emphasis on the consequences of this type of violence for the spillover effects towards
Venezuela. This type of violence started in the early 1980s with the assassination of magistrates,
judges, and prosecutors and reached a peak with the assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo
Lara Bonilla in May 1984. His death marked the beginning of a spiral of violence between the
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Medellín cartel and the government that would end only in 1993. At this stage, the killing
machine set in place in 1981 to be used against the guerrillas, Death to the Kidnappers, began to
be used in an all-out war against the government and anyone who dared to take a position
against the drug trafficking organizations. Death to the Kidnappers became a Medellín cartel
"Death to Everybody" group which received training from Israeli and British (former Special
Air Forces -S.A.S -) mercenaries.408
A fifth type is a reactive violence against political personalities (although not necessarily
members of the government), journalists, and anti-drug trafficking speakers.
A sixth type of violence is the so-called "social cleansing" (grupos de limpieza social) in
Medellín and Cali cities. It refers to the killing of people considered as "undesirable" by the
traffickers (such as prostitutes, beggars, drug addicts, alcoholics, homosexuals, and common
criminals). This is a common practice in the city of Cali, where gangs of killers (sicarios) at the
service of the Cali cartel carry out these executions. The purpose of this violence is to seek
support from the rest of the community by restoring “order.”409 Table 1 shows these six types
of drug trafficking-related violence. These types were elaborated on the basis of the information
provided by the Colombian historians Darío Betancourt and Martha García.410
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Table 1. Types of drug trafficking related violence and targets of violence
PERPETRATOR: MOTIVATION: LOCATION:
METROPOLITAN AREAS RURAL AREAS
Drug traffickers Preemption PREEMPTIVE URBAN
(Victims: Political leaders and
candidates, Trade union leaders,
Journalists, Judges ,Prosecutors)
PREEMPTIVE RURAL
(Victims: Political Left
(UP),Peasant population)
Drug traffickers Reaction REACTIVE URBAN
(Victims: Civilian Military and Law
enforcement members of the
government)
REACTIVE RURAL
(Victims: Guerrillas,
Civilian and Military or
Law enforcement members
of the national or local
government )
Drug traffickers Competition COMPETITIVE URBAN
(Victims: Other drug trafficking groups)
COMPETITIVE RURAL
(Victims: Guerrillas ,
Other drug  trafficking
groups)
Drug traffickers Gain support of the
police and the local
population
PROSELITIST URBAN
(Victims: Beggars, prostitutes, thieves,
homosexuals)
PROSELITIST RURAL
(Victims: Cattle thieves
Common criminals)
Guerrilla Groups Defense of peasants
as a base of
political support
and recruitment
and source of
economic revenue
(revolutionary
taxes to coca and
coca paste
production)
STRATEGIC REVOLUTIONARY
URBAN
(Victims: Agents of the state, state
buildings and property)
STRATEGIC
REVOLUTIONARY
RURAL
(Victims: Armed
forces/Police forces/
civilian eradication teams)
Guerrilla Groups Tactical defense of
drug traffickers’
production sites in
exchange for
money and
weapons
TACTIC REVOLUTIONARY URBAN
(Agents of the state)
TACTIC
REVOLUTIONARY
RURAL
(Police/Armed Forces units)
This typology is based on the situation in Colombia. However, it could be applied to the
rest of South America or even Latin America (for the specific case of  Mexico) in terms of
existing or latent drug trafficking-related violence. Certain similarities exist in Peru as far as the
rural violence in the Upper Huallaga Valley is concerned, and Brazil is probably going in the
same direction in terms of the urban drug trafficking-related violence.
 The following indicators can be used in order to identify cases of drug trafficking-related
violence and measure the extent of drug trafficking-related violence in a country:
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Number of civil judiciary officials (judges, prosecutors, magistrates, auxiliaries, and investigators)
killed by drug traffickers’ hit men per year.
Number of Armed Forces/ Police and other security forces, which are part of drug trafficking
paramilitary organizations, discovered per year.
 
Number of armed actions by drug traffickers against the Armed Forces/Police or other security forces
patrols or detachments per year.
 
Number of armed actions by drug traffickers against the Armed Forces / Police or other security
forces patrols of detachments by guerrilla groups acting on behalf of drug traffickers per year.
 
Number of political candidate assassinations by drug traffickers' hit men per year.
 
Number of state governor assassinations by drug trafficker's hit men per year.
 
Number of political leader assassinations of by drug traffickers' hit men per year.
 
Formation of drug traffickers' paramilitary groups.
 
Mercenary groups or trainers hired by drug trafficking organizations.
 
Number of personal attempts against guerrilla leaders self-adjudicated by drug trafficking
organizations.
 
Number of attempts against drug trafficking organizations' bosses perpetrated by rival bosses.
 
Amount of property or equipment belonging to drug trafficking criminal organizations claimed by
rival bosses.
 
Number of civilian government coca eradication teams attacked by guerrilla groups per year.
 
Number of  Police/Armed Forces units participating in eradication activities attacked by guerrilla
groups per year.
Some of these indicators are used in the at the end of this Chapter where statistical tables
are displayed in order to show the parallel and concomitant evolution between militarized
enforcement and drug trafficking-related violence. More types inspired from the case of Bolivia
are elaborated in Chapter VI, which analyzes the consequences of militarized enforcement in
this other coca and cocaine producer country. These types will complement the typology
developed above.411
b) Manifestation of drug trafficking related violence in Colombia
How it is possible to observe Colombian reality through the types of drug trafficking-
related violence developed above? Darío Betancourt and Martha García identified four
manifestations of drug trafficking-related violence or "drug wars" between the drug traffickers
(especially the Medellín cartel) and the Colombian government (that is, the “institutional
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component” of the state). Betancourt and García classified these episodes of violence according
to the motives, scenarios and goals of the players resorting to violence.412 These manifestations
of drug trafficking-related violence occurred simultaneously since the early 1980s, the period
when the cocaine industry became consolidated and integrated not only in Colombia, but also in
the Andean Region. The increasing pressure of the U.S. government over the Colombian
government also had an influence on the level of enforcement and subsequent spiral of violence.
Table 2 below categorizes four “drug wars” developed by Betancourt and García along the types
developed in the previous section of this chapter.
Table 2. Colombia's drug wars
War of the drug
traffickers against
the Colombian
criminal justice:
War  between drug traffickers
turned into landowners
against the Colombian
political left and the
guerrillas :
War  between a the drug
traffickers and a sector of the
traditional political elite:
War  between
the cartels:
PARTICIPANTS Drug Traffickers,
judges and police.
Unión Patriótica (political
branch of the FARC) and the
paramilitary groups.
Medellín cartel and the New
Liberalism
Medellín cartel
and Cali cartel
MOTIVES Retaliation of the
traffickers against
enforcement of the law
(including but not
reduced to the
extradition) against
ordinary crimes or
insidious crimes
related to drug
trafficking.
Armed clashes with the FARC
because of their revolutionary
tax on coca and anti communist
crusade.
Reaction of the government
against the infiltration of the Party
by Members of the Medellín
cartel. Reaction of the Medellín
cartel against the application of
the extradition treaty.
Attempt of the
Pablo Escobar to
take over the
New York
cocaine market.
Disagreement
between the Cali
and Medellín
cartel over the
use of frontal
violence against
the government.
VICTIMS 7 Magistrates, 41
Judges, and more than
200 judiciary
investigators and
assistants.
UP  Presidential Candidate
Jaime Pardo Leal, 840 activists
of the UP, journalists and
political leaders supportive of
the opening of the system
towards the left. Thousands of
peasants and their families.
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla (Ministry of
Justice), Guillermo Cano
(President of the newspaper "El
Espectador,” Enrique Parejo
(Governor of Antioquia), Luis
Carlos Galán (presidential
candidate for the New Liberal
Party)
Innocent people
victim of the
bomb attempts
and shootings.
Lieutenants of
the Organizations
and members of
the families of
the leaders.
TYPE OF
VIOLENCE
REACTIVE REACTIVE AND
COMPETITIVE
REACTIVE AND PREEMPTIVE COMPETITIVE
Source of data: Betancourt and García, op.cit., pp. 253-301
Like in a Garcia Marquez' novel, all these types of drug trafficking-related violence occur
simultaneously, an absurd combination in which enemies fight each other but can at the same
time cooperate against a common worse enemy on a different front. For example, the police
combated the cartels a the same time as the army supported the cartel's paramilitary groups in
                                                          
412Betancour and García, op.cit, pp.257.  Originally these authors only name the wars between the
traffickers and the judicial system, the drug traffickers and the political left, and the drug traffickers and
the government (particularly the New Liberal Party representatives and officials). For the scope of this
dissertation, I am also including the “war” between the Medellín and Cali cartels because, as will be
shown in this chapter, there was a tacit alliance between the Government and the Cali cartel that
eventually led to the death or arrest of all the leaders of the Medellín cartel and the disruption  of that
criminal coalition.
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their fight against the guerrillas.413 Or the guerrillas occasionally gave protection to the cartels
in exchange for weapons and money.
As stated above, this chapter will concentrate on the consequences of the utilization of
militarized enforcement as the Colombian government’s main strategy to control the expansion
of the illicit drugs industry.
Section B of this chapter will focus on the "drug wars" between the Medellín cartel and
the Colombian government (the judicial system and the Colombian political elite as described in
the table above). The effects of other types of drug trafficking-related violence--such as the rural
violence against the guerrillas and the political left, or the "drug war" of the cartels against the
political left--will also be analyzed as a secondary variable insofar as it created an exodus of
displaced peasants to Venezuela.
The enforcement policies of the Colombian government were motivated, in part, by
American pressure. In large part, they also came about as a reaction against the Medellín
cartel’s attempt to penetrate the political system, as well as a reaction to the campaign of
political terror or "narco-terrorism" unchained by the coalition led by Escobar. The
militarization of the police and the utilization of the armed forces in particular were a response
to American pressure, motivated by the fact that the major part of American assistance to
Colombia was military equipment and training. As argued by one analyst,
“What Colombia wanted was the means to crush this arrogant display of criminal power. In addition
to an adequate supply of police and military hardware. Colombia also asked for $ 19 million to install
security systems to protect its judicial system, a clear sight that the government perceives the problem
as a civilian one. That aid arrived , however in the form of  $65 million worth of military equipment -
cargo planes, A-37 subsonic jets, helicopters, assault boats, jeeps, trucks, and communications
equipment- and presented a problem since much of this military equipment is not entirely useful for
the Colombian national police, which conducts 85 to 90 percent of the antinarcotics operations [it
should be stated however that National police is a highly militarized corps which functions under the
Ministry of  Defense].” 414
Militarized enforcement, especially the use of the armed forces, was also a natural
reaction of the Colombian state against the increasing armed power and violence of the
Medellín cartel.
                                                          
413 On this issue see Human Rights Watch/Americas and Human Rights Watch, op.cit., pp. 17-22
414Marbry, Donald, J., “Andean Drug Trafficking and the Military Option,” Military Review, March
1990, p.31
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C- DEADLY  FEEDBACK: MILITARIZED ENFORCEMENT, DRUG
TRAFFICKING RELATED VIOLENCE AND SPILLOVER (1978- 1994) 415
This section analyzes the evolution of drug trafficking control policies from 1978 to
1994. The dissertation takes in this period under analysis because it overlaps with the beginning
of the cocaine era in Colombia when the “marimba” (marijuana) bonanza gave rise to the
cocaine trafficking organizations. It also overlaps with four presidential administrations:
President Julio C. Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986),
President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), and President Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994). This period
also overlaps with the Reagan and Bush administrations’ "war on cocaine" on the supply side
through the militarization of the police forces and the utilization of the armed forces in the
Andean countries. The analysis ends in 1994 because, in fact, enforcement and drug trafficking-
related violence against the government fundamentally decreased after the death of  Pablo
Escobar in December 1993 and the disruption of the Medellín coalition. As stated earlier in this
dissertation, the Cali coalition does not have a confrontational approach vis-à-vis the state.
a) The beginning of militarized enforcement against drug trafficking:  President  Julio César
Turbay Ayala's administration (1978-1982)
In this period, cocaine trafficking is not identified yet as the dominant illegal activity in
Colombia. At the beginning of President Turbay Ayalas´ term, the main concern was the
production and trafficking of marijuana.  Cocaine trafficking was identified only as another
form of organized smuggling. This is the period of consolidation of the cocaine trafficking
coalitions. By 1980, the Cali and Medellín coalitions formed a real cartel in the economic sense:
they pooled together for transportation and production of the drug, and for the protection of the
business with an agreement to keeping prices as high as possible.
In this period it is possible to say that enforcement against drug trafficking was above all
a response to U.S. pressure. During the mid and late 1970s drug trafficking was not perceived as
a threat to the state, that is to say that it was not perceived as a national security issue. As stated
by Juan Tokatlián,
“Clearly, in the 1970s the Colombian system did not see itself seriously threatened by (1) the
political-institutional reach of the marijuana business; (2) its negative effect on national security;
nor (3) the financial consequences of its production and trade. Thus, Colombia did not
accentuate unilaterally, repressive measures in its attempts to control and eradicate this
traffic.”416
                                                          
415Most of the information for the writing of this chapter has been gathered from the following works:
Arrieta et el., op.cit, especially pp. 199-272 and pp.277-360 and Thoumi, Francisco, Political Economy
and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, especially pp. 203-229. References to any other sources will be
specifically quoted.
416 Tokatlián, Juan Gabriel, “National Security and Drugs: Their Impact on Colombian-US Relations,”
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 30, Spring, 1988, p. 139
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Moreover, the government welcomed the money generated by both marijuana and the
incipient cocaine trafficking. As explained by Francisco Thoumi, in 1975 the Colombian
Central Bank relaxed the requirements to prove that real exports of services had occurred before
purchasing the foreign exchange (generally US dollars) generated by them. This mechanism,
know as the “sinister window” (ventanilla siniestra), continued during Turbay Ayala’s
administration.417
In this period there were several proposals, especially from then-president of the National
Association of Financial Institutions (Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras-ANIF-),
Ernesto Samper Pizano, to legalize the industry considered as a trade for the country.418
Enforcement against drug trafficking was directed against the production of marijuana
and was related to two factors. First, President Turbay Ayala feared that this activity could
potentially corrupt the structure of his political party, as well as that of the state institutions.
Second, the Carter administration exerted significant pressure. In fact, the U.S. Department of
State indicated that Turbay Ayala could have links with the marijuana trafficking rings through
members of his family. There were also U.S. spy flights in Colombian territorial waters set up to
detect and capture marijuana shipments.
As explained by Thoumi,
“In the United States there were widespread rumors that the marijuana industry had infiltrated
the highest government levels, the [Carter]  administration had begun ‘Operation Stopgap’ in
which spy planes were used to locate and intercept marijuana boats, and President Jimmy Carter
himself increased pressure on the Colombian government to become more active. Domestically,
Turbay realized that the size of the marijuana industry was too corruptive, and that it could
threaten his control over the government.”419
In order to prove the Colombian commitment against drug trafficking and to eliminate
any suspicion of his alleged personal involvement, President Turbay started an aggressive
campaign of marijuana eradication and disruption of the Atlantic Coast trafficking rings. 420
As stated in Chapter I, because of the characteristics of marijuana production, the
traffickers of this drug did not form sophisticated and articulated coalitions that led to a
vertically articulated illicit industry. Their ability to resist the state was not significant.
Moreover, marijuana plants are relatively easy to eradicate with defoliants and herbicides.421
The campaign was very aggressive and consisted of the use of the aerial spray of gliphosate, a
                                                          
417 Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, pp. 50 and 209
418On this issue see Arrieta et.al, p.215
419 Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.210
420Arrieta et al., p. 295
421As pointed by Lee III,
“[s]pecial problems are associated with coca: The coca bush... is extremely difficult to kill. A herbicide
sufficiently toxic to destroy coca form the air might also damage other crops, harm farm animals or
wildlife, and pollute the waterways. No effective and environmentally safe herbicide for use against coca
has yet been found.,” Lee III, The White Labyrinth, p. 91
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potent herbicide. The armed forces were also involved in the destruction of plantations and the
arrest of traffickers. But the use of the military was a response timed to the pressures of the
Carter administration. Even if the U.S. did not directly request it, the military was used by
Turbay to show his strong commitment to the eradication of marijuana.422
The armed forces were used in a single operation called “Fulminant” (Operación
Fulminante) that started in November 1978. The military resisted participating in marijuana
eradication arguing that their main function was to combat guerrilla groups. They were also
afraid of the possible corrupting effects of involvement in counter drug activities.423  As a
matter of fact, cases of corruption and frequent clashes with the peasants delayed the eradication
operations and began to undermine the image of the armed forces. Moreover, the eradication
operations distracted a large number of troops from combating the increasing threat of guerrilla
groups and from dissuading an external attack. These factors led to the termination of Operation
Fulminant in March 1980. Since then, the  Colombian armed forces have been reluctant to
directly intervene in enforcement operations against drug trafficking activities.424
By the end of the Turbay administration, marijuana was no longer an issue for Colombia,
partly because the eradication campaign was very successful. Also, the traffickers soon
discovered that one kilo of cocaine (the new drug in demand in the U.S.) was as profitable as a
shipload of marijuana. Also, a new variant of marijuana called sinsemilla began to be cultivated
in California, Alabama, and Appalachia--thus reducing the demand for imported marijuana. 425
In September 1979, an extradition treaty was signed between the Turbay Ayala
administration and the United States government. The purpose of the treaty was the extradition
of Colombian drug traffickers to the United States. Both the Colombian and the U.S.
Congresses approved the treaty in March 1981.  It became valid in April 1982, five months
before the end of Turbay's presidential term. In order that social conflict not increase during the
presidential campaign then in progress, the United States did not request any extradition, and
Turbay did not have to extradite anyone.426
The extradition treaty was the result of the concern of the U.S. government over the
growing cocaine seizures from Colombia and growing cocaine consumption in the United
States. This preoccupation is reflected in hearings such as “Cocaine: A Major Issue of the
Seventies” partially quoted below.
                                                          
422Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.210 .
423See: Arrieta et al., pp. 297-298 and Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p. 210
424 See: Lopez Restepo, Andrés, “Costos del combate a la producción, comercialización y consumo de
drogas y a la violencia generada por el narcotráfico,” in Thoumi Francisco, Uribe, Sergio, Rorcha,
Ricardo, Reyes Alejandro, Garzón, Edgar, López, Andrés, Tokatlián, Juan and Hernández Manuel,
op.cit., 426-428.
425 See: Betancourt and García, p. 68
426 See: Thoumi, Political Economy & illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.211
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“ As chairman  of the special task force on cocaine - and my name is Tennyson Guyer- recent
developments concerning the state of cocaine have come to my attention which call for decisive and
immediate action. The availability, abuse, and popularity of cocaine in the United States has reached
pandemic proportions with 19 metric tons illegally entering the United States in 1978. This is a drug
which, for the most part, has been ignored and its increased use in our society has caught us
unprepared to cope effectively with this menace....Its [of cocaine] popularity has spread vastly, and
during the last several years it has become the drug of choice of millions of Americans. The National
Institute on Drug Abuse estimates that almost 10 million Americans have used cocaine, including 1
million under the age of 18. No longer it its use restricted to the so-called elite of society.
Businessmen use it to get going in the morning, as do housewives, stockbrokers, and college
students. Children indulge in it, and entertainers use it to keep going. Since cocaine is a powerful
stimulant with a high potential for abuse, it is our responsibility to see that its availability is
minimized and that its use not be taken lightly.”427
As will be shown later, the use of the extradition treaty as the main tool for future
administrations would be the key that would liberate all the demons from the spiral of violence
between the Medellín cartel and the Colombian government. During this period, Colombia did
not register a high degree of drug trafficking-related violence against the state. However, it is
important to note that Pablo Escobar issued personal vendettas against every judge, witness or
policeman who attempted to prosecute or arrest him. 428
It is worth noting here that, from 1978 to 1982, there was an increasing militarization of
the Colombian government drug law enforcement structures. As a matter of fact, since the early
1970s the agency responsible for enforcement activities against drug trafficking was the
Administrative Security Department (DAS), a civilian intelligence body that works under the
direct authority of the president. Because of cases of corruption, the responsibility over the
enforcement against drug trafficking was transferred in early 1978 to the Judiciary Police, a
civilian police agency under the General Prosecutor of the Republic.429 In July 1980, after
Fulminant Operation was over, the United States and Colombia signed a counter drug
cooperation agreement that established that the United States government would,
                                                          
427 Cocaine: A major drug issue of the seventies: Hearings  before the Select Committee on Narcotics
Abuse and Control, of the House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979, pp. 1 and 2.
428Murder was a constant in the criminal life of Pablo Escobar (I am referring here to his drug trafficking
criminal record since he started as a car thief in the early 1970s). In the mid-1970s Escobar started his
cocaine trafficking career smuggling the drug within hollowed marble grave stones that he trafficked
between Medellín and the Atlantic ports of Urabá in the Atlantic coast.  In 1976 Escobar  was arrested
under charges of drug trafficking [cocaine] and attempt to bribe a public official. Under Escobar’s orders
the two undercover agents who participated in the investigation of the case were murdered, the judge in
charge of the case received death threats and finally abandoned the case. Police Major  Monroy Arenas
who conducted the police investigation was murdered five years later in 1981. Finally only the couriers
involved in this trafficking case were convicted. On this issue see: Castillo, Fabio, La Coca Nostra, pp.
50-55.
429  See: Lopez Restepo, Andrés, op.cit., 426-428 and Henmann, Anthony, Mama Coca, Bogotá, El
Ancora and Editorial La oveja negra, 1981, pp.86 and 87 and 118-121
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“pay costs, in the amount of $13,225,000 for supplying and maintaining helicopters, patrol vessels,
fixed radar equipment, transport vehicles, and fuel, which will be used exclusively for interdicting
drug traffic, for training personnel with respect to the interdiction of drug traffic.”430
In order to implement this agreement, in 1981 the Colombian government created the
National Antinarcotics Directorate (NAD).This directorate functions within the structure of the
Colombian National Police (CNP), which is in turn directly subordinated to the Ministry of
Defense. Since its creation the NAD has been the main agency in charge of enforcement
operations against drug trafficking. This force has suffered a constant process of militarization
in terms of its doctrine and equipment.431
b) Knocking at hell's door. President Belisario Betancur Cuartas administration (1982-
1986)
By 1982 the flood of cocaine to the United States by the Colombian cartels was alarming.
Law enforcement officials where astonished by the amount of seizures in ports of entry
especially Florida and New York. As stated by an analyst,
“In 1981 authorities [in Florida] seized 3.5 million pounds of marijuana and 2,508 pounds of cocaine,
two-thirds of all national seizures[...].Drug trafficking made homicide a common event in South
Florida. The number of murders in Miami had skyrocketed, going from 349 in 1979 to 569 in 1980 to
621 in 1981, with about 40 percent of the murders related to drugs. So many people were being
murdered in Miami that the mortuaries could not handle all the corpses, forcing the Dade Country
Medical Examiner’s Office to use refrigerated trucks to accommodate the overflow.”432
By this time, the Cali and Medellín coalition become a cartel, pooling agreements for
production, transportation, and distribution. They also had very effective machinery for reprisals
against the armed political left (the MAS mentioned earlier). This cartel would last until 1986
when the saturation of the U.S. market provoked a fierce and violent competition between the
Cali and Medellín coalitions for the sale of their cocaine shipments. This division was also
provoked by deep differences in the way of conducting the business.433  As explained by
Clawson and Lee,
“Yet this political and economic cooperation had begun to fade in the mid-1980s, in part due to
market saturation in the United States. Port-of-entry U.S. cocaine prices declined almost 40 percent
between January 1982 to January 1985 and more than 70 percent from January 1982 to 1989. Ruthless
competition for external sales took place within Colombia’s drug underworld. In a particularly
egregious example, Medellín kingpin Pablo Escobar Gaviria and José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha took
advantage of Gilberto Rodríguez´s [Cali kingpin] sojourn in a Spanish prison to penetrate the cocaine
                                                          
430 U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, Colombia. Narcotics Drugs
Cooperation to Curb Illegal Traffic. Agreement effected by exchange of notes. Signed at Bogotá July 21
and August 6, 1980; Entered into force August 6 1980, TIAS 9838.
431 See: Lopez Restepo, Andrés, op.cit., 426-428
432Chepesiuk, Ron, Hard Target, The United States War Against International Drug Trafficking, 1982-
1997, Jefferson, McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 1999, p.29
433 Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 46
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market in New York City, traditionally a Cali preserve. Important philosophical differences also
divided the Colombian cocaine establishment. Medellín traffickers had personal political ambitions,
harbored deep resentments against the Colombian elite and favored the use of violence as a political
tool. By contrast, the group of traffickers based in  Cali (and more broadly in Valle del Cauca
department) preferred to advance their objectives through bribery and manipulations rather than
through bullets and car bombs.”434
Immediately after President Betancur took over in August 1982, the Reagan
administration began an intense policy of persuasion and pressure aimed at the application of
the extradition treaty. However, because of his strong feelings about Colombian sovereignty,
President Betancur was reluctant to implement the treaty during the first two years of his
government.435 This chapter will argue that during this presidential period government
enforcement against the cocaine industry  (including the application of the extradition treaty)
was motivated more by internal factors rather than bilateral issues between Colombia and the
United States.
By the early 1980s, the Colombian political class could no longer ignore the economic
and paramilitary power of the drug traffickers. Several factors overlapped in this period that
would lead to the beginning of a bloody spiral of violence between the Medellín cartel and the
Colombian government. This escalation of terror by the Medellín cartel came to an end in
December 1993 with the death of Pablo Escobar.
In first place, as stated before, the Colombian political class had tolerated and even
legally incorporated the illicit money generated by drug trafficking. However, since 1982, drug
traffickers were perceived as a threat because they tried to penetrate the Colombian political
system. A new social class claimed its right to share the political power with the traditional
political elite. This was perceived as a threat to the monopoly of the traditional political class on
political power as well as to the integrity of the traditional parties and Colombian institutions
because of the possibility for subordination of political decisions to the interests of powerful
criminal groups.436 In fact, in March 1982, Pablo Escobar was elected as the replacement
representative of Jairo Ortega Ramirez for the political movement Liberal Alternative
(Alternativa Liberal).437 Moreover, Escobar had already gained popularity in Medellín through
the creation in 1982 of the local movement Civismo en Marcha (Civism on the Move) and his
foundation Medellín sin Tugurios (Medellín Without Slums). Through both political
organizations Escobar sought to gain electoral support and a social base of support among the
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435 See: Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.212
436 See: Arrieta et al., pp. 229-232
437In June 1981, Escobar and Ortega were expelled from the New Liberal Party by the national party
coordinator Rodrigo Lara Bonilla who publicly accused them of being linked to drug trafficking
activities. They  would also be expelled in October 1983  from the Colombian House of Representatives.
See: Castillo, Fabio, Los Jinetes de la Cocaína,Bogotá, Editorial Documentos Periodísticos, 1988, pp.199-
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low-income sectors of Medellín, which in fact would provide him with support in terms of
information, recruitment base for his hit-men and employees, hiding places, etc. With the
fortune gained from cocaine trafficking, Escobar built soccer stadiums, housing, and health
centers. As explained earlier in the dissertation, Escobar filled the vacuum left by the weak
capacity of the Colombian state.
Another trafficker, Carlos Lehder, had created a political party the Movimiento Latino
Nacional (National Latin Movement-MLN-). As explained by Rensselaer Lee III,
"The party's ideology combined populist and fascist themes (opposition to communism, 
imperialism, neo-colonialism and Zionism); it aims included nationalization of banks, transport, 
and the assets of multinationals ; and the end to "foreign intervention" in Colombian life; the 
abrogation of the extradition treaty; and the creation of a united Latin American army to 
safeguard Latin sovereignty, culture and frontiers. The MNL for a time maintained its own 
newspaper, Quindío Libre, which circulated in Major Colombia Cities. The Party had limited 
electoral successes -winning approximately 12 percent of the vote in the regional elections in 
Quindío in March 1984. By  1986, however, the MNL's future had ebbed. Most of its followers 
had rejoined the traditional political parties or had affiliated themselves with the leftist Union 
Patriótica (Patriotic Union). Lehder himself, although a fugitive from justice, was the MNL 
candidate for the Colombian Senate from Quindío in the March 1986 congressional elections; 
he lost overwhelmingly"438
The Colombian government would react against this growing competitive criminal
political force. A leader in this crusade against drug traffickers, (especially and almost
exclusively the Medellín) cartel was Betancur's Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. A
Liberal himself, he was concerned about party penetration by members of the Medellín cartel.
Also, as the rest of the Colombian political class, Bonilla feared the formation of a political
force that could represent the interest of the drug traffickers. Lara Bonilla was a strong supporter
of the utilization of the Extradition Treaty to control the expansion of the cocaine industry in
Colombia and he had the will to implement it. 439 He would lead the first campaign of
enforcement against the drug cartels.
A second factor that precipitated the spiral of violence was a campaign of intimidation
against members of the judiciary and other government officials investigating drug trafficking
activities and flagrant crimes, including massacres of peasants perpetrated or supported by the
traffickers. Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was persistently harassed and threatened by the
traffickers since the moment he took office in 1983. Death threats were part of his daily life and
the traffickers tapped his home and office phones.440 This threat to use of violence was also a
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preemptive move to prevent the application of the Extradition Treaty,  a policy that became
evident in 1983 after Betancur took office.441
The traffickers preemptively threatened the use of violence against the state as a tactic of
intimidation. They also tried to penetrate the Colombian party system in order to gain political
power.
The state made a second move in the escalation of violence through a campaign of
aggressive interdiction against drug traffickers. The first big government intervention was the
discovery, capture, and destruction in March 1984 of a huge complex of cocaine processing
laboratories on the banks of the Yari river in the department of Caquetá.442 The larger complex
was known as "Tranquilandia.” Lara Bonilla was responsible for authorizing and politically
directing the National Police operations. The result was a retaliatory campaign leading to the
assassination of government officials and journalists. The reactive violence started with the
assassination of Lara Bonilla on April 30, 1984. This unleashed a campaign of harsher
enforcement by the government.
The traffickers attempted to set a truce through secret negotiations with the government.
However, the negotiations were leaked to the press (presumably by the U.S. Embassy in
Bogotá), and they were strongly opposed in public opinion and by the political parties.443 The
government was left no alternative but to resort to enforcement operations against the Medellín
Cartel.444 Clawson and Lee describe this episode in the following terms,
“The traffickers communicated the […] offer to the government in successive meetings with
former President Alonso Lopez Michelsen and with Colombian attorney general Carlos Jiménez
Gómez in May 1984. Lopez happened to be in Panama then as an observer for that country’s
president election […] At the first meeting, in the Hotel Marriott in Panama City, Pablo Escobar
and Jorge Ochoa told Lopez that they represented 100 top Colombian mafiosi […] The traffickers
said they were ready to ´dismantle everything’ and repatriate money in Swiss bank accounts
provided that the government discontinued extradition and agreed not to confiscate their wealth.
(According to one disputed version, the traffickers also offered to pay off Colombia’s 10$ billion
national debt). Lopez communicated the offer directly to Colombia’s president Belisario Betancur,
who has just initiated a peace dialogue with the country’s guerrilla groups. Betancur found the
traffickers’ plan intriguing and authorized his attorney general to travel to Panama to contact
Escobar and his colleagues. The traffickers gave Jiménez a long written document addressed
directly to President Betancur in which they proposed to eliminate once and forever any drug
trafficking in our country’ and asked the president to ‘consider the possibility of our reinstatement
in Colombian society in the near future’[…] Referring to prosecution in Colombia, the traffickers
denied responsibility for the murder of Lara Bonilla and affirmed their support for the Colombia’s
democratic and republican system of government. In a ‘Suggestions’ section at the end of the
document, the traffickers requested revisions in the extradition treaty, an exemption for crimes
committed before the revision and the right to appeal extradition decisions to the Colombian
Supreme Court […] Nothing ever came out of the trafficker’s initiative, in part because of the
overwhelmingly negative reaction of Colombia’s political establishment. Leaders from every
political party –liberals, new liberals, and conservatives- almost unanimously expressed open and
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categorical opposition to a dialogue with drug traffickers. Carlos Holguín Sardi, the conservative
president of the Colombian Senate, summarized the view of the majority when he observed,
‘[Negotiations] where criminal law is concerned…would mean the total disintegration of our legal
and other institutions’.”445
According to Clawson and Lee III, Carlos  Jiménez Gomez (one of the negotiators of the
Colombian government) had informally communicated the substance of the drug kingpins’ offer
to the U.S. embassy in Colombia, and the Reagan administration strongly objected to an
agreement with the traffickers. Besides domestic pressure, U.S. pressure would have then also
motivated Betancur to stop the negotiations and to deny that they had ever taken place.446
As stated before, government enforcement activities during this period were motivated
more by a reaction against the violence unchained by the drug traffickers and their overt
attempts to penetrate the political system than by the pressure exercised by the U.S.
government.  As a matter of fact, President Betancur’s reticent attitude towards the application
of the Extradition Treaty changed after the assassination of Lara Bonilla. For example, right
after Lara Bonilla´s murder, the government authorized the extradition of Carlos Lehder.
Extradition became a main enforcement tool.447  The Betancur administration also engaged the
armed forces, in particular the army, in counter-drug activities. Since 1983, joint activities with
the National Police and separate army operations were carried out for the destruction of
production sites and the eradication of coca plantations. The involvement of the armed forces
would become more evident after the assassination of Lara Bonilla. This participation took on
operative and juridical dimensions: the armed forces would participate in counter-drug
operations and the military justice would intervene in the prosecution of drug trafficking related
crimes.448 The tables and figures below illustrate some of the results of the enforcement
operations against drug trafficking during this period.
Table 3. Seizure of Illicit Drugs 1983-1986
(in kilograms)
Type of drug 1983 1984 1985 1986
Cocaine 2,082 19,582 4,240 3,039
Cocaine base --------   9,448 3,700     4,070
Coca leaves -------- 41,583 151,671 163,000
Bazuco ---------      785       605       481
Marijuana 3,537,387 4,301,262 1,021,045 846,000
Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997.
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Table 4. Captured presumed drug traffickers 1981-1986
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
National 105 430 665 5,250 11,981 3,659
Foreign ------- ------- -------- ------- --------      40
Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997
 Graphic 1. Destroyed laboratories 1981-1986
Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997
Table 5. Goods and elements seized during enforcement operations 1982-1986
 (in units)
Units 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Weapons 621 308 1,517 337 39
Radios ----------- ------------- 241 120 46
Vehicles 107 155 520 228 185
Ships and boats 30 9 20 24 5
Planes 8 13 64 33 21
Portative power
plants
----------- ------------- 52 26 25
Scales ----------- ------------- 60 389 133
Ammunition 35,588 9,698 6,615
Grenades ----------- ------------- 9 6
Dynamite (kilos) ----------- ------------- 84 --------------- ----------------
Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997
Parallel to this spiral of violence between the government and the traffickers, the war
between the traffickers continued (especially Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha and his alliance with
the landowners and sectors of the army) against the UP and the guerrillas. As reported by
Human Rights Watch,
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“Political violence in Colombia took a dramatic turn on December 3, 1981, when a helicopter flying
over the city of Cali dropped leaflets announcing the formation of a new group, Death to Kidnappers
(Muerte a los secuestradores, MAS) […] In the Middle Magdalena region, where people with land or
business faced increased demands for so-called ‘war taxes’ , supplies and food from the FARC, and
were plagued by kidnapping for ransom the MAS model represented a violent, yet effective means for
fighting back. The Bárbula Battalion, in Santander´s Puerto Boyacá, and the town’s military mayor,
Capt. Oscar de Jesús Echandía, adopted the MAS model. In 1982, Echandía convened a meeting of
local people, including local Liberal and Conservative party leaders, businessmen, ranchers, and
representatives from the Texas Petroleum Company. They found that their goal went far beyond
protecting the population from guerrilla demands. They wanted to ‘cleanse’ (limpiar) the region of
subversives. To do so, they agreed to gather guns, clothing, food, and a fund to pay young men to
fight. Money came from businessmen and ranchers, while the military committed tactical support […]
Before ending the meeting they chose a name for their new group: MAS, the same used by drug
traffickers […] by 1983, MAS was taking part in joint operations without the army. At the time , local
peasants reported numerous cases of troops accompanied by MAS members carrying out extrajudicial
excecutions and destroying farms[…]
[In 1983] MAS set up a public entity to carry out civic improvements and aid peasants who joined
their fight: the Association of Peasants and Ranchers of the Middle Magdalena (Asociación
Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio, ACDEGAM). Likes the military’s
own counterinsurgency strategy, ACDEGAM operated in two levels: public statements against
communism and in favor of a legalization of so-called ‘self-defense’ groups paired with covert
attacks, assassinations, and death threats through MAS in league with the military. […] By 1985,
ACDEGAM had powerful new members: drug traffickers who bought land in the Middle Magdalena.
The financial support of king pins dramatically improved the quantity and quality of the groups
weapons, intelligence-gathering ability, and rage of action”449
Paramilitary squads massacred at least 5,300 peasants during this period, particularly in
the Magdalena Medio Region where Rodriguez Gacha had purchased enormous extensions of
land.450 This violence will be also considered since it provoked the displacement of
Colombian peasants to Venezuela.451
The chronology bellow illustrates the reactive and preemptive spiral of violence carried
out by drug traffickers during this period.
                                                          
449 Human Rights Watch, Colombia’s Killer Networks, pp.17, 18 and 20
450 See: Castillo, La Coca Nostra, pp. 197-225 and pp. 200-202.  Notice also that   Colombian NGOs
CINEP (Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular) and (Comisión Intercongregacional de Justicia y
Paz (Justicia y Paz) reported that between 1985 and 1994 there where 586,261 people displaced in
Colombia as a consequence of  violence (related or not to drug trafficking). See: CINEP and Justicia y
Paz, “The internal displaced: personage of the year,”  Banco de Datos de Derechos Humanos y Violencia
Política, Balance Sheet 1997, special offprint, 1997, p.9
451  It is worth noticing that the Magdalena Medio region is formed by 29 municipalities in four
departments- Bolívar, Antioquia, Norte de Santander and César- which are located near the border with
Venezuela. The issue of  displaced people towards Venezuelan territory as refugees is analyzed in
Chapter V (infra) of this dissertation.
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Deadly escalation 1983-1985:
December 1983 Creation of the peasant self –defense (autodefensas)  groups finances and armed by the
landowners of the Magdalena Medio region against the FARC. This self defense groups are supported by
the “Bárbula” Army Battalion based in Puerto Boyacá.
April 30 1984 Rodrigo Lara Bonilla is assassinated.
January-April 1985 The self-defense groups of the Magdalena Medio eradicate the FARC from the area
and consolidate as stable armed groups in the area.
June 1985 First contacts and talks conversations between the autodefensas and the drug traffickers.
August 1985 the autodefensas start patrolling and protecting coca producing plots and cocaine producing
laboratories in the Magdalena Medio and Yarí lowland areas.
November 6 and 7 , 1985. Assassination of 15 Justices of the Supreme Court and the Council of State,
during the occupation of the Palace of Justice by the M-19 Guerrilla group , with the trouble (alleged)
support of drug traffickers.
Sources: Betancourt and García, op.cit., pp. 236-300 and Office of the President of the Republic, The
Fight Against the Drug Traffic in Colombia, Bogotá, November 1989, 69pp.
c) Colombia's ordeal: President Virgilio Barco administration (1986-1990)
This is the period of greater escalation between the Medellín cartel and the Colombian
government. Drug trafficking-related violence stemmed from the utilization of the Extradition
Treaty as the main repressive tool of the government. A group known as "The Extraditables"
was created under the leadership of Pablo Escobar. The traffickers also intensified their
campaign of terrorism against the state.
President Barco considered drug trafficking to be a national security problem and his
point of view was that all the available resources of the state had to be used in order to cope
with this threat. In Barco´s view, drug trafficking was threatening the survival of democratic
institutions and public liberties.452As explained by a group of Colombian analysts,
“[w]hereas traditionally drug trafficking was considered to be a particularly violent problem of
delinquency, the Barco administration defined it as a foremost problem of national security. This
implied [in its view] that the commitment of the armed forces in the repression of drug trafficking
had to be enhanced.”453
Although at the beginning of the Barco administration the National Police and the DAS
had the lead in counterdrug activities, the Colombian president enhanced the participation of the
armed forces in interdiction activities in remote areas. The table below shows the evolution of
                                                          
452 ibid. p.148
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casualties provoked by drug traffickers to the Colombian armed forces and national police
during the Barco administration.
Table 6. Casualties in the Armed Forces and the National Police provoked by drug trafficking
organizations
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Killed 328 383 408 473 295
Injured 548 666 673 670 464
Source: Office of the President of the Republic, The Fight Against the Drug Traffic in Colombia,
Bogotá, November 1989. (Data for 1989 is incomplete, due to the change of presidential
administration in August of that year.)
The increase in participation of the armed forces in counterdrug operations was
particularly evident during 1988 and 1989.454  Further militarization during that period was due
to two factors: First, the recently inaugurated Bush administration was applying pressure for a
stronger involvement of the Colombian military in enforcement operations against drug
trafficking. Secondly, stronger involvement of the armed forces formed part of the offensive
against the Medellín cartel provoked by the assassination of Galán.455
The assassination of Galán was a preemptive move by the Medellín cartel. Galán was not
killed because of policies he had applied, but because of policies he would implement in the
future. Galán was the favorite candidate for the 1989 elections. He was young, dynamic, and a
friend of Lara Bonilla; he favored of the use of the Extradition Treaty as a means to combat
criminal organizations.456 Paradoxically, his death would create a contrary effect from that
intended. After his murder, governmental enforcement was harsher than ever. The process
would lead to a crackdown on the organization. The government retaliated by destroying
laboratories and seizing property and assets belonging to the heads of the Medellín cartel. On
December 15, 1989 Rodriguez Gacha was killed during a joint arrest operation of the CNP and
the DAS. The tables and figures below illustrate some of the results of the enforcement
operations against drug trafficking during this period.
                                                                                                                                                                         
453 ibid. p. 247
454See: ibid. pp. 337 and 338
For example in 1989 the CNP and the Colombian army carried out the “Primavera” and “Arco Iris” joint
operations which resulted in the seizure of 30 tons of cocaine, the capture of 3,500 people related to the
drug industry and the destruction of about 500 laboratories. On this issue see: Arrieta et al., p. 252
455 See: ibid., pp. 341 and 343
456 Thoumi, Political Economy & Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.222
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Table 7. Illegal Crops Eradication 1985-1990
 (in hectares)
Crop 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Coca 1,334 870 572 230 641 760
Marihuana 124 149 371 918 132   36
Opium poppy --------     5 --------- ------- -------- ----------
Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997
Table 8. Seizure of Illicit Drugs 1987-1989
(in kilograms)
Type of drug 1987 1988 1989 1990
Cocaine 8,326 18,701 30,633 44,962
Cocaine base      6,712     3,897     6,726     5,786
Coca leaves 188,689 97,360 202,973 533,694
Bazuco        279     537       524       394
Marijuana 128,850 922,858 707,617 653,322
Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997.
Table 9. Captured presumed drug traffickers 1987-1986
1987 1988 1989 1990
National 4,653 4,898 3,574 2,678
Foreign      39      31      33       7
Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997
Graphic 2.  Destroyed laboratories 1987-1990
Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997
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Table 10. Goods and elements seized during enforcement operations 1987-1990
 (in units)
Units 1987 1988 1989 1990
Weapons 358 758 986 887
Radios 61 206 376 307
Vehicles 187 348 494 311
Ships and boats 40 29 38 35
Planes 20 57 50 36
Portative power
plants
22 55 105 74
Scales 177 261 300 214
Ammunition 12,572 46,321 40,728 132,620
Grenades 6 41 45 205
Dynamite ------------------ ------------------ ---------------- 25,428
Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997
The position of the cartels was clear: terrorism would not cease unless extradition
stopped. For this the treaty would have to be declared unconstitutional. The victims would
naturally be the magistrates of the Supreme Court who had the last word on this matter. During
this period, the violence of the traffickers against the political class was particularly high.   The
chronology bellow illustrates the reactive and preemptive spiral of violence by drug traffickers
during this period.
Deadly escalation 1986-August 1990:
July 16, 1986, Leticia (Amazonas). Assassination of the journalist Roberto Camacho Prada, a
correspondent of the newspaper "El Espectador.”
July 17, 1986, Bogota, Assassination of Judge Hernando Baquero Borda.
September 1, 1986 Assassination of Pedro Nel Jiménez Obando, UP’s Senator.
September, 17,1986, Cali. Assassination of Raul Echavarria Barrientos, assistant director of "Occidente,”
a daily newspaper.
October 22, 1986, Bogota, Attempted assassination of Judge Gustavo Zuluaga Serna.
November 17, 1986 Assassination of Col. Jaime Ramírez Gómez, chief of the Narcotics
Division of the National Police.
December 10, 1986, Bogota. Assassination of Lieutenant Colonel Jose Agustin Ramos Rodriguez,
distinguished officer of the Valle Police Department, very active against delinquency.
December 17, 1986 Assassination of Guillermo Cano, director of the journal El Espectador.
1985-1989 Period of further organization, consolidation and training of the autodefensas (turn into fully
organized paramilitary groups) by contracted Israeli, British and South African mercenaries.
October 1987 Bomb in the Ministry of Defense.
October 7, 1987 Massacre of peasants in Puerto Boyacá.
October 14 1987 Assassination of Jaime Pardo Leal, presidential candidate by UP.
November, 24 1987, Medellín, Abortive Kidnapping of Juan Gomez Martinez, Director of the Newspaper
El Colombiano and elected mayor of Medellín.
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December 17, 1988, Budapest (Hungary), Attempt on former Minister of Justice and then Ambassador of
Colombia in Hungary, Dr. Enrique Parejo Gonzalez.
January 1988, Five former members of the armed forces allegedly paid by the Cali cartel are assassinated
by the Medellín cartel.
January 13, 1988, 700 kilos of dynamite explode in front of the “Mónaco” building in Medellín owed by
Pablo Escobar and also  the residence of his family. Escalation of violence between the Cali and the
Medellín cartels.
January 18, 1988, Kidnapping of Andrés Pastrana, son of the former president Miguel Pastrana Borrero,
and Conservative candidate  for the office of mayor of Bogotá (and current president of Colombia).
January 25, 1988, Kidnapping and assassination of the General Prosecutor of the Nation, Carlos Mauro
Hoyos. By coincidence during the failed attempt to free Hoyos, Dr.  Andrés Pastrana is localized and
released.
February 18, 1988, a pharmacy of the Cali cartel owed commercial chain “La Rebaja” is burned in
Medellín. From that moment on there were forty bomb attempts against “La Rebaja” locals and ten bomb
attempts against the Colombian Radio Group owed by the Rodríguez Orejuela Family.
April 3, 1988, 38 peasants are killed in La Mejor Esquina (Córdoba Department); allegedly they were
giving support to the guerrillas.
April 11, 1988, 12 fishermen and banana workers are killed in Punta Coquitos (Turbo, Urabá)
July 3, 1988 ,  16 peasants are killed in El Castillo (Meta). They were accused of supporting the UP.
January 16, 1989,  12 judges that were investigating massive killings  are murdered in La Rochela
(Santander).
February 4,  1989, 5 people are murdered in Santa Rosa del Cabal (Risaralda).
February 27, 1989, Assassination of  Teófilo Forero, member of the Central Committee of the Colombian
Communist Party.
March 29, 1989, Murder of the "El Espectador" Journalist, Dr. Hector Giraldo Galvis.
March 30, 1989 , In El Dorado airport of Bogotá is assassinated José Antequera, Secretary General of the
Communist Youth and member of the UP. In the same attempt is wounded Ernesto Samper Pizano
(presidential pre-candidate for the Liberal Party and president from 1994 to 1998).
May 30, 1989, Bomb attempt against Brig. General Miguel Alfredo Maza, Director of  the Security
Department (DAS).
July 4, 1989, Assassination in Medellín of Antonio Roldán, Governor of Antioquía.
July  28,Medellín, Assassination of Public Order Judge Maria Helena Diaz Perez.
June-August 1989, Escalation of murders of judges, magistrates, peasants and members of UP.
August 16,1989, Assassination of Doctor Carlos Valencia Garcia, Magistrate.
August 18, 1989 Assassination of Col. Valdemar Franklin Quintero, chief of the Metropolitan Police and
assassination of  Luis Carlos Galán S., presidential candidate for the New Liberal Party.
August 23, 1989, the Medellín cartel declares a “total war” against the state.
August 18-October 1, 1989, Eighty five dynamite attempts in Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla, Cartagena and
Bogotá against banks, financial corporations, electoral campaign offices of the Liberal and Conservative
parties, hotels and restaurants, newspaper offices, commercial centers etc.
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September, 2, 1989, Bogota, car-bomb attack on  the building of the newspaper " El Espectador.”
September 11, 1989, Medellín , Assassination of Doctor Pablo Pelaez Gonzalez, former Mayor of
Medellín.
October 16, 1989 Bucaramanga. Attack against the newspaper "Vanguardia Liberal,” 2 dead and 7 people
injured.
October 17, 1989, Medellín. Assassination of Doctor Jose Hector Jiménez Rodriguez, Magistrate of the
Penal Superior Tribunal of Medellín.
November 1, 1989, Assassination of the Magistrate of the Penal Superior Tribunal, Ms. Mariela Espinosa
Arango.
November, 27, 1989, Soacha, Bogota, Avianca flight bombed, 107 dead.
December 6, 1989, DAS building explosion, 63 dead , 600 injured.
December 19, 1989. Kidnapping of the son of the Secretary of the Presidency and 18 more people among
them members of the family of President Barco.
March 29, 1990, Chigorodó (Urabá), five peasants are assassinated. Massacres in Trujillo.
May 1990, the rural violence provokes massive displacement of peasants in Sucre.
May 27 1990, Presidential elections. The generalized violence and terror provokes the highest rate of
abstentions in the last 50 years (68%).
May-July 1990, Bombs in Medellín against military and police transport units.
July 15, 1990, new massacres against peasants in Urabá and Córdoba.
July 28, 1990, the government announces that up to that date there had been 517 bomb attempts and in
only six months 11,000 people had been murdered.
Sources: Betancourt and García, op.cit, pp. 236-300 and Office of the President of the Republic, The
Fight Against the Drug Traffic in Colombia, pp.12-16
This period also registered a large number of massacres in rural areas. As reported by
Human Rights Watch,
“The year 1988 proved a crucial one. The Center for Investigation and Popular Education
[CINEP], a human rights group recorded 108 massacres that year […], the worst of the decade.
Not only wee paramilitaries increasingly active in the regions where their members were based;
with the active coordination and support of the military, paramilitaries where also sent across
country to kill supposed guerrilla collaborators.”457
The main reason for this was that, since its institutionalization as a political party, the UP
began winning support in the rural zones. These areas overlapped with the property of
traffickers-turned-landowners who perceived the party as a threat since the main political flag of
the UP was agrarian reform. Traffickers such as Rodríguez Gacha joined forces with the
landowners and the army to counter the advance of the left by terrorizing the peasants to prevent
                                                          
457 Human Rights Watch, Colombia’s Killer Networks, p.23
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them from supporting UP and guerrillas. 458 They formed an anti-Communist political party
called Movimiento de Restauración Nacional (MORENA) -Movement of National Restoration-
whose main goal was to stop the expansion of the left. Paramilitary groups were trained by
Israeli Defense Forces and ex-SAS mercenaries.459
The following tables and figures present general statistics of violence elaborated by the
Council for Reconciliation, Normalization and Rehabilitation (Consejería para la
Reconciliacíon, Normalization and Rehabilitation) of the Presidency of Colombia during 1988
and the first semester of 1989.460 Notice that the figures displayed are not necessarily related to
drug trafficking related violence as defined in this dissertation. However, violent acts registered
under the category “private justice groups, drug trafficking organizations (narcotráfico), and
organized crime (delincuencia organizada) can be assimilated to drug trafficking-related
violence. Notice also the tables and figures below display official indicators and categories used
by the Colombian government.
Graphic. 3 Armed actions that took place in 1988
(by responsible groups)
“Armed actions” refers  to the following acts: ambushes, armed encounters, terrorist acts, armed
assaults to villages, towns and private and official entities, attacks to installations, road robberies
and armed harassment.
                                                          
458Castillo, La Coca Nostra, p.201
459 See: Human Rights Watch, Colombia’s Killer Networks, p.20
460 Presidencia de la República, Consejería para la Reconciliación y Rehabilitación, Estadísticas
Generales sobre Violencia en Colombia 1988-1989, Bogotá, September 1989, pp.12 and 33 and
Presidencia de la República, Consejería para la Reconciliación y Rehabilitación, Estadísticas Generales
sobre Violencia en Colombia (January-July 1989), Bogotá .July 1989, pp.50 and 73
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Graphic 4. 1988- Murder and kidnapping of civilians and public official/political leaders
(by responsible group)
“Public officials and political leaders (dirigentes y funcionarios)” refer to the following categories:
Prosecutors, congressmen, national political leaders, departmental political leaders, mayors,
members of local government assemblies, local political leaders, political candidates, trade union
leaders, popular leaders, political militant and activists, police inspectors.
Graphic 5. Armed actions that took place in the first semester of 1989
(by responsible group)
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Graphic 6. First Semester of 1989- Murder and kidnapping of civilians and public official/political leaders
(by responsible group)
“Public officials and political leaders (dirigentes y funcionarios)” refer to the following categories:
Prosecutors, congressmen, national political leaders, departmental political leaders, mayors,
members of local government assemblies, local political leaders, political candidates, trade union
leaders, popular leaders, political militant and activists, police inspectors.
d) Escobar's Phyrric Victory: César Gaviria administration (1990-1994)
President Gaviria would follow a different approach to stop the spiral of violence and
terror unchained by the Medellín cartel. On one hand, the president continued with the
enforcement against the traffickers but, at the same time, opened negotiations with them. In his
effort to de-escalate violence, president Gaviria give the bulk of responsibility on counterdrug
activities to the judiciary power and the police. The army was involved in counterdrug
operations but their efforts were kept to a minimum; moreover, the army was allowed to
concentrate on counterinsurgency operations as a their main task.461
On the other hand, in September 1990 the president offered a negotiated surrender, in
exchange for their surrender to the Colombian authorities. Surrendered traffickers would be
tried in Colombian courts and imprisoned in Colombia.462 Also, in June 1991 a Constitutional
Assembly that had been elected in December 1990 in order to reform the Colombian
Constitution declared the Extradition Treaty unconstitutional.463 The ban of the Extradition
                                                          
461 Tokatlián, Política pública internacional contra las drogas de la administración Gaviria y las
relaciones entre Colombia y Estados Unidos, pp.520,522 and 529.
462 Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.110
463 At the end of his administration, President Barco promoted a referendum that approved convening a
constituent assembly in charge of rewriting the 1886 constitution, which had survived for more than a
century (although undergoing several reforms). President Gaviria, who inaugurated his administration in
August 1990, convoked the elections for the Constitutional Assembly in December that year. Besides
banning extradition of Colombian Nationals, the new Constitution attacked the foundations of clienteles
by declaring representatives were to be elected nationally instead of in each department, established the
election of mayors, entitled Colombians to important economic rights (health, education and so on), and
strengthened the judiciary. The Constitutional Assembly also closed the existing Congress until a new
one was elected (that happened in October 1991). On this issue see Thoumi, Political Economy and
Illegal Drugs in Colombia, pp. 57, 226 and 227.
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Treaty was a result of a combined campaign of lobby and terror implemented by the Medellín’s
traffickers.464
Eventually, the war between the Medellín cartel and the government would end up in a
Phyrric victory for the traffickers. The traffickers had imposed their will on the extradition
issue. In exchange, the Medellín kingpins stopped the wave of violence and surrendered to be
prosecuted and jailed in Colombian prisons. However, the coalition had been disbanded. As
stated before, Rodriguez Gacha was killed during a police raid in December 1989. By February
1991, the Ochoa Vasquez Brothers and Pablo Escobar had surrendered voluntarily. Most of
their goods, laboratories, airstrips, and land had been destroyed or confiscated. In a desperate
attempt to avoid imprisonment in a military unit and a trial, Escobar escaped from prison in July
of 1992, and started a new campaign of terror against the state and his rivals. 465 The Bloque de
Búsqueda, (Search Block, a special elite unit formed by 600 members of the CNP and the army)
localized and killed him in December 1993. Escobar's demise was the result of constant and
tacitly combined harassment from his rivals (allegedly the Cali cartel sponsored the hit group
Los PEPES  ) and the Colombian police.466 His death marked the end of the Medellín coalition
as well as an end of the spiral of violence between the traffickers and the state. The Cali cartel
would, however, benefit from the demise of their rivals. As explained earlier in this dissertation,
the Cali traffickers were less prone to direct armed confrontation with the state and preferred
corruption as a tactic to secure the business. In this way, they were able to maintain a low
                                                          
464 See: Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.226 and Clawson and Lee, The
Andean Cocaine Industry, p.197
465 Under the new constitution was approved in July 1991, traffickers had to be released after 120 days if
the trial had not started. That was the case of  Escobar. In order to avoid this scenario, President Gaviria
declared a state of emergency (siege state) and ordered to transfer Escobar from his specially prepared
"mansion prison" to a military prison. See: Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia,
p.228
466 As noted by Clawson and Lee, “In February 1992, the People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar (PEPES)
inaugurated its existence by burning down a farm belonging to Escobar’s mother. PEPES subsequently
incinerated an estate and a ceramics gallery owned by Escobar’s wife and blew up a warehouse in Itagüi,
a town south of Medellín that contained the trafficker’s collection of antique cars. In addition, PEPES
liquidated at least seven of Escobar’s close associates between April and June 1993[…] PEPES received
significant financial support from Escobar’s rivals in Cali; some observers even claim that Cali leaders
were de facto members of PEPES[…]Escobar’s enemies collaborated enthusiastically with the Colombian
government. Colombia Libre [another anti-Escobar group which was composed of former Escobar
associates and emerged in 1993] claims to have provided intelligence to the authorities so support forty
operations against Escobar’s organization. Similarly, leading Cali traffickers maintained a network of
informants in Medellín and – according to several accounts- also deployed a high-tech tracking devices to
intercept Escobar’s communications. The information obtained from these channels was passed on to the
police and the DAS. Colombia’s prosecutor-general, Alfonso Valdivieso, acknowledged the Cali cartel’s
contribution of  ‘valuable information’ to search for Escobar and his enemies.”  On this issue see:
Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, pp.114 and 115.
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profile during the all-out war between the government and the Medellín cartel. The Cali
coalition would dominate cocaine exports in the first half of the 1990s.467
The chronology below illustrates the reactive and preemptive spiral of violence by drug
traffickers during this period.
Deadly escalation August 1990-1993:
August 30, 1990, kidnapping of Diana Turbay Quintero, director of the Hoy x Hoy magazine, partner of
the Criptón T.V. news program and daughter of former president Julio César Turbay Ayala.
September 1990, the “Extraditables” clamed responsibility for the kidnapping of Diana Turbay and her
news team and announce that they will only release her if they receive a similar treatment to the one
granted to the M-19 and EPL (that is open negotiations and truce with the government).
Gilberto and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela (heads of the Cali cartel) announce that as a preventive
measure against the Medellín cartel they have formed their own intelligence network.
October 30 and November 1990, kidnapping  of  Maruja Pachón de  Villamizar sister in law of  Luis
Carlos Galán.
January 25, 1991, during a police operation Diana Turbay Quintero is killed while the police attempted
to release her.
March 1991, indiscriminate killings in Cali and murder of Cali traffickers.
March, 7, 1991 , the police identify 11 of 31 bodies that were found floating in the Cauca river.
Allegedly drug traffickers operating in the Norte de Valle department (members of the Cali coalition)
killed this people.
March 19, 1992, the Cali police deactivates a bomb of 50 kilos placed near a soccer stadium.
July 21, 1992 ,Pablo Escobar escapes from prison.
In 1993 the organization of Pablo Escobar carried out 6 terrorist attempts in Bogotá with a total of 64
dead and 276 wounded. A similar campaign of terror took place in Medellín
.
February 28, 1993,a  house belonging to a boss of the Medellín cartel is burned by Los Pepes.
March 5, 1993, a lawyer of the Medellín cartel is murdered by Los Pepes. Four other lawyers are
                                                          
467 It worth mentioning that with the death of Pablo Escobar, the Cali coalition was no longer able to
keep a low profile. In fact the cartel’s network of connections and bribes could not stop an enforcement
campaign launched in 1995 by president Ernesto Samper (1994-1998). In August 1994, president Samper
was involved in a scandal related to the alleged financing of his electoral campaign with funds provided
by Cali traffickers. Samper´s enforcement campaign was motivated by the need of cleaning the image of
his government and by a the strong diplomatic pressure of the US government. By August 1995 the more
important leaders of the Cali coalition ( Gilbert and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela and José Santa Cruz
Londoño) were arrested and jailed in Colombian prisons. Colombian security forces killed Santa Cruz
Londoño in March 1996 (he had escaped from prison in January of that year). As a result of the crack
down o the Cali cartel the Colombian  cocaine industry started to be controlled by about 40 medium-size
organizations to whish must be added an estimated 2,000 to 3000 drug entrepreneurs running familiarize
businesses. Some of these medium size organizations such as the so-called “North Valley Cartel”
(formerly linked too o the Cali coalition) have established alliances with powerful paramilitary
organizations financed by landowner and groups linked to the prospection of emeralds. On this issue see:
Dreyfus, El lado oscuro de la globalización, p.36; Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry,
p.61and OGD, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995/1996 [on-line], available
http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP12_1_Colombie.HTML
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threatened.
January-March 1993, several installations of the Medellín cartel are attacked by Los Pepes.
December 2, 1993, the Colombian security forces kill Pablo Escobar.
Sources: Betancourt and García, op.cit, pp. 277-300 and CINEP, La verdad del '93 : paz, derechos
humanos y violencia, Bogotá, Cinep, 1994.
Rural violence between guerrillas and paramilitary groups did not stop during this period
and, paradoxically, the paramilitary groups financed by the traffickers would still have the
support of the Colombian military.  As reported by the Human Rights Watch,
“Law enforcement investigators identify three groups engaged in violence there [the northern part
of the Middle Magdalena region]: the FARC and ELN; a handful of ranching families and drug
traffickers who have organized paramilitary groups; and the military. Although violence has a long
history here, the most recent increase dates from the early 1990s, as the military-paramilitary
alliance based in Puerto Boyacá and Puerto Berrío began to push north in pursuit of suspected
‘subversives’. By 1993 when, Mobile Brigade 2 was active in that area, human rights groups were
flooded with reports of serious human rights abuses […] In a letter to the Public Ombudsman
(Defensoría) in Bogotá, the regional ombudsman identified a group calling itself  the “Peasant
Self-Defense Group” (Autodefensas Campesinas) as responsible for the July 30, 1994 massacre of
six people. He reported that despite abundant evidence, Gen. Ricardo Cienfuentes, commander of
the Fifth Brigade and the officer responsible for the area, claimed  ‘not to be aware of self-defense
groups in the area’. At the same time civil authorities described themselves as ‘overwhelmed’ with
reports of such groups.”468
Table 11. Goods seized because of drug trafficking crimes 1982-1995
Units 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Weapons 324 523 867 538 608
Radios 113 226 226 185 153
Vehicles 115 327 465 358 459
Ships 44 26 39 47 52
Planes 27 37 27 30 80
Portative
power
plants
58 63 47 47 113
Scales 190 231 251 276 427
Ammuniti
on
24611 19192 63960 17192 33741
Grenades 100 20 260 6 31
Dinnerti
me (kilos)
233 2111 3653 14 11
Source: República de Colombia, Ministro de Justicia y del Derecho, Dirección Nacional de
Estupefacientes, 1997
                                                          
468Human Rights Watch, Colombia’s Killer Networks, pp. 47 and 48.
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Table 12. Eradication of Illicit crops
(hectares)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Coca 459 944 846 4904 25402
Marijuana 7 100 138 14 36
Poppy 1497 12864 9821 5314 5074
Source: Colombia, Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes, 1997
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CHAPTER V:  DRUG TRAFFICKING AND THE  SECURITY OF
VENEZUELA (1978-1994)
A- INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes the national security problematique of Venezuela in terms of the
threats posed by drug trafficking. The chapter studies both the threats stemming from
Venezuela’s vulnerability vis-à-vis drug trafficking activities in South America and from the
spillover effects of militarized enforcement in Colombia (threats that are, of course, reinforced
by Venezuela’s vulnerability).
Other factors such as the change in the international prices of cocaine and the rise of new
consumption markets will also be analyzed insofar as they affect the role of Venezuela in the
cocaine industry.
B) DRUG TRAFFICKING AND VENEZUELA AS A WEAK STATE
a) A brief introduction to Venezuela
As explained in the second chapter, the strength of a state is not a static condition. States
move along a continuum depending on changes in their sociopolitical cohesion, policy capacity,
socioeconomic development, and territorial centrality. Venezuela, as this chapter will show,
clearly reflects this back and forth movement along the continuum.
What is today Venezuela was part of the Spanish Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada,
comprised of the current territories of Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. The country
became effectively independent from Spanish rule in 1821 after a long period of military
campaigns (1810-1821) led by Venezuela’s national hero El Libertador Simón Bolívar. For
eight years, Venezuela was part of the Republic of Gran Colombia’s federation  (formed by
Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela), which was part of Bolívar’s project for a united
independent Hispanic America. However Venezuelan nationalism, politically and economically
centered in Caracas, prevailed and in 1829 one of Bolívar’s lieutenants, José Antonio Páez led
Venezuela in its separation from Gran Colombia.469
During the first hundred years of its independence, Venezuela was a prototypical--almost
stereotypical--Latin American society, with an agrarian economy, an elitist social and economic
structure, and a tradition of military rule.470 As explained by an analyst,
                                                          
469 Rudolph, James D., Historical Setting, in Haggerty, Richard,ed., Venezuela: a country study,
Washington D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993, pp.10,11 and 12; Deas,
Malcolm, South America and the Caribbean 1999, Seventh Edition, London, Europa Publications
Limited, p. 670; Halperín Donghi, Tulio, The Contemporary History of Latin America, Durham, Duke
University Press, 1993, p. 93
470Haggerty, op.cit., p.xxi
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“Until 1935 Venezuelan history was characterized by long periods of authoritarian rule,
including the regimes of José Antonio Páez (1830-46 and 1861-63), Antonio Guzmán
Blanco (1870-88) and Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-35), alternating with shorter periods
of more democratic instability. The legacy was still an apparent combination of respect
for authority and an insistent democratic rhetoric.” 471
Things started to change with the discovery of oil reserves during the regime of caudillo
Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935). A more educated and politically aware middle class
developed in the wake of expanding oil production. Representatives of this class, the so-called
Generation of 1928, led the protest movements that eventually brought democracy to Venezuela
in the 1940s and 1950s.472 As noted by an analyst,
“The dominant figures in the 20th century Venezuelan political history were Rómulo Betancourt,
founder of the social democrat Democratic Action (Acción Democrática-AD) party and Dr. Rafael
Caldera Rodríguez, founder of the christian democrat Committee of Independent Electoral Political
Organization (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente -COPEI). Their democratic
convictions were derived from early  experiences of opposition to Gómez, with both parties emerging
from the middle class student movement. From 1945 to 1948 (known as the ‘Trienio’, or three-year
period) Betancourt was provisional  President under a revolutionary seven-member junta, which had
overthrown another dictator, Isaías Medina Angarita”473
The Trienio experience, mentioned in the quote above, was frustrated  in 1948 by another
military coup led by  General Marcos Perez Giménez, who was later ousted  by a civil-military
movement in 1958. Since the ousting of military dictator Marcos Perez Jiménez, the country has
had a presidential democratic regime characterized by the dominance of two highly disciplined
centrist political parties: Democratic Action (Acción Democrática-AD), which adheres to a
social democratic line; and its opposition, the Social Christian Party (Comité de Organización
Política Electoral Independiente-COPEI). However, since the late 1980s, a combination of
economic constrains and widespread corruption have progressively provoked the de-
legitimization of the two-party system, and third parties have started to challenge the dominance
of AD and COPEI. Other relevant parties (in terms of representation) are: Convergencia
Nacional (electoral coalition of 17 political parties founded in 1993); Causa Radical -Causa R-(
center-left party formed in 1970 but only politically significant since 1988); Movimiento al
Socialismo-MAS- (democratic socialist party founded in 1971 by dissidents of the Communist
party).  The country is politically organized as a federal republic and administratively divided
into twenty states and two federal territories (Amazonas and a federal dependency consisting of
seventy-two islands).474
Venezuela can be defined as a “petro-state,” a type-state that an analyst has defined in the
following terms,
                                                          
471Deas, op.cit., p.670
472Haggerty,Venezuela: a country study, p.xxi
473Deas, op.cit.p. 670
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“Oil is not different from gold in one respect. When minerals are the key source of wealth for a 
state, these mining revenues alter the framework for decision-making. They affect not only  the
actual policy environment of officials but also other basic aspects of the state such as the
autonomy of goal formation, the types of public institutions adopted, the prospects for building
other extractive capabilities, and the locus of authority. The manner in which a state earns a living
influences its own patterns of institutionalization. In petro-states, oil provoked changes in state
capacity are the ‘intervening variable’; they shape policy preferences...”475
As shown in the figure below, oil is the main component of the Venezuelan
economy as well as the main source of income for the Venezuelan institutional
component of the state.
Graphic 1. Oil industry as a share Venezuela’s exports; State public revenues, and Gross Domestic
Product (GDP)
Source: CIA Fact Book 1997 [On-Line], available internet http://www.cia.gov
Oil has generated a rentier state. Political elites have benefited from oil profits.
Redistribution of oil revenues and pacts based on the redistribution of these profits has been the
key to the stability of the Venezuelan long lasting “pacted democracy” or democracia pactada.
As explained by Terry Lynn Karl, this particular type of democracy established in Venezuela
was settled,
“through elite bargains and compromises during the transition from authoritarian rule. They 
[pacted democracies]  ensure their survival by selectively meeting demands while limiting the 
scope of representation in order to reassure traditional dominant classes that their vital interests 
will be respected. Because they  usually promote regime practices that are simultaneously top-
down, inclusive yet preemptive, and restrictive, they may bolster the patterns of the petro-state 
by establishing formal institutions and informal norms that limit contestation and by restricting
the policy agenda and the autonomous organizational capacity of mass actors [....] In the most
telling example, the two major political parties, Acción Democrática and COPEI, sought to keep
                                                                                                                                                                         
474Haggerty, Richard ,op.cit., p.xvi
475Karl,  Terry L., The Paradox of Plenty. Oil Booms and Petro-State, Berkeley, University of California
Press,1997, p.44 . In this book, Karl uses Venezuela as an example of a “Petro-State”.
Exports 70%
State revenue 50%
GDP 25%
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the barriers to power especially high and to guard their role as the principal means of access to the
state by sacrificing their programs and becoming machines for extracting rents from the public
arena. Together these factors encouraged the persistence of a development trajectory fueled solely
by the expenditure of petrodollars”476
The failed experience of the Trienio had been marked by the predominance of the AD and
by a lack of political compromise with other political forces. This precipitated the fall of
democracy in 1948.477
Based on the Trienio experience, in 1958, the two major political forces agreed prior to
the elections to uphold the Constitution and to direct political conflict into institutional
channels. This pact known as the Pact of Punto Fijo was also designed to marginalize the left
(the Communist Party was excluded from the Pact) by channeling all patronage through the AD
and the COPEI and by incorporating popular organizations into the two party system.478
“This document [the Pact of Punto Fijo] guaranteed that all parties would respect the electoral
process and share power in a manner commensurate with the voting results. In addition, the
parities promised to maintain a ‘prolonged political truce’ that would depersonalize debate as well
as ensure consultation among the parties. This truce, although not involving explicit quotas of
power, required the formation of coalitions and an equitable distribution of the benefits from the
state. Regardless of who won the elections, each party was guaranteed some share of the political
and economic pie through access to state jobs and contracts, a partitioning of the ministries, and a
complicated spoils system ensuring the political survival of all signatories.” 479
Complementing the Pact of Punto Fijo was another pact that concerned social and
economic issues, The Declaración de Principios y Programa Mínimo de Gobierno (Declaration
of Principles and Minimum Program of Government), by which,
                                                          
476Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, p.93
477 As explained by an analyst, “AD’s wide margin of victory (in 1946 it drew 79 percent of the vote; in
1947, 73 percent) led its leaders to believe that they could push through a highly progressive program
without considering the conservative political opposition. A new constitution was promulgated in 1947.
The party’s vigorous pursuit of ‘social justice and better conditions for the workers’[...] engendered
widespread hostility within the business community, both foreign and local.  The overhaul of  [...]
petroleum law[s] to assure the government a 50 percent tax on the oil industry’s profits intensified the
foreign oil companies’ antagonism. The junta’s aggressive campaign to expand public education and its
regulation of  both public and private education incensed the Roman Catholic Church.  The Church,
whose dominant role in education had heretofore gone unchallenged, now enlisted COPEI in a strident
antigovernment campaign [...] [the] signing of AD’s wide-ranging land reform bill in October [1948]
pitted the nation’s powerful landowners against him [newly elected president Rómulo Gallegos], and his
reduction of the military personnel in his cabinet and advocacy of a reduced military budget alienated the
armed forces. In mid-November, the UPM issued an ultimatum to the president demanding that COPEI
share political authority with AD and that Betancourt, still AD leader, be sent into exile. Gallegos refused,
and on November 24, after barely ten months in office, the military overthrew him in a nearly bloodless
coup...” See: Rudolph, James, Historical Setting, in Haggerty, op.cit., p.20
478Deas, op.cit., p.670 The URD a minor center-left party was also included in the pact.
479Karl, Terry Lynn, “Petroleum and political pacts: The transition to Democracy in Venezuela,” Latin
American Research Review, Vol. XXII, Nº 1, 1987, p.63-94
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“All parties agreed to support oil-led development, broad state jurisdiction in matters of
production and social welfare, and high protection for and subsidies to local industry. To
reassure oil companies, the Minimum Program ruled out the expropriation or the socialization of
property; although it proposed agrarian reform, it promised agrarian reform, it promised that
changes in land tenure would be based on the principle of compensation[...] The Pact of Punto
Fijo and the Minimum Program were complemented by basic agreements  between workers and
employers and between organized interests and parties [...]capitalists and organized labor
pledged, in the Worker-Employment Accord, ‘harmonious collaboration’ through  the
establishment of commissions with equal labor and capital representation They also agreed to
widespread social spending; new legislation regarding health, education, and social security; and
strict adherence  to collective bargains and the Labor Law. In order to further minimize conflict,
the leaders of the political parties created a unified labor confederation based on the proportional
representation of all parties.”480
As noted by Karl, the emerging regime could be characterized as: inclusive, since pacts covered
every sector of society and everyone could also vote in open elections;  preemptive, because it
sought to eliminate conflict between political and economic sectors; and restrictive, because
political competition was limited and monopolized by the center (that is, AD and COPEI). 481
The system worked because it was oiled by ... oil money. However, as this chapter will show
later, to quote Charles De Gaulle, these pacts “like roses and young girls lasted while they
lasted.”482
Oil profits also disguised the huge Venezuelan social disparities. Corruption and resource
mismanagement were easily hidden when oil generated huge revenues but all these advantages
disappeared as soon as oil prices dropped in the early 1980s and the effects of an irresponsibly
contracted foreign debt started to be felt.
The absence of oil money revealed the mismanagement of resources due to corrupt
policies, and the incapacity of the state to extract resources and implement policies directed to
satisfy the needs of the population. This led to a loss of legitimacy not only of the pacted
democracy but also of the traditional political parties and their leaders.
This section will concentrate on the situation of Venezuela since the late 1970s, in an
attempt to understand the situation of the country as the cocaine industry arose. This section is
also an attempt to understand why the spillover effects of enforcement against drug trafficking
in Colombia and drug trafficking-related violence from Colombia became a national security
problem to Venezuela. Weak states, no matter which of their components is weak, are
vulnerable. As we will see, Venezuela moved towards the “weak state” polar type from the end
of the 1970s, thus becoming vulnerable to the illicit drug industry.
                                                          
480Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, p.99
481Actually the Military and the Church also received guarantees . On this issue see: Karl, Petroleum and
Political  Pacts in Venezuela, p. 83
482 Actually Charles de Gaulle said “Treaties are like roses and young girls. They last while they last”.
See: Simpson’s Contemporary Quotations, compiled by James B. Simpson. 1988[on-line],available at
http:// www.bartleby.com/63/61/61.html
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b) Sociopolitical cohesion
Venezuelan society is not fragmented along linguistic or ethnic lines.  Indigenous groups
are a minority, sparsely distributed in the Amazon territories and the Guajira Peninsula. They
represent less than 1% of the population. For the scope of this dissertation, the Guajiro tribe (or
waiús) is particularly interesting. These people live in the Guajira Peninsula on the border
between Venezuela and Colombia. They do not necessarily identify with the Colombian and
Venezuelan state and have traditionally lived from smuggling activities between the two
countries. This is due above all to the depression of the traditional rural activities in this area
since the Venezuelan oil boom in the 1950s. Even if this group has never been completely
integrated into the nation-state, they are not a source of conflict or disintegration of the
Venezuelan state. They do not have secessionist aspirations and they have gradually
incorporated the Spanish language, the Catholic religion, and a way of life similar to the rest of
the population.483 Venezuela can, however, be considered a fragmented society along the lines
of welfare and social conditions. As shown in the tables below, Venezuelan society registers
huge disparities in terms of the distribution of welfare and living conditions.
Table 1. Poor Households, by Urban and Rural Areas (percentage)
Year Urban Rural Total
1970 26 62 40
1980 25 54 35
1986 30 53 37
1990 36 56 41
1994 34 55 39
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical
Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago de Chile, ECLAC, 1997.
                                                          
483On this issue see: Siqueira Wiarda, Iêda, “The society and its environment,” in Haggerty, Richard
A.,Venezuela: a Country Study, pp.48 and 49. See also: República de Venezuela, Presidencia de la
República, Comisión Nacional Contra el uso Ilícito de las Drogas (CONACUID), Drogas y Fronteras:
Consideraciones desde la Perspectiva de la Idea de Seguridad, Caracas, CONACUID, 1986, pp.7, 9 and
14.
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Table 2. Indigent Households by Urban and Rural Areas (percentage)
Year Urban Rural Total
1970 10 34 19
1980  9 28 15
1986 11 30 17
1990 13 33 18
1994 12 33 17
ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1996 edition.
Table 3. Venezuela and income distribution
1981 1987 1989 1990 1994(*)
DECILE 1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 2.5
DECILE 2 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.3 ---
DECILE 3 2.7 3.1 2.7 3.3 ---
DECILE 4 3.6 3.6 3.9 4.0 ---
DECILE 5 5.0 5.1 4.9 5.1 ---
DECILE 6 6.0 6.5 6.2 6.7 ---
DECILE 7 8.6 8.6 8.2 7.6 ---
DECILE 8 11.4 11.7 10.8 10.9 ---
DECILE 9 15.9 17.4 15.6 17.2 ---
DECILE 10 43.7 40.6 44.3 41.8 31.4
Sources: Márquez, Gustavo (compiler), Gasto Público y Distribución del Ingreso en Venezuela, Caracas,
Ediciones IESA, 1993. and ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000
edition.
(*) In urban households
The potentially destabilizing effects of these inequalities could be reduced in the time of
the oil boom era when Venezuela prospered, especially during the oil crisis in the 1970s when
Venezuela as a member of OPEC adhered to the unilateral rise of oil prices. As stated by an
analyst,
“Socially, Venezuelans benefited to a significant degree from the oil boom years of the 1970s. Per
capita income became the highest in Latin America, literacy rates climbed, and the standard of
living rose for many Venezuelans. Beneath the bright veneer, however, nagging problems festered.
Poverty persisted for many. Even for many in the middle class, the prevailing system provided an
artificial and impermanent brand of prosperity. The bloated government bureaucracy and heavily
protected domestic industries provided employment, but they also strained the resources of a
nation heavily dependent on the export of a single volatile commodity. When the bill for years of
wasteful spending came due in the 1980s and 1990s, many Venezuelans began to experience a
kind of personal privation from which they had previously considered themselves immune.”484
Redistribution and social policies were made possible by the enormous benefits flowing
from oil. However, a combination of a continuous drop in oil prices since 1983, economic
mismanagement, and a rise of the foreign debt led to the implementation of harsh economic
adjustment policies in the late 1980s. As explained by Terry Lynn Karl,
                                                          
484 Haggerty, Venezuela, a country study, p.xxi
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“[o]il prices started downward in 1983, and then plunged dramatically from $27.99 to $13.08 a
barrel between 1985 and 1986. Relieved only by a quick rise during the Iran-Iraq War in 1990,
prices showed no real prospect of recovering to the previous high level. The decline in oil prices
was the most visible expression  of a major new challenge confronting Venezuela: the demise of
the rentier model of accumulation that had been the basis of its economic prosperity and political
stability for thirty years. Thus even when oil prices and government  income plunged, government
behavior did not change: public expenditures and investment outlays did not go down […] Instead,
in a pattern reminiscent of that in Spain in the sixteenth century, public spending stayed high and
foreign debt replaced mineral rents as the preferred mechanism for smoothing over budget deficits,
institutional disarray and political tensions […] Most striking in the period covering the
administrations of COPEI´s Luis Herrera Campíns (1979-1983) and AD´s Jaime Lusinchi (1984-
1988) are the persistent efforts of governments, regardless  of party affiliation, to appease
immediate interests and postpone the profound policy changes that sooner or later had to be made.
Although throughout the 1980s distortions of all kinds were accumulating at an alarming rate, the
response to this deteriorating situation was at best, partial reforms, half measures, and perpetual
debt renegotiations.” 485
“ As [President] Pérez assumed office in 1989 amidst promises of sustained recovery and
expectations of prosperity, the economy collapsed. Price controls and artificially repressed
inflation, somehow held in check during the elections, produced a burgeoning black market,
rationing, and the most sever shortages in Venezuelan history. Foreign reserves plunged by half,
and the current account deficit reached a whooping $5.8 million. The budget deficit, which had
stood at 3 percent of GDP in 1985, shot up to 9 percent of GDP. As real wages plunged, real per
capita income barely equaled what it had been in 1973. By  1989, the number of households living
below the poverty line had increased tenfold since 1981[…] Completely hemmed in by the
country’s desperate fiscal situation, Pérez embraced neoliberal economic reforms. Immediately
following the elections, he entered into direct negotiations with the IMF, and in February 1989,
with virtually no warning to the public […] abruptly announced a package of painful market-
oriented reforms” 486
With the end of oil prosperity, the gap between the ‘have’ and ‘have not’ became
increasingly evident, and social violence erupted in the form of popular uprisings (occurred in
February 1989) and popular support for military coup attempts (as in February and November,
1992).487 As explained by an analyst,
“The [February 1989] riots in began in response to government austerity measures that included a
jump of almost 100 percent in domestic gasoline prices and 30 percent increase in public
transportation fares. In less than a week of rioting and looting, some 300 Venezuelans died and
some 1,800 were wounded. The army reinforced police forces in the capital and elsewhere in order
to restore order. The riots, which were marked by widespread looting, apparently expressed the
frustration of the Venezuelan urban poor with their lack of economic progress. The disturbances
had been preceded by a week of student demonstrations, some of which had resulted in
violence.”488
Another analyst also expressed that the social explosion of 1989 and the coups of 1992,
                                                          
485 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, pp. 162 and 163
486 ibid. pp. 179-180
487 The November coup, in particular, generated antigovernment protests, manifestations of support for
the rebels, and several riots and clashes with police in the barrios. See: Hillman, Richard, Democracy for
the Privileged. Crisis and Transition in Venezuela, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 141
488 Haggerty, National Security,  Venezuela: a country study, p.206 and 207
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“[c]onstitute ‘moments’ in the Venezuelan national conscience. According to this line of
reasoning, the 1980s destroyed the populist promise of prosperity. CAP´s [Carlos Andrés Pérez’s]
attempts to reconstruct this promise in neoliberal terms were perceived as a failure in light of
increased corruption and violence. The progressive erosion of Venezuelans’ quality of life led to a
loss of credibility in government and a crisis of legitimacy to which the Bolivarian Movement
(MB2000) [the group of officers that staged the coup attempt] responded”489
Another aspect to be considered is the fragile legitimacy of the Venezuelan political
regime.  Personal dictatorships or "caudillo" rule and brief democratic experiences interrupted
by military coups characterize the history of Venezuela as an independent nation throughout the
19th century and the first half of the 20th. This situation was overcome in 1958 through the
institutionalization of a "pacted democracy" between the two major parties, ADECO and
COPEI . These parties agreed to renounce the use of violence as a means of increasing political
competitiveness. The political left was marginalized from the pact and popular organizations
such as the trade unions where coopted into the pact as part of the political parties. The main
corporate sectors also participated in the pact. The result was a pact in which each party agreed
to maintain a common political plan, to avoid the polarization of policies, and to distribute
political posts equally between the two parties.
AD and COPEI have dominated political representation since 1958 without opening the
alternative to third options. They regularly alternated in the presidency power from 1958 to
1989, when for the first time an AD candidate, Carlos Andres Perez, replaced another AD
president, Jaime Lusinchi.
The key to the legitimacy of the Venezuelan democracy was the legitimacy of the parties.
Regime and party system became synonyms. Although this rigid bipartisanism excluded third
parties, the legitimacy of the system was possible thanks to enormous resources at the disposal
of the state from oil revenues. As long as there was enough oil income to distribute among the
signatories of the pact, including trade unions and industry, the system remained legitimate.
When the revenues ran out and the two parties could no longer satisfy societal demands, both
the traditional parties and the regime lost legitimacy.  As stated by an analyst in a study
published in the aftermath of Pérez´s resignation under charges of corruption,
                                                          
489 Hillman, Democracy for the Privileged, p. 131. According to Hillman,  in the modern era the
Venezuelan tradition of caudillistic leadership has been perpetuated within the context of limited
institutional democracy in the sense that political leaders acts as patrons who act as power brokers for
clients seeking material reward (jobs and opportunities for loyal dependent supporters). Carlos A. Pérez´s
grandiose rethoric of the 1988 presidential campaign convinced people that his election would restore the
prosperity of the 1970s. As a matter of fact Pérez had previously been president during the oil boom
period ( 1974-1979) when , thanks to oil revenue, he had implemented a populist platform based on
nationalization of  oil companies and retribution. According to Hillman, Venezuelans who voted for Pérez
because they associated him with past prosperity were disillusioned and frustrated by the austerity plans
required by the IMF economic package. In that sense Pérez´s neoliberal policies ignited social explosion
and the popular support to the coup attempts. See Hillman, op.cit., pp. 60 and 124.
178
“Venezuelans perceive crises of multiple dimensions: Confidence has been lost in the political,
economic, legal and social systems. Moreover, it does not appear that there is a widespread belief
that a democratically elected government will resolve these crises. The perceptions of one
informant are typical and revealing: ´ We Venezuelans have very little confidence in any of our
institutions. Party pacts are dominated by elites, leaders are corrupt, the courts are devoid of justice
and judges can be bought. The police are incompetent, the military is fractionalized, the
educational system is subversive, the news media are coopted, corporations are exploitative, public
administration operates on patronage and is inefficient. Palanca [leverage] rules!’ These beliefs
question performance on all levels and lead to crisis of legitimacy itself”490
Since Venezuela is an oil-rentier state, the government did not have the capacity to
extract resources from alternative sources in to meet the demands and expectations of society.
The fragile political legitimacy of the restrictive political regime is linked to the great disparities
of the Venezuelan society and the endemic and ever-present tradition of corruption in the
Venezuelan political system.491 Both corruption and poverty did combine to increase the lack
the regime legitimacy. In periods of austerity, adjustment, and economic crisis such as the post-
bonanza Venezuela of the 1980s, corruption become obvious. This situation is well explained
by Walter Little and Antonio Herrera who argued that,
“Beginning with the debt crisis of 1982 and deepening after 1985, the easy calculus that
conflicting interests could be reconciled non-antagonistically began to be eroded. As it did, so the
salience of political corruption began to rise. One does not have to be a cynic to accept that if the
‘feelgood factor’ is sufficiently widespread in society, then political corruption is unlikely to be
high on the agenda. No one in Venezuela has argued that corruption is new. Indeed, most
observers would accept that it reached unparalleled heights following the oil bonanza of 1974. Yet
since even those who did not benefit to any real degree could at least hope that they (or their
children) might benefit in the future, the question of corruption had little resonance. Venezuela
was hardly alone in its myopic belief that the good times would never end. Progressively
throughout the 1980s the structural weaknesses of the Venezuelan economy began to impinge on
employment, growth and real consumption levels. Corruption began to emerge as an issue within
the political class, but not so far as the general public was concerned […] Things did, however
change abruptly in early 1989 when Pérez´s IMF-approved stabilization plans led to mass rioting
in Caracas and the death of hundred protestors […] From then on the question ‘where has all the
money gone?’ began to be posed more and more insistently. It culminated in mid-1993 when Pérez
was obliged to resign amid charges of having misappropriated $17 million from a secret account.
The money, it is alleged, was used for both personal and political purposes.”492
                                                          
490 Hillman, op.cit.,p.161
491 Although “corruption” has been defined before in this dissertation it is worth to state here what is the
meaning of  corruption in Venezuela as officially defined by the Ley de Salvaguarda del Patrimonio
Público (Law for the Safeguard of Public Patrimony). This law defines as corrupt the following acts:
seeking illegal advantage in public administration; any unofficial act performed or not performed in
return for cash or other benefits, whether received or not; private agreements between functionaries and
others (including intermediaries) concerning contracts, services or goods that prejudice public monies;
misuse of public funds; the issuing of false documentation; influence trafficking; the illegal issue of
permits; alteration of documents; negligence or failure to support the actions of public bodies. See:
Herrera and Little, Herrera, Antonio and Little, Walter, Political Corruption in Venezuela, in Little,Walter
and Posada Carbó, Eduardo, Political Corruption in Europe and Latin America, London, McMillan,
1996,p.269
492 Herrera and Little, op.cit., pp.267 and 268.
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Political corruption, whether or not it was linked to drug trafficking, contributed to
undermining the legitimacy of the regime. It also gave the military an excuse to intervene in
politics in 1992 after a period of 34 years of political "abstention.”
“The conspirancy´s leader, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías, seemingly struck some
resonant national chords with his postcapitulation statements condemning the corruption and
indifference of the governments. Some of the residents of Caraca´s ranchos, or slums, expressed
sympathy with the rebellious soldiers. Some members of the middle class echoed those sentiments.
Just as the population at large resented perceived corruption among the government leadership and
the bureaucracy, so too did military personnel harbor bitterness toward those at the top.”493
c) Policy Capacity
The policy capacity of the Venezuelan state is directly linked to the dependence of the
national economy on the extraction and refining of oil. Because oil revenues have always been
extremely high, successive governments have never had to explore alternative sources of
revenue. Policy implementation is subject to the revenue generated by oil production and by the
taxation of oil companies. As noted by an analyst,
“In dramatic contrast to the other countries in the Western Hemisphere, which received [in the late
1970s at the time of the oil boom] an average of 14.75 percent of their tax revenues from corporate
income taxes, or to all developing countries which averaged 16.53 percent,  a full  70.3 percent of
Venezuela’s taxes were derived from corporate income taxes (essentially from the oil industry).
This arrangement permitted Venezuelans to pay strikingly less individual income tax, domestic tax
on goods and services, and tax imports than the majority of citizens in the Americas, where for
example the percentage of taxes raised from domestic taxes on goods and services alone was five
times higher. Equally as remarkable,  Venezuela’s percentage of tax revenues raised from
individual income taxes was less than half of other developing countries. But petroleum revenues,
which freed Venezuelans from normal tax burdens from their entire modern history, also served as
the excuse for repeated postponements of the tax issue and eroded an alternative tax base.”494
Once this source of revenue shrinks, as occurred in the 1980s, the easiest way for the
government to maintain the same levels of public expenditure and to keep the budget balanced
was to ask for foreign loans. This led Venezuela to have the third highest foreign debt in Latin
America and one of the highest debt services as part of its GDP.495
The drop in oil prices and increase in foreign debt significantly reduced the capacity of
the Venezuelan government to implement policies aimed at improving the standard of living for
the population and maintain control over the national territory.
Because of the oil boom, in the past the Venezuelan political elite did not care to develop
a permanent trained bureaucracy to effectively collect taxes and administrate the state.496  This
worsened the situation when the economy took a downturn. The weak capacity of the state
                                                          
493 Haggerty, Venezuela, a country study, p.xxv
494 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, p.177
495ibid., p. 172 See Chapter III for the evolution of South American countries' foreign debt services.
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aggravated problems concerning weak territorial control and the weak legitimacy of the regime.
Without resources, border patrol is more difficult, as is assuring a strong presence of security
forces in border or unpopulated areas. It also became more difficult to improve living standards
and health conditions among the population. Under these conditions, drug trafficking and
consumption were more likely to increase.
The government’s inability to deal with everyday problems contributed to a loss of
legitimacy and weakened confidence in the traditional parties and hence, the regime. The
problem was made worse by the prevalent political corruption.497
 Widespread corruption in the Venezuelan political system reduced the capacity of the
government to administer justice and enforce the law, and created opportunities for a situation
of connivance between government institutions and drug trafficking organizations.498
Moreover, as explained before, the legitimacy of political institutions is also hindered by cases
of  corruption such as  the “RECADI (Régimen de Cambio de Dinero-Currency Exchange
Office-) affair” that eventually caused Perez´s fall in 1993.499
“The president stands accused of misusing 250 million bolívars, converted through RECADI into
US$ 17.2 million at a preferential rate in 1989. Attorney General Ramón Escovar Salóm stated that ‘there
is strong evidence’ that CAP diverted the money to purposes other than national security. In an action of
unprecedented in Venezuelan history, the Supreme Court decided (by a vote of nine to six) on May 20
1993, that the president should be brought to trial. The next day presidential immunity was suspended by
the opposition-controlled, forty-nine-member Senate. Thus, CAP was indicted to stand trial as an ordinary
citizen. His entire cabinet (the seventeen-member Council of Ministers) offered their resignation […].
Pérez then resigned, despite his repeated vows to finish his term of office.[…] Some observers view the
situation as an example of lowering tolerance for corrupt civilian leadership and a triumph for the
functioning of democratic institutions, while others see the demise of Pérez as a golpe seco (nonmilitary
coup) that will do little to improve socioeconomic conditions in Venezuela.”500
The election of Hugo Chávez  as President of Venezuela in December 1998 is illustrative
here. At the forefront of  the failed coups of 1992, Chávez  later became leader of the
independent movement Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) and candidate of the electoral
coalition Polo Patriótico. His election to the presidency seems to confirm the delegitimization
of the traditional parties and the end of the “pacted democracy” (although the end was already
                                                                                                                                                                         
496 ibid. p. 178
497 On this issue see: Hillman, op.cit., p.129 and Herrera and Little, op.cit.,p.266
498 To give a striking example, in September 1987, a criminal  judge of the Supreme Court was arrested
and dismissed after he ordered the release of seven drug traffickers in return for a bribe of 10 million
bolivars. At the time, the justice minister publicly claimed knowledge of 400 other similar cases of  drug
trafficking related corruption. On this issue see: Venezuela: a country study, Washington D.C., Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress, [on-line]available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/vetoc.html
499  The RECADI oversaw the various exchange rates (there is an official exchange rate and a differential
exchange rate). Between 1983 and 1988, businessmen bribed RECADI officials in return for access to
half-priced United Dollars to funnel an alleged US$ 8 billion overseas. See:Seyler, Daniel, The Economy,
in Haggerty, op.cit.,p.86
500 Hillman,op.cit.,p.162
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near when Rafael Caldera –former COPEI president from 1968-1973- was elected president as
leader of an ad-hoc independent electoral coalition, the Convergencia). It is worth remembering,
however, that in the aftermath of the coup of 1992,
“[i]n his surrender speech just before noon, Chávez emerged as a charismatic figure whose
defiance of an increasingly unpopular regime generated widespread debate about alternative
directions for Venezuela.”501
At the time of this writing, it is still too early to determine if these new directions will be
more democratic (in terms of participation and representation) or more authoritarian.
d) Socioeconomic Development
Venezuela may have been a rich state with high rates of growth, but it was not, and still
is not, developed. In relative terms it is not developed according to the  basic indicators of
development given in chapter III. It is not developed because the economy is oil-dependent.
Until the 1970s, foreign corporations owned or managed oil extraction and refining companies..
The state virtually lived on the royalties and on taxes collected from these corporations. During
the first administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979), the companies were nationalized,
but this did not result in the utilization of oil revenues for a state-driven diversification of the
economy. Since the 1920s (when the first oil pits began to be exploited), the economy relied
more and more on oil export surplus and gradually began to import all its food products. During
the 1980s, for example, Venezuela imported 40% of its food needs. This proportion was,
however, reduced to 20% in the 1990s, thanks to the implementation of protectionist policies
that stimulated investment and management strategies in the agricultural sector. With the
exception of the development of heavy industry in the petrochemical and iron/steel and
aluminum sector, Venezuela has not developed the conditions necessary for the regeneration of
capital within the country. The economy is extremely dependent on exports and extremely
open.502
When oil prices began to fall in 1983, the growth of the economy, employment rates, and
the standards of living of the population were seriously affected. High rates of unemployment
and reductions in the public sector, mainly linked to the oil industry, provoked a rise in the
underground (informal) economy. This issue was very well analyzed by Scott MacDonald, who
argued that Venezuela become part of the illegal cocaine trade as a consequence of  “the shift in
                                                          
501 Hillman, op.cit., p. 132
502 On this issues see: Hackett, Paul, “Venezuela: Economy,” in South America Central America and the
Caribbean, Seventh Edition, London, Europa Publications, 1999, pp. 674-680 and Venezuela: a country
study, Washington D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, [on-line version]available at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/vetoc.html
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the country’s economic fortunes,” among other factors. In the late 1980s, MacDonald noticed
that,
“In the 1970s, when oil prices were high, Venezuela’s economy boomed; employment was almost
at full capacity, per capita income increased, and the middle class expanded. The country’s wealth
relative to the middle class expanded. The economy , however, was hurt by the downturn in oil
prices in 1982 the growth rate in GDP was –5.6 percent, followed by – 1.4 percent in 1984.
Although the GDP rate was positive in 1985, it was an anemic 0.4 percent. Venezuela was forced,
like most of its neighbors, to reschedule its external debt and accept austerity measures. One
confidential study estimated that low income families in 1987 spent up to 60 percent of their
budgets on food and that , with higher prices (from rising inflation during the year), the quality of
their diets deteriorated. This situation helped increase nutritional deficiencies and health problems
that had been a rarity in Venezuela. Housing also suffered: at least half of the population now lives
in shantytowns in and around urban centers and in substandard rural housing. This, when oil prices
fell, the economy contracted, and with that, the population suffered the price of adjustment […]
unemployment rose well above 10 percent. The trend in unemployment was particularly
worrisome compared with the almost full employment of the 1970s. In addition, the erosion of the
formal economy occurred in tandem with  the expansion of the informal or underground economy.
Although the informal sector included a wide range of activities such as street vendors and home
repair handymen, it also included unemployed pilots who became cocaine traffickers.”503
 The deterioration of the Venezuelan economy as a result of unfavorable oil prices is shown in
the following graphics and tables:
Graphic 2.  Value of  petroleum exports
 (constant 1985 prices, billions of Bolívares )
Source: Karl ,Terry L
Source: Karl, Terry Lynn, The Paradox of Plenty, p.258 (the rise in the value of oil exports in 1990 can be
explained by the grow in prices due to the Gulf War.
                                                          
503 MacDonald, Scott, Mountain High, White Avalanche. Cocaine and Power in the Andean States and
Panama, New York, Praeger/Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989, pp.84-85 As explained
by  Terry Lynn Karl, the rapid downward oil price spiral was provoked by the concerted affords by the
advanced industrialized countries to diminish their dependence on OPEC oil, the development of
alternative energy supplies, the flooding of the market with crude oil newly discovered in the North Sea
and Mexico, and the inability of OPEC to function as a fully effective cartel in order to stabilize a new
international oil regime that emerged after the oil booms of 1973 and 1980. See: Karl, The Paradox of
Paradox of Plenty, p.162.
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Graphic 3.  Real rate of growth of petroleum exports (percentage)
Source: Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, p.268
Table 5. Rate of unemployment
1967 5.0*
1968 3.7*
1969 5.9*
1970 7.8**
1975 6.32
1976 4.57
1978 4.19
1979 5.45
1980 5.59
1981 5.94
1982 7.37
1983 10.50
1984 13.08
1985 11.94
1986 10.05
1987 8.16
1988 6.54
1989 9.14
1990 9.57
1991 10.1**
1992 8.1**
1993 6.8**
1994 8.9**
1995 10.9**
1997 13
*over 24 years old
**Open urban unemployment
Sources: Banco Central de Venezuela / Valecillos Héctor, Estadísticas Socio-Laborales de Venezuela:
Series Históricas 1936-1990, Caracas, El Banco, 1993; ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America
and the Caribbean, various years; CIA Fact Book 1997 [On-Line], available internet http://www.cia.gov
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Graphic 4. Population employed  in the informal sector as % of the total
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Source: Banco Central de Venezuela / Valecillos Héctor, Estadísticas Socio-Laborales de Venezuela:
Series Históricas 1936-1990, Caracas, El Banco, 1993.
Weak societal development aggravated the weak political capacity of the state. More
foreign debt services, fewer resources, and the lack of export income due to a non-diversified
economy conspire against the possibility of obtaining state revenue to solve urgent social
problems.  Another aspect that could be considered a weakness of the social component of the
socioeconomic development of the state is the pre-existence of widespread patterns of marijuana
consumption as well as networks for the traffic of marijuana from Colombia and production in
Venezuelan territory for consumption in Venezuela.504 Widespread use of marijuana (a cheaper
and more accessible drug) might have influenced the shift to cocaine when the transit through
the country increased and the prices for the drug dropped. The local criminal groups adapted the
distribution patterns and routes to the new drug. 505
e) Territorial Centrality
In terms of territorial centrality in Venezuela, the figures speak for themselves. About 75
% of the population lives in only 20% of the national territory, mainly in the northern areas
(Caracas and the surrounding areas) and the Maracaibo lowlands. The north of the country
remains the social and economic heartland of the country.506
                                                          
504 Interview with Dr. Rosa del Olmo, Caracas, February 1998 and interview with Dr. Bayardo Ramírez
Monagas, head of the Venezuelan National Drug Control Commission from 1984 to 1992, Caracas,
February 1998.
505 Interview with Dr. Bayardo Ramirez Monagas, Caracas, February 1998
506See: Haggerty, Venezuela: a country study,  p. 52
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Venezuela shares a 2,050 km border with Colombia, most of which are jungle, savannas
and highlands.507 The border is porous and virtually unpatrolled in some areas such as the
Amazonas territory in the south of the country.
Particularly in the border states--Apure, Táchira and Zulia--all kinds of smuggling
(mainly food products, cigarettes and cattle from Colombia) activities have existed since
colonial times. Drug trafficking is simply a more sophisticated kind of smuggling that has
adopted the same routes and is particularly active in the area of Guajira where the local
population, the Guajiro tribe, has historically carried out smuggling activities between
Colombia and Venezuela  as part as the local economy in the area.508
Vast expanses such as the Federal territory of Amazonas and the State of Apure, both
bordering Colombia, are virtually unpopulated. The situation is the same for the Delta Amacuro
Territory and the state of Bolívar. The Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación (National Guard) is a
24,000-member force in charge of (among other functions of internal security) counter drug
activities.509 The National Guard is present throughout the territory. However, as shown by the
maps displayed in the annexes of this dissertation, the number of detachments ( the detachment
is the basic unit of the National Guard and corresponds in size to an army battalion -500 men-)
is not enough to patrol the long borders and cover the vast and scarcely populated territories
such as the states of Amazonas, Bolívar, and Apure.510 This vacuum creates an opportunity on
which drug traffickers and guerrilla groups capitalized.
All the Venezuelan states bordering with Colombia (the states of Zulia, Táchira, Apure,
and the Federal Territory of Amazonas) are in contact with Colombian departments where
guerillas and traffickers operate virtually unhindered. Another aspect of concern is that, since
the late 60s, Venezuela has been a haven for exiled members of the Sicilian Mafia. Groups like
the Cuntrera-Caruana clan established their operations in Venezuela in the 1970s as part of the
heroin traffic from Europe to the United States. The Cuntrera-Caruana families established a
trafficking circuit connecting Sicily, Canada, and Montreal. At the time, the idea was to
                                                          
507 Even if Venezuela shares a long and unpatrolled border with Brazil, this work will stress the
importance of Venezuela as a neighboring state of Colombia as a drug producing state. Brazil became a
main player in the drug trade as a transshipment route with production by local organizations for internal
consumption and  Colombian organizations' traffic going through Brazil to the United States and Europe.
This role has steadily increased since the mid 1980's. However all the trafficking routes going through
Brazil, and from Brazil, go through big Atlantic ports like Rio or Santos or through Suriname in transit to
the Netherlands, not through Venezuela. Moreover, Brazilian prospectors or garimpeiros relate the main
Venezuelan preoccupations concerning the Brazilian border:   the question of the illegal prospecting for
gold and strategic materials in the Venezuelan Amazon.
508 CONACUID, Drogas y Fronteras: Consideraciones desde la Perspectiva de la Idea de Seguridad,
pp.7, 9 and 14.
509See:“ Defensa y Fuerzas Armadas de Venezuela,” in Tecnología Militar, Nº 2, 1999, p.65 and Kurian,
George Thomas, World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems, 1989, p.470
186
introduce heroin coming from Turkey and South East Asia to the United States, via Venezuela
from the south and Canada from the north.511 As noted by an analyst,
“La branche vénézuélienne a organisé la livraison d´heroïne aux Etats-Unis par tonnes -trois par
na- en 1982, soit la moitié de la quantité totale introduite sur le territoire, selon le FBI. Elle traite
près des deux tiers de la cocaïne qui traverse le Vénézuela, ou blanchit l´argent qui provient du
trafic; à présent, quatre-vingts pour cent de la cocaïne qui sort de Colombie transite par le
Vénézuela. Elle blanchit les narcodollars tant pour les Colombiens que pour les Siciliens.”512
The mafiosi got into the new business of cocaine when the drug began to turn profits
following the rise in consumption in the USA and Europe. The expansion of the cocaine
business has been possible because of another Venezuelan weakness: widespread corruption.
Italian organized crime survived in Venezuela with the protection and "blind eye" of the
Venezuelan authorities.513
There are no local insurgent groups operating in Venezuela. Nevertheless, cross-border
operations by Colombian guerrillas are an everyday fact. 514  In particular, the FARC group is
linked to drug trafficking activities in that they obtain "protection" money from peasants and
traffickers in the bordering Colombian states. Because of the lack of state presence, such
incursions are frequent.
C- DRUG TRAFFICKING AND THREATS TO VENEZUELA
The purpose of the previous section was to explain why Venezuela became vulnerable to
the threats of the expanding drug trafficking activities in the region and why it became
threatened by the spillover consequences of enforcement and drug-related violence in Colombia.
As this dissertation has shown, in the 1980s Venezuela moved along the strong-weak state
continuum from the strong state pole to the weaker extreme. This was a consequence of the
decay of its single-product export economy. This economic decay seriously affected the state’s
legitimacy and ability to implement policies. Venezuela was already vulnerable in terms of
territorial centrality, and socially in terms of preexistent widespread patterns of drug
consumption. From 1980 and onwards, Venezuela is weaker than it was in the 60s and 70s.
                                                                                                                                                                         
510  See: Guardia Nacional, Nº 1, 1997, pp.16 and 36 and Kurian, op.cit., p. 470. The geographical
distribution of the Regional Commands and detachments of the National Guard  and the area covered by
them is displayed  in the annexes of this dissertation.
511 Sterling, Claire, La pieuvre. La mafia à la conquête du monde 1945-1989,  Paris, Éditions Robert
Laffont, 1990, p.139 (French translation of   Octopus, the Long Reach of the Sicilian Mafia, New York,
W.W. Norton, 1990)
512 Sterling, Claire,op.cit.,p.134
513 See: Sterling, op.cit.,p. 136
514 There was an upsurge of Castrist groups in the early 60s, which were defeated by the armed forces, by
1969 the armed activity of these groups had completely ceased as the political left was legalized and the
insurgents opted for electoral competition. A small urban guerrilla group called Bandera Roja (Red Flag)
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Compared to other South American states like Colombia, Peru, or Bolivia, Venezuela remains a
strong state. However, it has become vulnerable to the threats posed by the illicit drug industry.
This section will analyze how the expansion of the drug industry and the spillover from
Colombia threatened Venezuelan security. Threats will be analyzed according to the threat
typology given in Chapter I.
The analysis will concentrate on the period 1978-1994, which overlaps with the
beginning of the rise of the cocaine industry in Colombia and the period of harsher drug
trafficking-related violence and enforcement in that country. However, the analysis of the
situation after the 1980s will be considered as an epilogue to the consequences of spillover
effects from Colombia since there is evidence to suggest that, after this period, Venezuela has
become a minor producer of coca, cocaine, and opium poppy.
The country could no longer be considered only a transshipment country since the criminal
organizations based in Venezuela became minor players in the production of cocaine and
probably heroin.
a)  Traditional military threats
 Clear and Present:
 Colombia and Venezuela are a clear examples of how the spillover of drug trafficking
activities and cross-border activities of non-state armed groups linked to drug trafficking
activities can contribute to the worsening of  preexistent military threats created by territorial
disputes and competition over natural resources. The example posed in Chapter III clearly
illustrates this situation. In 1987, an attack on a Venezuelan national guard detachment by an
armed group allegedly at the service of Colombian traffickers overlapped with a military crisis
over the territorial waters in the Gulf of Venezuela, almost sparking a confrontation.
 
 “Responding to escalated violence  related to the drug trade, the Venezuelan government sent
national guard troops to search and destroy the clandestine marijuana and coca plantations in the
Sierra de Perija. In May 1987, a 32-acre drug plantation was discovered and destroyed. In July a
23-member Venezuelan national guard patrol was attacked by Colombians, leaving 18 dead
soldiers. General Marcial Rojas Agüero, the head of the National Guard’s intelligence division,
identified the attackers as ‘narco-guerrillas of Colombia’s Ejército de Liberación Nacional(ELN).
The attack on the patrol was believed to be in retaliation for the destruction of the plantation. A
year-end 1987, the Venezuelan armed forces became more active in confronting both the guerrillas
and narcotraficantes. In December 20 ELN members were captured and on January 17, 1988, 17
were killed on the Venezuelan side of the border. These violent events along the frontier helped
revive the border claims issue-which was, however not the intention.”515
 
 Since the 1980s, as enforcement increased in Colombia, coca plantations (along with the
FARC fighting fronts), and cocaine production moved towards the Venezuelan border, and
                                                                                                                                                                         
was active in minor acts of sabotage during the early 1980s, the groups have been disrupted and is
currently inactive. On this issue see: Balencie, and de la Grange, Mondes Rebelles, p.163
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skirmishes between units of the National Guard, the Venezuelan Armed forces and traffickers or
guerrilla groups based in Colombia became an everyday event.516  Kidnappings and attacks on
Venezuelan landowners by guerrilla or drug trafficker groups are also part of the problem.517
This situation is illustrated by the graphic below.
 
Graphic 5. Extortive kidnappings perpetrated in Venezuelan bordering states by Colombian guerrillas and
other armed groups (bordering states)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Col. (Army) Oswaldo D. Quijada, La violencia en Colombia y sus repercusiones en zonas
limítrofes con Venezuela (Táchira, Zulia y  Apure), May, 1994, IAEDEN, Caracas, annexes.
 
In response, the Venezuelan National Guards have carried out cross-border operations,
generating a permanent source of tension between the two nations. As noted by an analyst,
 “Venezuelans generally have tended to view Colombia as a violent and unstable country whose
problems and people washed over the border into more peaceful and prosperous Venezuela. News
of attacks on border posts, kidnappings of wealthy Venezuelan ranchers by Colombian guerrillas,
and drug seizures during transshipment have reinforced this conception.”518
 
 
This situation has worsened since coca and coca paste production increased in Colombia
due to the increase in interdiction efforts Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley.  From the beginning of
the 90s, Colombia has gradually become the second largest coca producer in the world. At the
same time, all cocaine processing is carried out in this country. Production of coca and coca
paste is carried out by peasants on the Colombian border departments of  Vichada, Vaupes, and
Arauca under the protection of the FARC. The ELN group operates in the bordering
departments of Norte de Santander and Cesar and La Guajira where the main traffic routes are
located.
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516 On this issue see: Ramírez León, op.cit, pp. 276 and 277 and 283- 283
517 ibid. p.276
518 Haggerty, National Security, p.189
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 Since 1988 (after the crisis of 1987), the two countries agreed on the need to avoid a new
military crisis over the cross-border activities of drug traffickers and guerrillas.519  As noted by
an analyst,
 
 “ Both governments moved to reduce tensions and held a meeting on January 21 [1988]. At that
meeting it was agreed that the two countries would strengthen their respective border forces. The
two governments also agreed to improve intelligence cooperation to reduce guerrilla activities and
drug trading. In addition President Lusinchi sent a message of solidarity to the Colombian people
in their struggle against the narcotraficantes and guerrillas”520
 
 
 Between 1989 and 1991, a series of treaties were signed in order to regulate bilateral
cooperation on border issues, including drug trafficking.521  A very complete and
comprehensive set of binational rules of procedure for border security issues was elaborated in
1996 to facilitate cooperation between the Venezuelan National Guard and Colombian National
Police, as well as between both countries’ armed forces.522 After the crisis in 1987, the cross
border activities of non-state actors have not been likely to cause a war between the two
countries, nevertheless they were still a source of diplomatic tension during the 1990s.523 An
article published in The Economist reported in the following terms a very illustrative example
of this border tension,
 
 “When the Venezuelan government announced on March 15th that it was sending 5,000 troops to the
lawless 2,200 kilometer […] border it shares with Colombia, and that four border states had  been
decreed a ‘theatre of operations’ eyebrows were raised. When Colombia then dispatched 6,000 men
to its side of the border and placed them on a ‘state of alert’, many more eyebrows went up. Was this
to become another Latin American war like that between Ecuador and Peru? The sudden alarm has
been followed by well-publicized visits of both countrie´s presidents to the rambling frontier.
Venezuela’s 80 year old Rafael Caldera went south to meet reinforcements at the remote Carabobo
                                                          
519 At that time it was reported that “Venezuela has called for joint action with Colombia to control the
growing activities of the Colombian drug traffickers and leftist guerrillas along and inside this country’s
western borders. Although Venezuela seems intent on avoiding a diplomatic incident because of tensions
over an unresolved territorial dispute, a senior Venezuelan official described the situation along the
border as ‘very serious’. In recent months, there has been a surge of kidnappings by Colombian guerrillas
who have held ranchers captive in Colombian territory until heavy ransoms have been paid. Several
kidnapping victims are still missing. There have also been reports of occasional incursions into the border
jungle regions of Venezuela by heavily armed columns of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
[…] At the same time, using roads and rivers, Colombian drug traffickers have begun developing
Venezuela as an important transshipment point for cocaine en route to the United States or Western
Europe. Some cocaine processing laboratories have recently been found in Venezuela.” See: Riding, Alan
“Colombian Drugs and Rebels Upset Venezuela,” The New York Times, January 20, 1988, p. A9
520 MacDonald, Mountain High, p.88
521 On this issue see: Cardona, Diego; Nasi Carlo; Obregón T., Liliana; Tickner, Arlene and Tokatlián,
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522 Interview with Col. (National Guard) Oscar José Márquez, Deputy Director of the National Counter
Drug Commission (CNA), Caracas, February 1998. Also see: Ramírez León, op.cit., p. 276
523 ibid.
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outpost on the Meta river where , on February 26th, Colombian guerrillas had killed eight Venezuelan
marines, reportedly mutilating the victims’ bodies. Carabobo, he said, was the last straw. Two days
later, Colombia’s Ernesto Samper was at the northern end of the border, checking on the welfare of
1,200 illegal but well established Colombian immigrants deported from Venezuela in the previous
week. These peasants farmers say they were threatened and their crops burnt; Venezuelan officials
say the crops at issue were poppies, for heroin, and that the farmers were guerrilla collaborators […]
The two governments had agreed on deportations. But Venezuela abruptly brought the date forward.
Colombians reckon the expulsions were a response to the Carabobo killings. […] But war is in fact
unlikely. Mr. Samper has proposed a joint force to patrol the border area; better this, he says, than
accepting pursuit across the frontier.[…] Many of Colombia’s’ guerrillas by now have been squeezed
to its far-flung corners. For Venezuela, that has meant murder, kidnappings of cattle ranchers,
common crime and, more recently, reports of guerrilla recruitment of Venezuelans.[…] Another
irritant is the cross-border flow of cocaine, lots of it, en route from Colombia’s coca plantations and
laboratories […] Venezuela’s own drug consumption and drug related crime have soared in recent
years.”524
 
 
b) Political Threats
Clear and Present threats:
• Corruption of government officials:
Because of its endemic and historical problem of political corruption and lack of control,
Venezuela has become vulnerable to cases of corruption related to drug trafficking activities at
high-ranking  levels. This problem, in addition to other serious administrative scandals
involving President Perez and his close collaborators, has harmed the legitimacy of the
Venezuelan party system and the democratic regime. In February and November 1992, Perez's
government suffered two coup attempts carried out by mid-rank army officers. The main reason
for the attempted coup was the corruption of the political class and the discontent caused by the
corruption of high-ranking officers of the armed forces, particularly cases of corruption linked
to, or direct participation in, drug trafficking activities. In fact, corruption in the high-rank
cadres of the armed forces and the political parties is widespread and has seriously contributed
to undermining the legitimacy of traditional parties that are incapable of solving the economic
crisis and carrying out effective austerity measures. As explained by an analyst,
“ Another dimension of the cocaine trade was its apparent penetration of political parties in
Venezuela, as reflected in the 1988 election campaigns. The two major presidential candidates, the
ADN´s Carlos Andrés Pérez and Copei´s (Comité de Organización Política Electoral
Independiente) Eduardo Fernández, were locked in a ‘dirty war’ over allegations that their
respective campaigns were financed by narcotraficante money. The original allegations were
made by a leading Socialist politician. José Vicente Rangel, who provided a list of names of those
involved. According to those allegations and others, an Italian Cuban smuggling organization was
assisting Pérez´s campaign, while an Italian-Canadian group was aiding Fernández. Both
Venezuelan political parties found these charges embarrassing and strongly denied such
involvement. ADN and Copei lost little time, however, in accusing each other of guilt. Pérez case
was especially delicate. The former president and candidate admitted to knowing Manuel Noriega
as well as Colombian horse-breeder Fabio Ochoa, but he denied ties to the elder Ochoa, but he
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denied any ties to the elder Ochoa´s three sons, who were accused of belonging to the Medellín
cartel.”525
Some cases of drug trafficking-related cases of corruption in the period under study are
outlined below:
Table 6. Drug trafficking related cased of corruption (1978-1994)
Political Parties : Armed Forces and security forces:
1987- Representative Hermocrates Castillo, arrested
for drug trafficking; protected by his political
immunity.
1988- Presidential candidate for COPEI, Eduardo
Fernandez. Allegedly received funding for his
campaign from the Cuntrera-Caruana Clan.
1988-President Candidate Carlos Andres Perez
accused of receiving payoffs from the Ochoa family
of Medellín cartel after interceding for the
extradition of Jorge Luis Ochoa from Spain to
Colombia, where he was liberated.
1991-  Adolfo Ramirez Torres, high-ranking
director of AD, former governor of  the Federal
District (Caracas), and former vice-minister of  the
Interior. Arrested for drug trafficking to the United
States. Lead a transnational organization.
1992-1993-Release of reports that confirmed that
President Pérez received money from the BCCI
bank (linked in worldwide money laundering
activities) for his political campaign.
1983-Ex-Navy Officer Lisardo Marquez Perez
involved in cocaine trafficking. One of the leaders
of the local drug trafficking organization known as
the “Táchira cartel.”  He was arrested in November
1984.
1983- General (Army) Italo del Valle Alliegro Ex-
Minister of Defense and ex- Commander of the
Táchira Military Garrison, allegedly facilitated
Marquez' activities and was involved in drug
trafficking activities in Marquez' organization.
Fugitive.
1985-General (Army)Pedro Maria Paz Paredes,
former head of the Army Martial Court. Arrested
leading an organization of cocaine trafficking
towards the United States.
1992-General (Army) Alexis Ramon Sanchez Paz,
former head of the Intelligence Direction of the
Army, arrested by the DEA for involvement in drug
trafficking for the "Táchira Cartel.”
1992- General (National Guard)Ramon Beningno
Guillén Dávila, Director of the Conterdrug Division
of the National Guard arrested together with a group
of national guard officers. Allegedly used his
position to divert captured cocaine towards the
United States.
Source: Azocar Alcala, Gustavo Enrique, Los Barones de la Droga: La Historia del Narcotráfico en
Venezuela, Caracas, Alfadil Ediciones, 1994, pp. 11-43 and 51-81
The list is longer, but the most representative case involves members of the Cuntrera-
Caruana Clan, a group of the Sicilian Mafia which, as explained earlier in this chapter, operated
in Venezuela for twenty-two years without interference from the Venezuelan authorities. This
"Italian connection" is particularly concerning since members of the Italian mafia established
alliances with the Cali and Medellín cartels (and their current heirs) for the transport of drugs
through Venezuelan territory to Europe. Members of the Sicilian mafia have purchased large
cattle ranches near the border with Colombia in order to disguise their activities under a legal
mask and to use the land as bases for their operations.526 The drug is hidden in cattle trucks in
order to be trafficked out of the country. Colombian traffickers followed this pattern of
territorial penetration. In this way criminal organizations are not only controlling territory but
they are also penetrating the Venezuelan economy. As explained by an analyst,
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“Plusieurs associés optèrent pour le commerce du bétail, décision à la fois stratégique et rentable.
Très souvent la cocaïne quitte la région en contrebande cachée dans le ventre des vaches, dans leur
peau ou dans les camions de bétail qui franchisent la frontiere; le bétail, en effet, sent plus fort que
la drogue (En 1987, selon le directeur du committé anti-stupéfiants du parlement vénézuelien,
quinze tonnes de cocaïne quittèrent le Vénézuela a bord de tels camions). En 1971, John Gambino
prit, avec sa femme et son cousin Erasmus, la direction d´un élevage de bétail dans l´Etat de
Barinas près de la frontière colombienne. La même année, Chichiteddu Greco et Nick Rizzuto
s´associèrent avec Gaspare Cuntrera pour monter une enorme entreprise de bétail, Ganadería Río
Zapa, toujours dans l´Etat de Barinas. Antonio Napoli acquis lui aussi un grand ranch, spécialisé
dans l´élevage, anisi que plusieurs fabriques de lait en poudre. En l´espace d´une décennie, les
investissements du groupe Cuntrera-Caruana au Vénézuela atteignirent la somme de quatre
milliards de bolivars: soit, à l´époque, un milliard de dollars.”527
Even if the their arrest was requested by Italian and Canadian authorities, the heads of the
clan managed to obtain Venezuelan citizenship and established their operations in the country at
the beginning of the 1970s. As a cover (and as a way to expand their business), they shifted into
the legal sector. The clan headed a huge holding called "Aceros Prensados" (comprised of
industries, hotels, service companies, transportation, construction, and real estate businesses)
with transnational connections.528 It was in September 1992, following strong American
pressure (the U.S. government threatened to kidnap the Cuntrera brothers and try them in a U.S.
court), that three important leaders of the clan--Paolo, Pasquale, and Gaspare Cuntrera--were
deported to Italy. Before this, they were able to remain in Venezuela under the protection of
Venezuelan authorities.529 The rest of the organization (comprised by the Caruana part of the
Clan), however, including the clan’s companies, bank accounts, and money laundering networks
remained in place and still operate in Venezuela.530
Significant threats:
• Control of the national territory by criminal organizations and  non-state armed groups:
Colombian coca growing peasants and traffickers have moved their operations to the
border with Venezuela and within Venezuela. Since the mid-80s, coca fields have been detected
in the Perijá Highlands in the state of Zulia. As stated by an analyst,
“In 1984, the drug trade’s tempo increased following the crackdown in Colombia [after the
assassination of  Lara Bonilla]. Venezuela, with its long and porous border was, an ideal new
launching point for cocaine and marijuana. And it became a major source for such production
inputs as ether and acetone, which came under government controls in Colombia.” 531
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 Also, as reported at the time by the UN´s International Drug Control Board and law
enforcement sources,
“The discovery of large coca plantations by the Venezuela National Guard in April, 1984 and
March, 1985, constitutes another significant and new element in the development of drug-related
activities in this small South American Country. The second coca plantation was found in a remote
area of the mountainous Perija region, 100 kilometers west of Maracaibo and close to the
Colombian border. These are believed to be the first such incidents of this kind.”532
“An extensive strip of coca cultivation was discovered in the middle [sic], and in the Venezuelan
portion of a mountain range on the border with Colombia.”533
According to U.S. official sources, some coca processing may have taken place in the
Perijá area.534 More recently poppy fields have been discovered in that area.  According to an
official Venezuela report, poppy plantations have been detected in the Perijá area since
1994.535  As reported by Venezuelan authorities,
“According to investigations carried out by the Law Enforcement Agencies, the Colombian cartels
have brought to our country growers trained by Burmese peasant farmers from the so-called Asian
Gold Triangle (name given to the geographical area made up by the territories of Burma, Laos and
Thailand).”536
This latter fact may be an indication that, in the future, the production of heroin could
also expand from Colombia towards Venezuela.537 As explained before in this dissertation, the
production of heroin has been growing in Colombia since the early 1990s as a response to
increase in demand in the U.S..
There is evidence of a spillover of cocaine production towards Venezuela. According to
the United Nations Drug Control Programme, cocaine laboratories have been detected in the
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territory of Amazonas and the states of Apure, Táchira, Guarico, Barinas, and Bolívar. 538
Also, as reported by a U.S. law enforcement agency,
“Unsubstantiated reporting indicates that  the Colombian drug mafias are moving drug processing
operations to Venezuela. The availability of essential chemicals in Venezuela, a shared border with
an expanse an isolated and undeveloped areas in those Venezuelan states bordering Colombia, and
a developed economic and financial system are all conditions that would lure traffickers to
Venezuela […] Drugs (primarily cocaine and increasingly, heroin) are shipped overland from
Colombia to Venezuela through a number of border crossing points. Multiton quantities of cocaine
transit and are stored temporarily in Venezuela on a monthly basis. Large shipments of cocaine are
concealed in containers of legitimate cargo and are transshipped to the United States and Europe
by air cargo and ocean vessels.[…] The Colombian drug mafia operates in Venezuela pervading
Venezuela’s financial and commercial sectors and undermining law enforcement efforts. Once
drug shipments reach Venezuela, Colombians rely on Venezuelan criminal groups to arrange
transportation to U.S. and European markets. The Cúcuta group, a border trafficking organization,
consists of Venezuelan and Colombians who provide cross-border transportation. The group also
has formed its own distribution networks in Venezuela, the United States, and Europe. The Guajira
trafficking organization-claiming turf in the Venezuelan State of Zulia- controls the key
transshipment ports of Maracaibo and Punto Fijo. They also oversee the cultivation of cannabis,
coca, and opium poppy, and handle the transshipment of drugs from the Guajira Peninsula.
Additionally, Italian organized crime, comprised of Sicilian born capos (bosses) who have married
into Venezuelan families and have acquired Venezuelan citizenship, is present in Venezuela.
These capos traffic in marijuana, cocaine, and heroin for distribution to U.S. and European
markets. They also work in concert with the Colombian drug mafias to launder illicit  profits.”539
 This confirms the fact that because of harsher and sustained enforcement measures in
Colombia, the traffickers can take advantage of the vulnerabilities of the Venezuelan state in
terms of low territorial centrality, low policy capacity (expressed above all in terms of
corruption), and low socioeconomic development and can expand their cocaine refinement
operations in Venezuela. As reported in the mid 1980s by a law enforcement agency,
“ In November 1984, Venezuelan authorities dismantled two cocaine refining laboratories in the
western part of the country, seizing approximately 400,000 litres of acetone and ether and 500
kilograms of cocaine base. Both laboratories were situated in the state of  Táchira, near the
Venezuelan/Colombian border. The first facility was located in a produce packing plant, leading
drug enforcement authorities to believe that refined cocaine was hidden inside shipments of
produce. In the second instance, the majority of the laboratory equipment had been destroyed in an
attempt to remove the evidence of an illegal operation. Various pieces of equipment, including
dryers and filters, were found together with quantities of precursor chemicals at both laboratory
sites.”540
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“Several factors account for Venezuela’s recent shift from essentially a transshipment area for
Colombian cocaine and marihuana to a more active role in terms of cultivation and processing. Its
geographic location and unprotected border with Colombia, a major source country, facilitate drug
trafficking activities. This frontier area is sparsely populated and the wilderness is conductive to
unhampered illegal activities [….] Colombia’s more stringent drug laws and renewed enforcement
have put definite pressures on surrounding countries such as Venezuela. The deteriorating
economy, high unemployment rate and inflation are conditions that make Venezuela vulnerable to
drug traffickers and may serve as incentives to increased drug-related activities […] [a]bandoned
facilities and supplies were found in 1985 which indicated multi-ton capacities for refining
cocaine”541
The case quoted above led the Venezuelan authorities to identify and partially dismantle a
local drug trafficking organization identified as the “Táchira cartel,” which allegedly worked in
association with the Cali cartel for the transshipment of cocaine produced in Colombia.542
Members of the Táchira cartel actually owned the estate where the laboratories and the chemical
inputs were found. 543
No substantiated reporting about other cases of discovery of large facilities for the
production of cocaine by Colombian organizations in Venezuelan territory were found during
this research. However, a growing number of estates located along bordering areas were being
purchased with Colombian capital of doubtful origin.544 As reported by Venezuelan
authorities,
“The Cuerpo Técnico de Policía Judicial (Technical Branch of the Judiciary Police), CTPJ,
through investigations carried out in the Subordinate Registries of the States of Barinas,
Portuguesa, Apure, Amazonas, Táchira and Zulia, has been able to detect the purchase of
Venezuelan farms with Colombian capital. Likewise, illegal bands connected with drug trafficking
and with the Colombian guerrilla are urging Venezuelan cattle breeders to sell their properties.
Kidnappings, according to investigations by Venezuelan law enforcement agencies, are connected
with this situation, which is made evident through the colorful events that take place daily on our
border, such as: abductions, ‘tolls’, use of the national logistics (roads, airplanes, vehicles) for
personal purposes.”545
We have seen before in this chapter that large estates have been also purchased by
members of Italian criminal organizations with the purpose of legitimizing illegal capital and to
have bases of support for cocaine trafficking. With the same purpose in mind, Colombian
traffickers would be expanding their operations to Venezuela though the purchase of land. The
table below gives information provided by Venezuelan law enforcement sources about the tracts
of land purchased with Colombian capital in the border area.
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Table 7. Venezuelan Farms purchased with Colombian capital
State/ Municipality Name of the Farm Hectares Price (in Bolívares)
Barinas/Obispo La Venganza 1,000 Bs. 70 million
Barinas /Obispo La Pastora 746 Bs. 14 million
Barinas/Obispo Irurteña 475 Bs. 8 million
Barinas/Barinas Palmitas Diamante 7Ha. and 107
meters
Bs. 116, 581.35
Barinas/Pedraza Agropecuaria
Las Lomas
628 Bs.600,000
Barinas/Barinas Los Manatinales (Grano
de Oro)
97 Exchanged with
vehicle and apartment
Barinas/Zamora Hato Las Maracas 2,521 Bs. 10 million
Portuguesa/Ospino Agropecuaria
El Brillante
1,000 Bs.64 million
Portuguesa/Ospino Agropecuaria
Caleros, S.A
626 Bs. 30 million
Tachira Los Laureles
Los Compadres
Los Manantiales
Los
Higuerones
Las Coloradas
El Remanso
Santa Ana
Extension not specified.
Bought in Bulk
Bs. 40 million
Source: CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, Caracas, February
1997,p. 37
As a consequence of increasing enforcement measures in Colombia, the Colombian
paramilitary groups and guerrilla groups that are linked to drug trafficking activities (FARC)
also use the Venezuelan border areas as sanctuary.546 The territorial penetration of drug
traffickers and guerrillas has been qualified as a “low intensity threat” because as non-state
actors they do not appear to have generated the capacity to match the power of the Venezuelan
law enforcement and armed forces. The Venezuelan National Guard and Judiciary Police have
been able to effectively disband drug trafficking organizations and rebuff guerrilla
incursions.547 The traffickers have not developed the power and capacity to match the state and
do not control parts of the country as has happened in Colombia and Brazil (in the case of the
organized crime in Rio de Janeiro, for example). Nevertheless, because of the impossibility of
sealing the borders, controlling all commercial traffic between Colombia and Venezuela, and
the lack of a state presence in large areas such as the Amazon Territory, cocaine production has
grown over the years and is unlikely to decrease. This trend is also exacerbated by widespread
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government corruption. The case of the Cuntrera-Caruana clan could indicate that the
Venezuelan state has voluntarily adopted an attitude of “tacit connivance” vis-a-vis organized
crime. Phil Williams has defined this attitude as a situation in which
“[t]he state lacks the power to confront organised crime and acknowledges that there are real
benefits –to the economy, to society, or to the state officials themselves- in the operations of
organised crime in and from the country. In this case, government policy tends to be limited to
denunciations of criminal activities which are primarily symbolic but help to disguise the
operational passivity of law enforcement.” 548
We have seen, in fact, that acting on their own or as front men for the Sicilian and Italian-
American mafia, the Cuntrera-Caruana clan made considerable investments in the industrial,
agrarian, and services sector.  This might have contributed to the “blind eye” policy adopted by
the successive Venezuelan governments during twenty years. Venezuelan academic Rosa del
Olmo shared the same suspicions about a possible connivance between the government and
transnational criminal organizations. She referred to the case of the recently arrested boss of the
Northern Valley cartel, Pastor Parafán. This Colombian drug trafficker was arrested in
Venezuela and then extradited to the United States in April 1997. Dr. Del Olmo, who had been
closely following the case, suspects that there was collaboration between Venezuelan officials
and Parafán because “he had spent too much time operating in Venezuela” without being
bothered by the authorities.549   This “tacit connivance” would be voluntary because, as stated
before, criminal organizations do not have the capacity to match the law enforcement agencies
of the Venezuelan state.  When the government came under U.S. pressure, it was capable of
arresting and deporting the Cuntrera brothers without fearing a retaliatory escalation of
violence.
There is also the problem of the increasing inflow of Colombian peasants fleeing police
repression, as well as paramilitary and guerrilla violence. Refugees are perceived in military and
law enforcement circles as a possible base of support for Colombian guerrilla groups and drug
trafficking organizations, mostly because the majority of these refugees settle down in border
areas like Zulia and Táchira.550
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c) Economic Threats
Clear and present threats:
“I came here because there was no other solution [no había más remedio]. The guerrillas killed
one of my brothers. Some times they use to  pass by the patio and they usually bought a chicken.
How could I say ‘no’? Because of that the police accused me of collaborating with the ones who
killed my brother. Then the paramilitaries arrived and I had to leave. This was two years ago, and I
arrived to Venezuela a year ago. I had almost six month in this finca [ranch]. If everything goes
fine I will bring my family who is in Cúcuta…”551
• Uncontrolled influx of refugees from Colombia and worsening of the illegal immigrations
situation:
Venezuela has traditionally been a magnet for immigrants from Colombia. This trend was
especially prevalent during the oil boom of the 1970s. Most Colombians were illegal
immigrants (indocutmentados), who did not have adequate documentation and permits to work
in Venezuela. They were thus subject to exploitation in terms of lower salaries and work hours.
As pointed out by an analyst,
“These indocumentados suffered exploitation and discrimination; many Venezuelans considered
them criminal elements. In reality, most crossed the border simply in search of better economic
conditions. Most of them, farm or urban laborers, came in response to the lure of salaries several
times as high as those prevailing in Colombia. Others were seasonal workers; about 15,000
reportedly entered each year to work as field hands during the harvest season. Still others entered
to take jobs on farms or in factories for a longer time, but with the intention of eventually returning
home. Most did stay, however, particularly in the northwestern states of Táchira and Zulia, where
most of the border crossing took place. Some eventually migrated farther into the country to
Maracaibo and Caracas. Maracaibo hosted the largest urban concentration of Colombian
indocumentados, who found work in the construction, petroleum and other industries.”552
 This was not considered a major problem until the oil crisis. When the economy started
to slow down in the early 80s, there was a reaction by Venezuelan trade unions and the press in
general against the indocumentados problem.553  In the early 1990s it was estimated that there
were around 500,000 to 1,000,000 Colombian illegal immigrants in Venezuela.554 Other
estimates raise this figure to 2,000,000.555 In a situation of high rates of unemployment and
recession, Venezuelans perceive this strong foreign presence as unfair competition and as a
threat to their jobs. As explained by an analyst,
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“After long years of this continuing flow of illegals –customarily estimated at more than
250,000- Venezuelan public opinion was strongly adamant. Respondents were given three
choices: (1) closing the border and deporting the illegals; (2) closing the border but ignoring the
indocumentados already present; (3) opening the border to all […] Nationally, nearly two thirds
[63%] preferred the first and toughest option; a bare 6% chose the third option –opening the
borders.”556
The enormous presence of illegal immigrants harms the state’s ability to administer the
economic crisis. Since the 1980s it has been argued--by Venezuelan authorities, academic
analysts, and the media--that the influx of illegal migrants contributed to increasing the deficit
in the provision of public services (such as health and housing), and has worsened the problem
of unemployment. 557
Although there was a marked slowdown in the Venezuelan economy at the beginning of
the 1980s, the presence of Colombians in Venezuela did not decrease.558 Because of the
extreme violence caused by the combination of drug trafficking and insurgency in rural areas,
thousands of Colombians kept crossing the Venezuelan border, this time as refugees.559 Since
the end of the Venezuelan oil boom, it is estimated that part of this movement is due to people
looking for safety and not economic progress, above all because the income in Colombia has
been higher than the average Venezuelan income since the beginning of the crisis.560
Already in 1988, the Venezuelan military warned about the imminent threat of an influx
of refugees from Colombia due to the situation of violence related to drug trafficking and
insurgency in that country. This could have created a “potentially explosive and subversive
situation” in bordering areas.561 In some zones, for example, the Colombian migrant peasants
outnumbered Venezuelans by 15 to 1.562 This concern was also shared by Venezuelan
authorities in 1994.563 It was estimated that between 1994 and 1998 approximately 20,000
people arrived to Venezuela as a direct consequence of the violence in Colombia.564 On the
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other hand, it is estimated that there is a movement of 250,000 Colombians in and out of
Venezuela every year.565 This represents, however, just two percent of the one million
internally displaced people in Colombia as a consequence of the drug trafficking and insurgency
related violence.566 Venezuelan military authorities estimate that bordering states could face a
humanitarian crisis at any moment if massive waves of refugees start arriving from
Colombia.567
• Money Laundering and distortions in the economy:
Venezuela has a weak judicial system and a banking system with established international
connections but few controls and a sophisticated business environment. It is a neighbor of
Colombia and, as explained before, the Italian organized crime is well established in
Venezuelan territory. As the Cuntrera Caruana case demonstrates, authorities usually do not ask
too many questions. It is almost logical that the Colombian traffickers would chose Venezuela
as a money-laundering haven. In fact, Venezuela has served this purpose since the beginning of
the 1980s.568 As reported,
“Due to its proximity to Colombia and the size and sophistication of its financial markets.
Venezuela has become a major drug money laundering center. Most Money laundering occurs
through exchange houses, commercial banks, the stock market, casinos, and real estate
transactions and is primarily linked to Colombia-based cocaine trafficking organizations. While
drug proceeds are controlled by Colombian or other third country nationals, the money laundering
networks primarily are Venezuelan-run. Laundering transactions generally involve the exchange of
U.S. dollars for Colombian pesos or Venezuelan bolívares . Additional intelligence suggest that
money laundering occurs through false invoicing of export and import transactions and the
growing contraband trade.”569
Venezuela does not have tight banking regulations concerning the amount of money that
can be wired out of the country or deposited in bank accounts is the exchange of foreign
currency regulated. As recognized by Venezuelan authorities,
“ [t]here are still sensible weaknesses in the evaluation of the policy against capital legitimation.
For instance, the regulation of detection procedures, the setting up of action procedures and the training
programs are left at the will of the regulated bodies, even though they are the exclusive responsibility of
authorities. This is happening to the extent that the official organizations for the control of the financial
system are unable to give a version of the evolution of the problem in recent years. Neither a Strategic
Information System nor alert indicators to monitor the problem and feed the design of policies exists […]
According to a preliminary balance, the prevention and control mechanisms show poor results and, in
some cases, they are practically nonexistent, which is a clear breach of the law. This conclusion stands
both for the Financial System Institutions, given the results of inspections of the Superintendence of
Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF), and for the regulating organizations themselves. This situation to
be even worse as concerns the control of legitimation manners other than the banking business, such as
the stock market, the real estate market, money exchange offices, etc. “Know your customer” is a correct
                                                          
565 ibid.
566 ibid.
567 Interview with Col. Marquez, supra. and also see: Cortes,op.cit., p. D/1
568 See for example RCMP, National Intelligence Drug Estimate, 1983.
569 DEA, Intelligence Bulletin: Venezuela, p.2
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approach, but it has been limited, because of the lack of specific and accurate regulations on the one hand,
and on the other, because to some extent this focus has been adopted by some banks as a mere formality
to comply with the Law. As far as regulations are concerned, this approach has been limited to
exhortations to make the best efforts to get to know the customer. Save a few exceptions, the initiatives of
banks have not been serious efforts either, beyond the manuals and brochures that repeat what is set forth
in the Law.”570
It could be argued that Venezuela is not only a transshipment state, but is also a "service
state" in the sense that it facilitates the movement and protection of illegal financial assets. As
defined by Phil Williams, service states
“[a]re those states with particular sectors-usually the financial sector-which are structured and
operated in ways that enable TCOs [transnational criminal organizations] to further their
activities, especially the movement and protection of their financial assets.571
Also as reported by Venezuelan authorities,
“In the case of Venezuela, there is a series of factors which, in recent years, have contributed
to increase the risk of drug related capital legitimation, namely:
*High exposure to contagion and movement effects from Colombia.
*High levels of informal economy and associated use of cash.
*High tax evasion.
*Structural changes in the patterns of cash use in recent years, as consequence of wrong
economic policies [...] and of the Venezuelan financial crisis itself.
*Lack of effective monitoring over short-term foreign capital flows.
*Absence of a national system of corporate accounting registry (Central Balance Office).
*Growth of organized criminal activities (car theft, kidnapping, etc.)”572
But is not only the banking system that is used to legitimize illegal money; as explained
before, large amounts of land have been purchased by Colombian and Italian members of
criminal organizations. These estates and also real estate properties are usually in big cities and
most of the time are purchased at double of the real price in order to obtain a quick legal
benefit.573 This has produced distortions in the Venezuelan economy by generating inflation in
the real estate sector.574 As explained by Venezuelan authorities,
“[r]eal estate purchase and sale and the construction industry are also used as a capital
legitimation means […] This is the balance estate purchase and sale movements through
the notary’s offices and registries of all states of the country. According to this balance,
the money flow for these operations was of the order of 12 billion dollars in 1996. This
is about 20% of the GDP. Two closely linked problems have been detected here.
                                                          
570 CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, CONACUID,Vol. I, pp. 35
and 36. Bank secrecy was eliminated in 1993 by a reform of the Venezuelan Organic Narcotics Act.
571 Williams, Phil, Transnational Organised Crime and National and International Security: A Global
Assessment, p. 26
572 CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, CONACUID, Vol.I, p.29
573 See: Briceño de Febres, Leyda, El Narcotráfico y la Sociedad Venezolana: Límites de la Legitimación
de Capitales. Su Incidencia Sobre la Economía y la Seguridad Nacional. Trabajo presentado como
requisito parcial para optar al Diploma Aprobatorio del Curso Superior de Defensa Nacional Nº XXIII,
Caracas, Instituto de Altos Estudios en Defensa Nacional (IAEDEN), May 1994, pp. 59 and 74
574 ibid.
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Because of the lack of controls and of loops in the Law, the true values of the real estate
were not declared. Partners, privately, may pay the true value. But they come to an
agreement with notary publics and registers and declare an estimated value in the
documents. The estimated value is always lower than the real value: it is declared in this
way to evade taxes. A group that is negotiating may find it cheaper to suborn a notary
with 10,000 dollars rather than paying 20,000 dollars in taxes. Therefore, the real
amount of the real estate transactions might be twice as much. And in that invisible
segment there is another problem: that might be an area suitable for money laundering
[…] It is said that when illicit money enters the construction and real estate market, the
demand and prices rocket in an unrestrained way.
In Venezuela we have observed some worrying signs in the real estate sector.
• Prices of real estate have gone up.
• There are luxury constructions that are being quoted in dollars.
• There are rents of real estate that are being quoted in dollars.
• This real estate is beyond the purchasing power of common Venezuelans,
because common Venezuelans do not have plenty of dollars.
[…] The construction market has recently show signs of recovery. This is partially due
to public works carried out by the central government or the regional governments.
Many of these works also count on international financing, from the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank, through agreements signed with the approval of
the IMF.[…] But there is something that we at the NAC [National Anti-Drug
Commission or CONACUID] are going to analyze: construction has traditionally been
an activity with an elevated level bank indebtedness. A certain boom of the commercial
construction with no bank financing attracts our attention. Where does the money of
those investors come from? Why don’t they need bank loans? All these signs seem more
than enough to suspect money laundering operations.”575
The gambling industry is also used to launder money and the proliferation of casinos and
illegal betting circuits is a recent boom in Venezuela. The amount of illegal money in
circulation through the Venezuelan banking system alone is estimated at 5 billion dollars per
year and the total amount of illegal money recycled in Venezuela is estimated at 21 billion
dollars per year.576
According to an official document of the Venezuelan government, the inflow of illegal
money harms the national economy in the sense that it causes,
“ * Inorganic (sic) increase of the monetary mass
* Inflation of costs and demand
* Distortion of national accounts
* General income of prices in goods and services
* Shifting from private investment to real estate and construction sectors
* Presence of a parallel market for the purchase and sale of foreign currencies
* Increase in the availability of monetary liquidity
* Promotion of various illegal activities as formal job
* Promotion of corruption
*International bad image of the country.”577
                                                          
575 República de Venezuela, The National Commission Against the Illicit Use of  Drugs, Venezuela,
Anti-Drugs Territory: A Commitment to Life, Speech of Carlos Tablante, Minister of State, President of
the National Commission Against the Illicit use of Drugs, Washington, D.C., CONACUID, no-date
(Carlos Tablante has been President of the CONACUID from November 1997 to February 1999, most
likely this speech took place in 1997 since it forms part of a package of public information prepared by
CONACUID that year), pp. 7-8
576 See: Briceño de Febres, op.cit., pp. 59 and 62
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All these facts occurred in a period when the government was struggling to reduce
inflation by reducing the monetary mass, balance the budget and the national accounts, and
promote legal foreign investment.
Significant threats:
٠Development of a strong illegal economy that could become dominant especially in border
areas:
As stated before, the Venezuelan economy is largely dominated by the oil extraction and
refinement sector. This situation is illustrated by the graphics bellow. Although this activity is
capital intensive and does not employ at large part of the population, the oil industry allowed the
state to develop a large public sector that created employment in government owned companies
and dependencies.
Graphic 6. Employment by sector
Source: Seyler, Daniel, The Economy, in Haggerty, Richard (ed.), op.cit., and p. 87
Since the 1930s, the Venezuelan economy became progressively oil-oriented, and by the
1950s and 60s the economy relied on the surplus of oil exports for the imports of almost all its
food. Because oil was plentiful and heavily relied upon, the development of other sectors was
not encouraged and the regions traditionally linked to agricultural activities and to intense trade
with Colombia began to decay. Economic recession became a common fact in the bordering
agricultural departments of Zulia, Tachira, and Apure. The country is still importing food
products with oil income. 578 The economic crisis caused by the drop in oil prices in the mid-
1980s, the debt crisis, and the structural adjustment policies carried out since 1989 worsened the
                                                                                                                                                                         
577 CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, pp.28 and 29
4% 13%
17%
20%
20%
26% Mining/Oil and other
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Government
Commerce
Services
204
situation in the bordering regions of Zulia, Táchira, Apure, and the country as a whole.579
Because of its proximity to Colombia and the patterns of both legal and illegal trade in the area,
the states of Táchira, Zulia, and Apure became particularly affected by the spillover activities
from Colombia resulting from the increase in enforcement activities carried out since the mid
1980's in that country.580 Cocaine production sites, storage sites of chemical inputs (Tachira
and Apure) and coca plantations (Zulia in the Perija Highlands), have been found in that border
area since 1983/84.581Allegedly, there is also intense trafficking and production in the territory
of Amazonas, the latter of which has been detected.582
As a consequence, in these areas drug trafficking has became an alternative to
unemployment and economic recession. This is in part demonstrated by the rising rates of
arrests for drug traffic in bordering states such as Tachira and Zulia vis-à-vis higher rates of
arrests for possession in the Federal District (where consumption and distribution is higher).583
Some Venezuelan landowners and members of the industrial sector have seen an opportunity to
increase their revenue through association with Colombian and Italian criminal organizations.
This has provoked a rise of sophisticated trafficking organizations.584
The illegal sector in Venezuela is not as important as in the Andean countries and, as
mentioned before in this chapter, the Venezuelan security forces have been effective in
countering the drug trafficking criminal organizations. However, the situation is not likely to
improve if the Venezuelan economy is not diversified and if the conditions to attract private
investment in the legal sector are not created.
The charts below show how the rate of people arrested for drug trafficking and drug
possession have risen since the mid-1980s. The charts also show an increase in the arrest of
Venezuelan nationals abroad. This gives an idea of an increase in the number of people that turn
to drug trafficking as an economic outlet. They also show figures of eradication of illicit crops
in Venezuelan territory. The sudden decrease in marijuana seizures could be explained by two
factors: the shift by Colombian drug traffickers from marijuana trafficking to cocaine trafficking
                                                                                                                                                                         
578See: CONACUID, Drogas y Fronteras, pp. 18-24
579 ibid. also
580 ibid.
581 On this issue see supra, section  C-“a” of this chapter. Also see: CONACUID, Drogas y Fronteras, p.
19. This document argues that due to the economic crisis of the 1980s an increasing number of people in
the border states of Zulia and Táchira started working as “mules” for the transportation of  gasoline and
kerosene (used in the production of cocaine) from Venezuela to Colombia and illegal drugs from
Colombia to Venezuela.
582 See supra., section C-“a” of this chapter.
583 On this issue see: Mayorbe, José Antonio; Sucre Heredia, Ricardo and Rolfini, Vanessa, “El Caso
Venezuela: Un Estudio de Referencia sobre Producción, Tráfico y Consumo de Drogas Ilícitas,” Caracas,
Centro Internacional de Estudios en Desarrollo y Comunicaciones (CIEDESCO), March 1993, pp. 102,
103 and 104.
584 See: supra, section C- “b” of this chapter.
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in the 1980s (already explained in Chapter IV of this dissertation), and the probability that with
the coca/cocaine boom in Colombia and the increase of cocaine trafficking through Venezuela,
the law enforcement forces might have focused their attention in coca eradication and cocaine
seizures. The decrease in coca and opium eradicated hectares for 1996 might be due to the fact
that statistics for this period did not cover the entire year at the moment of publication by the
CNA in early 1997. In any case, the fact that there has been some opium eradication in
Venezuelan territory shows that there might be also a spillover effect of heroin production
towards this country as a result of enforcement efforts in Colombia.
 Graphic 7. Venezuelans arrested abroad for drug trafficking
Source: CONACUID ,Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life. Venezuela’s Plan Against
Drug Production, Trafficking, and Consumption and Capital Legitimation, , p. 24
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 Graphic 8. Arrest for possession and traffic Min of justice and Judiciary Police
Sources: República de Venezuela, Presidencia de Venezuela, Comisión Nacional Contra el Uso Ilícito de
las Drogas (CONACUID), Aproximación Diagnóstica del Problema del Tráfico y Consumo de Drogas en
Venezuela, Caracas, January, 1993, annexes (pages not numbered) and Organization of American States,
Excecutive Secretariat of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), CICAD,
Statistical Summary 1997, Washington D.C., General Secretariat of the OAS, p.113
Graphic 9. Venezuela, eradication of illicit crops in the Perijá highlands
(in hectares)
Source: Col. (National Guard) Dávila Flores, Alfonso, La Transnacional de las Drogas y su Incidencia en
la Seguridad y la Defensa de Venezuela, Dissertation, Caracas,IAEDEN, May 1989, pp.47-48 and
CONACUID ,Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life. Venezuela’s Plan Against Drug
Production, Trafficking, and Consumption and Capital Legitimation, p.19
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Graphic 10. Eradication of  Marijuana in the Perijá highlands (hectares)
Sources: República de Venezuela, Presidencia de Venezuela, Comisión Nacional Contra el Uso Ilícito de
las Drogas (CONACUID), Aproximación Diagnóstica del Problema del Tráfico y Consumo de Drogas en
Venezuela, Caracas, January, 1993, annexes (pages not numbered) and Organization of American States,
Excecutive Secretariat of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), CICAD,
Statistical Summary 1997, Washington D.C., General Secretariat of the OAS, p.113
Graphic 11. Eradication of opium poppy in Perijá Highlands (hectares)
Source: CONACUID ,Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life. Venezuela’s Plan Against
Drug Production, Trafficking, and Consumption and Capital Legitimation, p.19
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d) Societal Threats
Clear and present threats:
As shown in the table below, increasing since the first big cocaine seizure in  September
1983:585
Table 8. Venezuela, illicit drugs seizures in kilos
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Marijuana (*) 34,619.7 3,345.1 1,703 2,472 996 2,455 8,717.7 3,243.8 526 9,989 13,685
Cocaine     378,9    862,5    366   735 2,704   2,661 1,107,9 1,852.2 1,705 5,596 5,844
Bazuco -- --   230 1,110     550   1,656 1,411.6 1,852.2 1,161 1,438    806
Heroin -- -- -- -- -- -- --            5       13     15      81
Sources: República de Venezuela, Presidencia de la República, CONACUID, Aproximación Diagnóstica
del Problema del Tráfico y Consumo de Drogas en Venezuela, annexes, Caracas, 1993 and Venezuela,
Ministry of Justice, Judiciary Police, 1997.
(*) The sudden decrease in marijuana seizures might be explained by three factors: the growing
importance in neighboring Colombia of cocaine trafficking vis-a-vis marijuana trafficking, the focus of
attention of Venezuelan law enforcement on the growing problem of cocaine trafficking, the change in
consumption preferences from marijuana to cocaine/bazuco in Venezuela.
 This increasing trafficking through Venezuela was motivated by the following factors:
• The policy of interdiction in the Caribbean by the Reagan administration, that led
the traffickers to look for alternative trafficking routes towards the U.S.
• The increase of inspections in air and surface cargo coming from Colombia.
• The pattern of enforcement in Colombia that led the traffickers to move their
operations closer to the Venezuelan border.
• The connection of the Italian organized crime in Venezuela that  facilitated
cocaine trafficking towards the U.S. and Europe.
• The rise of  Europe as a new consumption market and the high level of trade
between Venezuela with Europe.
• Venezuela’s vulnerabilities in terms of corruption, socioeconomic development
and territorial centrality.
The annual traffic through Venezuela is estimated to be about 100 to 200 metric tons per
year.586 The increase in cocaine traffic has produced a drop in the retail price of the drug, and
                                                          
585 According to some analysts and to Venezuelan official statements, the first big case involving cocaine
trafficking though Venezuela took place in September 1983 when, in a joint U.S.-Venezuelan police
operation, law enforcement officials seized 667 kilos of cocaine that were loaded in a plane that had
landed at the Charallave airport, near Caracas. The plane belonged to the Venezuelan landowner and
retired military officer Lizardo Márquez Pérez who was, in fact, one of the leaders of the so-called
“Táchira cartel,” a local drug trafficking organization that worked in association with the Cali cartel. On
this issue see: Azócar Alcalá, op.cit., p.13 and República de Venezuela, Diario de Debates de la Cámara
de Diputados, Tomo XIV, Volúmen I, Enero-Mayo 1984 (Debate records of the Venezuelan
Representatives House, January-March 1984)  Statement by Congressman Oswaldo Alvarez Paz,
Caracas, Imprenta del Congreso de la República, 1984, p.75
586 See: CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, Vol. II, p.20 and Briceño
de Febres, op.cit., p. 61
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has produced a diffusion of consumption. Even if statistics concerning consumption are lacking,
all the consulted reports affirm that, from the marijuana era in the 1970s, Venezuela passed into
an era of cocaine--and its cheaper variant bazuco (coca paste and tobacco)-- consumption.
An indirect indicator of consumption is the pattern of seizure. As shown in the table
below, the seizures of bazuco and crack have risen significantly. These cocaine variants are not
trafficked for retailing in Europe and the U.S.; rather, they are sold and consumed in Venezuela.
Thus this shows that consumption is growing in Venezuela. In the long term this poses a threat
to the integrity of the social fabric of Venezuela.  As a secondary issue, a recent study has
demonstrated the relationship between cocaine and bazuco consumption and violent crime. The
study shows that most of the people treated from wounds (including self inflicted injuries) in
emergency rooms in Caracas are either cocaine or bazuco consumers. 587
Graphic 12. Venezuela, drug seizures, 1996
(in kilograms)
Source: C.N.A, Venezuela: Anti-Drug Territory, A Commitment to life, p.18
                                                          
587 De Fuentes, Sofía Piñeiro; Medina-Orozco, Evelyn; Rojas, Maritza; “Prevalencia del consumo de
drogas en pacientes atendidos en urgencias de adultos atendidos en salas de emergencia” in Salud
Pública, Mexico, Nº 40, 1998, pp.234.240
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e) Ecological Threats
Significant threats:
• Deforestation produced by the spillover of illegal crops and pollution of river basins due to
cocaine production in the bordering country:
The main concern in Venezuela in terms of the negative ecological consequences of drug
trafficking is the deforestation caused by coca, marijuana, and poppy cultivation in the Perijá
Highlands.588 This area is a national park and, in theory, not open to exploitation. However,
coca and poppy are cultivated on a small scale in the Perijá region as Venezuela does not has a
peasant class that could produce coca or poppy on a large scale. Plantations seem to be the
product of sporadic shifts in production from Colombia to Venezuela depending on the intensity
of enforcement. Members of the Guajiro (or waiús) tribe also cultivate coca and marijuana as a
way to assure their subsistence. Nevertheless, the main activity of the waiús seems to be
smuggling of drugs, and not cultivation and processing.
As a conjecture, it is possible that there is some degree of contamination of rivers because
cocaine is produced near Colombian rivers such as the Guaviare, Meta, Vichada, Inirida, and
Guainia that form part of the Orinoco system. It is known that chemical inputs such as kerosene,
gas oil, sulfuric acid and lime are dumped in the Colombian and Venezuelan sides. In the long
term these rivers are very likely to have problems of water pollution and destruction of the
animal and vegetable life.
                                                          
588 Interview with Dr. Ramírez Monagas, Caracas, February 1998. Also see:  Lizarraga, Gillermo
(president of the CNA from 1995 to 1997), “Brazo motor de la difícil lucha contra las drogas,” Reflejos:
Organo de Información Preventivo del Delito, CONACUID, Caracas, Nº 20, 1995, pp.19-23.
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D- DRUG TRAFFICKING IN VENEZUELA’S NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA
This part of the chapter analyses the way in which drug trafficking is defined as a
problem of national security in the current legislation and by the government officials that
participate in the formulation of drug control policy. As shown in this chapter, in Venezuela the
spillover effects of enforcement against the cocaine industry in Colombia became an overt and
clear threat beginning in the early 1980s. Therefore, an analysis of the belief systems and the
representation of their cognitive maps concerning drug trafficking and the spillover effects of
drug trafficking is not needed here. The cognitive map method will be used in the case of
Argentina where, with the exception of the increase in cocaine trafficking and consumption,
most of the threats caused by the level of enforcement applied against the illicit drug industry in
Bolivia remain latent. Therefore it was necessary to analyze the belief systems of  Argentine
security and drug control officials  regarding the relationship between militarized enforcement ,
spillover consequences and national security.
In Venezuela,  The problem of drug trafficking began to be defined as a national security
problem in the 1970s and early 1980s. At the time the main concern was the trafficking of
marijuana from Colombia and its cultivation in the Venezuelan territory (Perija highlands) as a
consequence of successful eradication campaigns in Colombia. Because of this "marijuana
boom," a commission for the control of drug trafficking and consumption was created and
placed under the coordination of the General Prosecutor of the Republic.589 This  "Commission
Against Drug Abuse" (CCUID) included representatives from the Ministries of the Interior,
Defense, Education, Health and Public Welfare, Justice, and "Cordiplan" (office of public
policies coordination).
The general consensus in the commission was that drug trafficking was a criminal as well
as a public health problem; this issue was not officially defined by the CCUID as a national
security problem.590  As a matter of fact, the decree that created the CCUID did not mention
the national security issue. This document established that the creation of the CCUID was
necessary because:
“it is the duty of the State to watch for the protection of the physical and moral health of the
people” and because “The undue use of drugs constitutes a serious harm for the individual, its
family and the community”591
                                                          
589 Interview with Dr. Ramirez Monagas and Dr. Rosa del Olmo, Caracas, February 1998 and Ramirez
Monagas , Venezuela y su Politica de Estado frente al problema de las drogas, Caracas,
CONACUID,1988, 25 PP.
590 Interview with Dr. Ramírez Monagas, Caracas, February 1998.
591 Presidency of the Republic, Decree Nº 684, August 25, 1971 in Comisión Contra el Uso Indebido de
Drogas (CCUID), Informe de Actividades, Primer Período 1971-1972, Caracas, Fisccalía General  de la
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However, the representative of the armed forces to the CCUID and the armed forces
institutionally at the time considered drug trafficking as national security problem for two
reasons:
 First, growing consumption of marijuana among the recruits and professional soldiers
diminished the fighting potential of the Venezuelan troops in the event of a war against the
traditional enemy, Colombia. Drugs and drug trafficking were considered as worsening the
latent military threat posed by Colombia.592 Second, during the early 80s the Venezuelan
armed forces considered that the possibility of an alliance between drug traffickers and guerrilla
groups could led to a potential rise in the strength of guerrilla groups that could spillover into
Venezuela. A directive of the Major Joint Staff of the Venezuelan Armed forces defined drug
trafficking in the following way:
" Although drug abuse is a bio-psycho-social problem it has to be considered as within the world
geopolitical context and specially the Latin American geopolitical context, because it is a factor of
corruption and dependency that can be used as a weapon of war or as a means of subversion in
order to attempt against the national security and defense."593
However, policy makers in the area of drug control policy did not share this view. This
view was limited to the armed forces.
This situation began to change in 1983. The date is important because, at the end of the
year, the biggest cocaine shipment ever was seized in Venezuela: 667 Kg. This seizure led to the
arrest of active and retired officers of the armed forces. By November 1984, coca plantations
and laboratories for the production of cocaine were discovered at the border with Colombia. In
1983 there was also a scandal involving members of the Congress. The case of the 667 Kg.
cocaine seizure, the arrest of former Lt. Marquez Perez, along with the so-called Táchira cartel
(see previous sections) case prompted a debate in the Congress over the adoption of a narcotics
act and the reorganization of the national drug control policy agencies.594 This debate and the
adoption of new policies were initiated when Venezuela began to suffer from the spillover
consequences of enforcement in Colombia, interdiction in the Caribbean, and the consequences
of the cocaine business expansion.595
                                                                                                                                                                         
República (Office of the General Prosecutor of the Republic), 1972, p.15 (original in Spanish, my
translation).
592 Interview with Dr. Rosa del Olmo former member of the CCUID.
593 Joint Major Staff Directive Nº 41, 1981 quoted in Del Olmo,Venezuela en las relaciones
internacionales de la cocaína, in Pantoja, L. And Guridi, L., Drogas, Desarrollo y Estado de Derecho,
Universidad del Deusto, 1993, p.213
594 Interview with Rosa del Olmo and  Fernandez Escobar, Félix, Geopolítica y Drogas . Para que un
modelo?,  M.A. Thesis, Caracas, Univesidad Central de Venezuela, Facultad de Economía y Sociología,
1988, p. 14
595 Interview with Dr. Ramirez Monagas and Rosa del Olmo. Both agreed on the fact that this decision
was not motivated by American pressure.
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During the debate in Congress, drug trafficking was presented as a national security
problem and the main concerns were the expansion of production towards Venezuela and the
rampant consumption and corruption in the armed forces and the political class.596The debate
was led by two young representatives of bordering states, Tachira (Carlos Tablante) and Zulia
(Oswaldo Alvarez Paz), who introduced the debate.
"[drug trafficking] is a grave national problem that we have to face and confront. It is a problem
that goes beyond public health, is national security and defense problem and it has to be treated as
such"597
" the problem of kidnappings [in the border area] and the power of drugs ruling our western border
threaten our national security and our sovereignty"598
The result of this debate was to "awaken" projects for anti-narcotics laws that had been
dormant since 1974 and the enactment of the Narcotics Organic Law (Ley Orgánica de
Sustancias Estupefacientes-LOSEP-) on July 17, 1984. This is the first law that typifies and
punishes drug trafficking.599 Before, drug trafficking was only typified in the Criminal Code.
Through the enactment of the LOSEP act, a new drug control structure was created. The
National Commission Against Illicit Drug Use (CONACUID) is an inter-ministerial
organization directly linked to the president and led by a commissioner who holds the rank of
minister. CONACUID (referred to as C.N.A -Comisión Nacional Antidrogas- since 1997)
develops, plans, and coordinates drug consumption prevention and drug trafficking enforcement
policies. Drug trafficking control policies are followed by the security and armed forces
Judiciary Technical Police (PTJ), Intelligence Service (Disip), and the National Guard (GN).
The LOSEP act defines drug trafficking as a national security problem since it establishes
that this crime can:
" attempt against the independence or security of the Venezuelan State; its territorial integrity,
Public Powers, Organs of the State and against the social and economic development of the nation
and against the National Armed Forces" 600
The first president of the commission  (from 1984 to 1990) was Dr. Bayardo Ramirez
Monagas, who elaborated a conceptual model that has guided Venezuelan drug control policies
since 1984. This model has been called "structural-geopolitical" and considers drug trafficking
to be a state problem as well as a national security problem. In this view drug trafficking is not
                                                          
596See, República de Venezuela, Diario de Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, Tome XIV, Volume I,
January -May 1984.
597Representative Alvarez Paz, Oswaldo (COPEI) during the Congress debates of February 1984.
598 Representative Tablante , Carlos (MAS)-since 1997 he has been the head of the C.N.A (National
Counterdrug Commission) the agency is responsible for the elaboration and planning of drug control
policies, ibid.
599 In 1993 it was reformed to include money laundering as a criminal act.
600 LOSEP, art. 44.
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merely a problem of public health, nor a police matter, but rather a "multi-offensive" crime that
can harm all components of the state.601
Drug trafficking was defined a national security problem by Ramirez Monagas because,
"[i]t attempts against the national sovereignty, against the democratic institutions and the economy
[…] Is a security problem for Venezuela because it attacks a the health (sic) of the economy, the
institutions, it invades (sic) the territory , it infiltrates the state through corruption and weakens the
quality of the citizens of the nation. Moreover, because of the geopolitical situation of Venezuela
as an Andean, Amazon and Caribbean country which and a neighbor of Colombia, Brazil which is
a producer of chemical precursors and light weapons, and with the Caribbean Sea right in front of
us,  there is no doubt that it is a security problem" 602
The spillover consequences of enforcement in Colombia towards the border with
Venezuela are also considered a national security problem in official documents of CONACUID
because they challenge the authority of the state in border areas and can lead border areas to
dependency on an illegal economy.603
The fact that large extensions of land are being purchased in border areas by Colombian
capital (of dubious origin) is also cited as aggravating the traditional military threat posed by
Colombia. The purchase of land by Colombian criminal organizations is viewed as a violation
of the Venezuelan Act of Security and Defense (-Ley Orgánica de Seguridad y Defensa- the law
that considers all matters concerning -internal or external-security and defense) which forbids
non-nationals from purchasing land in bordering areas.
"Equally worrying is the breach of Article 16 of the Law of National Security and Defense which
is the ever increasing presence of foreign capital in farms located along the border on Venezuelan
territory, something which might be related to the process of legitimization of capitals proceeding
from drug trafficking and commercialization"604
The problem of drug trafficking is also defined as a national security problem by civilian
and military officials who study at the Graduate Institute of National Defense Studies (Instituto
de Altos Estudios de la Defensa Nacional, IAEDEN). The institute was created in 1970 with the
purpose of training military and civilian decision makers in the areas of national security and
defense.
All the IAEDEN dissertations consulted define drug trafficking as a national security
problem in similar terms to those in CONACUID documents.605 The flow of refugees as a
                                                          
601 For a development of the model see: CONACUID, La cuestión de las drogas en America Latina: Una
visión global, Presidencia de la República, Conacuid, Caracas, 1987, 288 p.
602 Interview with Dr. Bayardo Ramirez Monagas, Caracas, February 1998.
603 CONACUID,  Drogas y Fronteras. Consideraciones desde la Perspectiva de la Idea de Seguridad,
CONACUID, Caracas , 1986
604 C.N.A (CONACUID),  Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory. A Commitment for Life, Caracas, February
1997, p.37
605 See for example: Vargas Ríos, Luisa, Las Drogas como Problema Nacional y su incidencia en la
Seguridad y Defensa Nacional, IAEDEN, Dissertation, Caracas, August, 1979; Col. (National Guard)
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consequence of drug trafficking-related violence in Colombia is also quoted as an economic
threat with social consequences.606
How is drug trafficking viewed in Venezuela's national security agenda?
By now it is clear that drug trafficking is considered a national security problem. It is also
considered a "civil" security problem as opposed to a traditional military security problem.607
However, it is seen as a problem that reinforces and worsens other political and military threats
stemming from territorial conflicts with Colombia, such as the development of cross-border
operations by Colombian guerrillas.608 Traditional military threats stemming from territorial
and resource conflicts are placed here in order of importance:
a) the conflict with Colombia over the territorial waters (and the oil beneath
them) of the Gulf of Venezuela;
b) the conflict over the territory of Essequibo in Guyana, claimed by Venezuela;
c) the defense of the Caribbean routes of navigation;
d) the ideological and political conflict stemming from the Cuban support to
guerrilla groups and the rapprochement Guyana-Cuba (which diminished in importance after the
end of the Cold War);
e) drug trafficking;
f) the delimitation of the Amazon border with Brazil and the constant
incursions of illegal gold and strategic minerals prospectors.
In Venezuela’s national security agenda, drug trafficking as such is not considered as
relevant as possible military threats stemming from territorial or resource conflicts. However, its
importance increases when it is associated or linked as a catalyst of military or political threats
on the Colombian border.609
                                                                                                                                                                         
Dávila Flores, Omar, La Transnacional de las Drogas y su incidencia en la Seguridad y la Defensa de
Venezuela, Dissertation, IAEDEN, Caracas, May 1989; Cnel. (Army), D. Quijada, Oswaldo, op.cit.
606 See, Casturiello, Mario, La Subversión y el Tráfico de Drogas en la Frontera Venezolano-
Colombiana. Implicancias en la Seguridad y Defensa de Venezuela. Análisis Jurídico de la Situación, ,
Dissertation , IAEDEN, Caracas, May 1988.
607 Interview with Dr. Ramirez Monagas.
608 Interview wit Rosa del Olmo, Caracas February 1998 and Serbin, Andrés, Percepciones de Amenaza
y Equipamiento Militar en Venezuela, in Cruz Johnson, Rigoberto and Varas, Augusto (eds.),
Percepciones de Amenaza y Políticas de Defensa en America Latina, Santiago, FLACSO, 1993, p.289.
609 See Serbin, Andrés, op.cit.
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E - CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter analyzed the national security problematique of Venezuela in terms of the
threats posed by drug trafficking. The chapter studied both the threats stemming from
Venezuela’s vulnerability vis-à-vis drug trafficking activities in South America and from the
spillover effects of militarized enforcement in Colombia (threats that are of course reinforced by
Venezuela’s vulnerability). Other factors such as the change in the international prices of
cocaine and the rise of new consumption markets were studied as far as they affected the role of
Venezuela in the cocaine industry.
Next chapter will analyze the consequences of the utilization of militarized enforcement
as the main strategy of the Bolivian government in order to control the expansion of the illicit
drugs industry and it will show the consequences for Bolivia in terms of the reactive violence
provoked by these policies.
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CHAPTER VI:  EVOLUTION OF MILITARIZED ENFORCEMENT IN
BOLIVIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1982-1997)
“ ‘Mountain and sea’ means that it is bad to do the same thing over and over again.”610
A-INTRODUCTION
As in chapters IV and V, for the cases of Colombia and Venezuela, this chapter will
analyze the consequences of the Bolivian government’s utilization of militarized enforcement as
the main strategy to control the expansion of the illicit drugs industry. Further, it will show the
consequences for Bolivia in terms of the reactive violence provoked by these policies.
Developments in the rest of South America will be considered if they affect the Bolivian
situation and, therefore, Argentina’s security status.
In terms of transnational threats posed by the cocaine industry, Argentina is increasingly
used as a transit route for cocaine produced in the Bolivian tropics. In this chapter, the analysis
will be centered on Bolivia as the security environment of Argentina in terms of the cocaine
industry. This dissertation does not ignore the importance of Paraguay and Brazil as important
marijuana producers (Paraguay is the main source for marijuana consumed in Argentina) and
transshipment routes for cocaine, as well as countries where cocaine processing is taking place,
especially in the case of Brazil. However, when compared to Bolivia, neither in Brazil nor in
Paraguay would an increase in militarized enforcement present the same security consequences
for Argentina that will be analyzed in this and the following chapter. One reason for this is that
U.S. pressure for coca eradication and cocaine processing interdiction has been focused on the
Andean countries. Although important in U.S.-Paraguayan bilateral relations, the issue of
marijuana eradication in Paraguay is not as important for the U.S. as the issue of coca
eradication in Bolivia.611 In the absence of alternative development policies, marijuana
eradication would probably provoke an increase in illegal immigration to Argentina, thus
aggravating an  existing problem of structural unemployment and urban overpopulation.612
However, the use of aerial herbicide sprays to eradicate marijuana in Paraguay has not provoked
an escalation of violence because the small farmers who produce marijuana in Paraguay are not
organized in powerful trade unions. In that sense, there is not a powerful “marijuana peasant
                                                          
610Musashi, Miyamoto, op.cit., p.107
611Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.155 and interview with the Prefecto Principal (R)
Nelson Mandrile, National Director of Coordination for Drug Trafficking Control of Secretariat for Drug
Addiction Prevention and Fight Against Drug Trafficking (SEDRONAR) of Argentina, Buenos Aires,
July 1997.
612Interview with Prefecto Principal Mandrile (R) Nelson Mandrile, supra., footnote Nº 608
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lobby” in Paraguay.613 A spillover of marijuana production to the northeast area of Argentina
(particularly in the provinces of Misiones and Formosa) could occur.614 However, the varieties
of marijuana that grow in Argentina are not considered to be of high quality and would not lead
to the development of a “marijuana economy,” for export to the Brazilian market for
example.615Also as explained in Chapter I, because of the lack of sophistication involved in
marijuana production, this would not result in the establishment of powerful organizations with
the capacity to defy the state or corrupt local or national officials. Moreover, as will be shown in
the next chapter, the Argentine territory is sufficiently well controlled to prevent the
development of an illegal agricultural economy in that area. As far as Brazil is concerned,
cocaine production and ipadú growing (produced on a limited scale) is taking place too far away
from the Argentine border (in northwest states of Rondônia, Amazonas, Para, Pernambuco, and
Mato Grosso) to be a source of concern for Argentina.616
B- DRUG TRAFFICKING RELATED VIOLENCE IN BOLIVIA
a) Assessing the problem: underlying conditions for the rise of the coca-cocaine industry in
Bolivia and types of drug trafficking-related violence
There is an image of Bolivia as a peaceful country vis-à-vis other drug producing South
American countries plagued with problems of political violence, such as Colombia(analyzed in
chapter IV). This image has led to the use of Bolivia since the mid-1980s as a sort of
experimental field for the application of militarized drug control policies. The rationale behind
this is that since there are no active strong guerrilla groups in Bolivia, it would be easier to carry
out aggressive interdiction and eradication campaigns with the support of the armed forces or
UMOPAR, the counter drug battalion of the Bolivian National Police. As stated by one analyst,
                                                          
613As stated in a DEA report, “Most of the cannabis cultivated in Paraguay is consumed in Brazil, where
traffickers are willing to pay a premium for high-quality marijuana, in fact, is so popular in Brazil that
Brazilian traffickers occasionally contract Paraguayan peasants to cultivate cannabis plots on their behalf.
Smaller quantities are consumed locally or are sold to traffickers in Argentina,” DEA, Southern Cone
Situation Report , p.7
614ibid. and Colonel (R) Hector A. Pipet, Narcotráfico y Relaciones Internacionales, Revista de la Escuela
Superior de Guerra, January-March 1995, p.29
615See: DEA , Southern Cone Situation Report, Drug Intelligence Report, Washington D.C., 1994, p. 1
616Only after a bloody terrorist attempt (the bombing of the Jewish association AMIA) took place in
Buenos Aires in 1994 did Argentine security and intelligence agencies focus their attentionon the triple
border between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.  And even then, it was not because of the specific issue
of drug trafficking,which is intensive in that uncontrolled area. Rather, it was due to the fact that
Argentine (and U.S.) intelligence suspect that Islamic terrorists are harbored in the Paraguayan city of
Ciudad del Este. On this issue see: Der Ghougassian, Khatchick, “Old and New Sources of Weapons” in
Connecting Weapons with Violence: The South American Experience, ISS Monograph Series, Nº 25,
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“Official introduction of the Bolivian military into the drug war has been not only a self-defeating
anti-narcotics policy but, as numerous experts have already argued, this ‘institutionalised’
militarisation has created real dangers to human rights and democracy in the coup-ridden Andean
Nation. Moreover, militarisation could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, realising worst-case
scenarios of violent Bolivian narco-guerrillas and narco-terrorists, as existed in Colombia. Experts
have blithely assumed that Bolivia is different; unlike Peru or Colombia, it currently lacks the
violence of drug mafias, guerrilla insurgencies and paramilitary death squads. However, Bolivia
provides opportunities for counternarcotics and counterinsurgency strategies to foster extensive
peasant violence and popular terrorist or guerrilla insurgencies where none has previously
existed....”617
This image is clearly a myth. In terms of drug trafficking-related violence, Bolivia is a
sleeping volcano with sudden eruptions. Throughout its history Bolivia has been marked by the
absence of clearly defined political institutions, which has led to violent political practices.
Violence has been used to access political power in the form of coup d’etat; a short civil war in
1948, and an armed revolution in 1952, which opened the political participation to the
oppressed peasant and mining workers’ sectors and a massive program of land reform was
carried out. Violence has been used as a means to keep political power and to provoke political
change. Moreover, after the populist revolution of 1952, peasant and workers’ militias have
been formed and then used by several governments to counter the army or to pit against one
another. On several occasions during the 1960s and early 1970s, both the civil and military
sectors have used peasant militias in other to crush miner strikes.618 The following quotes
clearly illustrate this situation,
“The first MNR administration of President Paz Estenssoro [1952-1956], while encouraging the
mobilization of peasant unions and militias, also feared their potential independence and created
mechanisms to control peasant autonomy. Since the army was reorganized, Siles Suazo, the
second MNR president, used peasant militias against angry miners. In March 1959, some 800
armed peasants defended the government against a miners strike in the highland city of Oruro. On
the other hand, the military put down violent peasant unrest in 1957,1959 and 1960.[...]
Unfortunately for the peasant sector, the military institution had no reciprocal compunction. With
the infamous Massacre of  Tolata in January 1974, under the presidency of General Banzer, the
military ruthlessly repressed peasant protests over the low, officially controlled prices”619
“Plus qu’un pays de guerrillas, la Bolivie a surtout été le pays de prédilection des
pronunciamientos et des soulèvements populaires d’un jour. On en compte 180 dans son histoire
bicentenaire, c’est a dire un governement tous les neuf mois[...] La révolution de 1952 amène le
MNR au pouvoir. Paz Estenssoro réalise d’importantes réformes: nationalisation des mines et
création de COMIBOL [national owned mines] réforme agraire, création des milices de paysans et
                                                                                                                                                                         
May 1998, p. 14 and OGD, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1997-98, [On line, pdf version]. Available
internet http://www.ogd.org/rapport, pp. 197-200
617Queiser Morales, Waltraud, “ Militarising the drug war in Bolivia,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13,
Nº 2, 1992, p.353
618For an elaborated study on these aspects see: Queiser Morales, Waltraud, Bolivia Land of
Struggle,Boulder, Westview Press,1992, pp. 80-83.; Dunkerley, James, Rebellion in the Veins,Political
Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982, London, Verso Editions, 1984, 385pp. and Lavaud, Jean-Pierre,
L’inestabilité Politique de l’Amérique Latine. Le cas de la Bolivie, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1991,287pp.
619Queiser Morales, Militarising the drug war in Bolivia,p. 360
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d’ouvriers. Ainsi donc la Bolivie connaît des tempêtes brèves mais violentes, mais pas de
mouvement de guerrilla”620
This is to show that in the apparently “peaceful” Bolivia there is already a tradition of
armed peasant mobilization and political violence. With the upsurge of the coca-cocaine
problem in the 1980s, this tradition of peasant mobilization can turn into a situation
characterized by radical grassroot armed peasant resistance. However instead of being created
from the top, coca-growing trade unions were created from the bottom in order to resist the
militarized enforcement policies.
One difference with Colombia is that instead of a protracted situation of civil war in
Bolivia, highs of violence are followed by periods of relative social peace. Another difference
with Colombia is that Bolivia never developed the conditions for the rise of guerrilla
movements with the capacity to match the power of the state.
It is also a myth to consider Bolivia as a peaceful country in terms of the violence
generated by the cocaine industry vis-à-vis Colombia. Bolivia does not have a history of
protracted escalation of violence between drug “cartels,” as in Colombia, nor does Bolivia have
the same type of interaction between local or foreign guerrilla groups and the cocaine industry.
However, as shown in Chapter II, it is important to note  that between 1980 and 1981, the
interest of the Bolivian military and the drug traffickers colluded to carry out a coup d’etat and
organized a military regime whose members participated in the cocaine trade. Moreover the
military junta based its power on paramilitary groups at the service of drug trafficking
organizations. As in the case of the political violence, this experience on a limited time-frame. It
is not likely to be repeated because of the resistance of the armed forces to get involved in these
kinds of activities, and because Bolivia is heavily dependent on outside countries.  Therefore,
international pressure, as in the past, would not allow such a regime to subsist. This to say that
the fact that drug trafficking-related violence happened only once for a short period of time does
not necessarily mean that Bolivia is a “peaceful” country. The potential for drug trafficking-
related violence exists not only in terms of possible vertical violence between the government
and drug trafficking organizations but, as will be shown, between the government and the very
well organized coca-growing peasant unions. This problem will be analyzed in detail in the
following sections of this chapter.
What is certainly absent in Bolivia is the protracted “war of drugs” dynamics we have
seen in Colombia. Drug trafficking-related violence manifests itself in “highs” followed by
“lows” of activity. In the case of Bolivia it is possible to add six additional types of violence to
the drug trafficking-related violence typology developed in chapter IV: four on the downstream
                                                          
620Gandolfi, Alain, Les Luttes Armées en Amérique Latine, pp. 86 and 87
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side of the industry (the traffickers), and two on the upstream side of the industry (the coca
growing peasants).
As illustrated in Chapter III, on two occasions, violence was used against elected civilian
governments by a faction of the military allied with drug traffickers (1980), and by corrupted
members of the police against President Siles Suazo (1984). One manifestation of violence
resulted in a coup d’etat and the establishment of a “narcocracy” (1980-1981); the other resulted
in a failed coup and the temporary kidnapping of president Siles Suazo by UMOPAR officers
investigated for corruption.
When an “objective convergence of interests” exists between right-wing putchist military
officers and drug traffickers, and when the resulting coup is beneficial for this group, one may
speak of a “political power-seeking preemptive violence.”621 In fact, part of the traffickers’
support of García Meza’s clique was a preemptive movement against possible enforcement
measures to control the steadily growing cocaine business in Bolivia.622 In the case of the
UMOPAR, on the other hand, this was a preemptive coup in which the main group was
composed of corrupted police officers attempting to avoid judiciary measures against them. This
type will be called “inner system corruption related violence.” Corrupted police officials can
exert violence against other agents of the state carrying out counter drug activities. These are, in
my view, extreme cases of drug trafficking-related violence and represent the apotheosis of
political threats to the state stemming from the cocaine industry. True, Bolivia is less violent
than Colombia if one were to look at the number of people killed in drug trafficking-related
acts, but it cannot by any means be considered a “peaceful” country.
Violence in Bolivia is related to the upstream side of the cocaine industry (the coca
growing peasants) since this country is labor-intensive and linked to the industry as a coca and
coca paste center. Other types of drug trafficking-related violence emerged once Bolivia began
to occupy an important place as a cocaine producer country. The table below displays the six
drug trafficking-related violence types to be added to the typology elaborated in Chapter IV.
                                                          
621I owe the expression “objective convergence of interests” to Dr. Dante Caputo, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Argentina from 1983-1989. Dr. Caputo used this expression in general terms to refer to a
situation where players who do not necessarily share permanent interests and goals act together over a
punctual matter when a common interest is at stake. Interview with Dr. Caputo. Buenos Aires, July 1997.
622 On this issue see: McDonald, Dancing on a Volcano, p.55. McDonald explains that Bolivian drug
traffickers colluded with the military to stage the coup because they felt threatened by a brief campaign
against drug trafficking carried out during 1979, and they were wary of ongoing U.S. pressure to curtail
the drug trade.
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Table 1. Drug trafficking related violence in upstream producer countries
PERPETRATOR: MOTIVATION: METROPOLITAN
AREAS:
RURAL AREAS:
Drug traffickers &
Military officers
Seize political power Political power seeking
urban (victims: political
leaders and candidates ,
trade union leaders,
journalists, judges,
prosecutors)
Political power seeking
rural
(victims: peasant
leaders, peasant
population)
Corrupted police or
military personnel
Preemptive Inner system corruption
related urban violence
(victims: political
leaders and members of
the three powers of the
state)
Inner system corruption
related rural violence
(victims: fellow police
officers, military
personnel, judges and
prosecutors, political
leaders)
Coca growing peasants Preemptive Upstream preemptive
urban (victims: agents of
the state,“cooperative”
peasants
Upstream preemptive
rural (victims: agents of
the state, “cooperative”
peasants)
Coca growing peasants Reaction/defense of coca
fields
Upstream reactive urban
(victims: agents of the
state, “cooperative”
peasants)
Upstream reactive rural
(victims: agents of the
state, “cooperative”
peasants)
The indicators listed below can be used in order to identify cases of drug trafficking-
related violence and measure the extent of trafficking in an “upstream” or labor intensive drug
producer country. Although these indicators are not accurately measured in this work, it is
possible to identify them in the analysis presented in the next sections of this chapter.
• Armed attacks against police/military patrols or eradication teams by armed coca
growing peasants or guerrilla groups.
• Roadblocks by armed coca-growing peasants.
• Attacks against police/military patrols by paramilitary groups at the service of drug
traffickers.
• Assassinations of political candidates and leaders by drug traffickers.
• Assassinations of coca growing trade union leaders by drug traffickers.
• Organization of peasant self-defense groups (grupos de autodefensa).
• Organization of paramilitary groups at the service of drug traffickers.
• Kidnappings of relatives of drug trafficking bosses (claimed by rival drug traffickers).
• Attempts against drug trafficking bosses and cocaine processing facilities (claimed by
rival drug traffickers)
As stated earlier in this chapter, Bolivia did not suffer the kind of protracted drug
trafficking-related violence that we have seen in Colombia. Moreover, more than a spiral of
violence in Bolivia, we have a succession of high levels of violence provoked by enforcement
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policies followed by a de-escalation brought about by a step back of the government faced with
the threat of violence from the coca growing peasants or the traffickers. Bolivia is faced with a
non-outlet dilemma: A large part of its population is involved in coca growing and coca paste
production. This population is organized into trade unions or federations. Under North
American pressure, a big component of law enforcement is oriented to coca-eradication. The
result is a vicious circle of law enforcement and peasant reactive and preemptive violence which
begun in the mid-1980s.
When Bolivia became a cocaine producer country in the early 90s there were some cases
of reactive violence from the drug traffickers. This time the government preemptively moved à
la Cesar Gaviria in Colombia with a policy of voluntary surrender in exchange for
imprisonment in Bolivia. With this move the government expected to avoid a new dimension of
violence marked by a war between the state and the traffickers as had happened in Colombia.
The figure below shows the population employed in the different stages of cocaine
production in Bolivia as well as some comparative figures on the coca growing sector and the
legal economy. These figures give an idea of the labor-intensive nature of the cocaine industry
in Bolivia as well as the importance of the illegal economy in that country.
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Figure 1. Bolivia: Population employed in coca and cocaine production
150
Drug trafficking networks
500
Cocaine merchants and producers
25,000
Traffic of coca paste and chemical inputs
30,000
Producers of coca paste
 70,000
Coca leaves producers
175,000
Floating population
(temporary workers in the Chapare region)
Source: Sistema Educativo Antidrogas y de Movilización (SEAMOS), Datos y Cifras: Selección de
Cuadros Estadísticos de los Temas Hoja de Coca, Narcotráfico, Uso Indebido de Drogas, Desarrollo
Alternativo, Niños y Juventud. Dossier Hemerográfico, La Paz, SEAMOS, Centro de Información,
1996,p.16
The next sections of this chapter analyze the evolution of drug trafficking control policies
from 1982 to 1997. The dissertation analyzes this period under because it overlaps with the
coca-cocaine boom in Bolivia following a rise in demand in the  U.S. in the late 1970s.  Also in
this period, a series of problems in the legal side of the Bolivian economy led a massive
migration of unemployed peasants to the Chapare region to work in the coca-cocaine industry.
These cojunctural “push factors” of the coca-cocaine boom included a sustained drought in
1983-1984 in central and southern parts of the country (the drought was produced by the “El
Niño” sea stream) and the virtual collapse of the economy due to the drop in tin prices.623 As
explained by The Economist,
“The glittering years came to an abrupt halt in October 1985, when the London Metal Exchange
halved the price of tin almost overnight. The 22-nation International Tin Council announced that it
was bankrupt and could no longer support the price for buying-in excess stock in the market. From
$8,000 per tonne, the price fell to $3,400 by May 1986. The consequences for Bolivian miners
were grim. Bolivian tin was, and is, expensive to produce. The state mining company, Comibol,
sacked 16,000 of its 27,000 workers in a year. […] the number at work has inexorably shrunk to
under 2,000, as one mine after another has closed […] After the shrinkage of the industry in the
                                                          
623Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p.6
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mid-1980s, many of the miners left their highland homes, encouraged by government resettlement
programmes, to become farmers in the tropical Chapare lowlands, east of the Andes. Many of
them have since switched from food crops to the more profitable coca, to supply South America’s
burgeoning cocaine business. But now, having seen their old industry closed under their feet, they
find the government, under pressure from the United States, eager to close their new one too.”624
These conditions were aggravated by a series of economic adjustment policies
implemented since 1986 to address the economic crisis. The neoliberal strategies to reduce the
public sector further aggravated the growing problem of unemployment.625 As explained by
two analysts,
“In the early to mid 1980s, with the tin metals and natural gas markets in a precipitous decline, its
economy [Bolivian] virtually collapsed with the GNP failing 20 percent and per capita income
declining 30 percent, as 20 percent and per capita income declining 30 percent, as 20 thousand tin
miners were laid off in late 1985 due to the closing down of state run mines. Unemployment
doubled to 20 percent of Bolivia’s 1.7 million person labor force. Exports fell some 25 percent
between 1984 and 1985 and inflation literally spiraled out of control [...]”626
“The boom in the demand from abroad for cocaine coincided with Bolivia’s worst economic
slump in the century, caused essentially by government mismanagement but compounded by
falling commodity prices and growing debt service payments. The crisis started in the early 1980s
and was hardly resolved by the beginning of the next decade.”627
Because of its non diversified economy and its dependency on foreign aid, Bolivia is
more is prone to bend to U.S. pressure to elaborate and implement drug control policies. Bolivia
is a very good example of an underdeveloped and dependent country. The socio-economic
development of Bolivia is extremely low. As shown in the table below, together with Paraguay,
Peru, and Haiti, Bolivia is one of the poorest countries not only in South America, but also in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
                                                          
624 “Tin Soldiers,” The Economist, January 9, 1999, p.50
625 Centro de Documentación e Información-Bolivia (CEDIB), “La Absurda Guerra de la Coca” in Albó,
Xavier and Barrios, Raúl (eds.), Violencias Encubiertas en Bolivia, Volume 2, La Paz, CIPCA-Aruwiry,
1993, p.44
626Menzel, Sewall H., Fire in the Andes: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cocaine Politics in Bolivia and Peru,
Lanham, Maryland, University Press of America, 1996, p.1
627Painter, Bolivia and Coca , p.6
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 Table 2. Comparative Indices of Human Development (1994)
Bolivia Paraguay Peru Haiti
Per Capita GNP
U.S.$ (1991)
217.0 3,240.0 3,110.0 925.0
Life Expectancy at
Birth
60.5 67.2 63.6 56.0
Adult Literacy
Rate
79.3 90.8 86.2 55.0
Public Expenditure
in Education as a
% of GDP
2.4 1.0 3.5 1.8
Infant Mortality
Rate (per thousand
born alive)
86.0 47.0 77.0 87.0
Total Population
with access to
water (1988-91)
52.0 36.0 56.0 39.0
UNDP-Human Development Report 1994, quoted in UNDCP, La Paz Bolivia, Update 1994 Annual
Country Report, p.2
At the same time, its key economic sectors in the economy (primarily mining and
hydrocarbons) are severely affected by the continuous deterioration of the terms of trade mainly
due to price collapses of minerals, including tin and natural gas. The weak socioeconomic
development aggravates the state’s inability to extract resources and apply policies.628 This
makes Bolivia very vulnerable to external pressure when it comes to defining and implementing
its drug control policies. Since the early 1980s, successive Bolivian governments have been
trapped in a vicious cycle that can be illustrated in the following way (these steps follow
chronological evolution):
1. The U.S. government pressures for immediate results in terms of coca eradication;
2.The Bolivian government opts for forced eradication;      3. The coca growing peasants
organize themselves and put up resistance;    4. The government promises alternative
development programs (with U.S. aid) and offers an amount of money (usually $2,000 to
$2,500) per hectare eradicated;629          5.The U.S. government conditionally provides
economic aid for alternative development programs upon fulfillment of eradication goals, and
when the eradication goals are not fulfilled the support is withdrawn;
                                                          
628As reported, “Public Investments have been misallocated and inefficient. Although increasing in recent
years, over the long term- public investment in infrastructure and human capital has been negligible. In
the last years public investments was about nine percent of GDP and approximately 20 percent of public
expenditure as a whole.[...] The main problems of Bolivian economy persists: a)strongly negative
commercial balance and b) fragile fiscal position [...]The fiscal deficit has been financed in 1992 and
1993 through increasing external borrowing. In 1994 the fiscal position remains fragile, mainly because
of higher than budgeted payments. The fiscal position remains fragile, mainly because of higher than
budgeted payments. The 12 months fiscal deficit has been estimated at 4.5 percent of GDP as of
September 1994 and is projected to be 3.3 percent of GDP at the end of the year. These deficit levels are
not sustainable and may jeopardize macroeconomic stability” See: UNDCP La Paz Bolivia, Update 1994
Annual Country Report, Bolivia, p.9
629This policy of voluntary eradication began to be implemented in 1986.
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6.The coca growing peasants receive the $2,000/$2,500, and in the absence of access to
potential markets for alternative products and the existence of commercial barriers they use the
money and emigrate to other areas in order to restart coca production;         7. Taking U.S.
advice, the Bolivian government opts for a change of strategy and increases actions against
cocaine production installations;         8.The peasants occupied in coca paste production react
violently against the government in order to defend their source of employment (and
subsistence) and indirectly the traffickers gain support from the peasantry;630        9. The latter
factor is aggravated by the U.S. pressure for the intervention of the Bolivian Army in
interdiction and eradication activities;         10. The coca-growing peasants threaten  armed
resistance in order to prevent the entry of the army in the Chapare region. 631
This cycle is also reinforced by sporadic government failures to pay the promised
$2,000/$2,500 dollars for eradicated areas or the lack of fulfillment of alternative development
plans. This aggravates the unwillingness of the peasants to eradicate voluntarily, and the
government attempts forced eradication. This situation causes and still is causing a series of
clashes between the peasants and police and military units in the Chapare, the Beni, and the
Bolivian East (Oriente Boliviano).
Compared to other the South American countries, Bolivia can be considered as the
paradigmatic case of a weak state. To the low socioeconomic development and the lack of
policy capacity must be added a weak nature in all the characteristics of the attributes of the
state as defined in Chapter II. Bolivia is a country with a very weak sociopolitical cohesion.
Bolivia has a highly unstable political history. The country has have more coups d’etat than
years of independence. Until 1952, the history of Bolivia is a succession of personalistic
military dictatorships and oligarchic restrictive democratic governments that excluded the
participation of an oppressed and exploited Indian majority. In 1952 the Movimiento
Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, MNR), opened political
participation to the peasant masses and carried out significant land reforms. Political
participation came in the form of clientelistic relationships with MNR bosses and peasant
militias created from above and miner trade unions. In Bolivia, the institutionalization of the
MNR as an hegemonic party, much like the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) in
Mexico, was frustrated by a new wave of military coups that ended in 1982. Since then,
                                                          
630As stated by one analyst “Such [interdiction] operations, usually costing tens of thousands of dollars,
have provoked considerable opposition for the local population, in part due to the participation of the
DEA, in part due to the frequent abuses stemming from the heavy-handed manner in which the antidrug
forces treat local people and in part because of the perceived threat to the local economy...”See: Painter,
op.cit., p. 83
631As explained by one analyst, “In June 1991, the Inter-American Commission on Drug Policy, made up
of a distinguished panel of Latin American and U.S. experts, argued in a report that the policy of paying
US$ 2,000 a hectare in compensation ‘has actually the effect of sustaining the income of coca growers
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Bolivia’s path to democracy has been considered a process of consolidation. However, even if
the democratic mechanisms for elections and exercise of power are respected, the Indian
population, which constitutes 60% of the population along three main ethnic groups  (Quechua,
Aymara and Guaraní), continue to be socially and politically excluded. 632
Most of the Indian population hardly speaks any Spanish. They communicate in either
Aymara or Quechua. State institutions are not fully recognized in zones like Chapare, the Beni,
Pando, and the Oriente (near the Brazilian border in the east). On a visit to Bolivia I was
surprised by the fact that during the week of national independence day (August 6), it is
compulsory for people to display the Bolivian colors; not doing so is punishable by a fine.
During my visit to the Chapare, every farm flew the Bolivian flag and the majority of the people
did so because they where afraid of getting una multa de la Alcaldía ( a fine from the Mayor’s
Office). In my view, this “compulsory patriotism” shows how far Bolivia is from achieving its
consolidation as a nation state. People do not necessarily identify with the state simply because
the state is not present. For a long time this was the case in the Chapare. But the situation is
improving now thanks to infrastructure work done by USAID and UNDCP that allow state
institutions (schools, police, and health systems) settle in the area. It is still the case in huge
areas such as the Beni and Pando, as well as areas of the Santa Cruz department where state
institutions are still a very vague concept for the people living there. This vacuum led to a
situation in which plantation owners and cattle ranchers replaced the role of the state in
providing basic services. Most of the Beni and Santa Cruz ranchers later became part of the
cocaine bourgeoisie in the early 1980s. This has led to a situation in which organized crime
replaces the state and controls a portion of the territory, thus hindering the territorial centrality
of the state. The situation is different in the coca growing area of Chapare in the Department of
Cochabamba. In this region the cocaleros, or coca-growing peasants, are highly organized into
federations of sindicatos (trade unions). The basic unit of the federación (federation) is the
sindicato. The sindicato organizes the settling of a colony or peasant community, provides basic
services, and even administers local justice through a system of corregidores. These trade
unions compete with the government as a source of authority. In the absence of legitimate
institutions and a broadly accepted “idea of the state,” it not surprising that the coca growing
peasants see the enforcement policies of the Bolivian state as hostile acts coming from an
hostile external actor. The government is not perceived as the proper actor, present in order to
                                                                                                                                                                         
and thereby keeping them in the coca-growing business rather, than moving them into licit
pursuits...”Painter, op.cit, p.89
632The country has the following ethnic composition: Quechua, 30 percent; Aymara, 25 percent; mixed,
25 to 30 percent; and whites (blanco), 5 to 15 percent.and lowlands Indians numbering around 100,000 in
early 1980s, divided into nine major linguistic groups and nearly thirty subgroups. See: Hudson, Rex and
Hanratty, Dennis, Bolivia: a country study, Washington D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress, 1991 [On-line version], available http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.bo
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insure law and order; rather it is seen as a strange player subordinated to foreign interests (U.S.)
whose role is to destroy the peasants’ means of survival.
All these factors have contributed to the rise of a coca-cocaine complex in Bolivia and are
at the source of reactive violence to militarized enforcement policies.
As stated before, this chapter will analyze the evolution of the militarization of drug
control policies in the Bolivian democratic period from 1982-1997. This period was chosen
because the cojunctural push factors of the coca-cocaine boom all came together at the
beginning of this period. It is really difficult to speak of drug control policies (this does not
mean that there was not a veneer of drug control policies in order to keep the U.S. content) from
1971 to 1982 because the military rulers of Bolivia were either directly or indirectly related to
the drug trade. However, the period from 1971-82 will be studied as the prolegomenon of all the
events that took place after that period. Moreover, as the next sections will show, even if the
military rulers were direct participants in the drug trade, this activity provoked a certain degree
of violence that eventually came to threaten the military institution and the integrity of the state
as itself. On the other hand the period 1995-1997, that is the second half of the Sanchez de
Lozada presidency, will be studied as an epilogue to the militarization of drug trafficking
control policies.  This is because my study concerning Argentina as a neighbor country of
Bolivia ends in 1995, with the end President Menem’s first administration.
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C- MILITARIZED ENFORCEMENT, DRUG TRAFFICKING RELATED VIOLENCE
AND SPILLOVER (1982- 1997)
a) The Banzerato (1971-1978)
“Although Bolivia has had over 200 military coups, the combination of government violence and the drug
entanglement of top political officials may be traced to Hugo Banzer’s dictatorship from 1971 to 1978,
the period in which the cocaine business in Bolivia took off [...]The Banzer’s regime cruelty and its close
connection with cocaine pale by comparison with General García-Meza’s dictatorship.”633
“He may be a son of a bitch but he is our son of a bitch.”634
It is no secret that the incipient cocaine industry in Bolivia grew in the early 1970s thanks
to the blind eye and alleged active complicity of General Hugo Banzer Suarez. Possible
participation by Banzer in the expansion of the drug trade is unclear, and according to experts
on that period there is not enough evidence to prove or disprove it conclusively.635 However,
there have been some cases of drug trafficking involving either relatives or close friends of the
president. As analyzed by James Dunkerley,
“There were further, more tangible signs of trouble at the top [...] [in 1975] Edwin Tapia Frontanilla,
Banzer’s private secretary, was arrested at Montreal airport with a consignment of cocaine. In the same
operation Luis ‘Chito’ Valle, Banzer’s son-in-law and the Bolivian consul in Montreal as well as a
student at McGill University, was found in possession of the drug and discreetly asked to leave the
country; two other Bolivian diplomats were condemned to five-year sentences. The fact that Banzer’s
wife Yolanda had recently traveled on an unscheduled flight from Santa Cruz in an airforce jet to visit her
son in law in Canada did little to distance the presidential family from such unsavory matters. A further
member of the family, Guillermo ‘Willy’ Banzer Abastaflor, Hugo Banzer’s nephew, was later arrested in
Florida for cocaine trafficking [...] In the final weeks of his rule Banzer appointed his cousin Guillermo
Banzer Ojopi as consul in Miami, but his designation was met with a leak from the DEA that Banzer
Ojopi was involved in the cocaine trade”636
Just like his democratic counterparts in Colombia during the same period, the Bolivian
dictator preferred to adopt a posture of “nothing is going on here.” As prices for traditional
                                                          
633Malamud Goti, Jaime E. , Smoke and Mirrors: the paradox of the drug wars, Boulder, Westview Press,
1992, p. 72
634 Reportedly said by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1938 about Nicaraguan Dictator Anastasio
Somoza, Sr.
635As explained by one analyst, “there is no firm evidence to prove a concrete policy of unqualified state
backing and patronage under Banzer rather than a generally benevolent attitude, occasional assistance and
direct involvement on the part of certain individuals,” Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.315
In a country of paradoxes is not surprising that Bolivia´s General Banzer was elected President in 1997.
General Banzer proposed to destroy the creature he helped to create in a period of five years. As stated by
Banzer referring to his drug trafficking control policy,
“The Government of Bolivia has taken the decision to liberate the country from the drug traffic circuit
within the next five years,” General Hugo Banzer Suarez, ¡With Dignity! Bolivian Strategy for the Fight
Against Drug Traffic, 1998-2002, Republic of Bolivia, first page.
636Dunkerley, op.cit. p.318
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tropical products (mainly cotton) were falling, the General preferred to look the other way and
allow the “narcodollars” flow into the Bolivian economy. As long as the drug industry did not
challenge his power, everything was all right.
At the beginning of the 1970s, cocaine consumption was not a big issue in the U.S.
(heroin was the main drug addiction problem at the time), and illegal activities in Bolivia were
also overlooked. A right wing general surrounded by a team of “Chicago-School” liberal
economists was considered a good barrier against the “communist threat” in Latin America.
Further, Banzer had overthrown a nationalist and populist general (General Juan José Torres,
President of Bolivia 1970-1971) who, in the eyes of Washington, was turning too much to the
left.637
Several factors came together at the time of the rise of an incipient cocaine industry in the
area of Chapare (department of Cochabamba) and the department of Santa Cruz: A consumer
market, labor, raw material, entrepreneurial class, and capital all came together in the mid-
1970s.
Growing cocaine consumption in the United States provided the consumer market. As
stated earlier, the cocaine alarm in the U.S. would finally be sounded by the end of the decade.
There is a hypothesis that suggests that the cocaine consumption habit was imported and spread
to the U.S. by the Peace Corps working in rural areas in the Chapare. Allegedly, some of the
Peace Corps members began experimenting with cottage cocaine processing in the late 60s and
once back to the U.S. not only continued to demand the product but also contributed to the
drug’s popularization.638 Similar arguments about this “Peace Corps effect” have been
elaborated in the case of the popularization of Colombian marijuana in the 1960s.639 It has also
been argued that heroin consumption in the 1960s and 1970s was boosted as consequence of the
return of soldiers that had acquired the habit in Vietnam.640
Labor was provided by a stable flow of immigrants to the Tropic of Cochabamba and
more specifically to the Chapare region. Migration from the altiplano (Highlands) to the
Chapare had been promoted by the MNR government in the 1950s as a part of the agrarian
reform. For geopolitical reasons (settlement population of empty areas), the colonization of the
Chapare and the Oriente was promoted in the 1960s by civilian and military governments.
However, promised plans to build infrastructure and outlets to markets for legal crops never
                                                          
637On the role of the Nixon administration in the coup against General Torres see: Barrios Morón , Raul,
Bolivia & Estados Unidos. Democracia, Derechos Humanos y Narcotráfico (1980-1982), La Paz, Hisbol-
FLACSO, 1989, 203 pp. Also see: Rudel, Christian, La Bolivie, Paris, Karthala, 1995, p. 104
638See: Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, Coca: El Legado de los Dioses Locura de los Blancos, pp. 86-
87
639See: Betancourt and García, Contrabandistas Marimberos y Mafiosos, p. 47
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materialized. Moreover, the soil conditions in the Chapare were not ideal for the production of
legal products such as sugar, rice, or corn but proved excellent for the production of coca.
Settlers brought with them the habit of accullico (coca chewing), and the local production of
coca began to grow. Until the 1950s the production of coca was centered in the Yungas area
north of La Paz. The coca leaves from the Yungas produced for local traditional consumption
have a sweeter taste and a lower concentration of alkaloid. The kind of coca produced in
Chapare has a bitter taste and a higher concentration of cocaine alkaloid. As explained by one
analyst,
“…Chapare coca, variously known as ‘Vandiola’, ‘Misión’ or ‘Cochala’, has large, thick bitter-
tasting leaves, it is considered very inferior for chewing when compared to he small-leafed, sweet
Yungas coca, but since costs of production are much lower (it is merely sown in furrows, like
maize, with note of the elaborate terracing used in the Yungas), it is cheaper and thus finds a
market (often mixed with Yungas coca) among the poverty-stricken peasantry of the southern
Altiplano. It is also ideally suited for the elaboration of cocaine; any old coca, discolored, aged, or
evil tasting, can be trodden for cocaine, whereas chewing coca generally has to be of much higher
quality.”641
The conditions necessary for increasing the production of coca were present: labor and
the ideal raw material. What was lacking was a demand from an entrepreneurial class that would
process the coca. This came in the mid-1970s. Banzer’s coup had been supported and financed
by the landowning class of Santa Cruz.642 Banzer himself and his family were from this class
and very much indebted to it. Aware of how vulnerable an economy of tin and hydrocarbons
actually was, General Banzer sought to develop the export of tropical crops from the area of
Santa Cruz. The product chosen for this purpose was cotton. Banzer provided financial
incentives and support to the camba landowners in order for them to be able to compete
internationally in the cotton market.643 Unfortunately, the whole commercial maneuver was
based on price speculation. While prices rose in 1972 and 1973, they suddenly dropped in 1975.
Now all the ingredients were finally ready and in place: a growing demand for cocaine in the
U.S, cheap labor in the Chapare, capital and loans from the government and an entrepreneurial
class ready to exploit these factors. As explained by two analysts,
                                                                                                                                                                         
640See: Smith, The Gordian Knot: The Connection Between Narcotics and Development, pp. 9-11 and
Renard, Ronald D., The Burmese Connection: Illegal Drugs & The Making of the Golden Triangle,
Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers,1996, pp. 51, 58 and 59.
641 Spedding, Alison L., “Cocataki, Taki-Coca: Trade, Traffic, and Organized Peasant Resistance in the
Yungas of La Paz,” in Léons, Madeline Barbara and Sanabria, Harry (eds.), Coca, Cocaine and the
Bolivian Reality, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1997, pp.118-119
642The agrarian reform has strongly affected the altiplano region but had left the “modern productive
farms” of Santa Cruz and Cochabamba almost intact.
643Camba is the nickname for the people of the Santa Cruz area in the lowlands. They differentiate from
the kollas of the altiplano for their European background and their entrepreneurial and character and type
of economy linked to the world capitalist economy.
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“[t]he real expansion [of the coca-cocaine industry] began with the collapse of cotton in 1975/6
and was the result of a number of exploratory studies sponsored by the Banzer regime in close
alliance with the over-financed but under-productive members of the Asociación de Productores
de Algodón (ADEPA), centered in Santa Cruz. It is inconceivable that some degree of high level
planning did not take place since, for example, sulfuric acid [produced by military industries] was
needed in quantities that required a major commercial operation and some state assistance. Early
sufficient numbers of tightly-knit cruceño agro-industrial elite have subsequently took off after
July 1980 [....] almost all sources of information identify the Banco Agrícola as key component in
the rise of cocaine”644
“Coupled with business mismanagement, the subsequent loss of international markets drove the
industry into bankruptcy, which pushed the wealthy Santa Cruz cotton producers into looking for a
more lucrative enterprise. The enterprise of choice was cocaine hydrochloride, which required
immediate development organization of coca cultivation in the Chapare [...] Thus, the cocaine
boom was spawned through the use of primarily Kolla labor in coca production.”645
When the cotton prices fell, the camba bourgeoisie turned to the processing of coca.
Cocaine became the new alternative agro-industrial activity. Even if Banzer was aware of this,
credit kept flowing from the government for the development of this illegal industry.646 To the
above production factors we must add yet another factor that was decisive for the cocaine boom
in Bolivia. Once an illegal industry exists, it must be somehow protected from law enforcement.
Banzer’s government had encouraged the formation of paramilitary squads that would be in
charge of the dirty work (assassination of opposition leaders, intimidation, and torture). These
paramilitary groups were increasingly hired and utilized by the camba narcoburgeoisie in order
to intimidate and discipline labor hands in the Chapare and to protect their business in turf wars
with the increasingly influential Colombian buyers. As explained by Waltraud Queiser Morales,
“Especially since the 1971 Banzer coup, paramilitary organizations, composed of adherents of
the different military factions, gunmen for the drug gangs, and neo-Nazi militants-somewhat like
the “death squads” in Brazil and later Argentina- terrorized opponents of the military regime.”647
All the ingredients for a potentially explosive cocktail were in place. Only the lightning of a
match was needed for a “narcocracy” to arise. This would not materialize, however, under
Banzer who was ousted in 1978 under strong domestic and international pressure. As explained
in a historical analysis,
                                                          
644Dunkerley, op. cit. p.315
645Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 10
646Labrousse, Coca Coke,p. 133
647Queiser Morales, Bolivia: Land of Struggle, p. 128
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“ The ‘economic miracle’ turned out to be a myth, the production of petroleum declined sharply, and
Comibol [the state owned tin prospecting company] produced a loss, despite high mineral prices,
because it was subsidizing other state agencies. Cotton production also declined when world prices
fell. The stability of the Banzer regime was superficial because the military remained divided by
personal rivalry, ideological differences, and a generational gap. Growing civilian opposition was
centered in the labor sector, despite the renewed military occupation of the mines. Radical students
and the progressive sector of the Roman Catholic Church became spokespersons for the oppressed
groups; the peasants also criticized the government. External factions contributed to the weakening of
the Banzer regime as well. The negotiation with Chile for an outlet to the sea had raised hopes in
1974. When an agreement between Banzer and General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte failed because of
the opposition of Chilean nationalist, Banzer’s position was weakened. After Jimmy Carter assumed
the United States Presidency in 1976, the United States pressured Banzer to hold elections. In 1977,
with opposition from civilian groups and the military mounting and pressure from the United States
increasing, Banzer announced a presidential election for 1980, hoping to remain in control, but labor
unrest and hostility to his regime forced him to set the date for 1978. However, General Juan Pereda
Absún, Banzer’s handpicked candidate, carried out a coup in July 1978 after the National Electoral
Court annulled the elections because of widespread fraud by Pereda´s supporters […]General Pereda
did not call for elections, despite his promise to do so, and he was overthrown in a bloodless coup in
November 1978 by General David Padilla Arancibia (1978-79), who was supported by the younger
institutionalist faction of the military. He saw the main role of the military as the defense of the
country rather than political intervention and announced elections for 1979 without naming an official
government candidate.”648
b) Narco-Generals (1980-1982) prolegomena to the Bolivia’s cocaine quagmire
“What has happened in Bolivia is that of the two options on the table in he neighboring country the
one that was formally correct was the assumption of power by an elected government, but for us this
represented a high level of risk due to the possibility of diffusion of ideas contrary to our way of life. We
have viewed the other option-the establishment of a military government-with much more sympathy
because we don’t want in South America what Cuba is for Central America.”649
Bolivia has a multi-party system and usually none of the competing presidential
candidates is able to reach a majority in an election. This was once again the case in August
1979. Following procedure, the Bolivian Congress appointed the then-president of the Senate,
Walter Guevara Arce, as interim president, and new elections were set up for June 1980.
Guevara Arce was however ousted in November 1979 in a bloody coup under right-wing
Colonel Alberto Natush Busch. Natush, then stepped down after just two weeks because of
intense civilian opposition and only limited military support, as well as United States diplomatic
action to prevent recognition of the Natush government. Another interim president was then
appointed by the Congress: Lidia Gueiler Tejada (1979-80), head of the Chamber of Deputies
and a veteran MNR politician.650 In 1980 Gueiler presided over elections in which the parties
of the left gained a clear majority of the vote. Hernán Siles Suazo (a leading figure of the 1952
Revolution) with his coalition, the Democratic and Popular Union (Unidad Democrática y
Popular), got 38% of the votes and it seemed certain that the Congress would name him
                                                          
648 “Historical Setting” in Hudson and Hanratty, Bolivia: a country study, [On-line version], available
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.bo
649 General Jorge Rafael Videla president of Argentina from 1976 to 1980, Clarín, Buenos Aires, 6
August 1980, quoted in Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.306
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president on August 6, 1980. In order to prevent the return of Siles Suazo on July 17, 1980 there
was a coup d’etat orchestrated by General Luis García Meza.651 But, as explained in Chapter
III of this dissertation, there were other reasons for this coup. The military takeover was
financed and supported by the then-consolidating Santa Cruz narcoburgeoisie who were afraid
of a return to democracy and a possible counter-narcotic campaign. In fact, Lidia Gueiler had
already taken some steps favorable to an enforcement campaign against the expansion of drug
trafficking activities. As explained by Scott McDonald,
“In the aftermath of Banzer’s downfall in 1978, the country drifted: two general elections were
held, five presidents held office and four coups, one a failure and three successful, were conducted.
During one of the civilian administrations [the administration of President Gueiler] a brief
antinarcotics campaign was carried out by police chief Jorge Selum. This was not appreciated by
Bolivia´s narcotrafictantes, who were also wary of ongoing United States pressure to curtail the
drug trade. Bolivia´s leading drug baron in the 1980s was Roberto Suarez Gomez […] Suarez
called a meeting of Bolivia´s major drug dealers at Club Bavaria in Santa Cruz in the early 1980s.
These included Irwin Gasser, Jorge Naller, and Klaus Barbie. With contacts in the armed forces,
such as Colonel Luis Arcé [sic] Gomez (a relative of Suarez’s), the barons were able to contact the
army commander in Santa Cruz, General Hugo Echeverra. Through his ‘good offices’ a meeting
with General Luis García Meza, the supreme army commander, was arranged for a paltry sum of
$800,000. At the meeting with García Meza, the Suarez-led dealers offered the general a bribe of
$1,300,000 to lead the coup. There was an additional promise of the vast profits that would be
made after the coup in a García Meza-led Bolivia. An additional part of the pact was that Arcé
[sic], already involved in drug trading with Colonel Roberto Salomon, was to be given the position
of Minister of the Interior which handled antinarcotics affairs.”652
A “delinquent dictatorship,” characterized by a symbiotic relationship between a
corrupted sector of the armed forces and the cocaine organized crime, was born. 653 The coup
was particularly violent and was marked by a numerous disappearances. As explained by
Waltraud Queiser Morales,
“Between 1979 and 1982, the military and paramilitary forces committed atrocities that ranked
Bolivia among the major human rights offenders in the hemisphere. During García Meza’s rule,
according to an official government spokesman, there were at least 2,500 political prisoners; the
mines were bombed and 900 people were killed...”654
It was also characterized by an increasing privatization of violence. The paramilitary
groups at the service of both the Minister of the Interior Col. Arce Gomez (nicknamed “the
Minister of Cocaine”) and the Santa Cruz organized crime familias became increasingly
powerful, and eventually threatened to match the power of the armed forces. This created
dissent within the armed forces and eventually precipitated the fall of García Meza’s
                                                                                                                                                                         
650 See: ibid. and Smith, Clifford T., “Bolivia: History” in South America, Central America and the
Caribbean, 1999, Seventh Edition, pp. 118 and 119.
651 See: ibid.
652 McDonald, Dancing on a Volcano, pp.55 and 57
653This term was coined by Dunkerley in Rebellion in the Veins, p.292
654 Queiser Morales, Bolivia Land of Struggle, p. 128
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narcocracy. Needless to say, international pressure (mainly from the Reagan administration)
and diplomatic isolation played a major role in the fall of García Meza’s regime.
The paramilitary became a threat even to an authoritarian regime because a private sector,
the traffickers, had feudalized the use of violence and controlled part of the territory in Bolivia.
Some sectors of the armed forces could not tolerate this competition, which they perceived as a
threat to the authority of the state or territorial centrality.655 As stated by one analyst,
“Paramilitary forces which had existed under previous governments from the MNR on through
Banzer , had become a power unto themselves, threatening even to members of the military”656
Of special concern to the armed forces was the growing power and territorial control that
these paramilitary forces were gaining in the department of Santa Cruz.657 Moreover, besides
the process of territorial feudalization, there was a parallel process of political feudalization
within the structure of the government. The Minister of the Interior, Col. Arce Gomez (who was
also the link between the cocaine mafia and the government) had a joint venture with the
traffickers for command of this parallel paramilitary structure, which was headed and formed in
part by foreign mercenaries known as Los Novios de la Muerte. Some of the members of this
group were Italian neo-fascist terrorists as well as former SS officers such as Klaus Barbie, who
was an advisor of the Bolivian government and the contact between the government and the
mercenaries. 658 This organization adopted the name Servicio Especial de Seguridad (SES)-
Special Security Service.. As stated by James Dunkerley,
“He [Klaus Barbie] provided a useful contact with other old nazis, such as Joachim Stellfeld, a
former employee at the Kamaradenwerk organization who died in mysterious circumstances late
in 1980, as well as established foreign mercenaries: the notorious Jean ‘Black Jack’ Sharamme,
who had made his mark in the Congo, Albert Van Ingelgom, formerly a senior official at the
Auschwitz concentration camp, Roger Van Zande and his son , who worked with the SES and was
know as ‘El Tigre’ for his skill in extracting information by physical means. A younger group
contained men like Joachim Fiebelkorn, Stefano delle Chiaie and Pier Luigi Pagliai, who had
records of neo-fascist attachments, were linked to a number of terrorist operations in Europe
(including the Bologna railway station bombing) and exhibited a special interest in cocaine
trade.”659
García Meza was overthrown by another coup d’etat in 1981. His regime had lasted only
one year but had allowed the rise and consolidation of the Bolivian cocaine industry. If the
                                                          
655On this issue see the excellent and meticulous work of Barrios Morón, Raul, “Bolivia & Estados
Unidos. Democracia, Derechos Humanos y Narcotráfico (1980-1982),”pp.129-151
656Queiser Morales, Bolivia, Land of Struggle, p126
657Barrios Morón, Bolivia & Estados Unidos, p.134
658 In English, “The Grooms of Death,” a name taken from a song of the Spanish Foreign Legion. In fact
the head of “Los Novios de la Muerte” was a German neo-nazi mercenary that (escaping German law
enforcement) had served in that corp.
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alliance with the paramilitary groups was functional at one point, by the end it had become not
only a nuisance but also a threat to the military establishment. There existed a hard-line
anticommunist sector of the armed forces which, as far as human rights violations were
concerned, was just as guilty as the paramilitary. However, they started to become hostile to the
transformation of the dictatorship into a political fiefdom controlled by García Meza, Arce
Gomez, and the Santa Cruz mafia.660 As explained by one analyst,
“Much of this discontent was caused by the intemperate activities and vociferous proclamations of
Arce, who ran the regime virtually single-handed in its first months and whose independent and
overbearing paramilitary forces antagonised many sectors of the officer corps.”661
This growing power of the paramilitary groups also started to create concerns in
bordering countries that had supported García Meza’s coups in either tacit (as was the case with
Brazil’s military regime) or overt (as was the case with Argentina’s military junta) ways. For
example,
“[i]n May 1981, the Brazilian police captured half a dozen of Arce’s mercenaries operating well
over the border replete with nazi insignia, heavy weapons and a goodly quantity of cocaine,
Colonel David Fernández, head of the DNSP (Dirección Nacional de Sustancias Peligrosas-
National Directorate of Dangerous Substances) publicly supported all the charges made against
those arrested”662
A high-ranking Argentine civilian official confirmed to me that, in fact, at the time there
was a rising concern in a sector of the Argentine Armed Forces about the growing political
power that the drug traffickers were gaining in Bolivia.  There was also concern  regarding the
extent of cocaine problem in that country. Moreover, this source stated that at the time, he was
briefed by the Argentine Army about the disquieting situation in Bolivia and about certain
concerns that members of the Bolivian Army had transmitted to their Argentine
counterparts.663 These concerns referred to the growing territorial control that the traffickers
and its paramilitary groups were gaining in the Chapare and Beni regions. The Argentine Army
Major Staff was particularly concerned about the possibility of a spillover of cocaine production
                                                                                                                                                                         
659Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.300
660Barrios, Morón, Bolivia & Estados Unidos, p.143
661Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.307
662Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.323
663Interview (Buenos Aires, July 1997) with Dr. Oscar Camilión, Argentine Minister of Foreign
Relations during 1981 and Minister of Defense from 1993 to 1996. Dr. Camilión said that as minister of
Foreign Affairs he requested a detailed intelligence briefing from the Major Staff of the Argentine Army
on the situation in Bolivia. Dr. Camilión was manifestly worried since he had noticed that in an article in
Time magazine there was a map of South America with a little star that marked the northwest province of
Salta indicating that some cocaine production could be taking place in that area at the time.
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and commercialization to Argentina.664 The Argentine Military Junta apparently felt that the
“Frankenstein Monster” they had helped to create in Bolivia was getting out of control.665
During this infamous Bolivian delinquent dictatorship, the Santa Cruz-based criminal
organization was able to achieve a modest gain in the U.S. market with Miami as a port of entry
for their cocaine. Later on, the Bolivians would lose this position to Colombians, who were at
once more aggressive and better positioned in both geographical and logistical terms, and would
manage to get vertically integrated in the transnational industry as coca paste and base
producers.666
                                                          
664Interview (Buenos Aires, July 1997) with Dr. Oscar Camilión, supra.
665The Argentine Military Junta had actively participated in the preparation of García Meza’s coup. They
had also sent military advisors from the notorious SIN (Naval Intelligence Service) and the Army in order
to train and assist Bolivian military in interrogatories (meaning torture) and elimination of the opposition.
The Argentine Junta was also the first government to recognize García Meza’s government (South Africa,
Brazil, Chile, and Taiwan would also recognize the government later. ). For the Argentine military, the
reasons for this support were geopolitical: to avoid a leftist and democratic government on the border, to
overtly defy the Carter administration and its politics on human rights defense, and to counterbalance the
South Cone military governments (Chile, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil) vis à vis the Andean old and
new democracies (Colombia, Venezuela and Peru). Another factor was to win influence in Bolivia to
counterbalance Brazil as a regional power. These were the main reasons for the Argentine support. This
being said, it is important to remark that there were certain high ranking military officers (at least one
divisionary general) that were allegedly linked with the illegal drug trade, however as stated before the
Argentine Army as an institution was highly concerned about the possibility of cocaine spill over
production to Argentina and a contagion effect of corruption in the Argentine armed forces. On the
geopolitical reasons for the Argentine support see: Barrios Morón, Bolivia & Estados Unidos; for the
information concerning the participation of SIN officers in Meza’s coup see: Pasquini, Gabriel and De
Miguel Eduardo, Blanca y Radiante, Mafias, Poder y Narcotráfico en la Argentina, p.55 and Malamud
Goti, Jaime, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 72
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Table 3. Cultivated surface and coca production in Bolivia 1963-1990
Year Surface (hectares) Yield (kilograms per
hectare)
Production (metric
tones)
1963 3,000 1,600 4,800
1964 3,100 1,600 4,960
1965 3,187 1,725 5,497
1966 3,189 1,623 5,175
1967 3,980 1,623 6,459
1968 2,600 1,623 4,219
1969 2,600 1,615 4,199
1970 4,450 1,348 5,998
1971 5,430 1,252 6,798
1972 6,140 1,302 7,994
1973 7,160 1,313 9,401
1974 7,900 1,380 10,902
1975 11,285 1,380 15,573
1976 12,000 1,380 16,560
1977 12,000 1,400 16,800
1978 18,860 1,400 26,404
1979 20,833 1,400 29,166
1980 22,788 1,400 31,903
1981 28,308 1,400 39,631
1982 35,269 1,400 49,376
1983 44,661 1,400 62,525
1984 56,867 1,400 79,613
1985 64,542 1,400 90,358
1986 70,905 1,400 99,267
1987 81,637 1,400 114,291
1988 84,801 1,400 118,721
1989 88,365 1,400 123,711
1990 91,937 1,400 128,711
Source: Maca of. de Est. Econ. y Estad. 1976; Bolivia en Cifras, 1980-  , INE in SEAMOS, Dossier
Hemerográfico, Datos y Cifras, p. 40
                                                                                                                                                                         
666 As an extra-academic aside: this brief period of independent cocaine boost in Bolivia is illustrated in
Scorcesse’s movie “Scarface”.
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Table 4. Illicit Production of coca paste in Bolivia (in metric tons)
Year Coca production
(mt)
(-20% losses)
balance
(-10,000mt of
illicit
consumption)
Excess production
(100:1)
Coca Paste
1979/80 25,750 20,600 10,600 106
1980/81 33,555 26,844 16,844 168.4
1981/82 47,490 37,992 27,992 279.9
1982/83 59,927 47,941.6 37,941.6 379.4
1983/84 108,000 86,400 76,400 764
1984/85 158,600 126,880 116,880 1,168.8
1985/86 120,422 96,337.6 86,337.6 863.4
1986/87 132,463 105,970.4 95,970,4 1059.7
Source: Direco-Sudesal-RVP in Seamos op.cit., p.128
Drug control policies during García Meza’s regime were a charade set up to respond to
the pressures exerted by the Reagan administration (the same can be said about the situation
during Banzer’s regime). As a matter of fact, the term “drug control policy,” generally used to
refer to enforcement policies, ceased to be an oxymoron, given that the military regime through
Col. Arce Gomez, nicknamed the “Minister of Coca,” had part of the drug trafficking under his
control.
Early in 1981, García Meza imposed a state monopoly on the purchase of coca leaves
from the growers (Supreme Decree N° 16,168). Coca was to be sold by peasants to Centros de
Acopio (storage centers) and the government would commercialize it for traditional use. Also a
Consejo Nacional de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico (National Council for the Fight Against
Narcotics Trafficking-CNLCN-) was created in order to supervise a National Directorate of
Dangerous Substances. However, as explained by James Dunkerley,
“[t]here is little evidence to suggest that real progress was made. In the first place, the organs of
control were hopelessly unprepared of their own and their sole means of tracking air traffic in
Chapare was one VHF radar with a range of only ten kilometers. There were no resources to match
the unofficial price for leaf and insufficient manpower to cover the major cities, let alone the
countryside. More importantly still, there was no political will to make a campaign work, purge a
notoriously corrupt institution, or oblige other parts of the state apparatus to collaborate. Thus,
while the CNLCN issued a great deal of propaganda, prepared detailed studies, and made
occasional raids in which small producers were captured, the trade continued virtually as
before.”667
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However, coca paste and cocaine and coca leaves from the Centros de Acopio
mysteriously disappeared to re-enter the illegal traffic . Allegedly coca paste was processed by
conscripts within the Centros de Acopio and then sold to the traffickers.668 As described by one
analyst,
“Pictures of soldiers stomping coca leaves and of army lorries carrying heaps of basic paste during
General García-Meza’s cocaine dictatorship still circulate among politicians, trade union leaders
and students and hamper the army’s legitimacy in the contemporary move to establish
democracy.”669
Because of the internal dissent over the growing paramilitary power of the traffickers and
above all due to the international isolation of Bolivia as well as the economic pressure and total
lack of support from the Reagan administration, economic and military aid from the U.S. was
cut. 670 The EEC countries adopted the same attitude. Bolivia had become an international
pariah.
García Meza tried to manage this situation by beginning a noisy campaign against drug
trafficking and sacking Col. Arce Gomez as Minister of the Interior in March 1981. Under
military pressure, he himself resigned and delegated power to one of the members of his clique,
Gen. Celso Torrelio. But this was not enough. In the midst of a palace coup, in July 1982,
Torrelio was forced to resign. He was replaced by a new junta headed by Gen. Guido Vildoso
who, in view of mounting external and internal pressure, started preparing the way for a return
to democratic rule and began to fire paramilitary squad members from official positions. Arce
Gomez and García Meza prudently flew away to Argentina.671 A veneer of higher commitment
to counter drug activities could be observed during the brief period of Gen. Vildoso. It is quite
possible that Vildoso, as the head of a military that was opposed to the narco-contamination of
the army, used law enforcement as a way to eliminate the threat that the paramilitary
represented to the territorial centrality of the state. As explained by Dunkerley,
                                                          
668On this matters see, Dunkerley, op. cit., pp. 292-344
669Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 71
670Bolivia imports most of its food products.  The only country that was buying Bolivian gas (overpriced)
was Argentina. The Argentine military were also spending (already scarce) resources on sending food aid
to Bolivia. The Reagan administration was leading the anticommunist crusade in Latin America but was
not willing to tolerate a narco regime in South America in view of the growing cocaine consumption
problem in the U.S. The Argentine military autonomy and discretion on promoting their own puppet
military regimes in the area also annoyed the U.S. government. On this matter see: Barrios Morón,
Bolivia & Estados Unidos and specially ‘Next coup is ours’ U.S. warns Argentina, Latin American
Weekly report, WR-81-15, 10 April 1981, p.2
671After the return to democracy in Argentina both dictators flew the country and they started to be track
down through Brazil (García Meza was extradited from there to in 1985) Paraguay and finally Bolivia.
Arce Gomez was arrested near Santa Cruz by a commando operation of UMOPAR and expelled to the
U.S. in 1989.
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“[t]he president [García Meza] now under pressure from both the military and civilian participants
in the trade, could not decide if the armed forces or the police would take overall charge of the
operation. On 19 May he decided that the military would withdraw from all involvement, but 48
hours later he reversed this decision.”672
“The shift to formal cooperation with the DEA [the DEA offices in Bolivia had been closed during
García Meza’s government] was evident over the last months of 1981 and early 1982; it was
effectively sealed in 1982 when the U.S. embassy formally approved the CNLCN’s plan to destroy
coca plantations within a matter of six months [!!!]. This realignment followed the fall of García
Meza and Arce Gómez and corresponded to the need of the Torrelio government to reach a
rapprochement with Washington in order to tend to the state of bankruptcy that prevailed in the
formal economy.”673
In September 1982, before the democratic transition (October 1982), the government
made public a Five-Year Plan, the Plan Quinquenal, (which been approved in May 1982) for
the eradication of coca in Bolivia. Because of the resistance by the coca-growing peasants, and
due to the chaotic economic situation that the next civilian president inherited, this plan would
remain “frozen.” The internal competition within the armed forces and finally the switch
between General Torrelio and General Vildoso also stalled implementation of the Plan
Quinquenal.674
Even if this policy was little more than a charade, it was already possible to witness a
reactive violence on the part of the coca growing peasants against militarized drug control
policies in this early period. Some authors claim that, at this early stage, peasant violence
against the Centros de Acopio was “remotely controlled” by the traffickers who would
encourage the assaults against the storage centers in order to force a free market for coca.675
However, other sources characterize these attacks as spontaneous reactions of the cocaleros, as
a preemptive movement against the implementation of the Five Year Plan, and a reaction to the
abuses of the police and military groups present in the Chapare region.676 In any case, during
this period the cocaleros where already organized into trade unions and had an organizational
structure that allowed them to coordinate attacks. These assaults on storage centers caused the
death of seven policemen. Days before stepping down as president, Gen. Vildoso warned that
the coca producing areas had become a ‘no man’s land’.677 The Centros de Acopio were finally
abandoned as a policy during the first year of democratic government (President Siles Suazo
1982-1985). A very noisy eradication campaign using the combined forces of the police and the
armed forces in the Yapacaní region (between the Cochabamba and Santa Cruz departments)
also provoked clashes between angry peasants and government forces. The main reason for the
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violent peasant reaction was the fact that the parcels were sprayed with a very toxic chemical
known as 2-4-D which, like the infamous Agent Orange used in the Vietnam War, contains
triclofenoxiatic, a very potent poison.678 As explained by one analyst,
“By almost every account, ‘Operation Yapacaní’ was a disaster. First, it did not work. The
peasants simply cut the leaves and the tops of their coca bushes before the spray could kill the
entire plant, so little coca was actually destroyed. Second, the operation precipitated a major
political outcry. Predictably, the coca lobby -the COB, the CSUTB, and the regional growers’
federations- condemned the action.”679
These early examples of militarized enforcement attempts to disrupt the coca-cocaine
complex in Bolivia and the consequent violence stemming from them would only be a
prolegomenon to a repetitive cycle that continues to this day.
c) Bolivia’s War on Drugs
“On ira pendre notre linge sur la ligne Siegfried.”680
“Such then, are the politics of coca control in Bolivia. The prognosis is for continuing U. S. pressure on
Bolivia to make headway in eradication and for continuing confrontations between the Bolivian
government and the coca lobby. With or without a coca law, the Bolivian government clearly does not
possess the power to eradicate coca plantations. Furthermore, coca and cocaine are deeply ingrained in
the economic, social and political life of the country. Barring a U.S. military occupation of Bolivia and
the sterilization of all plant life in the Yungas and the Chapare, Bolivia’s status as a major coca producer
is unlikely to change for many years.”681
The two quotations above clearly describe the drug control policies and law enforcement
against the cocaine industry in Bolivia. The first one is a crude joke with a large amount of
truth. Bolivia’s war on drug is not funny but tragically comic. Mistakes are repeated over and
over again with increasingly worse consequences. Violence between the government and the
peasants escalates with both parties being fully aware that any threats (i.e. full militarization of
coca eradication or forced displacement of people out of the Chapare) will not be carried out.
This is the comic part: everyone plays a role, knowing that the play will repeat itself over and
over again. The tragic part is that, in repeating the play, people die and political instability
grows to the edge of breakdown. The play repeats itself, reaching a higher point of escalation
each time. Whether or not the second quotation will became a self-fulfilling prophecy is a
disquieting thought.
With the exception of a U.S. blockade, a U.S. multilateral intervention, or a multilateral
military intervention, all levels of militarization delineated in Chapter I have been reached in
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Bolivia. The escalation in the level of militarization of enforcement does not follow a
chronological order nor is it sequential. Instead, it is possible to observe escalations followed by
de-escalations in the level of enforcement against the cocaine industry. While escalation is a
response to U.S. diplomatic pressure, de-escalation is a response to organized peasant resistance
(and ensuing violence) as well as the threat of reactive violence from traffickers. When it comes
to enforcing drug control laws and applying enforcement policies, the successive democratic
Bolivian administrations have taken two steps forward and one step back.682
This vicious circle is reinforced by the fact that Bolivia is a coca growing country, and the
backbone of the policies suggested by the United States is the eradication of illegal coca.
Interdiction is then considered as a complement to eradication. Alternative development support
from the U.S. (United States Agency for Development, USAID) has been subordinated to the
reach of coca eradication programs. The result of this is a myriad of pressures from international
and national actors on the Bolivian government.
If we consider the definition of national security given in Chapter I, as well as the
examples of threats stemming from the illegal drug industry in South America (Chapter III), it is
clear that drug trafficking is a clear and present national security problem for Bolivia. Not only
did the drug traffickers and their military allies stage a coup and implemented “narcocracy” in
1980, but the paramilitary capabilities and territorial control of the traffickers became a threat to
the territorial centrality of the state even during a military regime. This threat to the sovereign
power of the state would become part of the everyday reality for the forthcoming civilian
governments. As illustrated earlier in Chapter III, in 1984 a group of corrupt officers from the
paramilitary police counter drug unit UMOPAR staged a coup against President Siles Suazo.
All the threats that drug trafficking could pose to the Bolivian state have been aggravated by the
militarized drug control approach imposed by the U.S.. As explained by one analyst,
“A Latin American, particularly Bolivian, perspective of the effects on national security related
to the drug question should bring two points back into the debate: a strong military approach to
the drug problem would 1) alter the social balance of power that is the foundation of the hard-
won democracy of the region and 2) clearly call into question the sovereignty of the states.”683
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d) When all the evils came together: President Hernán Siles Suazo’s administration (1982-
1985)
“Crushing requires a crushing mood.”684
“[t]he best thing we can do with this little country is cutting off the cash flow. If they want food they
better start cutting the coca bushes. Bolivia is a bad investment for the United States. This country has a
single problem: it is ruled by criminals:”685
“Drug production, processing and traffic, through corruption and terrorism, threatened state security, and
institutional stability of the countries concerned [produced].”686
The Bolivian Congress elected Hernán Siles Suazo president  in October 1982. A populist
leader and one of the main actors in the 1952 revolution, Siles Suazo was an experienced
politician. However, the task in front of him was titanic. Never before was a Bolivian president
subjected to such a crossfire situation. On one side Siles Suazo had to manage a hyperinflation
crisis while satisfying the demands of powerful social actors such as the COB (Bolivian Labor’s
Confederation-the coca growing trade union-). On the other side, the United States through its
ambassador Edwin Corr (who had been posted in Peru and is a specialist in drug control and
low intensity conflict), pressured Siles Suazo to adopt drastic measures to curb the cocaine
traffic. The U.S. still had in their minds the image of the delinquent dictatorship of García Meza
and wanted to avoid a new “drug trafficking control charade.” The U.S. officials probably
underestimated the good will of President Siles, whose drug control policies were highly
constrained by the chaotic economic situation, the opposition of the coca growing trade unions,
and the corruption that undermined the efficacy of law enforcement agencies. 687 As explained
by Jaime Malamud Goti,
“The scope and complexity of the Bolivian economy were the principal reasons why Siles did
not initially give in to U.S. pressure. As a man of vast political experience, and as the first
popularly elected president in the country in eighteen years, Siles considered a major repressive
campaign against the drug business to be a dangerous approach.”688
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According to Eduardo Gamarra, three factors diverted government attention from the
drug problem and hindered its ability to curb drug trafficking: 689
1) As in the rest of Latin America, Bolivia was suffering the effects of the foreign debt crisis.
Payments of the debt services were delayed and the government was suffering from a
chronic trade deficit. At the same time, the monetary and financial international institutions
were pressuring for the adoption of harsh austerity plans. This hindered even more the
capacity of the Bolivian state to carry out an effective counter narcotics program.
2) The president did not have a majority in the Congress. Siles’ center-left coalition was
matched by a Congress controlled by Acción Democrática Nacional (ADN, led by General
Banzer) and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, led by Víctor Paz
Estrenssoro). Under these circumstances all Sile´s initiatives were blocked.
3) As stated before, 1985 was the year of the fall in tin prices. To this must be added an annual
inflation of 26,000%. During Siles Suazo’s administration the coca-cocaine industry
virtually replaced tin prospecting as the countries country’s main  export sector.
U.S. pressure focused mainly on the total eradication of coca plantations and the adoption
of legislation that would declare coca growing illegal. In August 1983, Bolivia signed eight
agreements -four related to drug control programs and four related to USAID alternative
development programs-which made U.S. assistance for eradication and interdiction conditional
upon the realization of these two goals. The package included 30 million dollars for
enforcement programs and 50 million dollars for development assistance. However due to the
difficulties mentioned above and to violent peasant resistance there was little progress in the
fulfillment of the terms of the agreements. As a consequence, the promised economic assistance
never materialized. As illustrated in the following chronology, several cases of preemptive and
reactive violence from the peasants can be observed in this period.
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Episodes of upstream reactive and preemptive violence:
April 1983-Bolivia’s Confederation of Peasant Workers called a national strike in reaction to an U.S.
Bolivian communiqué announcing a coca-reduction plan. The strike blocked highways and stopped the
supply of food and other necessities to major cities.
March 1984- 2,000 Chapare farmers arrived in Cochabamba in 50 trucks to protest the signings of the
agreement and paraded around the city, chanting ‘down with Edwin Corr [the U.S. Ambassador], ‘down
with democracy’ and other anti-U.S. and anti-Bolivian slogans. Farmers also tried to take over the local
offices of the National Directorate for the Control of Dangerous Substances (DNSP) the superordinate
agency for the antidrug police
1984-Bolivian coca growers sealed off the city of Cochabamba on two occasions: once to protest a
planned military-police invasion of the Chapare and other to demand the lifting of a government ban on
marketing coca leaves.
Source: LeeIII, The White Labyrinth, pp. 62 and 68 and “Bolivian Government Agrees to ‘Coca
Pact’ ”Latin American Weekly Report, August 10, 1984, WR-84-31, last page.
Coca growing peasants also continued in their assaults on the centros the acopio which
where finally dissolved by new narcotics legislation decreed by the president. As stated by one
analyst,
“When Siles assumed office and there was a political shift toward guarantees for civil liberties,
effective peasant resistance on the unpopular wholesale centers surfaced immediately. Peasant
Union activists occupied local wholesale facilities in the Chapare and eventually destroyed them
with dynamite. The next major peasant public protests aimed at official marketing control were
road blockades during 1984.”690
A proliferation of legislation and new organs of enforcement were created. However, in
the absence of economic resources and because of the social pressure from the peasants, none of
these laws were effectively enforced nor could the new organs fulfill their assigned tasks. A
repetitive paradox would then start its cycle: the U.S. expected Bolivia to manage its economic
crisis and have a successful transition to democracy while at the same time pressuring for a drug
control policy that had highly destabilizing effects for the country.
Under U.S. pressure, in August the Bolivian government agreed to eradicate 4,000
hectares of coca. The eradication task would be carried out by two newly created  state technical
offices.  The DIRECO (Dirección Regional de la Coca) is a civilian agency founded in 1983
under the jurisdiction of the Agrarian and Peasants Ministry (today it is under the Secretary of
Social Defense from the Ministry of Government). Eradication was carried out by a new
paramilitary specialized police unit, UMOPAR (Mobile Unit of Rural Patrolling), commonly
know as Leopards. The UMOPAR was devised to enforce drugs laws in the jungle, in particular
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cocaine manufacturing and trafficking. 691 The 580 Leopardos are chosen from among the
most able police officers to receive special training by U.S. military (special operations) and
U.S. law enforcement personnel.
The first level of the militarization of enforcement had been reached: militarization of the
police. The entire police corps also started a process of militarization that involved the adoption
of typically military features, such as major staff and military training.692 Enforcement would
gradually become more and more “americanized” with the DEA choosing the targets and
operations for UMOPAR.693 As explained by one analyst,
“From the start, the mode of operation of these anti-narcotics units has been militarised.
Although these forces remain independent of the command structures of the regular national
police and the Bolivian armed forces, they have been directly responsive to the U.S. Embassy
(Anti-Narcotics Section, NAS) and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).”694
UMOPAR would prove to be a double-edged sword. As shown before, on June 1984 a
group of UMOPAR and high-ranking army officers under investigation for alleged involvement
in drug trafficking staged a “narco-coup.” The coup involved the kidnapping of President Siles
Suazo. Siles was freed only after negotiations with U.S. Ambassador Corr. The coup failed
because of the absence of support from the rest of the army. This was a clear case of inner
system corruption-related violence. If a paramilitary police counter-drug unit can become
corrupted and stage a coup d’etat, it is not difficult to imagine the consequences of the full
involvement of the armed services to law enforcement activities.
In order to show Bolivian commitment to drug control, Siles Suazo went even further:  on
July 31, 1984 (Supreme Decree Nº 20,372), he declared the Chapare a military zone and ordered
the police and armed forces to impose the authority of the state in the area. The operation failed,
first because the operation had been previously announced and the important traffickers fled the
area, and second because the police and the army found strong peasant resistance. As reported,
“The Bolivian government is under pressure from the U.S. administration to step up its efforts to
reduce cocaine production. […]The threat of an aid cut-off has put the government in an
unenviable position: it will have to comply with the U.S. government’s demand (if its wants
more aid) and at the same time strike a deal with peasants whose livelihood depends on coca
cultivation.”695
                                                          
691Even if UMOPAR members are recruited from the Bolivian National Police, the force does not form
part of the chain of command in this institution. UMOPAR falls under the aegis of Defensa Social, a
branch of the Interior Ministry and its director is usually a retired army officer. Painter, Bolivia and Coca,
p.81
692Barrios Morón, La Política contra las drogas en Bolivia, p.39
693Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p.81
694Queiser Morales, Militarising the drug war in Bolivia, p. 353
695“Bolivian Government Agrees to ‘Coca Pact’ ”Latin American Weekly Report, August 10, 1984,WR-
84-31, page not numbered.
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Also as explained by one analyst,
“The immediate reaction to the decree was another demonstration of peasant power. Peasants
from the Chapare and the Cochabamba Valley blockaded the city of Cochabamba and cut the
main highway with the Chapare. In the first week of August, the government and campesino
leaders conducted some hard bargaining. a complex deal finally was struck: the government
promised not to destroy Chapare farmers’ coca crops and not to interfere in the
commercialization of coca [...] In October 1984 the government banned shipments of coca leaves
from the Chapare and stepped up efforts to control the circulation of leaves within the region.
The stage was set of a new confrontation with the Bolivian government. In early November ,
campesinos again sealed off Cochabamba and blocked the Chapare highway, demanding the
“free sale of coca” and end to the military occupation. The coca growers won a partial victory:
The government lifted controls on transporting coca leaves, and the military left the Chapare
later that month.”696
Considering the chaotic state of the Bolivian economy at that time, the country was more
vulnerable than ever to U.S. pressure. This episode clearly illustrates the cycle described above
in this chapter: American pressure          Bolivian militarized enforcement       peasant reactive/
preemptive violence           government steps back and           over and over again...
One of the final acts by Siles Suazo concerning the drug issue was the enactment of very
strict--but inapplicable (under the circumstances described above)--drug legislation. In May
1985, the president enacted the Legal Regime of Controlled Substances (Presidential Decree Nº
20,811), which established that the National Directorate for the Fight Against Narcotrafficking
would delimitate zones for traditional (and thus legal) coca growing within the regions of
Yungas (La Paz) and Chapare (Cochabamba). Parcels outside these traditional zones would be
declared illegal and would be voluntarily or forcibly destroyed (art.39). The decree fixed a
period of 90 days for voluntary eradication of the coca bushes. After the expiration of this
period, plants could be forcibly destroyed. The law forbade the use of herbicides for eradication.
This legal instrument also abolished the infamous Centros de Acopio and established a system
of public markets for commercialization of coca for traditional uses (chewing, tea, religious and
medicinal uses). This law also forbade transactions outside these markets.697
Siles was, at once, unable to cope with the economic crisis, subject to strong U.S.
pressure over the drug issue, and incapable of reaching a substantial agreement with the labor
sector, the opposition parties and the international financial institutions.  He called for elections
one year before the end of his presidential mandate. Political scientists have elegantly named
this type of situation a “crisis of governability.” Siles’ premature departure was prompted by a
drug corruption scandal involving one of his close collaborators and best friend. In August
1984, news from a meeting held in 1983 between the powerful “King of Cocaine,” Roberto
Suarez, and Siles Suazos’ narcotics control adviser, Rafael Otazo, was leaked to the press.
                                                          
696Lee III, The White Labyrinth, p.69
697Quiroga, Coca/Cocaína, p. 59
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During the meeting, Suarez suggested paying the Bolivian foreign debt in exchange for
government non-intervention in his affairs.698 This revelation provoked a “Bolivian Watergate”
that forced Siles to resignation.699
e) Escalating the war on drugs: President Víctor Paz Estenssoro’s administration (1985-
1989)
“(A) up to 50 percent of the aggregate amount of such assistance allocated for Bolivia may be provided at
any time after the president certifies to the Congress that Bolivia has engaged in narcotics interdiction
operations that have significantly disrupted the illicit coca industry in Bolivia or has cooperated with the
United States in such operations and; (B) the remaining amount of such assistance may be provided at any
time after the President Certifies to the Congress that Bolivia has either met in calendar year 1986 the
eradication targets for the calendar year 1985 [...] or has entered into an agreement for the United States
for implementing that plan for 1987 and beyond (including numerical eradication targets) and is making
progress toward the plan’s objectives including substantial eradication of illicit coca crops and effective
use of United States assistance....”700
“(1) CONDITIONS ON CERTIFICATION-For fiscal year 1989, the President may make a certification
with respect to Bolivia [...] only if the Government of Bolivia A) has entered into narcotics cooperation
with the United States [...] B) has fully achieved the eradication targets contained in the agreement; and
C) has begun a program of forced eradication of illicit coca cultivation if the targets for voluntary
eradication are not being met or are not continued...”701
Elections were held in July 1985 and, as usual in Bolivia none of the candidates won a
definite majority. The issue was then solved by the Congress and Víctor Paz Estenssoro (MNR)
narrowly defeated Gen. Banzer (ADN). Paz Estenssoro learned from Siles mistakes. His motto
was “government with authority, and without anarchy”702. Paz Estenssoro formalized a
governability with the right (ADN) in the Congress known as “Pact for Democracy” and at the
same time by decree (Decree Law Nº 21,060) adopted a draconian economic anti-inflationary
austerity plan know as “New Economic Policy” (NEP). As usually in Latin America the public
sector was reduced and inflation was controlled but unemployment grew. Growing
unemployment in Bolivia, since the late 1970s, is a synonym of more hand labor for the cocaine
industry. The fall of the tin prices in late 1985 did not help.
With a majority in the Congress and a solid alliance with the private sector, Paz
Estenssoro did not hesitate in applying his motto: “democracy with authority.” At the beginning
of his administration a state of siege was declared to counter general strikes against the NEP.
                                                          
698It is very doubtful that Suarez had such a great amount of money (2 billion dollars).
699Suarez had invited President Siles to discuss the matter personally. Otazo declared to the Congress that
neither he nor any other member of the government had accepted money from Suarez, but  confirmed that
he had met Suarez following instructions from President Siles Suazo. Why  Siles Suazo authorized this
interview is still unclear. In any case, Suarez used this episode to further destabilize the Siles government,
and he succeeded. For a careful description of this episode see: Lee III, The White Labyrinth, p.144
700 U.S. Public Law 99-570-Oct.27,1986 100 STAT. 3207-66 [Known as Anti-Narcotics Act of 1986]
701 U.S. Public Law 100-690-NOV.18, 1988, 102 STAT. 4271 [Known as Anti-Narcotics act of 1988]
702Queiser Morales, Bolivia. Land of Struggle, p.103
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Two hundred leaders were arrested and exiled to Beni detention centers. Martial law was
decreed for nineteen days. Labor had been disciplined but only on the legal side of the economy.
Paz Estenssoro did not hesitate to use force against miner’s strikes. He would adopt the same
attitude towards the coca growing federations but this time the results would be different. An
escalation of militarized enforcement would be followed by an escalation of peasant resistance.
Faced with very powerful organizations that controlled extensive territorial areas like the
Chapare, Paz Estenssoro was forced to deescalate enforcement and eventually negotiate with the
peasants. The president was willing to curb cocaine trafficking but not at the price of a civil war
with peasants in the Chapare. Once again, Bolivian social and economic reality was stronger
than U.S. pressure.
Several factors contributed to an increase of pressure on Bolivia and an ensuing
escalation of militarized enforcement in this country:
1) The fact that President Reagan declared, in secret directive Nº 221, that drug
trafficking was a threat to U.S. national security encouraged  more active
participation of U.S and local armed forces in counter-drug activities in the Andean
countries.703 As explained by one analyst,
“In Washington, President Reagan formally declared that drug trafficking constituted a
national security threat to the U.S. and issued his National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD) 221 on 11 April 1986 to that effect. As such, U.S. military participation was to be
guided by three principles: 1. Host governments had to invite U. S. forces; 2.U.S. civilian
agencies (DOS and DEA) were to coordinate the effort of U.S. force; and 3. U.S. forces were
to be limited to support functions.”704
2) The elaboration through 1987 and final signature in 1988 of the UN Illicit Drug
Control International Regime, also called the 1988 UN Convention, already
mentioned in the first chapter.705
3) The enactment of the previously mentioned Anti-Drug acts of 1986 and 1988 in the
United States, which regulated the certification procedure as a means to politically
pressure the Bolivian Government.706
Paz Estenssoro had the will to carry out policies prescribed by the U.S.. He could also act
more freely at home since the hyperinflationary crisis was coming under control and the “Pact
                                                          
703See: Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.30
704 Menzel, Fire in the Andes, p. 17
705Interview with Minister Roberto D. Palarino, Director of the Drugs Unit of the Argentine Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (1987-1989), Embassy of Argentina, Washington D.C., January 27, 1995.
706 Both acts are quoted as introductory quotations at the beginning of this section.
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of Democracy” would grant him more capacity for securing congressional approval (that not
always would be necessarily requested by the president).
Siles Suazo reached the point of temporarily declaring the Chapare a military zone and
mobilizing all the armed services against the coca-cocaine industry, but Paz Estenssoro took
militarization one step further. President Paz Estenssoro agreed on the mobilization of a joint
U.S. (military) and Bolivian (UMOPAR) force as part of a strategy that would became the
backbone of Bolivian-U.S. cooperation: combining aggressive interdiction with coca
eradication. The idea was that aggressive interdiction would provoke a glut in coca production,
forcing prices  down. As the coca paste and cocaine base were disrupted, the demand for coca
would go down (traffickers would be too busy trying to escape law enforcement), and peasants
would be forced to shift to other products. While the plan may sound logical, once again reality
in Bolivia thwarted efforts.
The result of this idea would be a joint Bolivian-U.S. enforcement operation in the Beni,
the Chapare, and Santa Cruz regions coded “Blast Furnace” as mentioned in Chapter III. The
operation was not only unsuccessful in achieving its goals, but would also temporarily put the
Paz Estenssoro administration into a period of political hot water since the president had invited
the U.S. troops without warning the Congress. Blast Furnace  had very negative effects in the
sense that it caused concentrated drug production to spread all over the Beni and Santa Cruz
departments (in smaller portable laboratories).  After the operation, traffickers started to
delegate coca paste production to the peasants to shift the main target of law enforcement away
from themselves. As explained by one analyst,
“From April 26 to May 6 of that year, Leopardos and U.S. military forces were deployed in joint
maneuvers in the departments of Santa Cruz and Cochabamba in preparation of the joint U.S-
Bolivian Operation Blast Furnace, and after six months of planning, the operation was launched on
July 18, 1986. The legitimacy of the U.S. intervention was formally grounded by the Reagan
administration in a request from the Bolivian executive branch and the Lara Bonilla Treaty, an
agreement that was only ratified by the Bolivian Congress in May 1990, four years after Operation
Blast Furnace took place. [...] 160 U.S. military troops and UMOPAR units were transported into
the Beni, the Chapare, and Santa Cruz on six U.S. Black Hawk helicopters, and an airlift was set
up between La Paz and Trinidad where the operation’s headquarters were installed.
Operation Blast Furnace did not succeed. No major drug dealer was arrested, and large
laboratories were found dismantled. The operating forces had to make do with destroying coca
paste pits, which can be dug in a few hours. Military experts attribute the failure of what has been
properly labeled as the “Americanization” of enforcement to three factors. First, leaked data
concerning the operation aroused the resistance of local politicians and members of the Congress
in particular. [...] Second, easy identification of the aircraft employed in the campaign enabled the
traffickers to anticipate the move, and third, different conceptions of how to carry out the mission
led to rifts among U.S forces, the DEA, and the Bolivian UMOPAR.”707
                                                          
707Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.30. The “Lara Bonilla” treaty mentioned in the quote was signed
by the members of the Andean Group in 1986. The treaty allows international drug law enforcement
cooperation and also allows countries to invite other countries in support of these law enforcement
operations.
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As coca prices went down, peasants would start producing coca paste on their own in
order to get higher profits.708 As a matter of fact, in 1991 a new trend in coca leaf
transformation was detected: coca growers in the Chapare were skipping the process of coca
paste production by converting coca leaf directly into coca base in small-scale maceration pits.
The cocaine base is dissolved in a sulfuric acid solution, known as agua rica, for storage and
production.709
Blast Furnace also provoked a massive demonstration in Cochabamba and La Paz. While
the peasants did not use force,  they showed their disagreement with the interference of U.S.
troops in the country.710
While the Blast Furnace operation was being carried out, a confused episode of violence
in Huanchaca near Santa Cruz would show that in Bolivia drug traffickers could eventually
become as violent as their Colombian counterparts if their interests were seriously threatened.
This was the first case of reactive violence by the drug traffickers. Ironically, the biggest
cocaine processing laboratory ever discovered in Bolivia until that moment was found not by
the personnel participating in Blast Furnace but by a very popular leading botanist, Noel
Kempff-Mercado during a research expedition. In September 1986, Kempff-Mercado and two
other scientists had the bad luck of landing with their small plane near a cocaine processing
laboratory at Huanchaca in the north of the Santa Cruz Department. The thugs guarding the
laboratory unmercifully shot Kempff-Mercado and the scientists. The pilot survived to tell the
story.711 The incident generated major political repercussions as the population of Santa Cruz
conducted protest marches against the drug traffickers. There are indications that both the
Bolivian and the U.S. law enforcement knew of the existence of this laboratory. However, it had
not been identified for a possible attack by personnel participating in Blast Furnace nor were
                                                          
708This process of decentralization of coca paste production is very well analyzed by Dr. Jaime Malamud
Goti in “Smoke and Mirrors,” pp. 17 and 39. However during my research trip to the Chapare I could
verify that the way in which this “cottage industrialization” of the peasants occurs varies from peasant
community to peasant community depending on the attitude adopted by the local sindicatos (basic local
unit of the coca grower trade union federations). While some peasants work part time in the coca paste
transformation stage as employees at night others prefer to rent part of their land to the traffickers for
them to transform the coca paste. The land in the middle of the chaco ( spot of jungle) and was rented to
the trafficker for about 30$ a night (Interview with an agrarian specialist at Villa Tunari, Chapare, August
7, 1997). Nevertheless some peasant sindicatos are reluctant to do so in order to avoid becoming the
target of law enforcement and adopted a mechanism of “centinelas” (sentinels) that patrol the parcels in
order to avoid coca production on their land. (Interview with a former “dirigente” -leader- of a peasant
community in the Chapare, August 8, 1997).The situation of this latter group is especially dangerous
since they got caught in the crossfire between UMOPAR (for coca eradication) and the traffickers.
709DEA Intelligence Division, Worldwide Cocaine Situation, October 1993, p.31
710 See: “Anti-drug measures-Bolivian-U.S. Joint Operations,” Keesing’s Record of World Events,
,Volume XXXI, December 1986, p. 34,801.
711The declarations of the pilot and later findings by a UMOPAR personnel in the area would lead to the
conclusion that the laboratory belonged to a transnational organization. The pilot declared that the
gunmen spoke Portuguese (leading to beliefs that they were Brazilians) and the UMOPAR men found
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Kempff-Mercado and his team warned by the Bolivian authorities about the danger of landing
in the area. As explained by one analyst,
“Although the minister of the interior, the UMOPAR, and the DEA had also been informed that an
armed gang was protecting the cocaine hydrochloride laboratory, no action was taken to thwart the
illegal activity in Huanchaca or even to prevent the broadly announced tour of Kempff-
Mercado.”712
Other authors go as far to suggest that Huanchanca’s laboratory might have been part of
the drug trafficking network covered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in order to
finance the “Contras” in Nicaragua.713 As stated by two analysts,
“The Bolivian and Spanish press, for example, gave considerable attention to reports that a
notorious cocaine factory near Bolivia’s border with Brazil was financing the Nicaraguan
resistance. The story received a remarkable boost when the son of Bolivian drug lord Roberto
Suarez charged that the factory was actually controlled by the DEA and challenged Bolivian
authorities to let journalists see for themselves.”714
All these suspicious circumstances led to a congressional investigation, which sparked
escalation “à la colombienne” of drug traffickers’ reactive violence with death threats and the
assassination of one of the members of the congressional investigative committee. This
confirms the previous statement about Bolivia being a dormant volcano as far as drug
trafficking-related violence is concerned. When the “drôle the guerre” becomes a “guerre
serieuse” the dangers of a “Colombianization” of Bolivia are more than obvious. As stated by
one analyst,
“Bolivian drug interests surrounding the Huanchaca affair stretched beyond the jungle of northern
Santa Cruz. Active members of the congressional investigative committee received death threats to
deter them from pursuing the investigation further, and shortly after the committee’s report had
been submitted, Congressman Salazar, perhaps the foremost conductor of probe, was assassinated
in his hometown of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. It is presumed that Salazar, shot down in front of his
home by two men on a passing motorcycle in the Colombian style, had documents that entangled
high officials of the Paz-Estenssoro administration in the Huanchaca laboratories. But unlike
Colombia and Peru, violence of this kind is unusual in urban Bolivia today, and the Huanchaca
case remains one of the darkest incidents in the contemporary story of the drug war in Bolivia.”715
                                                                                                                                                                         
scattered literature in Spanish, Portuguese, and English on the site. .See: Malamud Goti, Smoke and
Mirrors, p. 52
712Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.52
713See: Oporto Castro, Henry, “Bolivia: el complejo coca-cocaína,” in García Sayán, Coca, Cocaína y
narcotráfico. Laberinto en los Andes, p.181. For a detailed analysis of CIA’s utilization of drug networks
for the financing of undercover operations in Central America see: Dale Scott, Peter and Marshall,
Jonathan, Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies and the CIA in Central America, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1991,279pp. See also: Garrido-Otoya, María Teresa, La guerre contre la cocaïne dans les
Andes: un autre piège au nom de la democratie, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales,
Memoire présenté en vue de l’obtention du Certificat d’études internationales, Geneva 1993, p.59
714Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, p.16
715Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 53
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Immediately after the end of the Blast Furnace operation, the Bolivian government
approved a very aggressive plan to curb the trafficking in Bolivia. The plan was called “Plan
Trienal de Lucha contra el Narcotráfico”(Three Years Plan for the Fight Against
Narcotrafficking).  It had the very ambitious (if not ludicrous) goal of eradicating 50,000
hectares of illegal coca by 1990, including half of the production in Yungas of La Paz (a region
where coca is grown for traditional purposes).716 The plan is important because it carefully
diagnoses the causes and consequences of the coca-cocaine problem in Bolivia, and clearly
defines drug trafficking as a threat to “the stability of all the institutions in the country,” “the
very consolidation of the National State,” and “the well-being of the population.”717 The goals
or the plan were:
1. Eradicate the excedentary [not for traditional use] coca plantations in Bolivia.
2.Economically compensate the destruction of coca in order to minimize its social and economic
impact.
3.Preserve the economic and political sovereignty of the National State against the penetration
of drug trafficking.
4.Recover the morality and values of society.
5.Protect the Bolivian Society from the political, economic, social, and moral effects of drug
trafficking.718
The plan was divided into two parts:
A development part included voluntary eradication with economic compensation
($2,000 per eradicated hectare) and a plan for post-eradication alternative economic
development. An enforcement part included the forcible eradication of all the illegal parcels
that remained after the voluntary eradication of coca. For this the government would use the
“direct participation of all government institutions especially the Armed Forces and the
Police.”719
These were very noble and surely well-intentioned goals. However, because of an
absence of national resources, the U.S. quid pro quo policy concerning aid, and above all
because of corruption concerning the management of funds, economic compensation in many
cases never come, would come late, or would come without other economic alternatives.720
                                                          
716Painter, Bolivia and coca,p.78
717“Plan Trienal de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico,” included in CEDIB, Coca-Cronología. Bolivia 1986-
1992, Centro de Documentación e Información –Bolivia (CEDIB) Cochabamba, 1992, see: pp.12 to 27.
718ibid., p. 20
719ibid., p. 25 (not underlined in the original and original in Spanish).
720Interview to a coca-growing peasant in the Chapare on August 8, 1997. On this matter see also: Tarqui
Jamira and Condo Riveros, Coca: El Legado de los Dioses o Locura de los Blancos, p.137; CEDIB, La
Abusurda Guerra de la Coca, p.46; Quiroga, Coca/Cocaína, p.70.
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The peasants would then take the $2,000 and go somewhere else to plant new coca or to
Argentina as migrants.721
The Three-Year Plan led to a new wave of peasant reactive and primitive violence that
would be only aggravated by the forthcoming policies. As reported,
“Former ministers Fernando Barthelemy (interior) and Edil Sandoval (rural affairs)-the main
architects of the drugs plan but sacked at end-February -as a result of U.S. pressure they, say- [in
fact Barthelemy was under investigation because of the Huanchaca incidents and would be fired
under suspicions of covering information about the laboratory] blame the U.S. for pushing for a
coca eradication plan which would entail the use of force. This policy, they warn, would lead to
clashes between police and peasants, given both the traditional role coca plays in society and its
importance in the cocaine trade. The Bolivian labor confederation (COB) has declared ‘a state of
emergency’ against the three-year plan and has called on peasants to block the roads in protest.”722
As soon as the plan was presented in early 1987, and as a preemptive movement against
the application of the eradication part of the Three-Year Plan, the peasants started a series of
mobilizations and roadblocks that would end in clashes with the army. As reported,
“Peasants have begun protesting against the government’s decision to begin the U.S.-backed
three-year coca eradication programme in July. The result so far: roads barricaded, some deaths
(five in all, say peasants) and promises of more unrest unless the government agrees to change
the plan. [...] Thousands of peasants in Bolivia’s coca-growing regions were blocking highways
in eastern provinces of Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and the low -lying areas of northern La Paz
province, preventing the transport of the supply of food and other goods into the towns. They
promised to take their protests to other parts of the country”723
Paz Estenssoro had not hesitated in mobilizing the army against the miner strikes and in
the beginning would adopt the same attitude towards the peasants. On May 26, 1987 the
cocaleros started to block all the main highways connected to the city of Cochabamba. More
than 10,000 people participated in the blockades.724 The peasants were also protesting against
the draft of the Controlled Substances Law (Ley de Substancias Controladas) that had been
approved by the Congress on March 31, 1987.725 The main demands were a reformulation of
the Three-Year Plan and the participation of peasant delegates in the elaboration of a new
policy. As far as the draft law is concerned, the issue at stake was that coca and coca production
were declared illegal. Peasants requested a special law for the regulation of production and
commercialization of coca that would not be included in a general law for the repression of drug
trafficking activities. In their view, only cocaine production and traffic should be declared
                                                          
721On this issue see: Wallon, Alain, Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues: La Drogue Nouveau
Désordre Mondial, Rapport 1992-93, , Paris, Hachette, 1993, p.256
722Latin American Weekly Report, WR-87-11,19 March 1987,p.2
723Latin American Weekly Report, WR-87,11 June, 1987, WR-87-22,p.2
724CEDIB, La lucha antidrogas ,p. 47
725Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, Coca legado de los dioses o locura de los blancos,p.124
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illegal.726 On May 28 the government mobilized the army to break the blockade. In the ensuing
meleé at least five people died (including an army conscript) and were several detained and
wounded. This episode came to be known “Parotani Massacre,” and led to an opening of
negotiations between the peasants and the government that came to an end in June 1987 with
the following agreement:727
• Agrarian reconversion would be implemented simultaneously with broad development
programs in the area.
• All concerned economic sectors (including of course the coca growing peasants’ trade
unions) would be involved in the planning and execution of alternative development
projects.
• Coca parcels would be voluntarily eradicated through a mutually agreed Integral Plan
for Development and Substitution (Plan Integral de Desarrollo y Substitución -PIDYS).
• Bolivia would insist upon an international commitment for a reduction in the goal
demand and the financial support for agrarian reconversion in Bolivia.
• The peasant organizations (federations) would intervene in the elaboration of a global
diagnostic to ensure adequate participation in the projects.
• In legal terminology, coca would not appear as a narcotic drug. The traditional and
ritual use of coca would be considered.
• The government would investigate all goods and fortunes of dubious origin.
• The government would assure the security of the settlers in the Isiboro-Sécure area (a
national park located within the Chapare the area is a zone of recent colonization).728
The peasants won a partial victory when the PYDIS, a mutually convened development
program, replaced the Plan Trienal, which was discarded. The PYDIS would be also included in
the final version of the law (Bolivian Law Nº 1008) approved by the Bolivian Congress in July
1988, which provided that alternative development would, by law, be one of the methods used
to curb drug trafficking in Bolivia. However, the law would clearly distinguish between legal
coca for ritual and traditional uses and coca “inter-criminis” for cocaine production. The law
would clearly indicate geographic areas for traditional production, excentary production subject
to voluntary eradication and complementary development activities (PIDYS), and illegal areas
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subject to forcible non-compensated eradication. James Painter describes this law in the
following terms:
“As promulgated in July 22, 1988, the law’s 155 articles provided the following:
*a traditional zone of coca production in two provinces of the Yungas (article 9);
* the establishment of 12,000 hectares of licit cultivation as that required to meet traditional
demands (article 29);
a transitional zone of excess production subject to annual reduction figures of 5,000 hectares
initially, and up to 8,000 hectares ultimately, in the Chapare [Although it was not spelled in out
in the law, the total amount to be reduced over a ten-year period was 35,000 hectares . New coca
plantings were also banned in the Chapare.(arts. 16 and 17 [and 31] ) Farmers growing coca in
the recent expansion area of the Yapacaní in the Santa Cruz department were given one year of
grace to reduce their plantings, during which they would be compensated and eligible for credit];
* that the meeting of these targets be conditional on the availability of financial resources from
national budget and on the disbursement of sufficient technical and financial cooperation from
multilateral and bilateral sources, which must be directed to alternative development (article 10);
*an illegal zone , in which coca cultivation is prohibited, comprising all territory outside the and
transitional areas. Existing cultivation will be subject to forced eradication without compensation
(article 11);
* a specific prohibition against the use of chemicals, herbicides, biological agents, and defoliants
for the reduction or eradication of coca. Only manual and mechanical methods will be used
(article 18);
*that all substitution of coca will be planned in a gradual and progressive manner, at the same
time as the execution of programs and plans of sustained socioeconomic development in the
transitional zones (article 22).”729
Nicely presented plans for total coca eradication in ridiculous time frameworks
continuously crashed against Bolivian socio-economic reality. The peasants’ gains in
emphasizing alternative development as a way to reduce the scope of coca growing would crash
against U.S. (and typically western) impatience for immediate results. Under U.S. pressure for
the fulfillment of eradication quotas, the emphasis would be put on the repressive side of law Nº
1008. And so it has been since February 1987, when the Paz Estenssoro administration signed a
bilateral agreement that resulted in even greater Bolivian reliance on U.S. assistance.730 This
treaty would fix the parameters of U.S -Bolivian relations in the years to come. The agreement
came into force on August 13, 1987 and is renewed annually through the exchange of
diplomatic notes, with annexes.731 At the time of the signing, Bolivia agreed to: carry out an
                                                          
729Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p. 79 Comments between brackets have been modified by the author from
endnote Nº 5 of Painter, op. cit. chapter 5.
730See: Gamarra, Eduardo, “U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts During the Paz Zamora
Administration: 1989-1992, in Bagley, Bruce and Walker III, William (eds.), Drug Trafficking in the
Americas, p.220
731As a matter of fact, the signing of two annexes to the agreement (1988 and 1989) tied U.S. assistance
to progress on crop substitution and [nominally] legitimized the Bolivian government’s alternative
development proposal. See: Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts: 1989-1992, p.220
Under Annexes I and II (1988 and 1989), Bolivia agreed to reduce coca paste and leaf production by
reducing the price of coca leaves, that is, reinforcing interdiction. In particular, Annex II tied U.S.
assistance to progress on crop substitution and legitimized the Bolivian government’s alternative
development proposal. This annex together with Annex III (signed in May 1990, it formalized
involvement of the army in counter narcotics operations) were kept secret until they were leaked to the
press in 1990 giving way to a wave of peasant resistance. See: CEDIB, La Absurda Guerra de la Coca,
259
effective interdiction program, set up mechanisms to eradicate coca, fight drug trafficking, and
enact a law banning cultivation of all coca used in the manufacture of cocaine.732
Law Nº 1008 was only part of the fulfillment of these terms. The treaty would give way
not only to an escalation in militarized enforcement, but also to increasing U.S. military and
DEA presence in Bolivia. In fact DEA agents in the field would also receive military training in
the U.S. and would participate (nominally as observers)wearing military fatigues in UMOPAR
interdiction operatives. As explained by one analyst,
“On April 10, 1987 the DEA initiated Operation Snowcap in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. A multifaceted
program to combat drug trafficking, Snow cap ran for eight years in Bolivia and focused on setting up
programs to suppress the drug trade and training Bolivians to run them. As part of operation Snowcap, the
DEA planned and oversaw the execution of major paramilitary-style operations to suppress drug
laboratories. These operations were carried out in conjunction with the UMOPAR. The main targets were
paste laboratories in the Chapare and refined cocaine laboratories hidden away in more remote areas of
the country like the Beni and the departments of Santa Cruz and Pando. These operations were modeled
on Operation Blast Furnace[...] which relied on small aircraft and UH-6 helicopters to carry UMOPAR
units to suspected laboratory sites and DEA aircraft to monitor and coordinate activities on the
ground.”733
“The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has continued to provide support for counternarcotics
operations in the region since the end of Operation Blast Furnace in 1986, with special attention to the
Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. U.S. Special Forces (Green Berets), based in Panama,
were first brought into Bolivia in 1987 and 1988 to give paramilitary training to UMOPAR. Mobile
training teams conducted five-week intensive courses in small unit tactics, map reading, jungle survival
and communications. By 1988 the U.S. was running six courses a year involving 60 to 80 UMOPAR
each[....]In 1989, SOUTHCOM formed the first Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs), combining personnel
from the different branches of the armed forces, with the stated information of improving intelligence
support for counterdrug operations [...]The official functions of the TAT’s are to : *Analyze intelligence
to determine drug trafficking trends; *Identify drug trafficking organizations; *Identify counterdrug
targets such as laboratories; *Support tactical operations; *Provide imagery support for counterdrug
ground operations; and *Provide target identification and location for counterdrug air operations.”734
On July 24, 1987 the Paz Estenssoro administration reorganized the drug law
enforcement bureaucracy. By decree Nº 21,666, President Estenssoro created the Special Force
for the Fight Against Narcotrafficking (Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico-
FELNC-).735 Actually the creation of such a force was part of the commitments agreed by
                                                                                                                                                                         
p.54 and 55 and Tarqui Jamira and Condo Rivero, Coca El legado de los Dioses o Locura de los Blancos,
p. 145
732See: Williams, Jacqueline, Waging the War on Drugs in Bolivia, Washington Office on Latin
America, WOLA Background Paper, February 28,1997, p.5
733Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit., p.14 SnowCap would also involve the participation of Coast Guard,
Border Guard and U.S. military personnel (for the training of UMOPAR, Blue Devils and Red Devils).
For a detailed description of Snowcap Operation see: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives, one Hundred First Congress, Second Session, “Operation Snowcap: Past,
Present and Future,” May 23, 1990, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.
734Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit.,p.18 See also: Operation Snowcap: Past, Present and Future, p.61
735 Until March 1996 the commander of the force was always a retired senior military officer but the
office of the Director General that can be either a civilian or a police officer has replaced the position.
The replacement of military officers as chiefs of the FELCN by police or civilian officers has been done
with the purpose of reducing the rivalry between the police and the armed forces. The army always
260
Bolivia in the 1987 U.S.-Bolivia Agreement on Narcotics Drugs. In article IV of its Annex II
the treaty established that,
“A.INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
1. For the development of the Three-Year Plan for the struggle against narcotics trafficking (interdiction
program and development program), a specialized organization will be created by the Government of
Bolivia to direct and coordinate the fight against narcotics trafficking in its different aspects.
2. To carry out its responsibilities, this specialized organization will be provided with the required
material, financial and human resources, as well as adequate incentives for the personnel assigned to
it.
3. Personnel of this organization responsible for the interdiction program will be rigorously selected and
will be assigned for a minimum period of two years.”736
The FELCN incorporated personnel from the Bolivian National Police (BNP) for
investigative tasks and UMOPAR for operative purposes (interdiction operations and support
for forced eradication), receiving logistical support from special units of the Navy (Blue Devils)
and the Air Force (Red Devils).737 Accommodating the army to drug law enforcement
activities has proven to be more difficult because of the historic role of the army in Bolivia in
the initiation of coups and repression of peasant and other grass roots organizations. Moreover
the Bolivian Constitution explicitly prohibits the military from playing a domestic law
enforcement role and the commanders of the army resisted becoming directly involved in
counternarcotics operations alleging risks of corruption. This was a clear and present fear
considering the past experience of the narco-dictatorship of García Meza. The army had no
permanent involvement in enforcement activities until April 1990.738An exception to this rule
was joint military and police operations in 1982 (Yapacaní episode) and the temporary
militarization of Chapare in 1984 by Siles Suazo, but the experience was considered negative
since at that time key officers of the Manchego Rangers Regiment had been bought off by drug
                                                                                                                                                                         
disliked the fact that UMOPAR was receiving more training and better weapons than similar military
units. See: Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit.p.22
736 U.S. Department of State, Agreement Between the United States of America and Bolivia, Annex II,
Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) 12053, Signed at La Paz February 24, 1987,pp.14 and
15.
737Bolivian Navy units that conduct counternarcotics operations on Bolivia’s rivers. The Blue devils
carry out regular Coast Guard duties patrolling Bolivia’s rivers, but with an emphasis on counternarcotics.
They receive training from the U.S. Coast Guards and, since 1988, from the special forces units of the
U.S. Navy (Seals). The Blue Devils also ferry UMOPAR forces. See: Williams,Jacqueline, p. 23. The
Red Devil Task force. Bolivian Air Force helicopters and pilots that support UMOPAR in
counternarcotics operations. The Task Force is equipped with U.S.-owned UH-1H helicopters and the
pilots have been trained by U.S. military personnel. In both cases (Blue and Red Devils) the Narcotics
Assistance Section of the U.S. department of state pays for fuel and maintenance. See, Williams,
Jacqueline, op.cit. p.23. In 1996 the FELCN was reformed and the armed forces (including the army)
formally included in its structure. This particular issue will be discussed later in this chapter.
738 On this issue see: Williams, Jacqueline,op.cit., p.29 and Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, pp.33
and 34
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traffickers. 739 Also the joint participation of army and UMOPAR forces had created a great
deal of tension and animosity that many wanted to avoid.
Violence escalated again while Law Nº 1008 was being discussed in the Bolivian
Congress and would escalate even more when the government attempted to enforce it. Reactive
violence from the peasants was aggravated by the everyday abuses and human rights violations
committed by the UMOPAR forces, with charges ranging from rape to petty stealing, robbery,
and destruction of private property.740
One of the most dramatic cases of upstream violence was the incident known as the
“Massacre of Villa Tunari.” In late June 1988, while Law Nº 1008 was being discussed in the
Congress, some 5,000 coca planters of the Chapare region forcibly occupied a post of
UMOPAR and the DIRECO offices in Villa Tunari. The peasants were trying to reach DIRECO
offices near an UMOPAR outpost to verify rumors about DIRECO experiments with herbicides
for the eradication of coca. Peasant rage was aggravated by the fact that, until mid-1988,
engineers from DIRECO utilized herbicides in spite of the government’s reiterated pledge that
chemicals would never be used in coca removal.741 Police mounted a counterattack and in the
ensuing battle seven peasants and one policeman were killed (three peasants were shot, and the
others were drowned in the Chapare River).742 In July 1988 a multisector investigative
commission formed by opposition congressmen, trade union leaders, the Catholic Church, and
the media concluded that in fact the peasants had started to occupy the DIRECO post by
jumping over the fence, however the clash allegedly started when one of the DIRECO officials
shot and killed a peasant.743 What followed was a massive occupation of the DIRECO post by
the peasants, which was repelled by the gunfire of UMOPAR personnel and, allegedly, of DEA
personnel.744 This bloody incident became a symbol (the victims became martyrs), and a
                                                          
739See: Menzel, op. cit., p.12
740 “They [UMOPAR] beat us a lot “Ellos pegan mucho” and always use tear gas “siempre usan el gas”
and they take money (when they find it) or labor tools “se llevan dinero si encuentran o implementos,”
interview with a former coca growing local leader (dirigente), Chapare, August 8, 1997. On this issue
also see: Sanabria, Harry, “The Discourse and Practice of Repression and Resistance in the Chapare,” in
Léons, Madeline Barbara and Sanabria, Harry (eds.), Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality, pp. 169-
190
741Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.37
742Latin American Weekly Report, 14 July 1988, WR-88-27, p. 8 and Coca-Cronología, p.19
743On this issue see: Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, op.cit. Annex 3 (page without number in the
original). It is worth noticing that the progressive Bolivian Catholic Church is the most credible
institution in Bolivian society. On the role of the Catholic Church in Bolivia see: Queiser Morales,
Bolivia. Land of Struggle, p. 131
744On this issue see: Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, op.cit. Annex 3 (page without number in the
original)
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peasant victory since the use of herbicides as an eradication method was later ruled out by Law
Nº 1008.745 As described by one analyst,
“ The 4,000 peasants who participated in the attack were organized by Julio Rocha, a top union
leader accused by Paz-Estenssoro officials of having close connections with the traffickers.
Whether the growers were driven by cocaine organizations or were spontaneously pursuing their
own interests, the turmoil demonstrates that they would not surrender their coca crops without
staunch resistance. The peasants were soon evicted from the UMOPAR barracks, but active
hostilities ceased only when the government promised to limit its original eradication plan.”746
Simultaneously, the militarized interdiction campaign implemented within the framework
of Operation Snowcap generated episodes of reactive violence from the drug traffickers and the
peasants employed in the transformation of coca-paste (downstream reactive violence). These
interdiction attempts also brought about corruption-related violence, that is violence between
(allegedly) Bolivian military personnel and UMOPAR/DEA personnel. One of these incidents,
probably the more significant during this period, is described below;
“In mid-1988, UMOPAR agents and their DEA advisers were transported by helicopter to Santa
Ana de Yacuma in the northern Beni where the notorious trafficker Jorge Roca (Techo de Paja)
had been spotted. Helicopters transporting the UMOPAR agents attempted to land on a plot
adjacent to the village but were forced to take off immediately when they were literally
surrounded by hostile peasants who bombarded the agents with a hail of stones[...] Then the
Undersecretary of the interior, Guillermo Perez-Beltrán, ordered a second attempt, and it was
launched on June 23 1989[...] This time the UMOPAR agents and their DEA advisers landed a
few miles away from Santa Ana, but they could not avoid drawing fire from traffickers operating
in the area as soon as they went into the village looking for Rivero-Villavicencio [another
kingpin]. The UMOPAR fired back, shooting down two of its antagonists and arresting Fernando
Roca-Ali, a half brother of Techo de Paja. In the middle of the shoot out, the traffickers
distributed arms among the villagers to repel the police raid. At that point, personnel from a
naval base a few kilometers north of the village approached the location, and they, too opened
fire on the UMOPAR personnel, intensifying an expanding shoot-out. A confusing battle
between Leopardos and a combination of naval forces, traffickers, and villagers ensued, and
when two villagers were killed by the UMOPAR, all of the villagers engaged in the scuffle[...]
The toll of this UMOPAR raid was four dead and several people wounded.[...] The outnumbered
Leopardos retreated to find shelter at the naval outpost from which they had earlier been attacked
[!]”747
                                                          
745Villa Tunari was, in 1997 (when I visited there), a beautiful and peaceful town. There is however a
monolith erected in memory of the victims at the exact place where the massacre took place. Through the
1990s, thanks to USAID and UNDCP aid, modern services (stone made roads are particularly beautiful)
have been built and the state has affirmed its presence in the area (there is a Police station and a school).
There were also some five star hotels being built in the area. And upper middle class people from La Paz
are visiting the area more and more as tourists. (Discussions with local people, August 1997.) UMOPAR
headquarters have been concentrated near Chimoré some miles east. In 1997 the region did not resemble a
“wild west area” at all. However, I had the impression of being in a potentially violent and non-controlled
areas in more recent colonies to the east of the Chapare. During a research excursion to this area and
while I was taking photos of coca plantations I was approached by a group of peasants handling machetes
who started to ask me in a very aggressive tone what I was doing there. Unfortunately for me I had left in
the jeep the  blue UN cap I had been given by UNDCP personnel (the head of the project had warned me
to use the cap all the time on the field). The communication was particularly difficult because of the poor
Spanish of the peasants (most of the colons use Quechua or Aymara as a first language).Fortunately the
FAO-UNDCP jeep was close by so I could wait locked in the car until the two engineers that were
travelling with me reassured the peasants.
746 Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 38
747Malamud Goti, pp.41-42
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Both episodes, the massacre of Villa Tunari and the “battle” of Santa Ana de Yacuma,
showed that in first place Bolivia is a relatively peaceful country compared to Colombia and
Peru but potential for escalation is strong. Second, areas such as the Pando and the Beni
are comprised of scattered drug trafficking fiefdoms. The Bolivian state may be able to bother
or harass traffickers with these kinds of operations but this does not mean that it is able to
exercise its territorial sovereignty over these areas. Third, fully involving the Bolivian armed
forces in enforcement operations against drug trafficking only worsens an already existent
problem of corruption. One must be really naive to believe the explanation of the Naval
Commander at Santa Ana, who alleged that he was resisting an invading force.748 But in some
ways,  the naval officer was right [!!!], since UMOPAR was invading Techo de Paja’s fiefdom
in the name of the Bolivian state....
Other versions of this story hold that some peasants were executed by UMOPAR and that
the naval forces defended them, or that the commanding naval officer was protecting the drug
trade, or both. The episode remains very confusing.749 Other authors support the idea of the
existence of a joint venture between the Bolivian Navy and drug traffickers that had been called
the “Puerto Villaroel” cartel operating in the Beni region. As a matter of fact, in October 1988,
eight high-ranking naval officers were dismissed by the High Naval Command as a way to
“encourager les autres.”750
In spite of his strong commitment to curbing the cocaine industry and all his noisy
counter-drug campaigns, Paz Estenssoro proved to be a besieged president. He was besieged at
once by American pressure, by the power of the coca-growing federations, by the territorial
control of the traffickers, and by the corruption within the state. At the end of his term his coca-
eradication goals were far from being accomplished, and the flow of coca base out of Bolivia
increased as well as that of cocaine. After the strengthening of enforcement in Colombia in
1985, members of the Medellín Cartel had begun to produce more and more cocaine in Bolivian
territory and Bolivian traffickers opened up a new path to a growing market: Europe.
A weak state had been matched again by an illegal industry and the problem had been
made worse by U.S. pressure for immediate results without consideration of the long-term
development strategy that would be necessary to reduce the coca-growing problem in Bolivia.
The chronology bellow illustrates the reactive and preemptive spiral of violence by coca
growing peasants during this period:
                                                          
748 Malamud Goti, p.42
749ibid. 42
750See: Oporto Castro, Bolivia: El complejo coca-cocaína, p.178
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Some episodes of drug trafficking related peasant (upstream) reactive and preemptive violence:
January 1986- 17,000 coca growers surrounded 245 “Leopards” (UMOPAR policemen) near the Chapare
town of Ivirgarzama isolating the detachment for five days.
July 1987- Coca growing peasants block reads going to Cochabamba as a protest against the application
of the Three-Year Plan. In clashes with the army, five peasants and a soldiers die.
June 1988- Seven peasants and one policeman killed while the police was rallying the forcible occupation
by peasants of  DIRECO´s offices in Villa Tunari. Peasants were protesting against the utilization of
herbicides for eradication purposes.
January 1989- The coca-growing leader Evo Morales questioned DEA and UMOPAR actions to
“forcefully” eradicate coca plantations in the semitropical plateau of Chapare. The peasant leader said that
peasants would organize to defend their rights and to retaliate if they were attacked by DEA and
UMOPAR personnel.
Sources: Lee, The White Labyrinth p. 62; Latin American Weekly Report, WR-87-22, June 11, 1987, p.2
and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) report, FBIS-LAT-90-012, p.45
f)  Ambiguous “war on drugs games” and preemptive de-escalation: President Jaime Paz
Zamora’s administration (1989-1993) 751
“The problem is presented incorrectly because many may start to believe that U.S. dominance in the
country is reduced to its military presence. The important thing is not whether the U.S. stays or leaves
,but that they come when they feel like and is even worse [sic]. As long as the U.S. does not realise that
narcotrafficking has to be fought without affecting the economic interests of the peasants and the Bolivian
people, these kinds of operations will not be successful [...] Unless there is a programme of fair
compensation that encourages farmers to plant, say, coffee instead of coca, the population will not
support these measures”752
“1.Requirements for the Bolivian Armed Forces.
a. Bolivian Army.
-Equip and train two light infantry battalions for counternarcotics operations.
-Equip and train an engineers battalion for Civic Action.
-Equip and train a transport battalion.
-Equip and train a supplies and services battalion.” 753
Social Democrat Jaime Paz Zamora (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario-MIR-)
was elected president in May 1989 by Congress with the support of his former rival Hugo
Banzer (ADN) and took power on August 6. In return for its support, the ADN was given
important positions in a government coalition of ‘national unity’, under a ‘Patriotic Accord’.
Although the MIR gained the presidency by means of the pact, the ADN controlled the vice-
presidency and ten of the eighteen cabinet slots, including the critical Finance and Planning
Ministries, which determined economic policy. In addition, former General Banzer, who had
                                                          
751 Most of the information for the writing of this section has been gathered from Gamarra, Eduardo,
“Gamarra, Eduardo, “U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts During the Paz Zamora Administration:
1989-1992, in Bagley, Bruce and Walker III, William (eds.), Drug Trafficking in the Americas,pp. 217-
256. References to any other sources will be specifically quoted.
752 Declarations of Jaime Paz Zamora as leader of Bolivia’s Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
(MIR), on the presence of U.S. troops in Bolivia, Latin American Weekly Report, October 23, 1986, WR-
86-41, p.6
753Annex III to the U.S.-Bolivia Narcotics Control Agreement, Signed by President Jaime Paz Zamora, in
May 1990, Text in CEDIB, Coca-Cronología, p.411 Original in Spanish.
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twice sacrificed the opportunity of regaining the presidency, was delegated undefined powers
behind the throne as head of a bipartisan council for “political decisions.” Strange couple. 754
The neoliberal policy of the previous government would be maintained and deepened in
the style of “democracy with authority.” The state of siege was to be used as a tool to overcome
public sector labor strikes against austerity and privatization plans. This is to say that the
situation of growing unemployment (with stability, of course) did not help in countering the
continuous shift of people to the underground side of the national economy, meaning
cocaine.755
Paz Zamora’s drug control policy would be more than ambiguous.756 Following a
position he had sustained before being elected president, he would ask for increased
responsibility in demand-reduction efforts in consumer countries, and more support for
alternative rural development programs in international forums and meetings (as the Cartagena
Summit in 1990 and San Antonio Summit in 1992). He sustained that this was the way to
counterbalance the coca-cocaine economy. His motto since the beginning of his administration
was “coca for development”(coca por desarrollo). He would also try to break the bilateral
“diplomacy of coca” with the United States by trying to create more European interest in the
matter and by attracting help from European governments for alternative development plans. He
also enacted a repentance decree, following the example of Gaviria in Colombia, in order to
prevent the initiation of an escalation of violence with the drug traffickers. 757 The decree was
enacted in late July 1991 and gave the traffickers a period of 120 days after that date to turn
themselves in along with their laboratories in exchange for a guarantee of non-extradition.
It is true that thanks to that decree (Supreme Decree Nº 22,881), most of the “most
wanted” traffickers turned themselves in. It is also true that the sentences they received were too
lenient (five years in prison), and that not only were these traffickers able to run their business
from prison but had also designated successors that would keep running the business during
                                                          
754See: Queiser Morales,Bolivia. Land of Struggle,p. 106 and Smith, Clifford, op.cit., p. 119
755This recipe of combining a populist and (sometimes young) and charismatic leader surrounded by
“Chicago school economists” in order to adopt IMF-advised austerity plans would be adopted
simultaneously in the rest of Latin America. This was the case in Venezuela with Carlos Perez, Argentina
with Carlos Menem, Brazil with Collor de Mello, and Peru with Alberto Fujimori. Banzer, who is a very
skillful politician, probably thought that it was not the time for a former dictator to be in charge of
unpopular measures so he probably decided to let his power grow in the shadow of Paz Estenssoro first,
then Paz Zamora, and later Sanchez de Losada. It would be possible also to speculate that in a period of
growing diplomatic U.S. pressure over the cocaine issue, Banzer was an undesirable candidate due to his
alleged past links with the Santa Cruz mafia. Or both.
756 For a very good analysis of U.S.-Bolivian counternarcotics efforts during Paz Zamora’s
administration see: Gamarra, Eduardo, U.S. Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts During the Paz Zamora
Administration: 1989-1992,pp.217 -256
757Following the Colombian example, this treaty granted softer sentences and non-extradition to the U.S.
in exchange for voluntary surrender to the traffickers.
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their forced “holidays.”758 U.S. law enforcement agents affirm that in fact the surrender of the
traffickers was caused by a successful operation  against Santa Ana de Yacuma from March to
June 1991 (Operation Safe Haven).759 (By this they meant that, this time, UMOPAR troops
and DEA agents were at least able to safely land in the town and search for the traffickers and
make arrests.) In my view both the improvement of law enforcement operations (after a period
of trial and error) and the opportunity of going to prison in a “friendly” environment contributed
to this massive surrendering.
On the other side, Paz Zamora had to face the predominance of the United States in the
Western Hemisphere, growing U.S. pressure after the George Bush’s Andean Initiative (which
as we have seen included further militarization as a main component).  He also had to deal with
the fulfillment of the goals outlined previous (in the U.S.-Bolivia Agreement and its Annexes I
and II) and recent (in Annex III and revision of Annexes I and II ) agreements, as well as the
application of the Law Nº 1008. 760 This ambiguity led to a series of confusing and erroneous
signals being sent to every internal and external player, which in turn brought about new ups
and downs in drug trafficking-related violence as well as an increase in U.S. pressure, thus
reinforcing the cycle.761
                                                          
758CEDIB, La Abusurda Guerra de la Coca, p.67; Laserna, Roberto, “Bolivie: la politique antidrogue du
gouvernement Sánchez de Losada,” Problèmes d’Amérique Latine, N.28, 1998, p.99;
759 This looks to me more like a question of hurt personal/institutional pride than an accurate assessment
of reality, since the results of the Safe Haven operation were far from reaching the targets. “Despite all
the hoopla, however, the operation’s success was arguable. Not a single major or minor drug lord was
arrested.” Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia, p.233. See also, Painter, op.cit., p82
760This is the ever-present dilemma of Bolivian administrations. On one side, Law Nº 1008 is very clear:
all coca in illegal areas must be forcibly eradicated, all new coca in excedentary areas must be forcibly
eradicated, and all old coca not eradicated during the period given during for voluntary eradication must
be eradicated. On the other hand, the government hesitates to go a step further in forcible eradication
because of the fear of initiating a civil war in the Chapare. The violent attitude of the peasants is
sometimes considered by the government to amount to blackmail (chantaje) with the goal of preventing
the enforcement of the law. Interview with a high-ranking official of SUBDESAL (Subsecretaría de
Desarrollo Alternativo- Secretaría de Defensa Social, Ministerio de Gobierno, Bolivia), La Paz, August,
1997.
761See: Gamarra, Eduardo, U.S. Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts During the Paz Zamora Administration:
1989-1992, pp. 217 -256
Ambassador Raúl Alconada Sempé, at the time undersecretary for Latin American Affairs of the Foreign
Affairs Ministry (1985-1989), affirmed during an interview that in Argentine diplomatic circles the
Bolivian position “coca for development” was particularly irritating. In the view of Alconada’s office,
Bolivia had an ethical and moral commitment to enforce the drug laws, independent of increased help for
development. (As we will see, in the late 1980’s, Argentina had became a main transit route for cocaine
produced in Bolivia, and started to grow as a consumption market for the drug.) Interview with
Ambassador Alconada Sempé, Buenos Aires, July 1997).
I should add that, leaving moral and ethical issues aside, because of its economic vulnerability and
dependency, Bolivia was not in a position to assume this kind of foreign policy. As a matter of fact,
President Fujimori would adopt a similar position, going so far as to declare coca growing as a crime. But
again Peru has a less dependent and more diversified economy as well as higher priorities (declaring coca
legal was part of his policy for denying peasant support to Shining Path in the Upper Huallaga Valley).
On this issue see: Dreyfus, Pablo, “Sendero Luminoso: ¿Un caso de Narcoterrorismo?,” Boletín Saap,
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For the reasons explained at the beginning of this chapter Bolivia would became an
experimental field for policies stemming from President Bush’s Andean Initiative. As shown in
the previous section, the image of Bolivia as a relatively peaceful country proved to be wrong.
Paradoxically (as almost everything in the “war on drugs”), the U.S. would keep insisting on
further militarization of enforcement. As explained by one analyst,
“ Primarily because of the absence of guerrilla groups and few visible violent drug lords, Bolivia
became a critical player in the implementation of the strategy. U.S. aid nearly doubled, a multi-
agency task force consolidated its activities throughout Bolivia and the U.S. mission became the
second largest in Latin America.”762
The importance given to Bolivia in the framework of the application of the Andean
Initiative would also be marked by the designation of Robert Gelbard as ambassador to that
country. As former Secretary for Latin American Affairs with the U.S. Department of State,
Gelbard was the highest State Department official ever to serve in La Paz (and probably in Latin
America). Gelbard would prove to be a very active and intrusive player in the implementation of
Bolivian drug control policies.763
Gelbard would go so far as to suggest the highest level of militarization defined in this
dissertation. That is: the establishment of a multinational or regional strike force that may have
included an U.S. military contingent. This proposal was made in the U.S. and never made public
in Bolivia. As stated by one analyst,
“While this proposal was never made public in Bolivia, it was discussed in great detail in the
U.S. Congress, the United Nations, and finally in a meeting between U.S. state department and
Bolivian government officials.”764
Facts demonstrate that these suggestions did not prosper, most likely because of Latin
American opposition.765  The forceful eradication (with no compensation to farmers) stipulated
in Law Nº 1008 began in 1991, mainly as a result of fierce pressure from the U.S. government
to stop new coca from being planted in the Chapare (Article 31 of law 1008).766 By that time, it
was evident that most peasants were taking the $2,000 in compensation and moving deeper in
the jungle in order to plant more coca. This was becoming increasingly irritating to the U.S.
government.767 The beginning of forced eradication against newly-planted coca and coca in
illegal areas led to a new high in reactive violence from the peasants. By 1988 the system of
                                                                                                                                                                         
Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político, Nº 8, 1999 pp. 3-32 and Dreyfus, Pablo “When All the Evils
Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in Peru´s Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995,”
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol.15, Nº4,1999, pp.370-396
762 Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivian Counternarcotics Efforts: 1989-1992, p.221
763See: ibid.p. 222.
764Gamarra, ibid, p.223
765 The domestic (in the U.S.) and international factors reasons that frustrated these initiatives are fully
analyzed in Chapter IX of this dissertation.
766Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p. 87
767Painter, op.cit.,p89
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peasant self-defense (grupos de autodefensa) formed by the local sindicatos had reached a high
level of organization and effectiveness.768 These self-defense groups would put physical
obstacles in the road (tranqueras) in order to make access for UMOPAR vehicles more difficult
and positioned groups of sentinels to warn the rest of the community (comunidad) when
escorted DIRECO teams were arriving by exploding dynamite. This would lead from a peaceful
blockade of roads to the stoning of the approaching eradication team. For example,
“As a result of U.S. pressure, some DIRECO eradication teams went out accompanied by
UMOPAR forces, which led to some nasty clashes and a general rise in the level of tension in the
Chapare. From January to August 1991. DIRECO forcibly eradicated over 500 hectares of
‘illegal coca’ that they said had been planted since the passing of Law 1008. The coca farmers
often denied it, which further exacerbated the tension. In the worst incident, in August, one
peasant was killed and several wounded after armed farmers confronted UMOPAR.”769
“On August 22, a communiqué from the ministry of information confirmed that a coca grower
died of gunshot wounds. According to the communiqué, UMOPAR troops fired a round as they
attempted to defend DIRECO officials who had initiated the forceful eradication of coca in the
Chapare. The communiqué claimed that campesinos destroyed nine trucks and that UMOPAR
fired off a warning round which unfortunately struck the campesino.”770
Faced to a new escalation of violence, DIRECO accorded a truce with the growers in
September 1991 and agreed not to use UMOPAR in forced eradication exercises. Farmers
continued to voluntarily eradicate significant amounts of coca in late 1991 and early 1992 only
to take the money and move to replant in new areas.771 One may ask not only “who is cheating
on whom?” but also “who is mocking whom here”?772 Paz Zamora promised alternative
development as the bulwark of his policy (and the U.S. recognized the need for it in the
Cartagena Summit) but was forced to increase eradication under U.S. pressure. The U.S.
government recognized that alternative development was necessary but only after eradication
goals had been achieved. Paz Zamora could not fulfill eradication goals without risking a civil
war with the peasants.
The other cause of a growing preventive threat of peasant violence was the so-called
“militarization” of enforcement in Bolivia. The issue at stake after the multilateral Cartagena
Summit was the full involvement of the armed forces in the Andean countries for counterdrug
activities. As shown in this chapter, the enforcement had already been militarized to a lesser
extent in Bolivia. However, the fact that the army could get involved in enforcement activities
                                                          
768Tarqui Jamira and Condo Rivero, Coca, El legado de los dioses...., p.159 see also: Sanabria, The
Discourse and Practice of Repression and Resistance in the Chapare, p. 186
769 Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p.88
770Gamarra, U.S-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts, p.238
771See: Painter, Bolivia and Coca, pp. 88 and 89
772In reference to the interaction between the Bolivian and U.S. drug control bureaucracies Malamud Goti
actually entitled one the sections of his book “Who is cheating on whom?” See: Malamud Goti,op.cit.,
p.65
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against drug trafficking provoked a reaction from the peasants who rightly perceived themselves
as the easier and more identifiable target for military operations.
In May 1990, after some hesitation, Paz Zamora signed Annex III to the 1987 U.S.-
Bolivia Narcotics Control Agreement. The treaty (quoted at the beginning of this section)
dramatically expanded the participation of the Bolivian military, particularly the army, in drug
law enforcement activities in exchange for increased military aid from the United States. The
most conflictive point of the agreement was that two infantry battalions would be trained by
U.S. instructors and equipped specifically for antidrug activities.
It is very likely that Paz Zamora signed Annex III with the goals of maintaining the
inflow of alternative development funds from the U.S. and of avoiding retaliation from that
country. However the credibility of the President vis à vis the peasants was further damaged by
this move. In fact Paz Zamora’s dream of coca por desarrollo (“coca for development”) clashed
from the beginning with the reality of U.S. predominance in the region. And even if he was able
to attract some funds from Western Europe for specific and localized development programs,
reality would also show him that the Monroe Doctrine was alive and kicking in terms of the
drugs issue as well. As explained by one analyst,
“One minister explained that the Bolivian economy was so dependent on bilateral aid from the
United States, and on multilateral aid from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (where the United States exerts a huge influence),
that it was virtually impossible to resist the pressure.”773
As soon as news of the treaty leaked to the Bolivian press, the opposition and influential
sectors--such as the Catholic Church, the COB, and most of the major newspapers and leading
academics (as well as some warnings from the armed forces about the inconvenience of the
policy)--started to bombard the president with criticism concerning his decision. The president
came under fire for bowing to U.S. pressure but also because of the (absolutely justified) fear
that involving the army in counter-narcotic operations would awake the devils of drug
trafficking-related corruption in the military.
The reaction of the coca-growing peasants was quick, and came in the form of threats of
direct confrontation with the state. For example in July, August, November 1990,
“[c]ampesino unions carried out road blockades and strikes, announced the establishment of armed
campesino defense committees, and called on campesinos in general to dodge compulsory military
service.”774
However under growing U.S. pressure and encouraged by the congressional support that
the “Patriotic Accord” granted him, Paz Zamora continued with the fulfillment of Annex III
terms. Finally, in mid-March 1991 it was again leaked to the press that U.S. Army advisors
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would be sent to train 500 members of the “Manchego Battalion” at the Montero military base
(the same base where, in the 1960s, the same regiment had been trained to fight against Che
Guevara’s guerrillas). After Congressional final approval, on April 5 the advisors and ninety
tons of ammunition for the army were being unloaded from an U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy at La
Paz Airport.
This again provoked fierce opposition from the peasants that would, this time, be
successfully repressed by the government.  It indicated, however, the potential of confrontation
with the government if the policy of involving of the army continued. Finally, because of
increasing internal political pressure and apparently because of an U.S. fear that this would end
up in forcible eradication, further army involvement was stopped in 1992. As explained by two
analysts,
“One new element was that the country’s main left-wing party, the MBL (Movimiento de Bolivia
Libre), started legal proceedings against three ministers for violating the constitution by not
securing the approval of the congress before signing the May 1990 agreement.[...] It [also]
seemed that U.S. officials were fed up with the political costs of the policy, with the reluctance
of the army to carry out operations, and with the lack of results.”775
“The timing of the congressional inquiry into foreign policy matters coincided with another
congressional investigation into the sale of military real state (land) by members of the cabinet to
a retired officer without proper authorization from the legislative body. The political fallout was
tremendous: the Minister of Defense the commanders of each branch of the armed forces, and
the commander-in-chief were all forced to resign. Once again, the image of the armed forces was
tarnished by the corrupt actions of a few officers and their civilian co-conspirators. For all
practical purposes this was the final straw that determined the army’s withdrawal from the drug
war.”776
In fact, the only interdiction operation (Operation “Definite Notice”) involving the
Manchego regiment would take place in October 1991 in a remote east area of Santa Cruz (very
far away from the Chapare).  The operation brought scant results (again apparently due to a leak
of information that allowed the traffickers to flee before the arrival of the troops).777
This attempt to further involve the armed forces in drug law enforcement operations had
another effect. It contributed to increase the rivalry between the army and UMOPAR and it
enhanced cases of inner-system violence related to drug trafficking. As explained by Jaime
Malamud Goti,
“The stress on drug enforcement in Bolivia has led to contradictory outcomes. In spite of the
importance given by U.S.-Bolivian officials to enforcement, the special body created to carry out
the task, the UMOPAR, is under equipped because of interference from rival Bolivian military
officers, some of whom believe that the Leopardos are totally corrupt and that, having sold their
loyalty to the U.S. Embassy, they cannot be differentiated from the DEA. The commander of the
Barrientos Battalion, Colonel Rodriguez, while getting his troops ready for the war on drugs,
                                                                                                                                                                         
774Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts, p.229
775Painter, op.cit.,p.101
776Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts,p.242
777Painter, op.cit.,p100
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stated in May 1990 that the task of the military should be to first terminate the UMOPAR and
then carry out the assignment against drug manufacturers and dealers.”778
This very eloquent veiled threat would materialize during 1990 and 1991 under very
dubious circumstances. Violence increased due to institutional hegemonic competition over the
war on drugs, or corruption, or both combined. According to an  account by one analyst,
“The army’s declared animosity against the UMOPAR and the DEA proved to be serious[...] Officers
from the Barrientos regiment, which is situated on the road from the town of Cochabamba to the
Chapare, arrested three DEA agents on the grounds that the men were not carrying adequate personal
credentials[...] On May 7 [1990] a group of young army officers attacked four UMOPAR agents near
their barracks in Villa Tunari. After suffering threats and provocations from a dozen troopers from the
Barrientos regiment at a canteen near Villa Tunari, three of the UMOPAR agents managed to escape.
The fourth, however, a corporal named Pedro Mariani, was caught by his tormentors [....] There
[Barrientos barracks] he was almost beaten to death[...] In May 1990, the second in command of the
UMOPAR Chapare outpost at Chimoré was Major Ramiro Ortega, and through an internal
memorandum, he reported another perplexing incident to the commander of the Bolivian special
forces, General Añez. The memorandum said that on May 10, at 10 A.M. , ‘army personnel opened
fire on our helicopters to deter them from flying over their encampment. To avoid a confrontation, we
immediately flew away’[...] Also in May 10, a bloody occurrence in the Chapare village of Insinuta
raised suspicions of further army aggression against the UMOPAR. A hand grenade thrown at a
UMOPAR officer sitting at a bar killed the agent and four civilians, including a four-year old, and also
wounded several bystanders.[...] UMOPAR officers and regular-policemen conducting the
investigation grew increasingly suspicious that the military stationed in the Chapare had been behind
the event, as examination of the grenade shrapnel indicated that the explosive was of the type that only
the army has access too.”779
Was it institutional rivalry for taking over command of the war on drugs? Was the
violence linked to army corruption? Or both? Most likely the latter is the answer. It must be
kept in mind that, as shown earlier in this chapter, corruption in the Manchego regiment had
deterred President Paz Estenssoro from utilizing the army in counternarcotics operations. But
most important, these kinds of episodes resemble the kind of violence between a corrupt
military involved in enforcement operations and a probably no less-corrupt special police force
in Peru’s Upper Huallaga Valley. 780 The chronology bellow illustrates the reactive and
preemptive spiral of violence carried out by coca growing peasants during this period:
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779Malamud Goti, op.cit. pp.78 to 81
780See: Dreyfus, Cocaine,the military and Shining Path, 1980-1995.
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Some episodes of drug trafficking related peasants (upstream) reactive and preemptive violence:
September 1989- “Speaking to the media they [the coca growing peasants] reported that despite
instructions issued by the interior minister to UMOPAR and promises that violence would be avoided,
peasant settlers have again been subject to violent actions. In view of this, the peasants say they will block
the main Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Road.”
April 1991-“The Single Trade Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers warned that military
maneuvers in coca-producing zones may provoke confrontations between coca planters and army
personnel.”
Sources: FBIS-LAT-89-183, p.24 and FBIS-LAT-91-084, p.25
g) “More of the same”: President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s administration (1993-
1997)
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada had been the architect of President Paz Estenssoro’s New
Economic Policy. Lozada made a pragmatic electoral alliance with the Aymaran leader of the
indigenist Movimiento Revolucionario Túpaj Katari de Liberación (MRTKL), and Mr. Víctor
Hugo Cárdenas, who ran as vice president. By doing so, he obtained the decisive support of
Indian voters. The economic policy would be the same: adjustment. Again, the government
mobilized the army to suppress miner strikes as well as unions from public services and again
the MNR government would show high resolve in curbing drug trafficking through forcible
eradication. The period of Sanchez de Lozada’s presidency could be defined as the years of
higher preemptive and reactive peasant drug trafficking-related violence and no results...
Sanchez de Lozada carried out a major reform not only in the drug control sector but also
in all the structure of the government ministries, which were reduced from 17 to 10. The
Ministry of Agriculture and Interior were merged into the Ministry of Home Office (Ministerio
de Gobierno). This means that, through the Secretaría de Defensa Social (Social Defense
Secretary,  an inter ministerial council), all drug control policies would be considered in the
Home Office area. In 1996 Sanchez de Lozada also reformed the FELNC, formally introducing
the Navy (“Blue Devils” force) the Airforce (“Red Devils”) force and the Army (“Green
Devils” force) for logistical support (mainly transportation for UMOPAR).781 Also a Policía
Ecológica (Ecological Police) was created in order to work with DIRECO in the eradication of
coca.782 They wear sand-colored uniforms to distinguish them from the Leopardos, and are
armed with machetes. However when peasant resistance is really strong, UMOPAR intervenes.
                                                          
781On this issue see: Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit., pp. 22-30
During my research trip to the Chapare, it was possible to witness how UMOPAR troops (it was possible
to see them coming and going all the time) were transported by U.S.-made army military trucks from the
Green Devils. Helicopters of the Red Devils (Huey helicopters) could be seen taking off and landing
every day from Chimoré headquarters.
782Williams, Jacqueline,op. cit., p.27
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At the beginning of his administration, Sanchez de Lozada tried to enforce Law Nº 1008
by forcibly eradicating illegal coca. The result was an escalation of violence throughout the year
1994. As an analyst explains,
“As the government stepped up antinarcotic efforts in early 1994, conflict soon erupted.
Violence broke out in the Chapare in February 1994 forcing the government to abandon its
eradication program. More unrest followed in June 1994 with the start of Operation New
Dawn783 a major counternarcotics offensive in the Chapare. In September thousands of coca
growers arrived on La Paz to protest the government’s eradication policies.”784
According to the sources consulted for this dissertation no there was (at least officially)
no direct involvement of the Bolivian Army or U.S. forces in enforcement activities against
drug trafficking during Sanchez de Lozada’s’ administration. 785 However, in March 1996, the
army inaugurated a new training center in the Chapare using an existing agricultural research
facility at Santa Rosa. The opening of this base in the Chapare has generated a great deal of
concern about the perceived “militarization” of the Chapare. These fears have been fueled by
recent reports of soldiers participating directly in eradication operations.786
It is worth remarking that the Andean Strategy came to an end in 1994 (it was a five year
strategy). However, the Clinton administration kept insisting on the involvement of South
American armed forces in enforcement against drug trafficking. As explained by one analyst,
“Apart from greater emphasis on source country efforts, the Clinton administration basically continued
the policies mapped out by President Bush in the Andean Initiative. Taking on Republican critics who
have tried to portray “soft on drugs,” Clinton has stepped-up strong-arm tactics with Andean leaders.”787
The situation worsened in mid-November 1994 when the president presented a very
original but very radical plan for curbing drug trafficking in the Chapare. The plan was called
                                                          
783On July 15 1994, joint forces, including more than 700 police personnel (UMOPAR) and other
sections of the FELCN, initiated an antidrug operation in the Chapare and Santa Cruz scheduled to last 60
days. The objective was to control highways, bridges, and borders in order to control drug trafficking.
Andean Commission of Jurists, Drug Trafficking Update, August 1994, p.3 Operation New Dawn was
supported by personnel of the U.S. South Command (SOUTHCOM) at the time based in Panama.
Between July 1 and 6, 1996 SOUTHCOM also supported law enforcement operation Hurricane in the
Chapare using U.S. radar to pinpoint coca seed maceration pits and cocaine laboratories. Williams,
Jacqueline, op.cit., p.18
784Williams, Jacqueline,op.cit. p13
785 I employ the word “officially” because in the periods under study, U.S. special forces (U.S. Navy
Seals) had been conducting riverine operations in the Beni. As reported by Eduardo Gamarra “A two part
article in the June 1991 editions of Soldier of Fortune traced the path of elite Navy Seals patrolling the
rivers of the Beni department. These operations were unknown to most Bolivians, including their elected
representative in the National Congress,” Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotic Efforts, p.232
786According to Jacqueline Williams, op.cit. p.29. “In December 1996, WOLA received disturbing
reports that Bolivian conscript soldiers are now participating directly in eradication efforts. According to
Cathy Breen, member of the Andean Information network, in the Villa 14 de Septiembre area of the
Chapare, soldiers were forced to carry out crop eradication,” Williams, Jacqueline, ibid, p.23
787Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit, p.7
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Opción Cero (Option Zero) and caused the highest levels of violence of the period under
analysis in this chapter. Option Zero was described in the following terms by one analyst,
“In exchange for two to three billion dollars of international economic aid, the state would agree
to “buy out” all peasant land holdings in the Chapare. After compensating them for their lands,
crops, and investments on their landholdings, the state would then resettle all of the tens of
thousands of peasant households to other parts of the country, regardless of whether they
cultivated coca or not. Resettlement was to proceed principally in Santa Cruz and the eastern
(Chaco) segments of the Departments of Tarija and Chuquisaca. There the new arrivals and their
families would be provided land grants by the state and they would be supplied with capital and
technical assistance that would allow them to establish new and viable economies. Furthermore,
all Chapare lands formerly claimed by the peasantry would revert back to state control , and the
region would somehow be sealed off to future peasant settlement. Finally, unfettered by
clamorous and troublesome peasants, the state would then have a free hand to transform the
Chapare (with an area of over 24,000 square kilometers) into either an enormous national park,
that would supposedly form the basis of a thriving tourist industry, or convert the entire region
into a powerful investment pole for private business interest.”788
This seemed an excellent idea that would certainly solve not only the drug problem but
also all of Bolivia’s economic troubles. President Sanchez de Lozada forgot one small detail:
What if the peasants do not want to leave? Well, they did not want to leave.
Faced with violent peasant resistance, Option Zero was abandoned.789 Even if Sanchez
de Lozada had promised to de-narcotize the bilateral relations with the United States, reality
proved that “he who has the gold makes the rules.” As a matter of fact, the Clinton
administration did not want to de-narcotize relations with Bolivia. After the failure of Option
Zero, Sanchez de Lozada’s drug control policy would be completely erratic and subordinated to
U.S. threat of de-certification .The result was a succession of attempts at forcible eradication
that ended up in clashes between very well armed self-defense groups. Peasant violence was
provoked by a return of the army to interdiction operations this time in the Chapare in 1994.790
As reported by one analyst,
“Faced with such wild opposition, the government, in a major publicity campaign reiterated that
Opción Cero was simply a plan in the “study” stage and that international agencies had simply
asked to provide funds to study its feasibility [...].Such statements were often repeated between
December 1994 and January 1995.”791
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America, Va, Department of Anthropology College of William and Mery, 1995, p. 85
789A high ranking UNDCP official commented to me during a research trip to Vienna in April 1995 that
forceful implementation of Option Cero would have meant civil war.
790For a very detailed analysis of Sanchez de Losada’s drug control policy see: Laserna, Roberto, Bolivie:
la politique antidrogue du gouvernement Sánchez de Losada, Problèmes d’Amérique latine, Nº 28,
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791Sanabria, Elusive Goals, p. 97
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Sanchez de Lozada’s erratic policy was merely a response to American pressure and to
the peasant responses, provoking continuous ups and downs of violence in the Chapare region,
which lasted until the last year of his administration. By the time this author visited the region,
General Banzer had won the elections, had assumed the presidency and was already talking
about total militarization of Chapare. The situation was one of calm between two summer
storms. The chronology bellow illustrates the reactive and preemptive spiral of violence by coca
growing peasants during this period:
Some episodes of drug trafficking related upstream reactive and preemptive violence:
February 1994-Some 15,000 coca growers staged a demonstration on February 25-26 at Chapare,
Cochabamba Department, protesting against the compulsory eradication of their plantations, which have
bee occupied by forces of UMOPAR. In clashes on February 26, 18 coca growers were injured and 78
arrested.
March 1994- In a conflict in the Entre Ríos zone (Chapare) more than 2,600 campesinos surrounded
DIRECO agents. One campesino was and 20 were wounded killed in the confrontations.
November 1994- Talks between the government and coca growers break down. Evo Morales, declared
that local self-defense groups would resist any forcible eradication. On November 15 some 2,000 anti-riot
police were deployed in the village of Sinahota (Chapare region) and in clashes with 5,000 coca
producers a young girl was killed.
April 1995-In statements to a local radio station coca growers´ leader Evo Morales insisted on warning
that violence could surface if the government insists on eradicating coca plantations by force. President
Sanchez de Lozada declared a 90-day state of siege to quell weeks of civil unrest. Some 70,000 public
school teachers were on strike and campesinos (peasants) set up roadblocks. Violent clashes between
police and coca producers took place in the central Chapare region, and mining and manufacturing
districts were at standstill.
July 1995-On July 19, the government announced  a 90-day extension of the state of siege introduced in
April, giving as its reasons:  unrest, illegal planting of coca by coca growers opposed to U.S.-sponsored
eradication of coca, and the instability generated by different social sectors opposed to government
economic policy. Protest escalated during the week beginning July 10 as coca growers resisted an
invasion by UMOPAR troops who began destroying coca leaf cultivation in the Isiboro-Secure national
park. At least three campesinos were reported to have been killed or to have disappeared and some 30
injured on July 15 following violent clashes with troops and the police. On July 19-20, some 300
campesinos and workers were arrested in Chapare as UMOPAR personnel broke up roadblocks and
campesino marches.
August 1995- A 22-year old peasant was killed in the Carrasco region in August 8 when local people
clashed with members of the anti-drugs taskforce, UMOPAR. A similar clash between local people and a
UMOPAR squad in the Isiboro Secure National Park on August 18 resulted in another civilian death.
February 1997-UMOPAR and Ecological police stepped up forced eradication. The coca grower
federations announced the reactivation of self-defense committees to resist forced eradication efforts. In
retaliation of forced eradication in Senda 5 and Senda 6 (rural paths) in Ivirgarzama, local residents
attacked the DIRECO office burning four DIRECO vehicles and computers inside the office. Violence
escalated as the police responded with tear gas and rubber pellets.
Sources: Keesing´s News Digest for February 1994, p.3959; Andean Commission of Jurists, Drug
Trafficking Update for November 1995, p.40819; FBIS, Translated Text from TELAM-SIN Buenos Aires
TELAM, April 3, 1995; Keesing´s News Digest for April 1995, p.40499; Keesing´s News Digest for July
1995, p.4060; Keesing´s News Digest for August 1995, p.40676; and Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit.pp.35
and 36.
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h) A brief thought on Bolivia’s ephemeral guerrillas
“La Bolivie est, avec le Guatemala, le seul pays d’Amérique latine où la population indienne est
majoritaire. Les Indiens, principalement des Quechas, des Aymaras et des Guaranis, représenteraient en
effet quelque 60% de la population. Cette majorité démographique se transforme cependant en minorité
sociale et politique, les élites étant essentiellement constituées par la population créole et métisse”792
“The Shining Path however does not count on the support of Bolivians peasants, particularly coca
growers. A peasant from Corioco, a coca grower’s village three hours north from La Paz said “Yes, we
grow coca but we do not want guerrillas”
Isn’t there subversion here?
“We have heard of subversion, but it will not obtain support here” said the peasant, who is the head of
one of the 300,000 families that, legally or illegally grows coca for a living.
What would you do if subversives arrived here?
“Nothing, we would only cooperate with our Army to break off with Shining Path members.” the peasant
said.
What would you do afterwards?
“We would work to help Bolivia overcome underdevelopment” he added.
If the Bolivian terrorist group’s propaganda is not accepted among coca growers, it is still less probable
that the Shining Path’s propaganda is.”793
Historically, guerrilla movements in Bolivia did not have popular support. The foquist
groups of the late 1960s proved to be disastrous (particularly to Ernesto “Che” Guevara himself,
who was killed in Bolivia in 1967) because of the almost complete lack of support from the
local populations. At that time, the ELN (National Liberation Army) was quickly and easily
crushed by the military.794
In the late 1980s early 1990s three small guerrilla groups (Comisión Nestor Paz Zamora-
CNPZ- appeared October 1990 and was dismantled late 1990; Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación
Zárate Wilka-FALZW- appeared in mid-1988 and was dismantled 1989; and Ejército
Guerrillero Tupac Katari-EGTK- appeared during the summer of 1991 and was dismantled and
allegedly dormant by 1992) were active in Bolivia. Again, because of the lack of popular
support and lack of internal organization they where easily suppressed by successive Bolivian
governments. The three groups were characterized by a radical anti-U.S. position and at least
one of them, the CNPZ, received support from the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru
(MRTA) of Peru. In the particular case of the EGTK the Marxist-Trotskyst ideology is
combined with radical (Aymara) Indigenist reivindications.795
                                                          
792Balencie and La Grange, Mondes Rebelles,p.141. The election in 1993 of Mr. Víctor Hugo Cárdenas,
the leader of the indigenist Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari and an Aymara Indian, as vice-
president of Bolivia proved to be in my view part of an electoral maneuver by President Sanchez de
Losada who needed popular support in order to carry out extremely unpopular economic adjustment
politics. The MRTK did not have significant representations after the elections of 1997 when General
Banzer was elected president.
793 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) report Nº FBIS-LAT-92-144,p.20
794 On this issue see: Balencie, Jean-Marc and de la Grange, Arnaud, Mondes rebelles: acteurs, conflits et
violences politiques, Vol.1, Amériques, Afrique, pp.139-140
795 Balencie and de la Grange, pp.139-142; Soruco, Juan Cristóbal, “La Incomunicación de los Medios de
Comunicación,” in Albó and Barrios, Violencias Encubiertas en Bolivia, pp.239-245; Barrios Morón,
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In my view, because of the Bolivian historical tradition of strong grassroots
organizations, there is no danger of a “Peruanization” of Bolivia.  That is, a guerrilla group is
not likely to emerge in the Chapare region in order to defend the peasants from the Bolivian
government. Such a group would not have peasant support (as Shining Path had in the Upper
Huallaga Valley in Peru) because of the strong political power and high degree of organization
of coca growing peasant trade union federations. Not only are the federations capable of
defending coca-growing peasants’ interests, but they also provide  self-defense groups (grupos
de autodefensa campesina) in order to resist forceful eradication. Moreover, there are no proven
links between coca growing peasants or drug traffickers and guerrillas.796 However the very
idea that a “narco-guerrilla” could emerge in Bolivia was disquieting for Bolivian government
authorities, particularly during Paz Zamora’s administration.797 Furthermore, there were
reports that both Shining Path and MRTA were using the inhospitable north of Bolivia (but also
clinics and hospitals in La Paz) as a safe haven and would also try to expand their operations to
that country.798 As a matter of fact in December 1989, the Peruvian Naval attaché was killed in
La Paz, allegedly by a Shining Path cell.799 However, due to the recent military defeat of both
movements it is very unlikely that they will try to expand operations to Bolivia. Moreover, the
Shining Path has a “revolution in one country” strategy, and it is very unlikely that they would
try to expand after taking over political power in Peru (this is no longer even a possibility,
however, because of the progressive dismantling of the movement after the capture of Guzmán
in 1992).800 And again, they would likely follow the same fate of Guevara’s foquistas in the
late 1960s because of the absence of local support.
It is important to point out that the FALZW, the CNPZ, and the EGTK tried to exploit
public resentment towards the U.S. role in counternarcotic efforts. Even if they were not
important threats to the Bolivian state, these guerrilla groups can be considered indicators of the
political violence caused by the increasing U.S. military presence in Bolivia in support of
militarized enforcement.
                                                                                                                                                                         
Raúl, “La Elusiva Paz de la Democracia Boliviana,” in Albó and Barrios, op.cit., pp.169-190 and Iturri
Salmón, Jaime, EGTK: La Guerrilla Aymara en Bolivia, La Paz, Ediciones Vaca Sagrada, 1992, pp.8-65
796See: Iturri Salmón, op.cit., pp.20 and 81; Painter, op.cit., p141
797Painter, op.cit.p.141; Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia counternarcotics efforts, p.228;
798See: “Shining Path Interested in Spreading to Bolivia,” FBIS-LAT-91-144,27 July 1992, p.17;
“Peruvian Shining Path Presence Rules Out,” FBIS-LAT-91-084, 1 May 1991, p.25; “Army: Strengthen
Borders Against Shining Path,” FBIS-LAT-90-120, 5 July 1990,p33; “Interior Minister Views ‘Shining
Path’, Security,” FBIS-LAT, Volume VI, 15 Nov. 1983,C1; “Authorities claim rebel presence,” Latin
American Weekly Report, September 15,p.8 and Malamud Got, Smoke and Mirrors,. p.75
799See: “Terror attacks shake La Paz,” Latin American Weekly Report, January 5, 1989, p.4
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i)  Transformations in the Bolivian cocaine industry
There are two factors that provoked a change in the pattern of drug trafficking in Bolivia.
They are related to the pattern of enforcement in Colombia, which provoked a spillover of
activities towards other countries. Enforcement in Colombia also weakened the Colombian
traffickers, particularly the Medellín coalition. This resulted in a greater autonomy of the
Bolivian traffickers, which started to sell their production in a growing and profitable new
market: Western Europe. This transformation would have consequences for Argentina. With a
fluid trade with Europe, scarcely patrolled borders, and an excellent road infrastructure,
Argentina would become (together with Brazil) a preferential transit route for drug traffickers
based in Bolivia. These changes occurred simultaneously at the end of the 1980s and
contributed to an increase in the intensity of the threats to the Argentine security in terms of the
illicit drug traffic.
In first place, there was a shift of Colombian traffickers operations towards Bolivian
territory and the rise in the autonomy and power of the Bolivian traffickers.801 The rise in
enforcement against Colombian drug trafficking organizations (especially against the Medellín
coalition) by the Betancur (particularly after the assassination of Minister Lara Bonilla), and the
Barco and Gaviria administrations (after the assassination of Galán), coupled with the increase
in interception activities by U.S. law enforcement agencies--and the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean
and Mexican routes to the United States--brought about two new developments.  They were:
a) a shift of Colombian coalitions towards the Bolivian territory ( in economic terms, a
flow of capital in the industry or an intra-industry capital flow); and
b) an increase in the independence and power of Bolivian organizations after the
Colombians were weakened and the Medellín coalition lost cohesion and spread into
independent groups following the arrest or death of their main leaders.802 As
explained by two analysts,
                                                                                                                                                                         
800Interview with Major (Argentine Army) Brown, Argentine Army Major Staff, Buenos Aires, August,
1997.
801For a very good analysis of this phenomenon see: Mora, Frank, “Victims of the Balloon Effect: Drug
Trafficking and U.S. policy in Brazil the Southern Cone of Latin America,” The Journal of Social,
Political and Economic Studies, Volume 21, Number 2, Summer 1996, pp.115-140 and Heargraves,
Clare, Snowfields, The War on Cocaine in the Andes, especially chapter, 53-83. See also: The South
American Cocaine Trade: An “Industry” in Transition, www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/cocaine.htm and
Dreyfus, Pablo, El lado oscuro de la globalización, especially, pp. 32-38
802 Hargreaves, op. cit., p 66
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“the Bolivians were no longer willing to be poorly paid suppliers of coca paste or base while their
Colombian counterparts, who refined it into hydrochloride, raked in the profits. They decided to
increase their profits by doing all the refining themselves. They set up their own hydrochloride
laboratories, and left past making to peasants in the Chapare. The mark-ups are dramatic: by selling
paste, a trafficker gets only $250 a kilo. With base he can earn six or seven times that amount. With
hydrochloride, the profits are even greater, selling at between $1600 and $2,500 a kilo[...]The
crackdown on drug mafias in Colombia in 1989 and 1990 speeded up the trend. Bolivian traffickers
found they had no-one to buy their partly processed cocaine which was rapidly stockpiling and going,
moudly in the humid jungle heat. They were forced to refine it themselves and to find other
nationalities to distribute it. By 1990 [...] Bolivia exported an estimated 250-300 tons , making it the
world second largest producer of market-ready cocaine...”
“In the early 1980s however, Bolivians - and Colombians working in Bolivia- slowly started to
manufacture more and more of the base in to the final product HCL. U.S. officials estimate that by
1990 as much as one third of Bolivian coca paste-or between 150 and 200 tones of cocaine-was being
processed into HCL within Bolivia. U. S. officials were adamant that Bolivia had become the world’s
second largest producer after Colombia [...]Colombians were also reported to be facing a production
glut in the mid-1980s, which encouraged some of them to move part of their operations to Bolivia,
where costs were cheaper, operations at times safer, and the supply of coca paste more assured. As a
result, more Colombians started to work in Bolivia on the final processing stages. At the same time,
there was evidence that Bolivian traffickers were attempting to diversify their markets and, to a
limited extent, bypass the Colombians. While it was still true that the United States remained the main
destination for Bolivian cocaine, new and more lucrative markets, particularly in Europe and the
Pacific Rim countries ( mainly Japan) were opening up via new routes through Argentina, Paraguay,
Uruguay or Brazil.”803
Table 5. Bolivia and Cocaine production804
CHCL (metric
tones)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Produced ( with
Bolivian paste)
73 83 110 261 205
Converted in
Bolivia
-- 29  39  91  72
Painter, “Bolivia and Coca,” p. 46
A second factor that contributed to modifying the role of Bolivia in the cocaine industry
chain was the change in worldwide consumption patterns. A shift in the main transit routes
occurred for two reasons: North American markets at the end of the 1980s were saturated and an
increase ( at higher prices) in the demand for cocaine/crack in Western Europe with Spain as the
main point of entry. In this scheme, Argentina became a main and preferential route for the
Bolivian traffickers to Spain and the rest of Western Europe.805 As explained by one analyst,
between 1989 and 1990,
                                                          
803James Painter,Bolivia and Coca,A study in dependency,p29. See also, Smith,Why people grow on
drugs,p.15; O’Brien, Cocaine Politics, p 41
804“The drug Enforcement Administration’s Intelligence Division in an investigation called
‘Breakthrough’, pointed out that the cocaine producing capacity of Bolivia is 273 tons. This under the
presumption that a 100 percent of the coca leaves is targeted to the cocaine production. In reality,
Bolivia’s current cocaine production is 193 tons”. UNDCP, Update 1994 Annual Country Report,
Bolivia,p. 27
805This fact is confirmed not only by the increase of the amount of annual cocaine seizures but also
because since 1987 big amounts of cocaine begun to be seized in one single police operation.
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“[ t]he amount of cocaine confiscated in Europe more than doubled, from 6 to 14 tones. Given that
police estimate they seize a maximum or 10 per cent of the total, that means that in 1990 Europe
was awash at least 140 tones [...] South American drug barons have seen their outlets to North
America squeezed by law enforcement and oversupply, and are looking for new markets [...]
Bolivian and Peruvian traffickers are also exporting directly to Europe.’ We are no longer seeing
as much of the north-south movements’, says Raymond Kendall, Interpol’s executive director.
‘Traffickers are switching from Caribbean routes to new ones through Brazil’s Amazon waterways
and Argentina through Africa and Europe’s major ports’. One U.S. drug enforcement official
calculates that as much as 40 per cent or world cocaine supply goes to Europe, compared to 60
percent of world cocaine to the U.S. [...]Although the risks and costs of getting cocaine to Europe
are greater, the prices make it worldwide. A kilo, which fetches $ 12,000 to $ 15,000 in Miami can
fetch three to four times that in Europe.”806
Table 6. Cocaine seizures in Europe 1991-1993
Spain Netherlands Belgium France Germany Italy United
Kingdom
Portugal
1991 7,574 1,653   698  690  964  734 1,024  994
1992 4,454 3,180 1,000 1,625 1,332 1,377 2,534 1893
1993 5,351 3,720 2,891 1,715 1,095 1,089  768  218
Source: POLICÍA NACIONAL, SERVICIO CENTRAL DE ESTUPEFACIENTES, Análisis Actual del
Tráfico de Estupefacientes y Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Madrid, March 1995.
Table 7. Cocaine Seizures in Europe 1973-1988 (kilos)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
23 20 45 47 59 155 149 240 259 398 1,026 891 913 1,482 2,391 5,321
Source: Revue Internationale de la Police Criminelle (INTERPOL) May-June 1989.
Table 8. Cocaine Seizures in Europe 1989-1991  (kilos)
1989 1990 1991
8078 16032 16874
Source: MAGE, Tristan,  Les Nouvelles routes du trafic de la drogue dans l’espace de Schengen et dans
le monde. Vol.I, Paris, T. Mage, 1994., p. 68
D- CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has demonstrated that the escalation in militarized enforcement in Bolivia,
particularly the forcible eradication of coca, has produced a reactive (and preemptive) escalation
of violence against the state. It has also shown how a weak state like Bolivia simply does not
have either the coercive power to force the coca growing peasant federations to eradicate illegal
coca, nor the capacity to develop an alternative legal economy in the tropic of Cochabamba. In
spite of this, this vulnerable state is continuously pressured by the U.S. to accomplish these
goals in a short period of time.
281
 At the time of this writing,  there were numerous  reports in the media about violent
clashes between peasants and the now joint forces of army and UMOPAR (which support
DIRECO teams). The Banzer administration has developed a new strategy called “With
Dignity.” This document proposes the grandiloquent goal of destroying (sic) the drug industry
in five years. With this goal the army had been involved in eradication activities, particularly in
the Isidobro Secure National Park.
General Banzer has experience in repressing peasants. In fact, during his first presidency
(1971-1978) he did not hesitate to bomb mines and crush peasant revolts in the 1970s. He ended
up with the military-peasant pact. As the putative father of the creature (drug trafficking,
developed under the “blind eye policy” during his first mandate), he probably thinks he is the
right person to try to eliminate it.
We are talking here about around 209,000 peasants (of a total national population of
about 7,000,000) affiliated to the coca growing federations. These peasants are small
landowners, strongly (and culturally) attached to their land. For the majority of them, coca
remains the only profitable and viable crop. In order to “destroy” the coca-cocaine industry in
Bolivia, the government would need to eradicate not only coca but also the peasants producing
it. An attempt to do so would mean, under the conditions described in this chapter, civil war
between the peasants and the government. Coca growing peasants are not only an economic and
lobby group; they are also a political force. All the mayors of towns in the Chapare area are
coca trade union leaders. In 1997, Evo Morales (president of the powerful Federación Especial
de Campesinos del Trópico de Cochabamba and president of the Committee that coordinates
the five Chapare peasant federations) and three other peasant leaders were elected congressional
representatives by Izquierda Unida (IU-United Left) a small but growing left-wing party.
Particularly disquieting is the fact that Bolivia is a transit route for arms trafficking for
guerrilla groups in Peru and Colombia.807 Arms trafficking also exists between Argentina and
Bolivia in order to arm drug traffickers’ protection groups. Argentine military industries
produce a variety of small weapons like the FAL assault rifle, Browning 9mm pistols, and 9mm
submachine guns (PAM). Some of these weapons and 9mm ammunition have been seized
during UMOPAR raids in Bolivia.808 Further, the fact that Evo Morales recently warned that
the peasants are asking the trade union leaders for automatic weapons in order to defend
                                                                                                                                                                         
806Hargreaves,op.cit, p8, See also,op.cit,p 66 and UN INCB Report 1993, p35; Painter, op.cit.,p29;
Servicio Central de Estupefacientes (Spain) 1995,p. 51; RCMP, National Drug Intelligence Estimate
1987/88,p.54
807 “Confirming that there have been media reports on the discovery in Santa Cruz of 260 rifles, 16
pistols, some rocket launchers and ground mines-all Chinese made- that allegedly were earmarked for
Shining Path,” FBIS-LAT-92-44
808FBIS-LAT-90-025, Trading of Drugs for Argentine Weapons Suspected.
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themselves from UMOPAR and army squads is cause for concern.809 All this seems to indicate
that they would have the money and the access to get these weapons if they have the desire to
do so. There are “gray areas” as Ciudad del Este in the neighboring Paraguay where they could
get all kinds of weapons.
The increasing enforcement against the Colombian “cartels” provoked a transformation in
the Bolivian cocaine industry. Since the mid-1980s Bolivia has been gradually evolving from an
upstream producing country to a downstream producing country, where the entire cycle of
production from coca to cocaine takes place in the country. The consequences of this for
Argentine security will be analyzed in the next chapter.
In conclusion, reducing the scope of the drug problem in Bolivia is not only a question of
eradicating plants (people will grow them again) or people (who will resist forcible
displacement, massive incarceration, and of course physical harm). Reducing the scope of the
drug problem in Bolivia is a question of increasing development - that is, developing an
alternative legal economy. A long term and consistent strategy is needed in order to break the
coca-cocaine dependency in the Chapare region.
The next chapter will analyze how the evolution of the cocaine industry in Bolivia (and to
a certain extent in the rest of South America) has affected Argentina’s national security. The
chapter will also analyze the views of relevant Argentine bureaucrats involved in internal
security, defense, and drug control areas concerning the consequences of militarized
enforcement in Bolivia as a possible national security problem for Argentina.
                                                          
809FIBIS-LAT-1997
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CHAPTER VII:   THE PROBLEMATIQUE OF ARGENTINA AS A
NEIGHBORING TRANSSHIPMENT COUNTRY (1983-1995)
“¿Te acordás, hermano, qué tiempos aquellos...?
Eran otros hombres, más hombres los nuestros.
No se conocía coca ni morfina;
los muchachos de antes no usaban gomina...”810
A- INTRODUCTION
In the scarce academic literature dealing with the problem of the implications of the illicit
drug traffic in Argentina, there is a group of authors that tend to concentrate their work on a
criticism of drug policy during two presidential administrations. Their work focuses on the
administrations of Presidents Raúl Alfonsín from 1983 to –1989, and Carlos Menem in his first
term from 1989 to –1995. (President Menem was reelected in May 1995 and this second period
in office finished in December 1999.) 811 The main critique is that there was a tendency in both
administrations to adopt U.S. policy goals as well as a  diagnostic and bureaucratic structure in
terms of illicit drug trafficking and  consumption control policies. These critiques are correct;
both administrations strengthened their enforcement apparatus against drug trafficking,
expanded the penal and criminal codes dealing with drug trafficking and consumption, and -
especially during the Menem administration- increased their cooperation with the United States
in police, legal, and military matters.  These measures followed the logic of the Bush strategy,
which assigned a military containment role to peripheral countries. 812  As an example, the
                                                          
810  “Do you  remember brother  those times? Men were other kind of men. Coca [cocaine] and morphine
were unknown. At that time guys did not use gomina [a trademark of hair gel for man].” From: “Tiempos
Viejos” (Old times), tango by Manuel Romero and Francisco Canaro, Buenos Aires, 1926.
811See for example: Cardoso, Oscar and Heguilein,Rubén, “Argentina y la Cuestión de las Drogas,”
América Latina/Internacional, FLACSO Programa Argentina, Vol.9, Nº 31, pp.473-480 ; Corigliano,
Francisco, El problema del narcotráfico y la democracia en Argentina, mimeo, Facultad Latinoamericana
de Ciencias Sociales, FLACSO, Buenos Aires, 1994, 24pp. and Tokatlián, Juan Gabriel, “Argentina y la
guerra antidrogas,” mimeo, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, pp. 1 and 2
812 The narcotics law Nº 23,737 (voted in 1989, at the time with the consensus of the PJ and the UCR) is
harsher than the previous drug control laws. Also during his administration, President Menem requested
(without success) in Congress for the establishment of the death penalty for drug traffickers. On the issues
of the evolution of the Argentine drug control legislation see:  Palarino, Roberto, Tráfico Ilícito
internacional de Drogas: Régimen de Control, Situación regional y perspectivas de cambio, Buenos Aires,
Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación, Buenos Aires, 1992, p 44; Puricelli, José Luis,
Estupefacientes y Drogadicción. Tenencia, Uso y  Tráfico-Prevención y Tratamiento Legal-Drogas en el
deporte- Responsabilidad de Laboratorios, Droguerías y Farmacias-Facultades del Juez-Ley 23.737 y
Normas Complementatrias, Editorial Universidad, Buenos Aires 1992.pp.166-235.; Corigliano op.cit.
p.16 and Auredy, Alejandro, El Narcotráfico en América: Sus Conexiones, Hombres y Rutas, Córdoba,
Lerner Córdoba, 1991, pp.349-351. On Menem’s statements in favor of the establishment of death
penalty for drug traffickers see: U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Intelligence Division, Southern Cone Situation Report: Drug  Intelligence Report, Washington D.C.,
1994, p.3; “Menem” (subtitle of Menem’s statement), Clarín, Buenos Aires, August 31, 1989; “Insiste
Menem con pena de muerte para ‘narcos’,” Ámbito Financiero, Buenos Aires, December 21, 1994;
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Alfonsín administration signed an agreement with the United States in 1987, which formalized a
preexistent monitoring of the Argentine security forces by North American agencies, and
established a legal framework for undercover operations in Argentine territory.813 Additionally,
in 1990 the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) carried out operation “Snowcap,” in
which DEA teams in Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador participated jointly in a
long-term interdiction operation.  The ambitious goal of the operation was to achieve a 50%
reduction of the cocaine flow from South America into the United States. Operation Snowcap
began in 1987 as an effort to address coca production through interdiction efforts on land and on
rivers, as well as the interdiction of chemical input.814 As for the military cooperation for
example in 1991 and 1992 U.S. South Command  [USSOUTHCOM] teams visited Argentina
and Brazil to describe counter-drug operations in the Andean Ridge and Central America. Also
in 1991 the Argentine Air Force carried out a combined radar interdiction exercise with South
Command personnel and provincial police agents.815
Some of the aspects discussed above will be considered in this chapter. However the main
goal here, in accordance with the assumptions of this dissertation, is to demonstrate how the
cocaine industry became a national security problem for Argentina because of the interaction
between changes in the security environment and the vulnerability of the country. In order to
achieve the goal of this chapter, it is necessary to characterize the vulnerability of Argentina, as
well as those threats which stem from drug trafficking and from the enforcement policies
adopted in Bolivia between 1983 and 1995, a period that coincides with President Alfonsín and
President Menem’s administrations. This period is important because most of the more relevant
changes in the Argentina’s security environment in terms of drug trafficking took place in the
late 1980s.
                                                                                                                                                                         
“Menem y la pena de muerte,” Página 12, Buenos Aires,p.2; “Palabras del señor [sic] presidente [sic] de
la Nación, doctor Carlos Saúl Menem a los señores participantes del VII Congreso de la Comisión
Interamericana contra el Abuso de Drogas, el día 30 de Marzo de 1990,” Washington D.C., 1990, [on
line], http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/project/arl/pm/sample2/argentin/menem/900508d.html
813Cardoso and Heguilein op.cit.p.478.
814 Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, one Hundred First
Congress, Second Session, Operation Snowcap: Past, Present and Future, May 23, 1990, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., p.1
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B- DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ARGENTINA AS A WEAK STATE
a)  A brief introduction to Argentina
It would be possible to say that together with Venezuela (and Uruguay and Chile),
Argentina could be considered as closer to the “strong state” pole of the typology developed in
Chapter I.  Argentina does not have problems related to ethnic or linguistic divisions (as in
Bolivia, Peru, Surinam, Guyana or Ecuador). In the absence of a peasant class, there are no land
reform or problematic land distribution conflicts (as in Brazil and Colombia). The political
regime in place since 1983 is not contested by armed groups and there is not a strong
ideological polarization in the political spectrum (as in Peru and Colombia). There is a big
urban middle class and the social disparities are relatively smaller compared to other South
American countries (with the probable exception of Uruguay) and the democratic regime is in
the process of consolidation. However, as explained before, states move along the weak-strong
continuum.
What is Argentina today was once part of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate (Virreinato
del Río de la Plata), created in 1776. The Viceroyalty comprised the current territories of
Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and some parts of southern Brazil). In 1810, due to the power
vacuum created by the invasion of Spain by Napoleon and the imprisonment of the Spanish
King, the Creole bourgeoisie of Buenos Aires revolted against Spain and proposed that the rest
of the Viceroyalty become part the United Provinces of the River Plate (Provincias Unidas del
Río de la Plata). After this, a long period of war against Spain and the “royalists”(creoles loyal
to the Crown) followed, culminating with a declaration of independence in 1816. By  1819
General José de San Martín had vanquished the Spaniards and liberated what is today the
Argentine territory. Through a process that for reasons of length and scope will not be explained
here, Bolivia (Alto Perú), Paraguay, and Uruguay (Banda Oriental del Uruguay) became
independent nations.
After the independence, the consolidation of Argentina as a nation-state took a long
period of seventy years plagued by civil war and tyranny. Basically the reason for this extended
period of turmoil was the confrontation between Buenos Aires and the rest of the provinces. A
liberal centralizing project linked to international trade (Buenos Aires) was confronted with a
traditionalist and authoritarian federalist project.  The aim of the latter was to put  an end to
Buenos Aires’ control over the routes of trade (Buenos Aires customs basically controlled all
link with the rest of the world specially Great Britain) and to keep provincial autonomy. As
explained by a historian,
                                                                                                                                                                         
815 See: Harmon et.al.,op.cit., p.35 and U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics
Matters, International Narcotics Matters Strategy Report for 1991, March 1991, Washington D.C., p. 76
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“War for independence followed by repeated secession brought about a conspicuous 
militarization of politics; by 1830, it became also obvious that the autonomy (let alone the 
hegemony) of Buenos Aires could hardly dispense with caudillo-led forces.”816
Unable to prevail over the provinces' caudillos the merchant elite of the city of Buenos
Aires paradoxically had to turn to the local caudillos of the province of Buenos Aires (the port
natural hinterland) for help. The chosen one was a powerful landowner called Juan Manuel de
Rosas.  Rosas governed Buenos Aires with an iron first and set up pacts with the federal
caudillos of the northwest and the litoral (the eastern region). Buenos Aires would nominally be
in charge of an Argentine Confederation formed by autonomous provinces.
However, as a constant in Argentine history, “he who controls the port controls the
country.” The triumphant federalist became a de facto unitarian and was in turn overthrown by a
coalition of federalist from the litoral provinces led by General Urquiza from Entre Ríos and
liberals from Buenos Aires. What followed over the next twenty years was the formation of an
alliance between the landowner class of the pampas (Buenos Aires and the litoral) and the
dominant classes of the provinces.  The provinces were linked economically to the process of
expansion of Buenos Aires, and who also saw their fortunes grow thanks to  protectionist
federal policy (such as the sugar industry in Tucumán, the wine industry in Mendoza and San
Juan, and the timber production in the northeast). The result was the conformation of an
“oligarchic republic” controlled by the landowner class and centered in Buenos Aires.817
Between 1860 and 1880 the nation-state was consolidated. The federal state crushed the last
provincial caudillos and imposed a unified currency, the metric system, primary education
programs, and civil and criminal codes.818  The successive administrations of Bartolomé Mitre
(1864-1870), Domingo F. Sarmiento (1870-1874), Nicolás Avellaneda (1874-1880) and Julio
A. Roca (1880-1886) promoted European immigration, British investment (railroads and
infrastructure construction), and “expanded the frontier” (a process similar to the occupation of
the west in the United States) for agricultural production. The result of massive European
immigration was the formation of a modern urban  middle class. A new political movement
representing this new urban middle class appeared and started demanding political opening in
the conservative order. Up to 1912 the ballot was voluntary and not secret and fraud was rife.
New presidents were elected by consensus among the governors of the provinces (who belonged
to the same social class) and there was a single dominant party, the PAN (Partido Autonomista
                                                          
816J.C., Merquior, “State-Building in Brazil and Argentina,” in Hall, John (ed.), op.cit., p.266
817 On this issue see: Kaplan, Marcos, La Formación del Estado Nacional en América Latina, Santiago de
Chile, Ed. Universitaria, 1969, p.241
818 On this issue see: Oszlak, Oscar, La Formación del Estado Argentino, Buenos Aires, Fundación
Editorial de Belgrano, 1990, 290p.
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Nacional), which was actually an alliance of the dominant provincial classes. 819 The system
worked very well while the country was socially divided between a ruling landowner class and a
poor and illiterate unorganized lower class. The situation only changed when a well-educated
urban middle class started to grow. This new emerging class rallied around a new party, the
Civic Union (Unión Cívica, later called Unión Cívica Radical, UCR). After several failed
revolts led by this party (the radical revolutions of 1890,1893, and 1905) the conservative
regime decided to finally open the system. As explained by a historian,
“Two separate enactment’s established universal male suffrage for natives over eighteen years of
age and an electoral roll based on the military conscription lists. The legislation had several
peculiarities: to foster habits of civic involvement and participation, voting was made compulsory;
and to minimize malfeasance, the Army was given custodial duties during elections.”820
The regime had set a trap for itself. The conservative coalition was not able to stay
unified under the umbrella of a strong conservative party, and continuous arguments and
disagreements led to a split into regional factions. In the 1916 elections, which were the first
elections in Argentina which incorporated the secret and compulsory vote, the conservatives
where defeated by the UCR.821 Under the leadership of Hipólito Yrigoyen the UCR would
become the dominant party between 1916 and 1930.
During these administrations, which spanned the last decades of the 19th century and the
first three decades of the 20th century, Argentina underwent an accelerated process of economic
growth, as well as political and democratic stability. In the absence of local reinvestment in
capital goods and heavy industry, however, this growth could not last. And indeed it did not.
The world had changed but Argentina did not change with it. The landowner class was neither
willing nor interested in reinvesting their profits in the industrialization of the country.
Successive governments also failed to encourage this type of development.822
Argentina’s period of outward expansion reached its limit in 1929 with the Great
Depression. Protectionism, a deterioration in the terms of trade, and the inconvertibility of
currencies strongly affected the expansion of Argentina’s agricultural sector and forced the
                                                          
819 On this issue see: Botana, Natalio, El Orden Conservador: La política argentina entre 1880 y 1916,
Buenos Aires, Hyspamerica, 1986, 351p. and Oszlak, op.cit.
820Rock, David, Argentina 1516-1987,p.190
821 See: Botana, op.cit, especially, pp. 217-346
822Argentina received two big waves of foreign investment in the 1920s and 30s (Nestlé, Colgate
Palmolive, Firestone, Johnson and Johnson, Goodyear, Dupont, Otis Elevators, R.C.A, I.T.T., Lever Bros,
Michelin, Philips, General Electric, Pirelli and Osram) and in the 1960s (Renault, General Motors-left in
the 1970s), Ford, Peugeot, Mercedes Benz-trucks-). But again, these companies were controlled from
abroad, and produced consumption goods. None of them contributed to the development of a local capital
goods and technology sector. See for example:  Prebisch, Raúl, La crisis del desarrollo argentino, Buenos
Aires, El Ateneo, 1986, pp.97 to 135.
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country to adopt an import-substitution strategy.823 This industrial growth (subsidized and
protected by the state) favored the consumption goods sector. Particularly the textile and food
products sectors grew during the 1930s.824 This was not, however a long-term industrialization
strategy. Argentina would only produce what it could no longer import simply because the
markets were closed, while neglecting investments in heavy industry and capital goods
production.
This period was followed by the Second World War and the subsequent European
recovery. Europe’s post-war changes would come to redefine Argentina’s relationship with its
most important commercial markets. The industrialized nations of Europe had embarked on a
process of agricultural revolution based on the utilization of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and
new varieties of seeds and cattle. By the 1950s Europe could compete with Argentina for the
export of agricultural products.825
In Argentina, the 1930 world economic crisis also brought political instability. For the
first time after 80 years of democratic stability, the military intervened in politics and took over
political power. In September 1930 a military coup d’etat overthrew president Yrigoyen.
Prevented from winning the elections by the Radical electoral predominance, the conservatives
resorted to the use of the military. A period of conservative “restricted” democracy followed
during the years 1933-1943, characterized by fraud and proscription (the Yrigoyenist faction of
the Radical Party was proscribed) and a nationalist military regime, which was in power
between 1943-45. An important member of this military government was Colonel Juan
Domingo Perón, who simultaneously occupied the posts of Minister of Labor, Minister of War,
and Vice-President. Perón would play a key role in this government and would also come to
change the entire political spectrum in the years to come.826
Import substitution brought about the growth of a new social class. During the 1930s
there was a big flow of migrants from the poor provinces of Argentina’s  “interior” to work in
the newly opened factories. As their European migrant predecessors of the last century had
formed an urban middle class, these internal migrants formed a urban proletariat.
Again they were excluded from the political system (through fraud and basic lack of
representation), and they did not have the benefit of any type of social legislation or protection.
                                                          
823 Argentina’s  major commercial partner, Great Britain, declared the pound unconvertible after the 1929
crash, and this prevented Argentina from buying industrialized consumption goods from the US, a
triangular pattern of trade that had been common in the 1920s.
824 On this issue see: Escudé, Carlos, 1942-1949: Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la Declinación
Argentina, Buenos Aires, Fundación Editorial de Belgrano, 1988, 399p.; Rapoport, Mario, Gran Bretaña,
Estados Unidos y las clases dirigentes argentinas: 1940-1945, Buenos Aires, Fundación Editorial de
Belgrano, 1981, 310p.
825 See: Escudé, Carlos, 1942-1949: Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la Declinación Argentina, pp.251-
386
289
Perón would fill this vacuum. In the same way that Yrigoyen had led the entry of the middle
class into politics, Perón would lead the entry of the urban proletariat into the political
scene.827 In 1945, under heavy popular pressure, the military government was forced to call for
elections. As was expected by all, Perón’s party, the Partido Laborista (later called Partido
Justicialista or simply “peronismo”), won the elections and was sworn into power. Perón
adopted a series of redistributive populist policies under an authoritarian regime with a
nationalistic rhetoric. At first these policies gained him wide popular acclaim. But in the long
term, too many (and powerful) interests were affected, and the increasingly authoritarian
character of his presidency was becoming intolerable for the opposition. Above all (as had
happened with the UCR at the turn of the previous century), Perón’s party, the Partido
Justicialista (PJ) dominated the political scene. Perón was finally deposed by a combined
military and civilian coup in 1955. The rules of the game imposed by the military was that the
peronist movement (not to mention Perón) could neither control the Congress nor access the
important decision-making elected positions (the presidency or governments in relevant
provinces). The military would intervene in politics each time this “rule” was violated or there
was a possibility of violating it. The paradox here is that the movement was the party with the
most popular support… The military-civil pendulum was swinging again: 1955-1958 military
government; 1958-1961 restricted democracy (UCR faction in power/PJ proscribed by the
military); 1961-1963 coup d’etat and puppet democracy; 1963-1966 restricted democracy (PJ
proscribed); 1966-1972 (coup d’etat and military government).828
In the late 1960s several guerrilla groups appeared in Argentina. The two most important
ones were the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), a rural insurgent group that carried out
attacks against military installations in urban centers, and Montoneros, a left wing Peronist
urban insurgent group that fought for a return of Perón and the re-establishment of democracy.
Several factors caused this armed insurgency to arise. These were: the influence of foquista
groups all over Latin America after the Cuban Revolution (and particularly after Che Guevara´s
failed campaign in Bolivia); a reaction against the oppressive regime of General Onganía (1966-
1970); and -in the particular case of Montoneros- an orchestrated manipulation of Perón from
his exile in Madrid that would use the insurgents as a tool to force the military to call for
elections with the provision that Perón would be allowed to run for president.
                                                                                                                                                                         
826On this period of Argentine history see: Ciria, Alberto, Partidos y Poder en la Argentina Moderna
(1930-1946), Buenos Aires, Hyspamerica, 1986, 414p.
827 On this issue see: Murmis, Miguel and Portantiero, Juan Carlos, Estudios sobre los orígenes del
peronismo, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI Argentina, 1987,129 pp.
828 On this issue see: O´Donnell, Guillermo, Modernización y Autoritarismo, Buenos Aires, Paidós,
1972, pp.180-214; Kvaternik, Eugenio, Crisis sin salvataje: la crisis político-militar de 1962-63, Buenos
Aires, Ediciones del IDES, Buenos Aires, 1987, 149p. and Kvaternik, Eugenio, El péndulo cívico militar:
La caída de Illia, Buenos Aires, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella/Editorial Tesis, 1990, 144 pp.
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Perón was successful. In 1970 the military overthrew Onganía and a junta headed by
General Pedro Agustín Lanusse called for elections. For the first time since 1955 the peronists
were allowed to run for the presidency. The result was predictable: the Peronists won with the
ticket Campora-Lastiri. Both resigned, allowing new elections to be celebrated and the winner
was... Perón, along with his new wife, María E. “Isabel” Martínez de ....Perón.
Once in power Perón turned again to the right (where he had always been) and to the “old
trade union guard,” and excluded the Montoneros from the participation in the government.
Moreover, he permitted the existence of and even sponsored -through his sinister Ministry of
Health and Well-Being and Chief of Police José López Rega, (a Rasputin-like figure, also
known as “El Brujo,” that is “the Warlock” or “the Sorcerer”)- the formation of a right wing
paramilitary group called the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA). This unleashed a
fresh round of open clashes and a bloody spiral of violence. At the same time the army was
given a green light to fight the ERP in the province of Tucumán. Montoneros went underground
in 1974 and started a campaign of urban terrorism, which provoked reactive terrorist attacks
from the AAA. The road to civil war was paved. When Perón died in 1974, the situation went
absolutely out of control.829 In 1976 the military took over initiating a period of
institutionalized terror that made the tyranny of Rosas pale in comparison. By 1978 both the
ERP and Montoneros had been virtually annihilated, however repression continued, at least
until 1981, against everyone thought to be suspicious of  “subversive” activities. The rest of the
story is notoriously well known. There were about 20,000 to 30,000 disappeared persons,
irresponsible borrowing of “petro-dollars” by the military, debt crisis, hyperinflation, and a
disastrous war with the United Kingdom in 1982. By 1983 the military had no other choice but
to run away from power and call for new elections.  It could be said that if President Alfonsín
had started (with a lot of difficulties including three military revolts and hyperinflation) the
transition from authoritarianism to democracy, President Menem started the transition from
“ [a] centralized and nationalizing economy to an economy of the market and private
initiative…”830
Although a grave hyper-inflationary crisis was resolved in the first three years of the first
Menem term in office, economic recession and unemployment were serious problems
                                                          
829For a very well documented explanation of the causes and development of the civil war in the 1970s
see: James, Daniel, Resistencia e Integración: El peronismo y la clase trabajadora argentina 1946-1976,
Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 1990, 359 pp. and Gasparini, Juan Alberto, Mouvements sociaux,
pouvoir militaire et guerrilla en Argentine. Les années soixante/quatre vingts. “Les années de plomb,”
Thèse présentée à la Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales de l’Université de Genève, Université
de Genève, 1989, 199 pp. Also see: Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987, Chapter VIII.
830Carasales, op.cit, p.7
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throughout the 1990s. An analyst described the economic situation of the late 1980s in the
following terms,
“By 1989 Argentina’s external public debt had grown to $61. 9 billion, or 60.5 per cent of GNP.
The rate of investment fell from 23.4 per cent for the period 1973-1980 to 14.4 per cent for 1980-
1987. Industrial production fell 9 percent in 1989, and declines of 30 per cent were recorded in
some sectors. The unemployment rate was 7.5 per cent in 1989 and 10 per cent today. The mean
annual rate of inflation was 298.7 per cent over the period 1980-1987: in 1988 inflation reached
387.5 per cent in 1988 and in 1989 the astronomical figure of 3,713 per cent....” 831
Argentina is currently organized as a Federal Republic (with 23 provinces and a Federal
district, each province is administered by a locally elected governor). Since the transition from a
harsh military dictatorship (1976-1983), the country is still in a process of consolidation of  its
presidential democratic regime. Up to 1997 the main political parties were the Peronist Party
(PJ-Partido Justicialista) and the Radical Party (UCR-Unión Cívica Radical). The PJ is a
national populist movement that has historically represented the labor class, while the UCR has
historically represented the large urban middle class. After an abrupt shift to the right by the PJ
in 1989 and the adoption of orthodox neoliberal policies, in 1994 a group of dissident peronists
formed an alliance with the Communist, Socialist, and Christian Democrat groups. The resulting
coalition was called “Frente del País Solidario” (FREPASO). In 1997 the UCR and the
FREPASO formed an electoral alliance (Alianza para el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación-
AJTE). Since then the main electoral cleavage is the PJ/AJTE one. There are some minor parties
but basically the country has a bi-party system (PJ/AJTE). In the period under study the main
cleavage was PJ / UCR.832.
As will be illustrated in the next sections of this chapter, social exclusion, poverty, high
rates of crime, and structural unemployment not only persisted but also continued to get worse.
The size of the government apparatus was reduced, and hyperinflation was controlled. However
the market was fully unleashed without proper regulation. If social welfare (called “social
justice”) had been the motto of the Peronist Party in the times of Perón, this was, paradoxically,
the most glaringly lacking component in public policy during Menem’s government. Basically
the Menem administration went to the extreme of curtailing public expenditures in basic
                                                          
831Carasales, Julio, C, National Security Concepts of the States: Argentina , United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research, Geneva, 1992, p.6
832Minor parties are: and as Acción por la República-Nueva Dirigencia (dissident former members of the
Menem’s cabinet); Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia (MODIN, right wing); Movimiento
de integración y Desarrollo (MID, center-right); Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, left); Partido
Comunista de Argentina; Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC); Partido Demócrata Progresista (PDP,
center right); Partido Intransigente (PI, center-left);Partido Nacional de Centro (conservative);  Partido
Nacionalista de los Trabajadores (PNT, extreme right-wing); Partido Obrero (Trotskyst);  Partido Popular
Cristiano; Partido Socialista Democráctico; Partido Socialista Popular; Política Abierta para la Integridad
Social (PAIS); Unión del Centro Democrático (UCeDé); Unión para la Nueva Mayoría.
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services that have been immanent to a modern state since the turn of the 20th century, including
education, health, and law enforcement. As explained by one analyst,
“Les politiques sociales ont été décentralisées d’autorité vers les provinces, conformément aux
recommendations de la Banque mondiale et aux conditions du FMI, l’État central se dégageant
en particulier de l’éducation et des programmes d’assitance sociale. Les administrations
provinciales n’étaient pas préparées à ce surplus de responsabilités [...] Une autre réaction a été
de privatiser certaines prestations sociales, par exemple les fonds de retraite, supprimant le
principe de solidarité entre les générations, les classes de revenus et les diveses régions du pays”
833
In some aspects, Argentina has in fact evolved throughout its history towards the strong-
state pole of the continuum. However the country remains vulnerable to transnational threats
such as drug trafficking. The weak nature of Argentina as a state, and the way in which it has
dealt (and continues to deal) with threats stemming from drug trafficking activities in Bolivia
will be explained in the next sections.
b) Sociopolitical cohesion
“ One of the officials involved in frauds linked to purchases in the Pentagon was
nicknamed ‘General 5%’. In Argentina his nickname would have been ‘General 500%’ ”834
As is also the case with Venezuela, Argentina’s society is not fragmented along linguistic
or ethnic lines. There are three main reasons for this. The first is that the indigenous population
of what is now the Argentine territory was not large. The total population of natives amounted
to approximately half a million people distributed in approximately 30 ethnic groups before the
arrival of the Spanish conquerors in the 16th century. In 1996 there were only 200,000 Indians
distributed in 12 surviving ethnic groups.
The second reason is that the local Indian population has been culturally and physically
eliminated by the white colonizers. In the northwestern part of the country (mainly Salta and
Jujuy), a region that was part of the Inca Empire before the arrival of the Spaniards, the Indian
population was decimated by disease, forced displacement, and forced work in the mines of
what is today Bolivia. Later on, during the period of consolidation of the nation-state from 1860
to 1880, the federal state started a campaign of occupation of the entire territory including the
south (Patagonia) and the Chaco area in the northeast. The Indian population of these territories
was virtually annihilated during the military land occupation campaign (in the case of the jungle
                                                          
833Hufty, Marc, Un gouvernement sous influence: les facteurs historiques, politiques et économiques à
l´origine de la politique économique du gouvernement du président de la République Argentine, Carlos
Menem, de 1989 à 1995, Genève, Thèse Presentée à l´Université de Genève pour l´obtention du grade de
Docteur ès sciences politiques, 1997, p.203
834Moreno Ocampo, Luis, “ Una propuesta de acción,” in Grondona, Mariano, La Corrupción, p. 130
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area of the Chaco, another military campaign was necessary in 1911 and there were still some
isolated Indian uprisings in the 1930s that were finally crushed by the army). The Indian
population has also been culturally eliminated because, from the 1870s on, the nation-state
carried out an aggressive policy to dissolve Indian communities and impose the Spanish
language and the respect for national symbols through a program of compulsive primary
education. By the 1930s the only purely ethnic and culturally Indian groups where confined to
small Indian reserves in the Chaco and Patagonia.835 Most of the Indian population also
“mixed” with the Spanish population, giving origin to a sizable “Creole” population, which also
adopted western culture.
The third reason involves the effective assimilation of European immigrant groups.
Waves of immigration from Europe took place from the two last decades of the 20th century to
the years immediately following the end of the Second World War. The Argentine state carried
out an efficient socialization and incorporation of the immigrants through a system of
compulsory primary education and the establishment of a one-year compulsory military service
in 1905 (abolished in 1994 and replaced by a voluntary system). 836
Despite a certain ‘unity’ along ethnic and linguistic lines, welfare and social conditions
during Argentina’s long economic decline—from the 1940s onwards—caused fragmentation. .
The increasing gap between the poor and rich sectors of the population was particularly serious
during the final crisis and collapse of the Argentine welfare state in the 1980s. If, for a long
period of time, the state was capable of creating sources of work and reducing the effects of
poverty, this would no longer be the case after the debt crisis of the 1980s.  The situation
worsened with  the policies of structural adjustment of the 1990s. Income poverty has been also
worsened by the increasing rates of unemployment caused by the process of state reduction and
the opening of the economy. By the end of the 1980s, the myth of Argentina as  “the middle
class of Latin America” had collapsed. As stated by two analysts,
                                                          
835For an excellent historical and anthropological analysis Indian communities of Argentina see:
Martínez Sarasola, Carlos, Nuestros paisanos los indios: vida, historia y destino de las comunidades
indígenas en la Argentina, Buenos Aires, Emecé, 1993, 659 pp.
836 On the role of the public education system and the compulsory military service as a mechanism for
the “argentinization” of immigrants see: Rouquié, Alain, Poder Militar y Sociedad Política en la
Argentina, Volume 1, Buenos Aires, Hyspamerica, 1986, pp. 80-88
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“The image of Argentina portrayed in these texts [in the 1950s] is one of a country that grows at a
faster rate than its European counterparts, develops its industry, and incorporates significant
sectors of the peasant population into its cities. [...] Forty years later Argentine society presents a
diametrically opposite panorama, with the national product stagnant for more than a decade,
evident signs of de-industrialization, and an increasingly reduced labor market making labor
relations precarious and giving impetus to the informal market. Moreover, the exhaustion of public
sector financing and the external debt crisis that broke out in the 1980s, caused a severe drop in the
resources destined for welfare policies and a deterioration in the quality of services. The same
country that developed social welfare policies at such an early date showing a very different
face.[...] In this decade [1980s] the Argentine government for the first time had to implement
national food assistance programs for growing sectors of the population whose incomes were
insufficient to satisfy even this basic need [...] Urban poverty is not simply the consequence of a
prolonged economic crisis. Another dimension to take into account is the retreat of the state from
areas in which it had traditionally intervened for the welfare of its citizens.”837
In a sense, although they have very different economies, Venezuela and Argentina share a
similar phenomenon: an acute social and economic crisis caused by the collapse of an oversized
and overextended state apparatus. As far as the increasing unequal concentration of income and
social fragmentation concerns, the figures below speak by themselves:
Graphic 1. Distribution of income in urban households in Argentina, 1980-1997
 by quintile in the metropolitan area (Buenos Aires and Great Buenos Aires), in percentages
Decile 1 and 2 = Quintile 1(the poorest 20% of the population according to per capita income) and Decile
9 and 10 = Quintile 5 (the richest 20% of the population according to per capita income)
Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), 1999 Statistical Yearbook
for Latin America and the Caribbean, [on line version]
http:// www.eclac.org/publicaciones/Estadisticas/6/lcg2066/parte1anu99.pdf
                                                          
837Golbert, Laura and Tanti Fafani, Emilio, Poverty and Social Structure in Argentina: Outlook for the
1990s, Democracy and Social Policy Series, Kellog Institute Working Paper Nº 6, Spring 1994, pp.1 and
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Graphic 2. Poor and indigent households, in the metropolitan area: Argentina
(percentage of total households)
Poor households: percentage of households in which income is inferior to the double of the size of basic
food basket. It includes the indigent households.
Indigent households: percentage of households in which income is inferior to the cost of a basic food
basket.
Source: ECLAC, 1999 Statistical Yearbook for Latin American and the Caribbean, [on line version] ibid
supra.
In 1989 Argentina faced the same problems that Venezuela suffered the very same year:
tired of chronic inflation and unable to stretch their income  to cover their basic needs, people
came out of the belt of shantytowns that surround the capital city and sacked supermarkets.
Structural adjustment and rising poverty have also brought a series of violent demonstrations in
the poorer provinces caused by the sudden reduction of the public sector took place in the
1990s. In December 1993 for example,
“[t]here were violent protests against the austerity schemes forced by the Menem administration on
provincial governments. In La Rioja, where almost 10 percent of the province’s population and 28 percent
of the employed work for the provincial government, an announcement that a fifth of the public workers
would be sacked and the wages of the rest reduced led to a protest that left sixty injured. The
demonstrators burned down the door to the government building and forced the police into temporary
retreat[...] A week after [...] there was even worse violence in Santiago del Estero. The government
announced that it could not pay the $350 monthly salary of provincial workers (they had not been paid
since August), although senior officials continued to draw their $16,000 monthly salaries. The protesters
in the provincial capital burned down the government house [...] the courthouse, and the legislature and
attacked the residences of government leaders. There were four dead, fifty injured, and much government
and private property destroyed by the violence[...] The protests accelerated during the half of 1994. In
January, protesters blocked roads in Patagonia protesting government policies toward the fruit and
aluminum industries [...] In February, March and April 1995, there were serious disturbances in Tierra del
Fuego, Jujuy, Tucumán, Neuquén, Río Negro, La Rioja, Catamarca, Chaco and Salta”838
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This kind of violence is very different from the political violence of the 1970s. While
insurgency in the 1970s stemmed from a reaction to a highly authoritarian regime and from a
high ideological polarization of society, violence in the 1990s is spontaneous and stems from
social and economic exclusion. More than “just” a problem, this violence is also an indicator of
the increasing gap between the “have” and the “have-nots” that exists in Argentina. As will be
explained later this exclusion is provoking a shift of marginal people towards the illegal side of
the economy.
As explained in Chapter II, all South American states share different degrees of weakness
in terms of socioeconomic cohesiveness. Argentina, as the rest of South America, has weak
political institutions because the democratic regime is not fully consolidated. The Alfonsín
government suffered three failed military uprisings, and was forced to leave power six months
before he planned, in the middle of an uncontrollable hyperinflationary crisis. The Menem
administration crushed a military revolt in December 1990.
As explained in Chapter III, the emerging South American democracies could be defined
as “Delegative Democracies,” that is, the recognized institution is the president who is seen as
responsible for solving urgent problems with efficiency and effectiveness. If a situation of
ineffectiveness at solving important issues (i.e., economic instability) is worsened by a scandal
of political corruption linked to drug trafficking activities involving the Executive office, then
the legitimacy of the office of the president could be weakened and the legitimacy of the entire
political regime could also decrease.
To local corruption we must add that in Argentina there is, as in Venezuela, a long and
growing tradition of political corruption at every level of political institutions. The case of
Venezuela already showed that a corrupted political system is more vulnerable to penetration by
criminal organizations. As the next sections will show, Argentina was not immune to this threat.
According to the expert and former Federal Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, the level of
corruption in Argentina can be defined as  “hypercorruption.” According to him, it is not that
there is corruption within the system; rather, corruption is the system itself.839 Corruption is
common and widespread at all levels, and stems from (among other things) the over-expansion
of the state bureaucracy and the overprotection of society by the state. The state has always been
inefficient, and paying bribes in order to accelerate procedures was and still remains common.
The many cases of corruption during the recent privatization of public companies are just a
reflection of this. The paradox of all paradoxes: a corrupted state apparatus is dismantled
through corrupt practices. As shown above, this process of increasing and deepening corruption
                                                                                                                                                                         
838Sawers, Larry, The other Argentina: the Interior and National Development, Boulder, Westview Press,
1996, p.33
839Moreno Ocampo, op.cit. p130
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can only slowly but steadily lead to a decrease of legitimacy of the consolidating
democracy.840
c) Policy Capacity
“From the loneliness of his office, the president gave orders for transformation, convinced that
society would follow them: limiting the payment of the foreign debt, currency change, constitutional
reform, displacing the capital city, judging the military involved in human rights violations. In each case,
the reality of power limited his aims and made them fail.”841
“The poorest 20 per cent of our society pays  28.8 percent of what has been collected by the state that is,
this sector pays proportionally more than the richest 20 percent of our society which only pays  22,9
percent.”842
A crisis of governability is what would best define the situation of the Alfonsín
administration. During the 6 years of his government, President Alfonsín had to cope with
enormous tasks: dealing with the problem of the foreign debt; controlling hyperinflation;
integrating the military into the democratic process and above all subordinating them to the
political power, while carrying out trials against military officers who have been involved in
human rights violations during the dictatorship. At the same time, the government was
pressured by internal and external actors, the IMF, the  Paris Group, and the World Bank, which
were asking for the repayment of a debt irresponsibly contracted by the military. Alfonsín’s
administration also had to cope with the strong and vertically structured Peronist trade unions
and capital interest groups such as the Rural Society (landowners), the Argentine Agrarian
Federation (farmers), and the local industry. All these groups were asking for policies that
would help them to cope with inflation and to get the share of state protection they had become
accustomed to over the last fifty years.
Alfonsín was neither capable of reaching a consensus with all these groups nor was he
able to satisfy the demands of each group individually. The government faced a demand
overflow. Besieged by corporations, the giant Argentine welfare state started to collapse. The
Argentine state was besieged by corporations. As stated by one analyst,
                                                          
840On the problem of generalized corruption in Argentina see: Grondona, Mariano (ed.), op. cit.. For
particular cases see: Saba, Pablo Roberto and Manzetti, Luigi, “Privatization in Argentina: The
implications for corruption,” in Crime, Law & Social Change, 25, 1997, pp. 353-369; De Paula, Victor,
Fuerte Apache,Argentina Siglo XXI; Buenos Aires, Centro de Estudios Sociales Dr. José Equiza,
1996,263p. Granillo Ocampo, Raúl (ed.), Corrupción, un riesgo para la democracia, Buenos Aires,
Fundación Integración, 1997, 188p.
841Brailovsky, Antonio E., Historia de las Crisis Argentinas: un sacrificio inútil, Buenos Aires, Editorial
de Belgrano, 1996, p. 252
842José Manuel de la Sota, Peronist representative, quoted in Brailovsky, Antonio, op.cit.,p.271
(originally in Spanish-my translation-)
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“ Les déficits chroniques des entreprises publiques et des provinces doivent être épongés par la
Banque centrale. Les seuls programmes de subvention à l’industrie coûtent environ 5% du PIB.
Les recettes fiscales tardent à s’améliorer. L’argentin moyen, pour échapper aux contraines qui
pèsent sur lui, a adopté des stratégies multiples. L’évasion fiscale et le travail au noir sont les plus
courantes”843
One of the strongest pillars of Alfonsín’s legitimacy was his titanic effort bring to justice
every military officer responsible for torture and illegal summary executions during the military
dictatorship.  Alfonsín faced three military uprisings (one in 1987 and two in 1988), and was
forced to concede two partial amnesty laws (Full Stop and Due Obedience Laws -Leyes de
Punto Final and Obediencia Debida-) that put an end to trials of junior officers under the
argument that they were following orders from their superiors. (The heads of the juntas and
some heads of military regions and corps were sentenced and remained in prison until they were
pardoned by president Menem in 1990.) This setback, together with the government’s lack of
effectiveness in solving the economic crisis, seriously eroded Alfonsín´s popularity and
authority.
As mentioned before, in 1989 poor people, fed up with chronic inflation and unable to
cover their basic needs with their income, came out of the belt of shantytowns that surround
Buenos Aires and assaulted supermarkets. The resulting looting and sacking marked the
beginning of the end. In July 1989 Alfonsín resigned his presidency, six months before the
appointed date. Under this situation, even if the drug problem was growing in importance, the
government was incapable of prioritizing the kind of social policies that would have prevented a
rise in drug consumption or a rise in drug trafficking-related crime.844
As an example the two commissions (1985-1988 and 1988-1989) that were created
during the Alfonsín administrations to deal with drug law enforcement and drug prevention and
treatment did not have a budget allocation.845 Both commissions had personnel “borrowed”
from other government dependencies and did not have a permanent professional staff. One of
the interviewed officials that was a general coordinator of the commissions defined them as
kind of bureaucratic “foreign legion” of officials that would periodically meet in order to
discuss and coordinate policies.846
                                                          
843Hufty, op.cit, p.116
844Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti, Jaime Malamud Goti, Executive Vice-President of CONCONAD
(National Commission for the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse) from 1985 to 1986 and
General Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Justice (1986-1989), Buenos Aires, July, 1997.
845Interview with Dr. José Corsunsky, Adviser of the Executive Vice-President of CONCONAD (1985-
1988) and Coordinator of the National Commission for the Coordination of Control of Drug Trafficking
and Drug Abuse-CONCONAD II- (1988-1989). Dr. Corsunsky was in charge of the coordination of the
implementation of  drug abuse control activities between the Federal agencies that formed part of the
Commission and the cooperation between CONCONAD and the provincial governments for the
application of national drug abuse control policies.
846 Ibid.
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Also the credits assigned to the federal drug treatment institution the CE.NA.RE.SO (for
the treatment of cases in the federal capital and the “great Buenos Aires” was incredibly low. As
shown in table Nº 1 below.847
Table 1. Budget allocations for the Centro Nacional de Reeducación Social (CE.NA.RE.SO) 1983-1987
(no data available for 1988 and 1989):
Year: Credits (in Pesos-$- and Australes -A-)
1983 53,013 $
1984 47,522 A
1985      432 A
1986     784 A
1987   1,568 A
Sources: Laws Nº 22,770(1983); 23,110 (1984); 23,270 (1985); 23,410 (1986) and 23,526 (1987),  (Laws
of the General Budgets of the National Administration for these years).
In the case of the Menem administration the situation was different but the problems were
basically the same. Some of them, such as unemployment and poverty, had been aggravated. In
fact the structural adjustment policy adopted by the Menem administration has caused high rates
of unemployment. This has been provoked by the reduction in the size of the government sector
(that has resulted in massive dismissals of public employees), and the abrupt end of protection
to the local industry and the opening of the economy that led local medium and small goods
production companies to close. Also, the adopted parity U.S. Dollar/ Argentine Peso (1 Peso= 1
U.S. Dollar) provoked an inflow of cheap imports that the local medium-sized industry could
not manage to compete with.  This factor was aggravated by a world trend of increasing
robotization of production in all sectors of the economy and a lower absorption of manual labor.
Structural unemployment is the result: a big mass of unemployed people without hope of being
reintegrated in the labor market in the medium and long term. The problem of unemployment
has of course aggravated an already existing problem of income poverty.
The Menem administration prioritized neither social nor employment policies; it was
obsessed with reducing the budget deficit. Nor did the state actually have the capacity or the
resources to face these problems. The main reasons for this lack of capacity are a regressive
taxation system that is insufficient to carry out social policies and the flow of state income for
the payment of the interests on foreign debt. As a matter of fact, most of the income resulting
                                                          
847As far as the drug law enforcement allocations they did not have a separate section in the budget
congressional presentations so it was not possible to trace an evolution of the drug law enforcement
budget of each police and security force.
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from the privatization and sale of state-owned companies ended up as payment on the foreign
debt.848
The budget allocations for the Secretary for the Coordination of Drug Enforcement and
Drug Prevention and Treatment strategies (SEDRONAR) have augmented considerably.
However, drug consumption and drug trafficking are the symptoms of other problems, namely:
unemployment and lack of social protection, which lead people to either consume or sell drugs.
This dissertation proposes that unless the Argentine state faces the problem of structural
unemployment and poverty, drug consumption and the shift of people to the illicit side of the
economy will increase.
The consequences of this situation of long-lasting poverty and structural unemployment
will be analyzed in the section concerning socioeconomic development. Again, as stated in the
first chapter, a weakness in one of the features of the state’s attributes reinforces the weakness
of other variables. In this sense, all variables are interdependent and of course a situation of low
socioeconomic development will limit the policy capacity of the state, and vice-versa.
Table 2. Budget Allocations for SEDRONAR
 (in Argentine pesos)   
Year Budget allocations for SEDRONAR in
pesos
1992   6,500,000$
1994 26,000,000$
1995 18,500,000$
1996 19,972,488$
1997 15,241,169$
Sources Organization of American States, CICAD, Tenth Ordinary period of sessions, Presentation of the
Argentine Delegate, OEA/ Ser.L/XIV.2.12, CICAD/doc.445/92, General Budget Allocations Laws for
1994,1995,1996 and 1997.
 In the period under study, Argentina lacked adequate banking and commercial legislation
to control  money laundering activities (creation or purchase of  companies -ghost businesses-,
purchases of  land, real estate operations, etc.) and this in turn created a large potential for
political corruption at  both the judiciary and executive levels.849
                                                          
848 On this issue see: Hufty, op.cit., pp.185-219
849On this issue see: Corigliano, op.cit p1; Comisión de Legislación Penal, Comisión de Drogadicción,
Jornadas Interparlamentarias sobre Lavado de Dinero, Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación
Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1991, Lestelle, Alberto, “Argentina, blanco predilecto del narcotráfico en
América del Sur,” Actualización Política, Nº 5, 1992, p.97 and Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección a la
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Money laundering related to drug trafficking activities was legally defined and penalized
by the Narcotics Criminal Law  (1989), however, this law does not establish mechanisms to
prevent this kind of crime.850 Under subtle diplomatic pressure from the United States
government, SEDRONAR submitted a Money Laundering Law project to the Congress in 1996.
The project proposed to extend the concept of money laundering beyond drug offenses to
include terrorism, trafficking in human beings and human parts, and administrative corruption.
The law would mandate the reporting of suspicious transactions by banks and other financial
institutions (like currency exchange houses), and establish an inter-agency Financial
Information Unit (FIU). The FIU would receive reports of suspicious transactions, initiate
money laundering investigations, and forward cases for prosecution. The project was however
blocked in the Congress due to arguments about its composition and the extent of its power and
authority. (Legislators disliked the fact that the FIU would be an agency of the executive
power.) The group of interests of the Argentine private banking sector allegedly lobbied for the
rejection of the project. A different version of the bill had to be submitted by SEDRONAR  to
the Congress in early June 1998 and had not been approved at the time of this writing.851
Some authors consider that the orthodox liberal policy implemented by the Menem
administration (and by most South American governments), contributed to this lack of control
over the movement of capital. As stated by one analyst,
“Ce système est aujourd’hui au coeur des transformations qui, par la mise en oeuvre d’un modèle
d’ouverture économique, cherchent à instaurer un neo-libéralisme économique encore plus
orthodoxe que celui de M. Reagan et encore plus inflexible que celui de Mme Tatcher. Les
principes de liberté dans les négociations d’affaires [...] on produit des résultats inadmissibles
pour les théoriciens du néo-libéralisme. Ces principes ont transformé la région en pôle de
développement d’une économie souterraine prospère face a une économie officielle comateuse.
Les principes du néo-libéralisme associés à une “morale financière” nonchalante, de double
discours, extrêmement “pragmatique” et sans pudeur, ont stimulé l'activité de mafias et de
groupes de pouvoir corrompus ”852
Also as reported by the NGO World Drug Watch (Observatoire Géopolitique des
Drogues),
                                                                                                                                                                         
Comunidad, Dirección General de Coordinación Estratégica, Análisis de la situación del narcotráfico y el
lavado de dinero en la República Argentina,  June 1996, pp. 6-8
850The only measure contemplated in the law (art 26) is lifting bank secrecy for the investigation of drug
trafficking related crimes under the order of a federal judge.
851 On this issue see: Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD), The World Geopolitics of Drugs
1997-1998 [on-line] http://www.ogd.org/98rapport/gb/gb98.html, pdf version p.197
The law was finally enacted on April 13, 2000 (Law Nº 25.246, Creation of the Financial Information
Unit), however it was not fully regulated and approved by the Executive Power until February 2001. The
FIU is still not functional because of delays over the appointment of its members.
852Blixen, Samuel, “La banque latino-américaine et le narco-trafic,” in Labrousse Alain and Wallon
Allain, La Planète des Drogues: Organisations criminelles, guerres et blanchiment, p.275
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“Following the implementation of the “Convertibility Plan,” which is aimed at encouraging
foreign investment, especially in the service sector, total foreign investment rose to $29 billion in
he space of six years (if the privatization of state companies is taken into account) [...] The most
visible signs of this influx of money are the hotels , casinos , shopping malls, and gas stations that
have sprouted like mushrooms in Buenos Aires and in tourists centers such as Pinamar, Mar del
Plata, Córdoba and winter resorts in Patagonia. The deals that have been set up to finance these
operations are often far from transparent for the  Argentine monitoring authorities and the United
States government, who believe they may conceal money-laundering operations connected with
drug trafficking both in Argentina and abroad.”853
d) Socioeconomic development
This section will concentrate on recent socioeconomic problems that may increase the
vulnerability to threats posed by the illicit drug industry.
A rising rate of unemployment, due in part to the austerity measures taken by the Menem
administration, resulted in a substantial reduction in public sector activities and in the
dismantling and privatization of public enterprises. This in turn caused a parallel rise in the
underground economy and in the rate of criminal activity (including drug trafficking-related
activities). This situation is particularly serious in the northern provinces, which are not only the
poorest in the country, but also share borders with Bolivia or are in the direct path of drug
transit routes.  Argentina is a federal country on paper but a centralized country in practice. In
Argentina’s poorest provinces (among these the provinces of the northwest region), the biggest
economic sector is the public sector (including privatized public enterprises such as
Petrochemical and steel or mining complexes). The public administrations of these provinces
actually depend on Buenos Aires’ economic contributions and proportional federal income tax
sharing in order to pay their employees’ salaries. The economies of this region of the country
were harshly affected by the structural adjustment policies undertaken by the central
government. As explained by one analyst,
“The cost of Menem’s adjustment has fallen most severely on the provinces of the interior. These
provinces are sparsely populated, arid, underdeveloped, and chronically poor [...] Trade
liberalization, a decline in subsidies, and the government’s insistence on provincial fiscal
discipline have placed most of the interior’s economies in crisis. There, unemployment rates range
up to 35 percent [...] Jujuy’s economy, for example, had shrunk 26 percent since 1983 and
unemployment was 28 percent; unemployment in Tucumán was 19 percent  [1994] [...] The
Achilles heel of Plan Cavallo may prove to be the sorry state of the interior’s economies and the
political dissents this spawns. Unemployment rates exceed 25 percent in several provinces.
Provincial governments cannot meet payrolls. The banking system in the interior is in crisis as 40
percent of provincial bank debt is unrecoverable.”854
Also as reported by The Economist Intelligence Unit,
                                                          
853OGD, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 19971998 [on-line]
http://www.ogd.org/98rapport/gb/gb98.html, pdf version p.196
854Sawers, op.cit.,  pp.33 and 35
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“Good levels of  GDP growth have not reduced unemployment. On the contrary unemployment
has risen as a result  of  public-sector redundancies and restructuring in the private sector. The
labor market could deteriorate in 1994 as the authorities try to stimulate external competitiveness
by cutting taxes and public spending further. The strategy is to reduce tax evasion and to
redistribute the tax burden to favour producers of tradeable goods.” 855
“[u]nemployment is not evenly spread across regions. In northern provinces, where economic
activity has been hard hit by the production and public-sector crisis In northern provinces where
economic activity has been hard hit by the production and public-sector crisis, unemployment has
reached unprecedented levels and currently exceeds 25% ” 856
The tables below illustrate the parallel increase of poverty, unemployment and crime in
the early 1990s. The tables also illustrate the situation in the northwestern provinces of
Argentina.
 Graphic 3. Argentina: Urban open unemployment (Average annual rates)
Source: Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), 1999 Statistical
Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, [on line version]
http:// www.eclac.org/publicaciones/Estadisticas/6/lcg2066/parte1anu99.pdf
                                                          
855The Economist Intelligence Unit, EUI Country Report: Argentina, 1st quarter 1994, p. 7
856EIU Country  Report: Argentina, 3rd quarter 1994, pp.20-21
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Graphic 4. Percentage of households with unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) in the Northwestern provinces
(data for 1991 according to the last national census)
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Anuario Estadístico de la República Argentina,
INDEC, Buenos Aires, Vol. 10, 1994.
Table 3. Delinquency rate
 ( Per 0/000 inhabitants. Country total and Northwest provinces)
Source:INDEC, Anuario Estadístico de la Reública Argentina, Vol.10, 1994 and 1999 (digitalized
version)
As unemployment grows, participation in drug trafficking activities, such as the
installation of cocaine laboratories (“kitchens”) or participation in drug distribution bands, could
increase.  As seen in Chapter V, a similar phenomenon took place in Venezuela in the early
1980s. Affected by a downturn in the prices of oil, its main export, unemployment rose, living
conditions decreased, and Venezuela became progressively involved in coca production and in
trafficking activities.
Precentage of households with  UBN
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As shown in the table below, Argentina has a diversified economic structure. Also, as
stated before, Argentina does not have a large Indian peasantry that could be involved in the
production of coca for cultural and traditional reasons. The risk of Argentina becoming a major
drug producer country dependent on the drug industry does not exist.
Nevertheless, the situation is worrisome in the poor northern provinces where the
production of cocaine in small laboratories could expand under management by local or foreign
groups. The situation is equally worrisome in big urban centers such as Buenos Aires, where
there is a higher risk of proliferation of coca paste and base produced in small laboratories that
would satisfy a growing consumption market. The transit of chemical inputs towards Bolivia
have come under tighter control; however, it would be easy to buy kerosene and acetone in
grocery stores in Buenos Aires where there is no government control for the sale of these
products.  The dark side of the economy is becoming more and more attractive for chronically
unemployed people. How could one possibly find small cocaine labs in a city with almost 15
million people like Buenos Aires?857
Graphic5. Argentina: criminal offenses requiring police intervention per year, according to type of crime
(country total)
Source: INDEC Statistical Yearbook  Republic of Argentina Vol.10 1994 and 1999 (digitalized version).
Data for 1993 only first semester. Year 1996 excluding the province of Salta. Year 1997 excluding the
provinces of  Salta and Jujuy.
                                                          
857 On this issue see: Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección a la Comunidad, op.cit., p. 5
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Graphic 6. Argentina: criminal offenses requiring police intervention per year
under Laws 20,771 and  23,737 on narcotics
Source: INDEC Statistical Yearbook  Republic of Argentina Vol.10 1994 and 1999 (digitalized version).
Data for 1993 only first semester. Year 1996 excluding the province of Salta. Year 1997 excluding the
provinces of  Salta and Jujuy.
Argentina is the second largest South American producer (after Brazil) of chemical inputs
for the production of cocaine hydrochloride.858 Thus, the country is an ideal center for the
installation of CHCL conversion laboratories. As reported,
“ Numerous cocaine essential chemicals- including acetic acid, acetone, benzene, ethyl ether,
hydrochloric acid, sodium carbonate, sodium sulfate, sulfuric acid, and toluene- are manufactured
in Argentina. Intelligence indicates that a portion of these chemicals are diverted for cocaine HCL
production in Bolivia and possibly, Argentina. ”859
The paradox is that as Argentina reinforces its control on the export of these chemicals
for illicit utilization the laboratories are moved closer to the Argentine border or into Argentine
territory  (which happened in Brazil a decade before). As reported by the UN International
Narcotics Drug Control Board,
                                                          
858 See: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1987/89,p.54
859DEA, Southern Cone Situation Report, p.3
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“ A decree imposing import and export controls over 43 chemical precursors has recently come
into force in Argentina. The decree has already contributed to the interception and prevention of
exports of substances used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine. Strict export controls may,
however, lead to an increase in the amount of coca leaves entering in Argentina and to the
establishment of cocaine-producing laboratories. The amount of coca leaves seized increased from
30 tones in 1990 to 47 tones in 1991. ”860
Within Argentina there already existed a widespread consumption of harmful drugs such
as the inhalation of solvents and other chemical products among the lower economic sectors of
the society ( e.g., “street children”-homeless children-), the abuse of  psychotropic
(amphetamines, barbiturates etc.), consumption of  marijuana in the middle class, and a limited
consumption of cocaine in the higher income sectors.861 This situation is changed as
consumers switch to the consumption of cocaine and new consumers appear because of two
factors:
1. The price of cocaine began to drop as the flow (supply) towards the territory
increased.862 As reported by the United Nations Drug Control Programme,
“  [k]ey informants report that the most important drugs abused are opiates, synthetic narcotics,
cocaine and coca-leaf, cannabis, amphetamines, benzoidazepines and hypnotic sedatives [...]  A
significant increase in the abuse of cocaine and synthetic narcotics was reported in 1988. A
slower increase is noted in the abuse of  benzodiezepines since the 1970s. Increases in the abuse
of cocaine are attributed to lower prices and more availability due the use of Argentina as a
transit country ”863
2. Internal networks of distribution formed by corrupted provincial and federal officers
began to rise as the traffickers bought their “permission” with cocaine to be resold in
the internal market.864 As reported,
                                                          
860United Nations, International Narcotics Drug Control Board, Report of the International Narcotics
Control Board (INCB) 1992, New York, 1992, p.43.  The INCB refers to Decree 2064/91 signed in 1991,
which requires that all transactions, including the manufacture, import and export of controlled chemical
inputs (and certain pharmaceutical drugs) to be registered with the Argentine Drug Secretariat Office.
861United Nations Drug Control Programme, Country Drug abuse and Treaty Implementation Profiles:
Argentina, Vienna, 1994, p.1
862 Cocaine prices in Argentina dropped 14 times, taking the New York prices as a parameter, See: La
Prensa, Buenos Aires, April, 13 1991,p.8. On this issue also see: Corigliano, Francisco,op.cit.,p3 and
UNDCP, Country Drug Abuse and Treaty Implementation Profiles: Argentina ,p.1
863 United Nations, International Narcotics Drug Control Board, Report of the UN International Narcotics
Control Board (INCB) for 1990, New York, 1990,p.34
864Lestelle, Alberto, Defendiendo el Futuro, (printed by Alberto Lestelle as Secretary of Drug Abuse
Prevention and Fight Against Drug Trafficking) Buenos Aires, 1994, p33.
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“Mais l’Argentine n’est pas seulement un passage. Depuis son entrée  dans le pays jusqu’à  sa
sortie, la drogue passe par de nombreux intermédiaires - plusieurs  fonctionnaires ou élus locaux
ont été interpelés  - qui préfèrent souvent se faire payer en “poudre.” Ils la revendent ensuite  pour
leur propre compte. C’est pourquoi il leur a fallu créer un marché sur place...”865
Argentina can be then considered a cocaine consumer country with all the consequences
that this fact implies for its social fabric and human resources.866
e) Territorial Centrality
Argentina shares long, porous and barely-controlled borders with Bolivia and Paraguay.
This latter country does not play a big role in the cocaine industry, but acts as a main transit
route towards Argentina. Moreover, Paraguay is the primary marijuana producer in South
America, and its economy is traditionally linked to all kind of smuggling activities; at the same
time its military hierarchy is suspected of being involved in drug trafficking.867 This is
illustrated by the chief of a Paraguayan military region who was also the head of a criminal ring
that exchanged stolen cars for cocaine on the Paraguay-Bolivian border.868 However, as stated
before, the focus of this chapter will be on Bolivia.
 Argentina shares some 1,800 km of border territory with Paraguay, and 900 km with
Bolivia.869 In terms of illicit drug traffic, the nature of the borders with Bolivia and Paraguay
exacerbates the security problem for Argentina. For almost 1,000 kilometers, until it empties
into the River Paraguay, the River Pilcomayo forms the border between Argentina and
Paraguay. It is a shallow river with only a slight incline; its course is irregular; it has an
abundance of swamps and marshlands; and its stream crosses territories, which are both
inhospitable and sparsely populated. The border area between Argentina and Bolivia is
mountainous, far up in the Andes, and can only be reached through certain valleys and passes.
Argentina shares an arid and mountainous border with Bolivia, (the province of Jujuy and the
main part of the province of Salta), as well as big areas of subtropical jungle (east part of the
Salta province, bordering with the western part of Formosa).  The entire border with Paraguay is
dense rainforest and jungle.870 Moreover, these provinces are scarcely populated territories
with densities of 5.5 (Formosa), 9.6 ( Jujuy), and 5.6 ( Salta) inhabitants per square
                                                          
865Le Monde, 12 October 1986, p5.
866 See: “País de Consumo,” Clarín, Buenos Aires, April, 9,1995, Editorial note, central page and
Lestelle, Alberto , Argentina. Blanco Predilecto del Narcotráfico en América del Sur p.95.
867On this issue see: DEA Intelligence division, Worldwide Cocaine Situation, p.43 and Wallon Alain, La
Drogue Nouveau Désordre Mondial: Rapport 1992-1993, Hachette/OGD, p.275
868Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD),La drogue nouveau désordre mondial,p.281
869Carasales, National Security Concepts of the States: Argentina,p. 67
870See: Roccatagliata, Juan A., La Argentina, Geografía general y los marcos regionales, Planeta, Buenos
Aires, Chapter 5.
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kilometer.871 The nature of the borders not only allows an easy transit of cocaine shipments,
but also would allow the overlapping activities of traffickers, paramilitary groups, and guerrillas
(should they develop in Bolivia).
There are also a large number of unregistered airstrips in both the northwest provinces
(Salta, Jujuy, Tucumán, Catamarca, and Santiago del Estero) and the northeast provinces
(Misiones, Formosa, Chaco, Santa Fe, Corrientes, and Entre Ríos) of Argentina, as well as a
network of navigable rivers across the national territory. Cocaine shipments enter through the
northern provinces of Salta, Jujuy, Formosa, Chaco, and Corrientes. The Pilcomayo and
Bermejo rivers are also used as transport routes. The main centers of distribution are the city of
Córdoba and the Cerrito Island in the tripartite border with Paraguay and Brazil.872 According
to law enforcement sources,
“ Law enforcement officials and a spokesman for the national anti-drug office said cocaine or cocaine
base form Bolivia can easily enter Argentina across the border, into the northern provinces of  Salta
and Jujuy. From there, drug shipments head south to Tucumán, where they tend to divide between two
main routes. One is to Santiago del Estero, Cordoba, Rosario and Buenos Aries or the sea side resort
of  Mar del Plata. The other route from the fork at Tucumán is to the cities of  San Juan and Mendoza
and then over the Andes to Chile and the Pacific coast, for shipment to Japan ”
“ Drug traffickers have ample opportunity to smuggle drugs through Argentina. Private aircraft is by
far the most common method of conveyance. Thousands of uncontrolled airfields and small municipal
airports blanket Argentina’s northern provinces. Cocaine shipments of 100 to 300 kilograms are off-
loaded at these airstrips onto trucks and transported to major ports on the east coast. Ones in Buenos
Aires, Mar del Plata and other cities, the cocaine is concealed in legitimate containerized cargo and
shipped via maritime vessels to United States and Europe[...]The Paraná River serves as yet another
drug smuggling corridor connecting the Andean Ridge to the Atlantic ocean. Designated as an
international waterway the Paraná [River] is free of customs inspection. Typically, sealed
containerized cargo is loaded onto barges from Paraguay and transported downriver to the Ports of
Rosario and/or Buenos Aires ”873
Climate and topography inhibit the cultivation of coca leaf. But in view of the shifting
pattern in the region towards the production of heroin, that the country has the necessary
conditions for the production of opium poppy is disquieting. In fact, during the II World War
Argentina was a producer of opium for the elaboration of morphine to be used in the war front
with medicinal purposes. 874 As reported,
                                                          
871See: National Institute of   Statistics and Surveys, Annual Statistical Survey of the Argentine Republic,
Ministry of Economy, Buenos Aires, 1994, p 33
872See: Pipet, Héctor, Aníbal (Colonel, retired), “Narcotráfico y narcoterrorismo en las relaciones
internacionales,” Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Nº 502, July-September, 1991, p. 48
873DEA, Drug Intelligence Report, Southern Cone Situation Report, pp. 1 and 2. On this issue also see:
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“ Seizure statistics and additional intelligence indicate that small opium poppy fields are located in
the Argentine provinces of  Buenos Aires, Catamarca, Cordoba, Entre Ríos, La Rioja, Salta , San
Luis. In comparison to poppy fields that were cultivated legally during the World War II era, these
plantations are small and usually contain less than few dozen plants per field. One exception,
however, was a plantation in La Rioja, where approximately 2.300 opium poppy plants were
seized in 1991.”875
Even though the Argentine state consolidated its physical and institutional presence over
all national territory at the end of the 19th century, there still exist some provinces where the
local power is exercised in a way that is incompatible with the prevalent political regime of the
whole national territory. This means that there exists a democratic facade when, in fact, power is
concentrated in traditional families and is exercised through arbitrary and sometimes violent
practices. This means that the degree of territorial presence of the state is high (through the
army, state enterprises, or the security forces), but the functional presence of the central state is
weak (in terms of generally accepted political rules over all the territory).876 As stated by one
analyst,
“Provincial governance in most of the interior can best be described as a mixture of patronage
systems and clientelism. In the provincial capital and perhaps a few second tier cities and towns,
the government functions as a political machine. In the more isolated, rural and backward areas,
patron-client relations maintain their hold. In the most traditional and underdeveloped provinces,
family dynasties remain in power for decades and control the provincial political machines, using
local patrons as lieutenants to rule the province. The Saadi family has dominated the government
of Catamarca since the late 1940s. Felipe Sapag ruled Neuquén for decades, and since 1990 his
relatives have continued to dominate the province. The Menem family has long been in control in
La Rioja, as have the Romeros in Corrientes, the Cornejos in Salta and the Guzmáns in Jujuy.
Adolfo Rodríguez Saá ruled San Luis for many years.”877
In these regions the degree of political control over the authorities is very weak and
corrupt practices are an everyday occurrence. This is the case of some of the northwest
provinces such as Salta, Catamarca, Jujuy, and Santiago del Estero. 878  This situation coexists
with poorly paid provincial police and governmental officers, which could generate situations of
drug trafficking-related corruption at the provincial level. As reported,
“Parallel and overlapping institutions inhibit information sharing and effective enforcement.
Moreover, there have been public allegations of police corruption in the drug units. President
Menem and senior officials in these agencies have publicly repeated concern about the problem
and have expressed their commitment to curb corruption. Recent arrests of  several police officials
charged with corruption are a positive sign of this commitment. However, without firm action,
corruption could worsen as the income levels of police officials decline and the presence of
Colombian and Bolivian cartels expands...”879
                                                                                                                                                                         
874 See: Lestelle, Defendiendo el Futuro, p. 30 and Garasino, Alberto, “Droga y Política,” Revista
Argentina de Análisis Político,  p.35
875 DEA,Southern Cone Situation Repport, p.1
876O’Donnell, Estado Democratización y cuidadanía,p. 70
877Sawers, op.cit.p173
878O’Donnell Estado Democratización y ciudadanía, pp.70 and 71
879U.S., Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1991,p78
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Even though no strong locally-based drug trafficking organizations currently exist in
Argentina, both provincial and federal officials could either be corrupted and begin to act as part
of a foreign-based criminal organization, or they could starting acting as one by exploiting the
provincial state structure. This would lead to a dangerous situation in which both the national
state’s effective control over the physical territories, as well as the political stability of these
provinces, could become seriously compromised. In fact, as argued by one analyst, the use of
governmental institutions for criminal purposes could be typified as one more form of organized
crime,
“  In fact, the most important data for the analysis of criminal organization may be the normal,
workaday institutionalized understandings and arrangements that are the underpinnings of
legitimate enterprise. Like technology, the services of government and legitimate business can be
turned to either lawful or criminal ends [...] Every legitimate enterprise is an invitation to criminal
exploitation by insiders. I can think of no more rewarding subject for investigation by the student
of criminal organization than the Watergate experience. The configuration of roles and
relationships that describes its organization is no more nor less than the structure of the American
government from an unaccustomed perspective. ”880
C- DRUG TRAFFICKING AND THREATS TO ARGENTINA
Considering the changes in its security environment and the state weakness analyzed
above, which are the main threats for Argentina’s national security stemming from drug
trafficking? In order to answer this question it is necessary to measure the types of threats
defined in Chapters I and II. These threats then must be classified according to their intensity
and open/latent status. Of course, in the absence of adequate tools of measurement, this
classification will be based on the analysis of statistical data and statements from government
officials.
a) Traditional /Military threats
Clear threats:
 A military conflict between neighboring countries stemming from drug trafficking issues
(as is the case between Colombia and Venezuela, for example) is highly unlikely. Still,
developments in Bolivia must be considered as the main concern for Argentina’s security, in
terms of its drug trafficking security environment. A diplomatic confrontation between the two
governments is, however, highly probable under the following circumstances: an outbreak of
civil war in Bolivia (because of the enforcement activities against the coca growers), the rise of
guerrilla groups that could overlap the borders, or the influx of refugees that would flow into the
country because of political violence. The measures taken by the Argentine government to
                                                          
880A.K. Cohen, “The Concept of  criminal organisation,” The British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 17, Nº
2, 1997, p 101
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refrain and contain these trends could lead to diplomatic tensions.881 As explained by one
analyst,
“Inevitable problems would arise that, though differing in nature and importance, could create
tensions with the Government of that particular country or with the rebel leaders who might have
control over considerable territory and forces. There is a wide range of possible difficulties but
there is no doubt that if certain extremes were reached, the security of the Argentine  Republic
could be jeopardized [...] What does not appear to be remotely likely is that these problems ,
should they occur cannot be solved through the normal channels of diplomacy between friendly
countries...”882
 b) Political Threats
Significant threats:
The successful establishment of permanent operational “pit stops” for Colombian and
Bolivian organizations (or any other transnational drug trafficking organizations) in Argentine
territory, or the development of local organizations that could control part of the national
territory, are not likely to materialize in Argentina. First of all, local drug trafficking
organizations do not have the same degree of organization and power as their Bolivian and
Colombian (or Brazilian) counterparts. There are some gangs that occasionally participate in
cocaine transportation and distribution and shift from one criminal activity to another. For
example, the past few years have seen the development of local rings that steal brand-new cars,
transport them to Paraguay, and exchange them through the Paraguayan-Bolivian border for
cocaine to be resold in Argentina or exported to Europe.883 As reported,
“ Last year the Argentine police also uncovered a novel method of financing the purchase of
drugs: using stolen cars to pay for them. Close to 300 stolen cars were seized form rings planning
to dispose of them in neighboring Paraguay and Bolivia. In the former [...] they are exchanged for
marijuana at a rate of 60-80 kilos per car; in the later for cocaine paste, at a rate of one kilo per car.
”884
Second, even if scarcely populated areas exist, the territorial centrality of the Argentine
state is higher than most of the rest of South America. Territorial penetration by the state
                                                          
881“On 2 December, interior minister Carlos Ruckauf announced that from next January the Argentine
government will begin to repatriate illegal immigrants. He reckoned that they numbered about 600,000
,”Latin American Weekly Report, 16 December 1993, p 588
“These cases illustrate the fact that hundreds of  thousands of immigrants form neighboring countries ,
many of them illegal, are working in Argentina, attracted by salaries that are double or triple those in their
home countries. The Ministry of Labor has announced that work by illegal immigrants will be more
thoroughly controlled and the Chamber of Deputies has voted for a bill restricting immigration,” EIU,
Country report 4th quarter 1993.
882Carasales, National Security Concepts of  States: Argentina, p 86 and 87
883On this issue see: Clarín, Buenos Aires, August 2, 1990,p.31 and Clarín, Buenos Aires, August 19.,
1989, pp. 18 -19
884Latin American Weekly Report, April 4,  1991,p 13
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through federal agencies (militarized police, coast guard, and federal police), the army, and the
provincial police encompasses the entire national territory.885 In this sense, there are no
political “no man’s land,” as is the case in the Peruvian, Ecuadorian, Brazilian, and Venezuelan
Amazon.
Third, there are not high levels of drug trafficking-related violence in the sense that there
are no records of terrorist attacks carried out by traffickers or turf wars between drug trafficking
organizations. For the moment, Argentina plays the role of routing drugs towards Europe
(through the utilization of clandestine airstrips), acting for now only as a new incipient market
for cocaine. However, there are indications of possible attempts by Bolivian and Colombian
traffickers to establish permanent operational bases in Argentine territory, such as the purchase
of large estates (estancias) in the northern provinces. For example, in July 1988 the Argentine
Federal Police seized a shipment of almost 600 kilos of cocaine (the first big seizure in
Argentina) concealed in boxes of frozen shrimp. At the same time, the police aborted an attempt
by the Medellín cartel to establish a permanent route for the traffic of cocaine from their
laboratories in Santa Cruz (Bolivia) to the U.S. and Europe. The traffickers had purchased an
estancia (ranch) with an airstrip in Santiago del Estero (a province in northwest Argentina) and
a front export company in Buenos Aires.886 In March 1995, a joint province/federal police
force dismantled a traffic operation of the Cali organization, and 1.5 metric tons of cocaine and
a plane were seized on the border between Catamarca and Santiago del Estero. The traffickers
had purchased  10,000 hectares one year later and planned to use it as a permanent base of
operations.887 Particularly the first aborted attempt  (1988) to establish a permanent pit stop
was considered a “signal of alarm” by law enforcement officials and led them to think that the
“cartels” could establish themselves in Argentina if the government “let its the guard down”.888
This case also led the Minister of the Interior at the time to believe that there was an installation
of the “cartels in Argentina” in association with local “mafia” groups (grupos mafiosos
locales).889 However, officials in the administrations of Presidents Alfonsín and Menem
dismissed this belief, maintaining that  attempts followed but the installation did not take place.
                                                          
885Interview with Comandante Mayor (National Gendarmerie) Jorge Alberto Vazquez, Head of the
Directorate of Dangerous drugs of the National Gendarmerie from 1983 to 1995 and commander of the V
Region of  the Gendarmerie at the time of the Interview , Bahía Blanca, August 1997.
886For a detailed description of this affair see Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp. 78-90 and
128-138.
887Clarín 10 March 1995,p40,41. "Noticias” magazine 12 March 1995 p120. La Nación 8 March
1995,p13
888Interview with Comisario General (R) Armesto, high-ranking official of  the Superintendence of
Dangerous Drugs of the Federal Police from 1989-1991, Buenos Aires, July 1991. Comisario General
Armesto participated in the investigation of the “Shrimp  Affair” (Caso  Langostino) as it came to be
known.
889Interview with Dr. Enrique Nosiglia, Minister of the Interior from 1987 to 1989, Buenos Aires, July
29, 1997.
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In the view of these officials, no big drug trafficking organizations had established in
Argentina.890 For example, as stated by a high ranking drug control and Justice official during
the Alfonsín administration,
“In 1988, Juan Pirker, then chief of the Federal Police, had conveyed his fear that Colombian
cartels could be attempting to make a breakthrough into Argentina, as a Colombian citizen
allegedly involved in cocaine smuggling had been arrested in the outskirts of Buenos Aires. This
case, however, in which Argentinean territory was used to try to transport cocaine to Europe, was
not the prelude of an invasion of the Colombian cartels but seemingly an isolated episode. No
serious violence was ever reported , and Luis Losada, the customs judge who investigated the case,
told me that to his knowledge, it was the only case in which a Colombian organization had
operated in Argentina.” 891
However, the first head of the Menem administration’s drug control agency, Dr. Alberto
Lestelle (in office between 1989-1995), believed that Colombian cartels were “trying the
territory” before establishing in Argentina.892
A particularly disquieting fact is that Argentina is also used as a hideout by members of
Italian criminal organizations, particularly the Ndrangheta and the Camorra.893 As a matter of
fact, members of these criminal groups have been detected in Buenos Aires and Rosario
participating in the coordination of shipments towards Italy and money laundering operations
through the banking system in neighboring Uruguay. Most of the time they receive the support
of relatives in Argentina and are thus able to elude detection by Argentine law enforcement
agencies.894 As explained by one analyst,
                                                          
890 Interview with Dr.  José Luis Manzano, Minister of the Interior from 1991 to 1992, Buenos Aires,
August 1997; Interview with Prefecto Principal (R), Nelson Mandrile National Director for the
Coordination of Control of Illicit Drug Traffic of SEDRONAR, Buenos Aires, July 1997. In the view of
these officials there were no big drug trafficking organizations established in Argentina.
See Also: Pasquini and De Miguel, p.169
891Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.x. Malamud Goti’s book was published in 1991 and in 1988 he
was Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, future events demonstrated that in fact Colombians would further
attempt to establish bases in Argentina.
892“ Lestelle alertó sobre los narcotraficantes,” Press report reproduced by the Press Secretariat of
SEDRONAR, Buenos Aires, September 1989.
893Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.122; OGD, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, p.79
894Pipet, H.A., “Narcotráfico y Narcoterrorismo en las Relaciones Internacionales, Cuarta Parte,” Revista
de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Nº 516, Jan-March 1995, pp.23 and 124, also see same author,
“Narcotráfico y Narcoterrorismo en las Relaciones Internacionales, Quinta Parte,” Revista de la Escuela
Superior de Guerra, Nº 517 (April-June 1995), pp.81
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“[t]he Sicilian mafia made a strategic decision in the mid or late 1980s to acquire a significant
position in the European cocaine market. At the time the Sicilian sought an unchallenged
monopoly on the importation of cocaine to Italy [...]The Sicilians did not succeed in obtaining this
monopoly today [...] Colombian cocaine suppliers deal directly with a multitude of Italian buyers
and distributors. For example [...] the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta’, the Napolitan Camorra and a
relatively new group, the Sacra Corona Unita [Apulia] [...] in the early 1990s the ‘Ndrangheta’
maintained ‘a permanent representation in Colombia, protected by the Medellín cartel’ also
‘Ndrangheta’ affiliated families have been identified in some Italian cities (Milan, Turin and
Florence) and in Argentina [...] Prominent examples of the Italian-Sicilian diaspora include the
Fidanzatti and Mollica-Morabito families in Argentina, the Ciulla family in Chile, the Ammaturo
group in Peru and the Cuntrera-Caruana clan in Venezuela. (The Mollica-Morabitos and the
Ammaturos are linked respectively to ‘Ndrangheta’and Camorra organizations [...]”895
It is my opinion however that, at least in the period under study (1983-95), the freedom of
action of the Ndrangheta and Camorra members in Argentina paled in comparison to the degree
of official protection that the Cuntrera-Caruana Clan had in Venezuela. When detected, Italian
mafiosi were arrested and extradited to Italy. By 1992 for example, Gaetano Fidanzati, Antonio
Gandolfo, Francesco Morabito, and Oreste Squillaci had been arrested and were awaiting
extradition. Most of these criminals however speculate that the slow nature of the Argentine
judiciary system will prevent their immediate extradition.896
During the last year of the Alfonsín administration as well as during the Menem
administration, authorities considered two possible scenarios in Bolivia as a latent threat to
Argentina’s security. The first was the consequences of a possible civil war in Bolivia; the
second was the possibility of the appearance of a strong guerrilla organization in that country as
a reaction to the enforcement policies of the Bolivian government.  The main concern was the
possibility of overlapping activities and raids of the guerrillas across the border and an
uncontrollable massive outflow of refugees.897 As the Clinton administration was still
endorsing interdiction and eradication strategies as a method for the control of cocaine supply,
with its resulting pressure on the Bolivian government, this threat appeared to be a lasting
concern. As stated by one analyst,
                                                          
895Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.73
896Pipet, Narcotráfico y Narcoterrorismo en las Relaciones Internacionales, Quinta Parte,  p.86
897Interview with Minister Roberto D. Palarino, Argentine Embassy, Washington D.C., January 1995;
Phone Interview with Dr. Osvaldo Santiago Raimondi, Chief of  Cabinet (Deputy Director) of the
Secretariat for Planning of Drug Addiction Prevention and Fight Against Drug Trafficking, Geneva,
1995.
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“ Consequently, neither the border between Argentina and Paraguay nor, still less, the border
between Argentina and  Bolivia would be very important for Argentina’s security, except in the
hypothetical case that very serious disturbances occurred in one of the two countries which spill
over into Argentine territory [...]it is generally believed that if any of these neighboring countries
should ever become a threat to Argentina’s security, this may occur as a result of an internal
political, economic and social conflict which would mean a serious breakdown of law and order
that could have repercussions on Argentine territory. The scenario portrayed above could
theoretically occur in any country with serious problems of underdevelopment and social
backwardness. Scenarios for possible internal conflicts in bordering States may of course, differ,
but basically the consequences for the Argentine Republic can arise from two situations. One of
them would occur if an outburst against the authorities of a neighboring  State developed into
armed revolt and even into civil war; in that case hostilities could occur  at points close to the
border and the overall conflict could, inter alia, result into a significant population movements, a
massive influx of refugees into Argentine territory, a large number of political exiles and persons
seeking asylum into the Argentine Embassy. ”898
Clear and present threats:
Threats that have become clearly overt in past years are drug trafficking-related
corruption at the federal and provincial levels. The cases of corruption in the executive power
began as a consequence of the increasing utilization of Argentina for money laundering
operations. As reported,
“Argentina has been a major center historically for the flow of money through the region. and its
police agencies are reporting an increase in drug money laundering, confirmed by USG
investigations in the U.S. which have demonstrated direct and indirect links to Argentina. Most
evidence indicates the use of exchange houses. which have less government control than banks and
a greater potential for corruption...” 899
 In 1991, several scandals involving high-ranking executive officials indirectly affected
the figure of the president. This fact is particularly dangerous for the political stability of a non-
consolidated Delegative Democracy (as defined in Chapter II).900
In April 1991, the head director of the National Customs Administration during Dr
Alfonsín’s administration, Mr. Juan C. Delconte, was arrested and put on trial for irregularities
in his office involving drug trafficking and smuggling.901 In December 1990 the former head
(he had recently resigned to his position) of the National Customs Administration, retired Air
Force Brigadier Etchegoyen, committed suicide under very suspicious circumstances.
Etchegoyen had been carrying out investigations on a possible drug trafficking and money
laundering connections in the air freight deposits of Ezeiza international airport, and he had
                                                          
898Carasales op cit,p87
899US Department of State, International Narcotic Matters Strategy Report,1991,p 357
“Moreover, Argentina is also becoming a center for money-laundering...” UN INCB report 1991 p 37
900 As we have seen in Chapter III, similar situations were cited as an excuse (although not the main
cause)  for  two failed military coups in Venezuela and finally led to the impeachment and destitution
under charges of corruption of  the Venezuelan President Andrés Perez in 1993. We have also seen that
President Perez already suffering from a crisis of confidence because of the uncontrolled economic crisis
of their countries.
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suffered several threats and intimidations before his death.902 The judiciary investigation could
never demonstrate if his death was a murder or an “induced suicide” and the case was filed as
“dubious death.”903
At the beginning of 1991, three high-ranking executive officials (the personal secretary
and sister-in-law of the president, Amira Yoma; the Director of the Ezeiza International Airport
customs office, Ibrahim al Ibrahim; and the ex-husband of Amira Yoma and the President of the
State Drinkable Water Agency, Mario Caserta) were accused by a Spanish judge of being
members of a money laundering organization directed by Ramón Puentes, one of the
accountants of the Medellín coalition. The organization was discovered in Spain and finally
dismantled in Buenos Aires. The three functionaries were dismissed and put to trial  (Ibrahim al
Ibrahim was later declared a fugitive from justice after he left the country).904 As reported,
“Un juge fédéral a inculpé, lundi 13 juillet Mme Amira Yoma, belle soeur du président argentin
Carlos Menem, d’infraction aux lois sur le blanchiment de l’argent du trafic de drogue. Secrétaire de
M. Menem jusqu'à l’an dernier, Mme Yoma a été mise en cause pour la première fois en janvier 1991,
lorsqu’un trafiquant de drogue jugé a Madrid l'accuse, ainsi que d’autres personnalités peronistes,
d'être impliquée dans ce type d’activités”905
“Early in March the Spanish newspaper, Cambio 16, reported on an investigation carried out by a
judge in Madrid, Baltasar Garzón, into drug traffickers connected to the Colombian Medellín cartel
who were laundering money in Argentina and Uruguay. The investigation alleged that Amira and
Karim Yoma, also in laws of  Sr. Menem through his ex-wife, Zulema Yoma, Ibrahim al Ibrahim, the
former husband or Amira, and Mario Caserta, president of a government body, were involved in this
affair. On March 20 Sr. Caserta resigned his post and put himself at the disposal of  Argentine ( not
Spanish) justice. Sr. Caserta is now under arrest.”906
Ms. Amira Yoma was finally acquitted in 1994 by the federal justice, after political
maneuvers by the executive power placed politically favorable judges in charge of the affair.
Her ex-husband, Mr. Ibrahim al Ibrahim, fled to Syria and Mr. Caserta remained in prison.907
This “Yomagate” scandal, as it came to be called, is one more piece of a big puzzle that leads to
a connection between former members of the executive power and transnational criminal
organizations. These kinds of connections could, in the long term, decrease the legitimacy of the
democratic institutions, leading to a new crisis of governability. One of the pieces of this puzzle
                                                                                                                                                                         
901La Prensa, April 30 1991, and Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp. 286 and 357
902Clarín, April 16, 1991 p. 11 and La Prensa,... December 1991, p.8
903Pasquini and de Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p. 283 and Clarín, April 16, 1991, p.11
904See Pasquini and de Miguel, Cocaína Dilates y Política,p.83,Le Monde,8 March 1991 “Des proches du
Président Menem seraient impliqués dans des affairs de drogue”p 8, Le Monde July 26,1991,The New
York Times International ,December 17 1991.
905Le Monde, Wednesday 15 July 1992,p3
906The Economist Intelligence Unit Report Nº 2 1991.
907Pasquini, Gabriel and De Miguel Eduardo, Blanca y Radiante, Mafias, Poder y Narcotráfico en la
Argentina, Buenos Aires, Espejo de la Argentina, 1995, pp.235 and 236
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is Mr. Mario Caserta, who was not only an official of the first Menem administration, but also
one of the organizers of Menem’s presidential campaign, had in the past had been linked to
cocaine trafficking activities.908 This raises questions about the possibility of financing
President Menem’s presidential campaign with drug money. Mr. Caserta declared to the judge
that Cuban drug trafficker Mario Anello (who was part of the Medellín coalition) had
collaborated with 8 million dollars for the presidential campaign.909  Another part of the puzzle
is Ibrahim-Al-Ibrahim. Mr. Al Ibrahim was a Syrian military intelligence officer that became an
Argentine citizen in 1989 after a brief marriage to Ms. Amira Yoma. Through the influence of
Amira Yoma and Mr. Caserta, Mr. Al Ibrahim (who did not speak Spanish at all) was appointed
the same year as advisor to the National Customs Administration of Ezeiza international
Airport.910 The rest of the story has been told above. From this position, Al Ibrahim would
occupy a key role in the money-laundering machine that the Medellín “cartel” had established in
Buenos Aires. But this is only part of the puzzle. As a matter of fact, before 1989 the Argentine
Intelligence Service (SIDE) was investigating Mr. Al Ibrahim in Bolivia for laundering drug
money, smuggling chemical inputs, and exchanging weapons for cocaine.911  The former head
of the SIDE also notified the new installed authorities (Menem administration) in 1989 about
Caserta’s drug trafficking activities. However both investigations were stopped after he left his
                                                          
908Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.233 and p.101
909Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, The Geopolitical Drug Dispatch, Nº 18, April 1993, p.5
910See Pasquini and De Miguel, p.240
911Interview with Dr. Facundo Suarez, head of the Argentine intelligence service from  1984 to 1989,
Buenos Aires, August 1997. While the SIDE was carrying this investigation the Ministry of Interior had
the working hypothesis of a Syrian cocaine connection in Bolivia. In the Ministry of the Interior it was
believed that Syria had established contacts with the Medellín cartel in order to serve as a transit point for
the cartel’s  shipments towards Europe. Interview with Dr. Daniel Larriqueta, Secretary of the Interior
(Secretario de Estado, Ministerio del Interior) during the Alfonsín Administration, Buenos Aires, July
1987. This hypothesis of the Ministry of the Interior (which at the time charge of the Federal Police and -
for law enforcement tasks-  the National Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard) based on information
provided by Israeli sources. As a marginal comment this case shows that as a result of the absolute
secrecy of this kind of investigations and probably inter-bureaucratic competition, while the Intelligence
Secretariat was certain about the drug trafficking of the Syrian connection in Bolivia, the Ministry of the
Interior managed this only as a working hypothesis based on information provided by Israeli sources. It is
worth noting that each of the police and security forces  under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior
has its own intelligence service. A high-ranking retired officer from the Dangerous Drugs
Superintendence of the Federal Police told me that in order to avoid information leaks, drug trafficking-
related investigations are so secret that each investigating team is unaware of the activities of other
investigation cells even within the same law enforcement force. (Interview with retired  Comisario
General Armesto -Federal Police-, Buenos Aires, July 1997). It  is very likely that the information
managed by the Intelligence secretariat was not shared with the Ministry of the Interior. Moreover as it
was a matter of intelligence collection in a foreign country (Bolivia), this case fell under the area of
intelligence of the SIDE, so it is natural that the Ministry of the Interior (in charge of internal security) did
not go further in this investigation. If Mr. Larriqueta reads this dissertation he will be very surprised to
discover that his working hypothesis was a proven fact.
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office at he end of the Alfonsín administration.912 Another disquieting fact is that, as stated
above, Mr. Ibrahim later became an Argentine citizen as well as an Argentine customs official.
Another part of the puzzle is the fact that a well-known Syrian arms and drug trafficker
called Monzer Al Kassar913 also obtained an Argentine passport in 1990, thanks to the
intervention of Ms. Amira Yoma (who by the way had spent fifteen years of his life in Syria and
was member of the Baath party).914 In 1987 the German Bundes Kriminal Amt (BKA) detected
that Al Kassar held a meeting in Río with “notorious South American traffickers.” Later that
same year a German trafficker called Erich Bunte was arrested in Hamburg and confessed to the
BKA that he had participated in meetings in which Al Kassar had negotiated with Jorge Ochoa
and Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha the opening of a new trafficking route towards Europe passing
through Spain.915Al Kassar was also denounced by another “repentant” trafficker of being an
                                                          
912Interview with Dr. Facundo Suarez quoted before.
913Among other things Mr. Al Kassar served an 18-year prison sentence in Great Britain in 1974 for drug
trafficking. INTERPOL issued an arrest mandate because of his participation in in “arms for drugs”
exchange with the Italian mafia in the Lebanese valley of Bekaa. Mr. Al Kassar  was expelled from
Britain and France in 1981 because of his links with terrorist organizations.  He also participated in both
the Irangate affair and the sale of weapons to Lybia in 1983. Al Kassar is also under investigation by the
Swiss prosecutor Laurent Kasper-Ansermet because of his alleged participation in money laundering
activities through the Swiss banking system. Allegedly in exchange of “favors” with the CIA the Spanish
secret service (CESID) protects Mr. Al Kassar.
914See Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante p. 240. Also the Yoma family and the Menem family
are originally from the town of Yabrud a Syrian town close to the Bekaa Valley (Lebanon) . Yabrud is
also the native town of the Al Kassar family  and President Menem (whose parents emigrated to La Rioja,
Argentina in ....) is a distant relative of Monzer Al Kassar because one of Menem’s cousins was married
to an Al Kassar’s cousins. See Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp.236 and 245 footnote 245.
915The BKA would have a particular interest in arresting Al Kassar  because he accused of placing the
bomb that destroyed  a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie (Scotland) in 1988. Al Kassar was mentioned in an
independent report prepared for Pan Am by an Israeli expert called Juval Aviv. Allegedly Al Kassar used
the same method in order to send heroin for the Badalamenti “family” in the U.S. for this he would count
with the protection of the CIA network in Frankfurt airport which would turn a blind eye on Al Kassar
drug trafficking activities because of his activities in providing arms to the Contra in Central America
with the money obtained from sells to Iran. According to Al Aviv’s report the attempt was planned by the
Iranian secret service as a revenge for the destruction of an Iranian Airbus over the Persian gulf five
months before however it turn to be that in the Pan Am there was a DEA team that was travelling to the
US with probatory evidence about the CIA’s complicity with Al Kassar’s drug trafficking activities. The
majority of the passengers that died in the attempt were German citizens. See: Salinas, Juan José, "Todos
los caminos pasan por Yabrud,” El Porteño, Junio 1992, pp.9 and 10 and Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca
y Radiante, pp.237 and 138
Al Kassar would have also counted with the protection of the Spanish intelligence service (CESID). As
reported: “Al Kassar au moment de son arrestation vivait en toute impunité dans sa somptueuse demeure
de Marbella. Il bénéficiait en effet de la protection des services secrets espagnols (CESID) pour les avoir
aidé à combattre l’organisation basque ETA [he had participated in negotiations of exchange -
prisoners’exchange-ETA members for French hostages in Lebanon- but he also sold to ETA missiles with
electronic localizers placed by CESID] et à négocier la vente d’armement national à des pays du Moyen
Orient. Il était revenu en Espagne après que les autorités espagnoles, soumises à des pressions
internationales, l’avaient expulsé en avril 1990. Son départ pour l’Argentine avait été alors négocié avec
les services secrets argentins (SIDE)” Wallon, Alain, La Drogue Nouveau Désordre Mondial, Rapport
1992-93, Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, Paris, Hachette, 1993, p.276. See also, Salinas, op.cit.,
p.10.
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AK 47 assault rifles to Colombian traffickers.916 Al Kassar has been also suspected of
participating in the bombing attack perpetrated on March 17th, 1992 against the Israeli Embassy
in Buenos Aires by the Iran- and Syria- backed terrorist group, Hezbollah, which is based in the
Bekaa valley of Lebanon.917 In fact, Al Kassar and another Syrian trafficker, Ghassan Al
Kassar (his brother), had been detected in Buenos Aires on March 12, 1992 five days before the
attack.918 As reported,
“Relatively free of terrorist problems in recent years, Argentina was the site of the single most
destructive terrorist act in Latin America in 1992. On 17 March a car bomb virtually destroyed the
Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 people and injuring 242. The Islamic Jihad organization,
an arm of the Lebanese Hizballah, took responsibility of the attack, claiming it was in retaliation for
the Israeli attack that killed Hizballah leader Sheikh Musawi in February. When the authenticity of
this claim was questioned, the group responded by releasing a videotape of the Israeli Embassy during
the surveillance before the bombing.”919
“Sous le pretexte d’avoir été lié à l’attentat contre l’ambassade d’Israël en Argentine du 3 mars 1992,
le trafiquant de drogue et d’armes syrien Monzer Al Kassar a été arrêté et inculpé à Madrid, le 3 juin
suivant. Le ministre argentin de l’interieur, José Manzano, a aussitôt annulé la naturalisation qu’Al
Kassar avait obtenue en un temps record et au mépris de la législation en vigueur [...] Al Kassar était
par ailleurs lié à l’organisation du trafiquant de drogue latino-américain Ramon Puentes, condamné
aux Etats-Unis. Ce dernier bénéficia en particulier de la complicité de Ibrahim [al] Ibrahim, époux
“séparé”et responsable , quoique ne parlant pas espagnol, de la douane de l’aéroport international de
Ezeiza, à Buenos Aires. Al Kasser est soupçonné d’avoir aidé Amira Yoma, impliqueé dans ce réseau
par le juge espagnol Baltazar Garzón, à transporter l’argent de la drogue de Buenos Aires à
Montevideo. Cette dernière s’était également rendue dans sa résidence de Marbella.”920
The final piece of the puzzle is the changing role of Syria’s Hafez al-Assad regime in the
international illegal drug trade in the mid-1980s. By that time Syria could no longer receive
economic support from its allies, Iran and the Soviet Union. Iran had to invest all its resources
in the war effort against Irak and the Soviet Union had already started its economic collapse. By
1986 Syria had a foreign debt of 3,000 million dollars and a foreign reserve of only 100 million
dollars.921 Syrian exports only covered only 40% of its imports and the Syrian currency was
                                                          
916See: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.236
917 “The group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 [...] Operates in the Al Biqa’
(Bekaa Valley), the southern suburbs of Beirut, and Southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe,
Africa, South America, North America, and elsewhere [...] Receives substantial amounts of financial,
training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran and Syria,” U.S.
Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, Appendix B,
http://www.state.gov/www/goblal/terrorsim/1997/Report/backg.html
918Goobar, Walter, El Tercer Atentado: Argentina en la mira del terrorismo ,Buenos Aires, Editorial
Sudamericana, 1996, p.61 and Lanata, Jorge and Goldman, Joe, Cortinas de Humo. Una investigación
independiente sobre los atentados contra la Embajada de Israel y la AMIA, Buenos Aires, Planeta, Espejo
de la Argentina, 1994 p.13
919United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1992, Washington D.C., US
Department of State, p. 9
920Wallon, Alain, coordinateur, La Drogue Nouveau Désordre Mondial, Rapport 1992-93, Observatoire
Géopolitque des Drogues, Paris, Hachette,1993., pp. 274-279
921See, Salinas, op.cit.p.6
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devaluated 50 % to the US dollar. The solution for Al Assad was to intensify drug production in
the Lebanese Bekaa valley (one of the first opium and heroin and cannabis producer regions in
the world),922 which is under Syrian military control. Due to the growing cocaine consumption
market in Western Europe, the Syrians also decided to establish links with the Medellín “cartel”
and thus became an alternative route for cocaine traffic towards that market.923 The Bekaa
Valley -under Syrian military protection- is also becoming an area for processing CHCL using
coca paste imported from South America. All this was done under the mixed Syrian policy of
turning a blind eye while providing military protection. As reported by several sources,
“ La cocaïne est importeé directement du continent américain par voie maritime ou à travers l’Afrique
pour être exportée vers l’Europe, les pays arabes et la Russie actuellement. Aussi, avec l’extension des
laboratoires dans ce pays, ces mêmes traficants trouvèrent plus lucratifs d’importer la pasta pure et de
la transformer dans les laboratoires libanais en chorhydrate de cocaïne [...] Nous estimons les
quantités de pasta et de cocaïne introduites au Liban actuellement à partir de 1985 à 2,500 kilos. La
consommation locale annuelle varie entre 350 et 400 kilos de cocaïne pure”924
“Apart from the economic benefits from drug profits which were derived by the Syrians, they were
put under political pressures, mainly by the U.S., due to their involvement in the drug industry. In the
70's and 80's, these pressures were insufficient to prevent the Syrians from lending their patronage to
the drug industry or participating in drug production and marketing out of Lebanon. In the beginning
of the 90's, a change in the Syrian policy was discerned, first and foremost due to Syria's involvement
in the peace process, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, its growing need for American
and Western political and economic aid. Looking back, the impression is that in the beginning of the
90's, Syria's increasing dependence on the U.S.A. and other Western countries brought on a change in
Syrian policy regarding the issue of narcotics, similar to the change which occurred in regard to its
approach to terrorism. In both cases, the Syrians did not terminate this or cease their involvement,
rather they attempted to blur their involvement in terrorism or narcotics and adopted new modes of
operation which made it difficult to point an accusing finger at them. In order to repudiate American
pressures on the issue of drugs, the Syrians, and the Lebanese government under their auspices, made
a principal decision in the beginning of the 90's to change the character of the drug industry. In this
framework, it was decided to gradually cut down the number of poppy and cannabis
fields and concentrate on the production of heroin and cocaine for marketing abroad. The production
of these drugs is made in several dozen small laboratories in the Bekaa Valley (mainly in the area of
Ba'albek) with the use of raw materials imported to Lebanon from the Far East, Turkey or Latin
America. It should be noted that the production of these hard drugs is more profitable, the labs in
which the production is made are harder to locate and the damages to those who use them are more
minor.”925
                                                          
922On this particular topic see the excellent work by Hassane Makhlouf, Culture et trafic de drogue au
Liban, Paris, Edition l’Harmattan, 1994.
923ibid.
924Malkouf, Hassane, Culture et trafic de drogue au Liban, pp.77 et 78.
925Ehrlich, Reuven, “Terrorism as a Preferred Instrument of Syrian Policy,” The International Policy
Institute for Counterterrorism, Herzliya, 1998 [on-line],
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=392
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“Paradoxically, American pressure on Syria in order to get it to sign the Middle-East peace accord
pushed Damascus, which is unwilling to leave ground for potential critics, to undertake eradication of
poppy and cannabis crops in the Bekaa Valley. Western countries are recognizing Syria as the
region’s policemen, while drug manufacturing activities, which are not as easily detected carry on and
diversify. A fact worth noting is that cocaine hydrochloride is being manufactured on an increasingly
large scale [...] During 1996, Lebanese customs agents did in fact “unfortunately” stumble over more
than 500 kg of cocaine base being shipped to the Bekaa Valley. Close to 3 t of precursor chemicals
were also discovered in the valley in 1996. It seems that many laboratories can manufacture cocaine
and heroin indifferently. Indeed, both base paste (328 kg) and opium (187 kg) were found stashed in
the same place in a single seizure that was advertised as two different ones on different dates by the
Syrian authorities”926
If all the pieces are put together, even a non-expert observer could comprehend the more
than unsettling dimensions of the corruption in Argentina’s political system and the degree of
direct involvement of members of the executive power in drug trafficking and money
laundering activities. All this seems to indicate that at some point there was a Colombian (with
production based in Bolivia)- Argentine- Syrian connection for the export of cocaine towards
Europe via Syria. Ms. Yoma was fired from the government (she was reincorporated in 1997 as
an official for Argentine-UN sponsored program White Helmets); Mr. Caserta is in prison; and
Mr. Al- Ibrahim fled to Syria and is, fortunately, no longer director of the customs office of
Ezeiza Airport. After the bomb attack against the embassy of Israel Mr. Al Kassar’s Argentine
citizenship was revoked. But some questions remain open:
1) Was Mr. Al Kassar involved in the attempt?
2) If he was indeed involved, was the attack a confluence of interests between the Hezbollah
and Syria? After all, Hezbollah had an interest in avenging their murdered leader but Syria also
probably had an interest in carrying out a “vendetta” because of the dismantling of their drug
trafficking network.927 The investigation by the Argentine judiciary system was absolutely
inconclusive. No person was ever indicted. The case was finally closed in 1997.
Another scandal took place when  President Menem gave the authorization for a series of
real estate investments by the Gaith Pharaon company, the largest of the major share-holders of
the BCCI (Bank of  Credit and Commerce International), which was closed the same year
because of its participation in drug and arms traffic and money laundering activities.928 Later,
in 1994, Dr. Domingo Cavallo, at the time Minister of Economics (later fired by Menem in
1995) accused Mr. Alfredo Yabrán, a very powerful private mail tycoon, of heading a  "mafia"
that had the goal of monopolizing all the mailing activities in the country. Mr. Cavallo also very
                                                          
926OGD, 1997-98 World Drug Report, http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP04_2_SYRIE.html
927President Al Assad refused to receive President Menem for three years. Only after  Amira’s sentence
was revoked and Al Ibrahim was safe in Syria could President Menem visit his family in Yabrud. See
Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.242
928See, Keesing’s News Records of  World Events, July 1991,” BCCI  Scandal,”p38355
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subtly suggested that Yabrán's mail companies might be used to smuggle drugs.929 As a matter
of fact, Yabrán virtually controlled the private postal business in Argentina. He owed the two
biggest companies in this area before selling them to the American Exxel group in December
1997. He also co-owned (with the air force) the company that has a monopoly on the cargo
storage houses of Ezeiza International Airport. He had one of the biggest companies of air taxis
in the country. His companies had a contract for the printing and distribution of passports and
other documentation such as car license plates. Yabrán also controlled several private security
companies. He also had contracts for the distribution of the official mail and documentation of
the government; and he was expanding into the tourism business and was starting to purchase
big tracts of land.930 Yabrán was very well connected with the Menem administration and
allegedly was protected by members of the government.931 The Argentine Federal Police and
the Drug Enforcement Administration suspected him of being involved in money laundering
activities and smuggling. Mr. Yabrán was an unknown ten years ago and the police naturally
wondered how could he increase his fortune that quickly, however none of these accusations
were ever proved.932 Alfredo Yabrán committed suicide under very suspicious circumstances
on May 24, 1998. By that time he was being investigated by a federal judge for his allegedly
having ordered the murder of the journalist José Luis Cabezas in January 1997. Whether or not
Yabrán was a “mobster”, as Cavallo used to call him, remains a mystery. However this case
contributed to further increase the cloud of suspicion that floats around the Argentine executive
power.
This kind of corruption scandals could not only de-legitimize the consolidating
democratic institutions but could also lead to a new crisis of governability that could endanger
the continuity of the democratic regime. We must not forget that the last military uprising in
Argentina took place in December 1990. In that occasion a bloody uprising by a group of army
officers and non-commissioned officers and led by the ultra-catholic and ultra-nationalist former
Colonel Mohamed Alí Seindeldín was crushed by the loyalist branch of the army. The Putchists
accused the Chiefs of Staff of being “politically motivated and corrupt [...] and of being traitors
to military ideals such as ‘national dignity’”933. The uprising, in a sense, had similarities to the
coup of Lt. Colonel Chavez in Venezuela except that it did not enjoy either the support of the
                                                          
929On this issue see: “The Yabrán Affair,” The Economist, June 28,1997, p. 34
930Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante,p.287 and OGD, “Argentina” in The World Geopolitics of
Drugs, 1997/1998 Annual Report, pdf version on line, http//:www.ogd.org
931Pasquini and De Miguel, op.cit., p.287
932ibid, p.286
933Keesing’s Record of World Events, News Digest for December 1990, p. 37913.
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population or of the rest of the armed forces which up to today seems to be fully subordinate to
the political power.934
This author hopes that a hypothetical Argentine crisis involving the President of the
Nation in serious cases of corruption, would be solved with the institutional tools available,
meaning, through an impeachment. But only time and the moral integrity of the elected officials
chosen by the Argentine people will tell if Argentina will eventually  pass this test.
Most of the Argentine officials that were interviewed dismissed the possibility of an
institutional breakdown induced by cases of corruption in the power branches of the State. In
their view, the Argentine regime was strong enough to resist further cases of corruption without
the risk of an institutional breakdown. However this author thinks that the views of two
particular interviewed officials who were directly related to the formulation of Argentina’s
security policy clearly illustrate the extent of the threat of drug trafficking-related corruption.
The former Secretary of Intelligence Dr. Facundo Suárez  (head of the SIDE during the
Alfonsin administration) stated that the extent of political corruption in the three branches of the
state creates a generalized lack of confidence in politicians and institutions “because those in
charge of providing security are in fact generating insecurity”935. This would open the road for
a generalized lack of obedience to the authorities caused by the lack of prestige for the
institutions. In sum: an increase in  corruption would create a decrease in the legitimacy of the
system. This lack of legitimacy could, in the long term, justify a revolution in the form of a
“young military officers” uprising.936
The vice-president of the Congressional Commission for monitoring of internal security
and intelligence agencies937 (Comisión Bicameral de Seguimiento y Control de los organismos
de Seguridad Interior e Inteligencia del Congreso Nacional) stated that an institutional crisis
caused by drug trafficking-related corruption would be resolved through the existent
institutional mechanisms. However he believes that the main political threat to Argentina is the
fact that organized criminal groups could penetrate the state structure and control the decisory
mechanism of political power. In that sense, he believes that in Argentina (as happened in
Russia) the worst case scenario would be the existence of a criminal group that would became a
“state within the state” controlling the institutional system.938
To the cases of corruption in the state power branches we must add disquieting cases of
massive drug trafficking-related corruption in some law enforcement organizations. The most
                                                          
934This did not happed without concessions as the amnesty granted by president Menem to the members
of the Military Juntas of the last military regime in early 1990.
935 Interview with Dr. Facundo Suárez, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
936Interview with Dr. Facundo Suárez, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
937Dr. Miguel Angel Toma. Dr. Toma was also president of the Defense Commission until 1998 when he
became Secretary of Internal Security of the Ministry of the Interior.
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alarming case has been the involvement of a large part of the police of the province of Buenos
Aires in drug trafficking activities. The province of Buenos Aires is the richest in the country .It
concentrates not only the main economic and financial activities but also almost half of the
population of the country. Most of the inhabitants are concentrated in the suburban belt around
the capital, Buenos Aires. This area registers the highest rates of drug consumption. Buenos
Aires Port, Ezeiza International Airport in the outskirts of Buenos Aires  and Mar del Plata Port
in the Atlantic coast are the main outlets of cocaine to Europe. Buenos Aires is a drug
distribution center and a main storage and transshipment point. This is a big temptation for a
police corps with poorly paid, trained, and monitored members. The Buenos Aires province
police corps is the biggest police force in the country. It has around 45,000 members. In the last
two years at least 2,000 members have been purged from the corps including a significant
number of high-ranking officers or "cúpula policial.”939 A radical reform of the structure was
decided in late 1997. In fact the Buenos Aires police had become a "runaway" organization.940
Most of these policemen were fired and dismissed due to charges of corruption, theft, human
rights violations, or their participation in drug trafficking activities. Many of them later became
full-time criminals.941
Three years ago Eduardo Duhalde, the governor of Buenos Aires, used to refer to his
province's police corps as "the best police corps in the world.” However, notorious episodes of
corruption prompted him to initiate the purges and to reform the police. In July 1996 an entire
counter-narcotics police division was indicted for drug trafficking and illicit enrichment. From
top to bottom, all its members were involved in drug distribution in the southern area of
suburban Buenos Aires. This was not only a matter of turning a blind eye; it went as far as
giving protection to drugs dealers and actively participating in cocaine retailing. This case led to
the detection of a police network of racketeering and drug distribution in the tourist resorts of
Buenos Aires Atlantic coast.942
In early 1997, two officers of the police force of Buenos Aires were prosecuted and
indicted for planting evidence in order to incriminate the people they were supposed to
investigate. Since the reform of the narcotics act in May 1995, the police can use undercover
agents. However because of the widespread police practice of planting evidence federal judges
                                                                                                                                                                         
938Interview with Dr. Miguel Angel Toma, Buenos Aires, August 1998.
939See:  “Argentina” in  OGD, 1997/1998 Annual Report pdf version on line, http//:www.ogd.org. Also
see: Dutil, Carlos and Ragendorfer, Ricardo, La Bonaerense: Historia Criminal de la Policía de la
Provincia de Buenos Aires, Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1997, pp. 175-227
940ibid.
941ibid.
942See: Dutil and Ragendorfer, op.cit., pp.189-227
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are very reluctant use undercover agents in drug cases.943 One could say that this constitutes a
most highly developed form of organized crime: vertically integrated, clear hierarchies and rules
and uniforms. The problem of drug trafficking-related corruption was so serious that the
counter-narcotics units of the Buenos Aires police department was dissolved as part of the
police reform.944 The reputation of the Buenos Aires police was also seriously harmed because
of the alleged participation of a group of Buenos Aires police officers in the organization of  a
bombing attack on a Jewish association building (Asociación Mutual Israelita -AMIA- and
Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas -DAIA-) . The attack took place in July 1994
and the officers were arrested in July 1996. These policemen were allegedly paid by an Iran-
backed terrorist group for preparing the car bomb that was used in the attack.945
The National Customs Administration was also under investigation for cases of
corruption during the second half of 1996 and the first half of 1997. At least 400 employees of
the customs service have been indicted because of their alleged participation in a smuggling
band known as the " parallel customs service.” The band was smuggling all kinds of imported
goods by using fake customs documentation. It is estimated that such cases of corruption in the
customs administration allow approximately 1,140 million U.S. dollars in goods to enter the
country illegally each year. It is not very difficult to reach the conclusion that if corrupted
customs turn a blind eye for illegal goods entering the country they may do the same thing for
drugs leaving the country.  A parliamentary investigative commission found out that the
deposits of confiscated illegal drugs, administered by the Customs office were not properly
monitored. The deposit of seizures was registered in a simple copybook with some of its pages
left blank.946
These cases of corruption and penetration of the national government institutions by drug
trafficking criminal organizations must be added to the threat of involvement of provincial
authorities  in drug trafficking activities. This issue is particularly disquieting considering that
provinces in the northwest region usually have traditional, clientelistic systems that are not
always open to a close monitoring of the activities of the administration.947
                                                          
943See: :  “Argentina” in  OGD, 1997/1998 Annual Report pdf version on line, http//:www.ogd.org. Also
see: Dutil and Ragendorfer, op.cit., pp. 175-188
944See:  “Argentina” in  OGD, 1997/1998 Annual Report pdf version on line, http//:www.ogd.org.
945On this issue see: Salinas, Juan, AMIA, El Atentado: Quiénes son los autores y por qué no están
presos, Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1997, pp. 239-400 and “Argentina” in  OGD, 1997/1998 Annual Report
pdf version on line, http//:www.ogd.org.
946See: “Argentina” in  OGD, 1997/1998 Annual Report pdf version on line, http//:www.ogd.org.
947 As argued by an analyst -“The political culture of Argentina is often characterized as authoritarian,
individualistic, yet intolerant, personalistic, and fatalistic, characteristics that are not supportive of
democracy. These aspects of the political culture of the country are generally believed to be especially
pronounced in the more traditional parts of the interior” Sawers, op.cit. p165
 I personally believe that after sixteen years of uninterrupted democracy these characteristics are
changing. Like most aspects in life, political culture is also a question of practice as well as trial and error.
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When questioned about the possibility of penetration and corruption of provincial and
local administrations by drug trafficking organizations, the fingers of some of the interviewed
officials immediately pointed to the northwest part of Argentina.948
In 1991, the governor of the Province of Catamarca was accused of direct involvement in
the transportation and distribution of cocaine. The president ordered federal intervention in the
province, and the governor was forced out of office. A former governor of the province of
Salta949 was also accused of leading a trafficking organization. Both governors were accused of
being linked to Bolivian trafficking organizations. Thus, the threat to Argentina’s effective
control over its territory did not lie in shifting Colombian and Bolivian operations , but rather in
the collaboration and participation of corrupt provincial administrations in these activities.950
c) Economic Threats
Clear threats:
Argentina does not have as large an indigenous peasant population as Peru, Bolivia and
Ecuador. Argentina also does not have the correct climatic or topographical conditions for the
production of coca. In this sense, the danger of becoming a new up stream producer country
does not exist. Nevertheless, the increasing number of small-sized CHCL laboratories
discovered in the provinces of Salta and Jujuy as well as the situation of high unemployment
and poverty in the Northwest region suggest that the installation of chains of cocaine
laboratories for internal consumption or exportation is a latent possibility. As reported,
                                                                                                                                                                         
An example of this can be seen in one of the most backward and poor provinces of the country, namely,
Catamarca. In this province, the traditional Saadi family had consecutively lost all elections since
1991thereby providing an opening in the system Unfortunately,   a subsequent murder by the son of a
politician closely linked to the Saadi mobilized the population of Catamarca and the issue was brought  to
Buenos Aires. The Federal Government intervened in the province and (a slow) investigation was carried
out. Finally in July 1997, a group of   “children of power”(as the members of  the rich families are called
in Catamarca) was indicted for the murder of María Soledad who was raped and beaten to death during a
party. The body of María Soledad also presented signs of cocaine overdose. After this episode the Saadi
family seemed to be eradicated from the political scene of Catamarca. This mobilization of the people
could not have happened without the continuous practice of participation that existed in the country since
the transition in 1983.
948 Interviews with: Aldo Neri, Ministry of Health and Social Action (1985-1986) and President of the
National Commission for drug control policies during these years; Alconada Sempé ,Under-Secretary of
Latin American Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina during the President Alfonsín
administration and delegate to the  National Commission for drug control policies of  to Armesto,
Comisario General Armesto (Federal Police), Dr. Facundo Suarez ,Secretary of Intelligence of the State
from 1984 to December 1989 and Ambassador Camilión. All these interviews took place in Buenos Aires
in July 1997.
949Pasquini and de Miguel op.cit. p52
950 “ ...Le gouverneur peroniste du Catamarca , M. Ramon Saadi, a été destitué mercredi 17 avril par le
président Carlos Menem à la suite d’une avalanche de scandales dans sa province , située dans le nord de
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“Small HCL laboratories are reported in Cordoba, Jujuy, Salta, and Tucumán provinces. Three of
such laboratories were seized as of November 1990”951
“ The coca leaf is consumed throughout a large part of the north-west of the country, encompassing the
provinces of Salta, Jujuy, Tucumán and parts of Catamarca and Formosa. The traditional “coqueo,” or
coca chewing, is prevalent throughout an area of approximately 292.000 sq. km amongst an estimated use
population of about 180.000 people. During the period between 1975 and 1985, the Argentine State
Police seized on average 8,500 kilos of coca leaf in the border areas each year. This serves to indicate the
extent of the local consumption problem, although more recent seizure statistics indicate, perhaps, that
conversion of leaf to paste and/or to base may be a new phenomenon”952
 Graphic.7 Cocaine and Coca paste seizures in Argentina (1970-1996)
Source: REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, POLICÍA FEDERAL
ARGENTINA, SUPERINTENDENCIA DE DROGAS PELIGROSAS, DIVISIÓN CENTRAL DE
DATOS, Estadísticas de los Años: 1979,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,1980,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89, ,
Buenos Aires, January 1995, 20 p. and REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR,
POLICÍA FEDERAL ARGENTINA, SUPERINTENDENCIA DE DROGAS PELIGROSAS, DIVISIÓN
CENTRAL DE DATOS, Estadísticas Años 1990/91/92/93/94/95/96 (primer semester), Buenos Aires,
1996, 24 p.   (*) 1996 first semester only.
                                                                                                                                                                         
l’Argentine ...,”Le Monde, April 20 1991,p7 See also: Le Monde,  April 10 1991p 9 and La Nación,
Buenos Aires, April 22 pp. 1,5 and 4.
951National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC ) Report,1990 p8.See also: UN INCB
Report, 1991,p37 and US State Department INCSR,1991,p75.
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Table 4. Cocaine trafficked through Argentine and seized in Western Europe (1985-1988)
Country: Quantity( kgs):
Belgium 35
France 22
Italy 53
Luxembourg 11
Netherlands 61
Portugal 26
Switzerland 42
F.R.G 37
Spain 40
Source: INTERPOL,Quest Review, 2nd quarter 1988*, pp. 10-11
* Of the 172 nationals arrested in Europe during the period under review (85-88) 64 were Argentine, 24
Spanish, 20 from Chile and Colombia respectively and 17 were Italian.
Table 5. Argentina, Drug trafficking statistics 1987-1991
mt= metric tones
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 est.
Refining/a
Cocaine HCL
mt 3.2 5.1 10.0 10.0 15.0
Seizures/b
Coca leaf mt 22.4 37.0 12.5 24.4 40.0
Cocaine
CHCL/Base
mt   0.6   1.2   0.4   0.9   1.5
Marijuana mt   1.9   3.2   1.3  6.7   1.5
Arrest/b 4,435 7,463 9,100 4,377 9,000
Labs
Destroyed
       4      10     7      4      17
Source: U.S. State Department, INCSR, 1991.
a Refining figures are DEA estimates based on production capacity of reported laboratories.
b Seizure and arrest statistics are provided by Argentina’s Federal Police Data Center. All of the above
figures are thought to be lower than actual number of occurrences because of the Argentine
Government’s reporting methods, e.g. not all seizures and arrests entering the judicial system are
prosecuted and also a backlog of cases.
                                                                                                                                                                         
952INTERPOL, the Quest Review, 2nd quarter 1988
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Table  6. Argentina, Seizures (1989-1994)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Coca leaves
kgs
18,385.671 30,778.483 57,387.995 80,209.320 52,120.480 59,120.080
Cocaine kgs     462.296    1,009.478    1,274.071    1,204.040    1,922.100     2,237.000
cannabis kgs   1,244.654      658.064    1,365.361   3,769.750   2,547.300     2,596,000
cannabis
seeds kgs
         0.026            4 .398            2.08           2.11           0.005            0.089
cannabis
plants
    1,850       878      1,063 1,056 3,268         342
haschis kgs 0,072     1,572      ---       0,79       ----  0,210
LSD (units) 188 732 448 8,815 47,873 14,621
Psychotropics
(units)
19,447 6,669 439,306 31, 314 18,518 9,194
Chloride acid
liters
     22    457.400        38.8        60.0         39.8      60.0
Sulfuric acid
liters
    10,240    186  51 12 51 12
Ether
liters
1,096.700 2,188 1,166 347      376.900      58.300
Acetone
liters
    962.800  2,633.510 1,117.415 349 490   60
Police
Procedures
6,085 3,163 ----- 6,196 6,387 4,699
Arrests 6,158 5,240 6,298 10,222 10,935 4,467
Laboratories: 3 Salta
                      2 Buenos Aires
                      1 Jujuy
                      1 Province of Buenos Aires
                      (for 1994)
Source: Gendarmería National Argentina, National Statistics 9531989/1994954
 Moreover, during the 1970s (before the Colombian boom), the northern regions of Chile
and Argentina were centers of a cottage cocaine industry, to be exported to California via the
Pacific Ocean. Some important political personalities at the time were suspected of being
involved in these activities.955 As stated by two analysts,
“ [l]es services de renseignements  de l'armée révéleront, peu avant le coup d'état militaire de
1976, qu’une importante mafia avait monté des laboratoires de pâte base en cocaïne dans la région
de Salta, au nord de l’Argentine, non loin de la frontière bolivienne et qu'elle exportait la drogue à
l'étranger. A sa tête se trouvait Lopez Rega, personnage notoirement corrompu[...] ministre du
Bien-être social”956
                                                          
953All the enforcement agencies in the country.
954The National Gendarmerie estimates that the annual seizures represent only 10 per cent of the total
amount of cocaine that passes through the country each year, Clarín, April 9, 1995, Editorial Note “País
de Consumo,” central page.
955Pasquini and de Miguel,op cit,p9
956 Labrousse and Delpirou, Coca-Coke,p209. See also: Gugliotta, Les Rois de la Cocaine, p24.
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This is a threat that could grow in intensity if no solutions are found to counter the
persistent rates of unemployment that have characterized the Argentine economy since the early
1990s. As in Venezuela, a large illegal economic sector could grow in importance and later
reach a dimension similar to that of the legal sector. For plenty of middle class unemployed
people of Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires area, retailing drugs has become an option in
the absence of finding a job in the short and medium term.957 In 1994, police sources stated
that in Greater Buenos Aires, there were at least 60 to 100 “kitchens” that processed about one
metric ton of cocaine (for domestic consumption) per month.958 An official document warned
in 1996 that –paradoxically- should the control of chemical inputs towards Bolivia become
dangerous for the traffickers, they could opt to send coca paste to Buenos Aires in order to
process it for export in a city that has a population of 15 million.959 This would certainly
transfer the problem of situating the laboratories in the jungle to the problem of localizing them
in the “urban jungle.” This scenario is however hypothetical.
Argentina has been always a magnet for immigrants from bordering countries. The flow
of illegal immigrants was never considered a threat to national security (except by the military
governments in the case of Chilean immigration into Patagonia)960.
Nevertheless, as unemployment rises and  purchasing power decreases, the inflow of
illegal immigrants could became a social and economic burden for the country.961This influx
could happen as a result of a civil war in Bolivia or a strengthening of the eradication programs
in that country.962
In fact, in 1993 after Argentine trade unions reacted against the inflow of Bolivian
migrants, more restrictive measures were taken by the government. As reported,
                                                          
957On this see the internet version of the Argentine Journal Radar ,September 20, 1998,
www.Pagina12.com/1998/suple/radar/semtiem/98-09-10/nota1_a.htm
958“Así funciona el siniestro negocio de la droga en Argentina,” Diario Poplular, February 13, 1994, p.18
959Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección a la Comunidad, Análisis de la Situación del Narcotráfico y
Lavado de Dinero en la República Argentina, Dirección General de Coordinación e Inteligencia, Buenos
Aires, June 1996, p.1
960Naciones Unidas, Departamento de Desarrollo económico y social, Estudios de Casos de Politica de
Población: Argentina, p16
961 “. Societies may react to immigrants because of the economic costs they impose or because of their
purported social behavior such as criminality, welfare dependency, delinquency etc. Societies may be
concerned because the people entering are so numerous or so poor that they create a substantial economic
burden by straining housing education, and transportation facilities [and this] may generate local
resentment...” Weiner , Myron,  Security, Stability, and International Migration, International Security,
Vol. 17 Nº 3,p114.
962“Certains paysans , qui ont accepté de détruire leurs plantations de cocaïers en échange de 2000
dollars,[...] souvent, incapables de permettre à leur famille de vivre de l’agriculture dans leurs
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“All told, it is reckoned that there are almost 3m immigrants from other Latin American countries.
[...] Most of the immigrants (89%) come from bordering countries; almost 1m from Bolivia ...”963
Of this number, between 500,000 and 350,000 would be illegal immigrants
(“indocumentados” or without permission to work). 964 As this phenomenon coexisted with
higher rates of unemployment, a wave of protest by the local unions arose against the lack of
immigration control. A private poll in August 1993 showed that 90% of the interviewed people
thought that these immigrants were a threat to the sources of employment for Argentine workers
and 70% supported expelling them from the country.965
While in 1974 there were about 500,000 Bolivian residents in Argentina, in the late
1990s,figures hovered between 700,000 and 1 million.966 Bolivian immigrants are mainly
located in the border zones (Salta and Jujuy) and in Buenos Aires.967
Another factor to be considered is since the early 1990s, Argentina has increasingly been
used as a center for money laundering operations. The economic stability that followed the
application of the adjustment policy or “Plan de Convertibilidad” attracted investment in the
services sector. In the period from 1992 until 1998, Argentina received around 29,000 million
U.S. dollars in investments (including the result of the privatization of state companies).968
Shopping malls, gas stations, rental video chains, hotels and casinos mushroomed in Buenos
Aires as did tourist centers in Pinamar, Mar del Plata, Córdoba and ski resorts in Patagonia. The
financial backing of these projects was not always clear. Argentine authorities as well as U.S.
law enforcement suspect that the goal of part of those investments was the laundering of drug
trafficking profits originated within or outside the country.969 As reported,
“Drug related money laundering is increasing, both from domestic sales of drugs and from drug
sales abroad. Although changes are being considered, Argentine lawmakers are slow to provide the
necessary countermeasures needed to protect an increasingly important money laundering center.
Colombian, Italian, Bolivian, and Argentine traffickers are laundering drug money through banks,
businesses, hotels, and casinos. There has been a flood of multimillion-dollar construction and
development projects that have questionable financial banking. The volume of drug dollars processed
through Argentina has increased as a result of the Central Bank’s decision in January 1993 to allow
Argentineans to hold U.S. accounts and write dollar-denominated checks. These steps have increased the
flow and availability of U.S. dollars which were already dominant in the monetary system”970
                                                                                                                                                                         
communautés d'origine, très pauvres et surpeuplées, sur l’Altiplano, en ont été réduits à grossir les
courants migratoires en direction de l’Argentine...”Labrousse, La drogue nouveau désordre mondial, p258
963Latin American Weekly report 5 august 1993.p355.
964Resumen Periodístico Latinoamericano, August 1993,p7.
965Resumen Periodístico Latinoamericano, ibid.
966Segal, An Atlas for international migration, p.48
967Center for Immigration studies, Immigration and Nationality Policies of Leading Migration Nations:
Argentina, p.6
968
969Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección  a la Comunidad (SSPC), Dirección General de Coordinación e
Inteligencia, Análisis de la situación del narcotráfico y lavado de dinero en la República Argentina, p.1
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 The expansion of money laundering activities, above all through the purchase of land
and the investment in the services sector has been identified as a threat because
“it develops a ‘black’ economy that eventually becomes superior in volume to the legal economy”971
and it also
 “ can corrupt the democratic system and destabilize a free economy, and rise as the basis of hidden but
omnipresent power”972.
Several interviewed officials identified drug trafficking-related money laundering as a
threat because of the power of corruption it can have over the political system. 973
d) Societal Threats:
Clear and present threats:
As previously noted, Argentine drug consumers are switching to cocaine and adulterated
forms of cocaine as the prices drop because of increased trafficking activities across the country.
This poses a direct threat to the human potential of society. Argentina can be currently
considered not only a transit route for cocaine, but also a consumption market974with all the
public health and drug related violence consequences that this status implies.
 Even if there are not uniform statistics all the consulted sources show that
*consumption is shifting towards cocaine
*cocaine consumption is increasing at high rates.
As reported,
 “  Government of Argentina (GOA) believes that consumption and addiction are on the rise; the
lack of reliable statistics prevents an accurate estimate of total consumption. The price of cocaine on the
local market fell in 1990 to $5000 from $8000/kg in 1989, but it is still prohibitively expensive for most
Argentines [...] Argentine officials continue to see a trend among young users to switch from marijuana to
cocaine [...]The drug problem in Argentina appears to be getting worse. Increased trafficking is leading to
greater consumption, and the number of drug addicts in the country continues to grow [...] The drug abuse
problem in Argentina appears to be getting worse. Increased trafficking is leading to greater consumption,
and the number of drug addicts in the country continues to grow. The GOA estimates that 70,000
Argentines are addicted to some illicit drugs and is especially concerned about the potential for abuse in
the northwestern provinces bordering Bolivia. This economically depressed region is vulnerable not only
to increased consumption, but possibly to the cultivation and processing of coca leaves”975
                                                                                                                                                                         
970DEA Intelligence Division, Intelligence Bulletin, DEA-96018, Working Papers, June 1996,p.3
971Lestelle, Alberto,  Argentina, blanco predilecto del narcotráfico en América del Sur, Actualización
Política, Nº5, 1992 (page number does not figure in the fax copy I received), Dr. Lestelle has been the
head of SEDRONAR from 1989 to 1995.
972SEDRONAR, La República Argentina frente al lavado de dinero, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.1
973Interview with Dr. Bertoncello, former head of the drug control commission during the Alfonsín
Administration, Bahía Blanca, August 19, 1997; interview with Ambassador Oscar Camilión, Minister of
Defense from 1993 to 1996;
974Lestelle, Defendiendo el Futuro,p.146 See also Clarín 9 April 1995,central page.
975US INCSR, 1991,p78
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In 1992, for example, a poll taken by the Secretariat of Planning for Drug Addiction
Prevention and the Fight against Drug Trafficking in Buenos Aires involving 37,000 new
recruits for military service revealed that 14.2 % of them had smoked marijuana and seven
percent used cocaine.976In 1990, Vice President Duhalde stated that there were 50,000 daily
consumers of cocaine who consume 1000 kilos of the drug per month.977
The Secretariat of Planning for Drug Prevention and Fight Against Drug Trafficking
(SEDRONAR) affirms that there are 500,000 daily consumers of all types of illicit drugs in
Argentina. About 70,000 of these people are addicted to cocaine.978
A Gallup Institute poll taken in January 1993 revealed that the number of drug users
between the ages of 18 and 24 years old have increased 56% between 1989 and 1993979. The
Secretariat of Addiction Prevention and Assistance of the Province of  Buenos Aires revealed
that 35.6% of the drug users in Buenos Aires suburbs were addicted to cocaine, over 22.4% to
marijuana, 6% to barbiturates, and 16.2% were multiconsumption (various drugs) addicts.980
In addition to the harmful effects of cocaine consumption already described in the first
chapter of this work, another disquieting fact is that in Argentina, 60% of cocaine addicts use
the drug  intravenously.981 This situation coexists with the rise of AIDS cases in the last seven
years. The rate of transmission of the AIDS virus among drug injecting users is 6.7 % and it is
estimated that 5% of diseases are due to the use of drugs (20% being caused by psychoactive
drugs -including cocaine- and 16% by the use of multiple drugs)982.
 Table  7. Drug addiction
(daily users, and addicts to legal and illegal drugs)
Year Estimated quantity % of the total
population
Average age: Increment:
1987   500,000   5%  22 years old      140%
1992 1,200,000 9,3%  18 years old
Source: Nuevo Mundo Foundation (Published in Página 12-Buenos Aires- 11 April 1993, p 17). The data
is for the Province of Buenos Aires only.
                                                                                                                                                                         
“Argentine narcotics consumption reportedly is rising. According to GOA estimates, consumption has
increased 30 percent since 1989” ,US INCSR,1993 , p 89
976Clarín September 18 1992p 44
977El Cronista Comercial, 23 September 1992,p 17
978Zaballa, Joaquín, “El Narcotráfico en la República Argentina,” Foro Político: Revista del Instituto de
Ciencias Políticas, UMSA, Buenos Aires, Vol. V, August 1992, ,p 32
979La Nación, 18 April 1993, p. 10
980La Nación, 4 October 1994,p.4 The sample information was taken from the total number of calls to the
Telephone Aid Service of the Secretary during May,June, and July 1994. The information is relevant
because Buenos Aires and its suburbs are the most densely populated area in the country.
981UNDCP,Foro de Expertos sobre la reducción del uso indebido de drogas en América Latina, San
Pablo, UNDCP, p. 8
“Intravenous drug abuse is fairly high among addicts, at about 60 percent. Cocaine, however is injected
and sniffed,” UNDCP, Country Drug abuse And Treaty implementation Profiles 1994,p1
982UNDCP, Foro de Expertos..,.p.9
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Table   8. AIDS
(infected people)
Year Estimated quantity % of the population Average age Increment
1987   5,000 0,60% 25 1600%
1992 80,000 22
Nuevo Mundo Foundation (ibid.)
Graphic 8. Type of Consumed Drug
(only in Buenos Aires suburbs or "Greater Buenos Aires")
cocaine
36%
solvents
1%m arijuana
22%
others
2%
m ulticonsum pt
ion
16%
LSD
1%
alcohol
16%
barbiturates
6%
Source: Fonodroga, Buenos Aires Province, Secretariat for Prevention and Assistance of
addictions.(1993)
According to a private national poll conducted in 1992, drug addiction was considered by
58% of those polled to be the main problem affecting Argentina’s young people  followed by
AIDS (36%) and Alcoholism (6%)983.
Another disquieting (although secondary in the scope of this dissertation) trend is the rise
in drug-related violence in big cities.  As reported,
“From 1980 to 1990, the number of cases involving cocaine-including arrests for possession and
trafficking as well as drug seizures-rose 7,000 percent [...] Buenos Aires Police Inspector Eduardo
Martínez said in an interview [...] Martinez said drugs are the chief reason for an increasing number of
assaults, rapes and killings. There were 9,116 arrests on drug charges last year, compared to 5,954 in
1991”984
The rise of gangs that specialize in the exchange of stolen cars for cocaine, described
earlier in this dissertation, clearly illustrates this trend.
                                                          
983Estudio Sociológico y Político Mora y Araujo, Felipe Noguera y asociados, Encuesta Nacional
SOCMERC, August 1992.
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D-CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter showed how the cocaine industry became a national security problem for
Argentina because of the interaction between changes in the security environment and the
vulnerability of the country.
In the view of this author, considering the vulnerability of Argentina as a neighbor of a
drug producing country, it is possible to speak of a danger of a “Colombianization” of Bolivia in
terms of drug related violence as well as a “Venezualization” of Argentina in terms of the
spillover consequences of enforcement in Bolivia.
As we have seen in Chapter V, Venezuela became first a major transit route for Colombia
(major downstream producer country); then, a coca producer (the counterpart in Argentina
would be CHCL production in laboratories); and finally, a consumer country (bazuco). At the
same time, Venezuela has had to cope with both Colombian refugees as a result of the violence
in Colombia as well as with the overlapping activities across the border of trafficker
paramilitary groups and guerrillas which sporadically attack bases of the Venezuelan Army and
produce racketeering raids in Venezuelan territory. What happened between Colombia and
Venezuela at the start  of the 1980s could take place between Argentina and Bolivia if the trends
of increasing enforcement as well as the increasing power of the local traffickers continue to
rise in the latter.
The next chapter will analyze the beliefs of these officials concerning the consequences
of militarized enforcement in Bolivia (and to some extent in the rest of the Andean Region) for
the security of Argentina.
                                                                                                                                                                         
984The Washington Post, Argentina Becomes Conduit for Drug Traffic, Tuesday November 2 1993,p16;
See also: Clarín, 28 May 1995,p.4.
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CHAPTER VIII:  DRUG TRAFFICKING IN ARGENTINA’S NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENDA (1983-1994)
A-INTRODUCTION
The way in which drug trafficking was defined as a problem of national security by the
current legislation and by those government officials who participated in the formulation of
drug control policy during the period under study will be addressed in this section. This chapter
will also analyze the beliefs of these officials concerning the consequences of militarized
enforcement in Bolivia (and to some extent in the rest of the Andean Region) for the security of
Argentina. This chapter  will also show that the evolution of the decision structures dealing with
drug trafficking control and the policies adopted in Argentina responded to 1) an increase in the
importance of drug trafficking and the drug consumption problem in the country; and, 2) the
view that this illegal activity was indeed becoming a national security problem. In other words,
leaving aside the ever-present U.S. “push”,  a local concern did exist, which created, in turn, a
local reaction to that concern.
B- METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION
In the case of Argentina, with the exception of the increase of cocaine trafficking,
consumption and drug trafficking-related institutional corruption, most of the threats caused by
the increase of militarized enforcement in Bolivia remain latent. Although there have been rises
in drug trafficking-related violence in Bolivia, they have not reached the levels of drug
trafficking-related violence experienced in Colombia. Moreover, the combined dual threat of
drug trafficking and guerrillas does not exist in Bolivia. Chapter VI has shown that fortunately,
no Bolivian government has reached the point where the state would need to use its coercive
power (which on the other hand has proved to be insufficient) in order to totally eradicate coca
in the Chapare and displace the population in that area. The situation is different in Colombia
where the clashes between drug traffickers’ paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and the army
provoke massive displacement of people. In the case of the displacement of laboratories across
borders, as has indeed happened, the production is more likely to displace to less controlled and
unpopulated Brazilian Matto Grosso and Paraguayan Chaco. Because of geographic and
topographic reasons, as well as good territorial control by the central government, it is also
unlikely that big cocaine production laboratories will move to Argentina. Nor that Argentina
and Bolivia will have any border conflicts that may escalate into military clashes as a result of
the violation of borders by armed non-state actors.985  However, some elements such as the
                                                          
985A National Gendarmerie Commander I interviewed in August 1997 shared that view. However, in
1988 he wrote an article in which he warns about the consequences of militarized enforcement in Bolivia.
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possibility of a civil war in Bolivia remain latent. As this chapter is being written, press reports
keep coming in about the willingness of the Argentine government to expel every illegal
immigrant in the country in view of the high rates of urban crime and unemployment. Leaving
aside the wrong diagnostic of blaming illegal immigration for all the evils of a country, it is true
that a massive flow of migrants from the Chapare region in Bolivia would certainly not  ease the
current societal and economic problems of Argentina. It would also be  disquieting to have a
neighboring country suffering from a protracted civil war, not to mention the possibility of the
northwestern part of the country being used as a safe haven by either of the sides involved in the
conflict.
This chapter analyzes the cognitive maps of the bureaucrats involved in the elaboration
and implementation of Argentina’s national security and drug control policy during the
presidential periods of Raul Alfonsín (1983-1989) and Carlos Menem (1989-1995).986 Both
periods overlap with the transition to democracy in Bolivia and the beginning of militarized
enforcement in that country. However, as a prolegomenon the views of some officials of the
military dictatorship have been analyzed.
The cognitive mapping approach assumes that policy-makers believe political issues to be
causal relationships between phenomena. It also gives a set of rules to code and represent these
causal relationships through the analysis of documentary sources, policy statements, and
interviews in order to represent policy makers’ causal assertions.987  In fact a cognitive map is
a graphic representation of a person’s causal assertions with respect to a particular policy
                                                                                                                                                                         
The article was published right after the  Blast Furnace operation and among the consequences of Blast
Furnace  the discovery of a cocaine laboratory in Argentine territory in December 1986 is mentioned.
See:  Major Commander Jorge Alberto Vazquez and Major Commander Ricardo Rodolfo Lopez,
“Influencia de la Operación ‘Blast Furnace’ sobre la frontera argentina,” Revista de la Escuela Superior
de Gendarmería Nacional, January-June, 1988,p. 136
Eleven years later Commander Major Vazquez discarded  the possibility of the establishment of big
CHCL factories (he does not discarded the proliferation of small CHCL labs or kitchens in the northwest)
for the reasons mentioned above. Interview at the Headquarters of the V National Gendarmerie Region,
Bahía Blanca, August 1997.
986President Menem was elected for a second period in May 1995. His second period finished in 1999.
For practical reasons (limiting the time framework of this dissertation) only the first period will be
analyzed.
987On the cognitive map approach in the field of international relations see: Axelrod, Robert (ed.),
Structure of Decision. The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites, Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1976, 359p.; Bonham, G. Matthew and Shapiro, Michael, “Simulation in the Development of a Theory of
Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” in  McGowan, Patrick, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy
Studies, Vol. 1, London, Sage Publications,1973,pp.55-72 and Bonham, G. Matthew and Shapiro,
Michael, “Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.
17 Nº 2, June 1973, pp. 147-172;
On the cognitive method in Social Sciences see: Eden, Colin, “On the Nature of Cognitive Maps,” Journal
of Management Studies, Vol. 23, Nº 3, 1992,261-265; Fiol, Marlene, “Maps to Managers: Where are we?
Where do we go from here?,” ibid, pp. 267-285;  and Eden, Colin and Ackermann, Fran, “The Analysis
of  Cause Maps,” ibid, pp.309-324
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domain.988 In other words cognitive maps represent the causal aspects of the structure of a
person’s belief system. For the purposes of this dissertation “belief system” will be defined as
“all the beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious or unconscious, that a person at a
given time accepts as true of the world he lives in”989. These belief systems at the same time
include all the “accumulated, organized knowledge that the organism has about itself, and the
world.”990 This dissertation will examine causal assertions about what has been defined
elsewhere as “contextual beliefs”; that is, what is taken as true or probable in a specific
circumstance about a certain matter and over the international system and about the situation of
the country within it.991 That is, causal assertions about the consequences of increasing drug
trafficking-related violence in Bolivia and increase in drug trafficking through Argentine
territory for Argentina’s national security.  The cognitive mapping approach gives a set of rules
to code and represent causal assertions through the analysis of documentary sources.992
The cognitive map reflects a relationship that is one statement having a subject, or cause
variable, that relates positively, negatively or neutrally to an object or effect variable by a
linkage concept. If the relationship is one that negatively influences the effect concept, the
relationship receives the linkage indication “minus” (-). If, on the other hand, the relationship is
positive, the  linkage is denoted by the “plus” sign (+). The symbol “0”(zero) is used to indicate
that the cause has no effect or relation to the object (neutral).993
A positive causal relationship means that changes occur in the same direction, although
not necessarily positively.994 For example: in the case of the statement “an increase in
                                                          
988In view of the lack of a commonly accepted definition among political scientists about what a belief is,
I decided use the Webster New World Dictionary where belief is defined as: 1. conviction that certain
things are true 2. religious faith 3. trust or confidence 4. creed or doctrine 5. an opinion, expectation;
judgment. Leaving aside the fact that for some officials, politics canbecome almost a religion, for the
purposes of this dissertation meanings 1 and 5 will be assimilated to the concepts of “belief”. The reason
being, that  I will observe whether or not governmental officials believe if some very real and present
phenomena (drug trafficking related violence in a neighboring country or drug consumption for example)
can become a national security problem for Argentina.
989Rocket, Milton, The Open and Closed Mind. Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and
Personality Systems, New York, Basic Books Inc.,1960, p.33
990Holsti, Ole R., The belief system and national images: a case study, Conflict Resolution, Volume VI,
number 3,p.245 For a very accurate description of the Belief Systems approach see: Belief  Systems and
International ,Oxford, Basil Rockwell,1988,specially Part I.
991On the definition of “contextual beliefs” see: Russell, Roberto, “Sistema de creencias y política
exterior argentina: 1976-1989,” FLACSO/Argentina, Documentos e Informes de Investigación Nº 204,
Buenos Aires, July, 1996, p.3
992See, Wrightson, Margaret, “The Documentary Coding Method,in Axelrod, Structure of Decision”. The
Cognitive Maps of Political Elites, Princeton, Princeton University Press,1976, pp.291-332
993There are four other symbols for all linkages that do not fit comfortably into a simple plus-or-minus
world. They are: ⊕ will not hurt, does not prevent, is not harmful; (-) will help, does not promote, is of
no benefit to; a  may or may not be related to, affects indeterminately;  m effects is some non-zero way.
See Wrightson,p.295. For the sake of simplicity in this dissertation I will narrow down my coding to the
basic codes indicating positive, negative or neutral relationship ( +, - and 0 ).
994Axelrod, Analysis of Cognitive Maps, in Axelrod, op.cit.p.59
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militarized enforcement will provoke an escalation of drug trafficking-related violence” the
causal linkage is “will provoke an escalation.” Therefore the relationship is positive because an
increase in the cause variable will cause an increase in the effect variable. Further, a decrease in
the cause variable will provoke a decrease in the effect variable. That is, changes occur in the
same direction. On the contrary, a relation is considered negative when changes are caused in
the opposite direction. For example: an increase in A will cause a decrease in B. Or the presence
of A will cause the disappearance of B. This also means than a decrease of A will provoke an
increase of B, and the disappearance of A will cause the appearance of B.
In that sense,
“[A] cognitive map has only two basic types of elements: concepts and causal beliefs. The concepts are
treated as variables, and the causal beliefs are treated as relationships between the variables (linkages) [...]
A cognitive map allows great flexibility in the variables. They may be continuous variables, such as the
amount of something; they may be ordinal variables, such as more or less of something; or they may be
dichotomous variables, such as the existence or non-existence of something. But whatever type of
concept is represented, it is always regarded as a variable that can take on more than one value”995
That is, cognitive maps are mathematical models of belief systems. Mathematical because they
represent relations between concepts that can assume different values. As such, cognitive maps
can be symbolized and graphically represented. As explained by Robert Axelrod,
“The representation takes the form of a directed graph of points and the arrows between those points [...]
A point represents a concept variable, which may be a policy option, the utility of the person (or his
organization) or any other concept that may take different values [...] An arrow represents a causal
assertion of how one concept variable affects another. A positive arrow from point A to point B means an
augmenting relationship; that is, other things being equal, an increase in A will result in an increase in B,
and a decrease in A will result in a decrease in B. A negative arrow from point A to point B means an
inhibiting relationship; that is, other things being equal an increase in A will result in a decrease in B, and
a decrease in A will result in an increase in B [...] A path is a sequence of distinct points which are
connected by an arrow from the first point to the second point, an arrow from the second point to the third
point, and so on, until there is also an arrow from the next to the last point of the path to the last point of
the path. The indirect effect of a path is positive if the path has an event number of negative arrows, and it
is negative if it has an odd number of negative arrows.”996
The use of signed digraphs for the representation of cognitive maps has been developed from
the “Digraph Theory” which is
“concerned with patterns of relationships among pairs of abstract elements. As such, digraph theory
makes no reference to the empirical world. Nevertheless it has potential usefulness to the empirical
scientist, for it can serve as a mathematical model of the structural properties of any empirical system
consisting of relation ships among pairs of elements..” 997
                                                          
995Axelrod, Analysis of Cognitive Maps, in Axelrod, op.cit.p.59
996Axelrod, Analysis of Cognitive Maps, in Axelrod, op. cit,p.72
997Harary, Frank, Norman, Robert and Dorwint Cartwright, Structural Models: An Introduction to the
Theory of Directed Graphs, New York, John Wiley &Sons, Inc., 1965. See also: Harary Frank, “A
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For the sake of simplicity the theory of directed (or signed) graphs will not be elaborated
or explained here. But it is worth remarking that there is a mathematical theoretical basis for
development of the cognitive map approach in social sciences.
As an example, a phrase of the type:
“ [t]he fact of having a “hot frontier ” [meaning by this an increase in drug trafficking related violence in
Bolivia] must mean for us a grow in concern from a security point of view.”998
Would be represented in the following way:
* hot frontier /+/ concern from a security point of view
Abbreviations:
A: hot frontier
B: concern from a security point of view
A •              +                     •B
This is a statement made by a high Argentine official to the question “what would be the
consequences of a further militarization of coca eradication in Bolivia?”. In this case a “hot
frontier” (A) with Bolivia (that is, an escalation of drug trafficking-related violence in Bolivia)
is the cause concept of  “concern from a security point of view.” The linkage concept is “ must
mean for a us a grow.” This linkage indicates a positive causal assertion. That is, the escalation
of violence in Bolivia (growth in violence, indicated by the concept “hot frontier”) would imply
a growth in the official concerns about the security of Argentina.
The following elaboration of Argentine officials’ cognitive maps is based on the analysis
of primary and secondary sources (interviews, speeches, memos, cables, statements in the press,
quoted statements in the press, verbatim records of meetings and official documents).
The fact that interviews have been used as a source can pose some problems. For example
most of the interviewed officials, particularly the officials of the Alfonsín administration were
interrogated about events that took place several years ago and thus their recollections may have
been affected by the passing of the years. It is also true that sometimes the comments of
governmental officials can be ideologically or politically biased or constrained for political
reasons. In order to overcome these difficulties, and when the existence of relevant
                                                                                                                                                                         
structural analysis of the situation in the Middle East in 1956,” Conflict Resolution, Vol. V, Nº 2,
1961,pp,166 -178.
998 Enrique Nosiglia, Minister of the Interior of Argentina during the Alfonsín Administration. Interview
realized in July 1997 in the offices of the Radical Civic Union, Buenos Aires.
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documentation allowed it, interviews have been “triangulated” (checked) with other sources
such as speeches, press statements and quoted statements found in books, articles and other
publications.
As far as the use of interviews is concerned, another difficulty results from the fact that
the coding method used for the elaboration of cognitive maps in this dissertation was originally
developed for the analysis of documentary sources, or rather, for the analysis of primary source
texts.999In an attempt to overcome this problem, interviews have been literally transcribed and
analyzed as texts,  or, as verbatim records.
Interviews were elaborated in accordance with this thesis’ working hypothesis and with
the indicators of military, political, societal, economic, and environmental threats mentioned in
Table Nº 5 of chapter I. Therefore, these indicators had to be identified in the answers (and in
other sources as well) in order to construct the cognitive maps. In that way, questions were
formulated with the goal of observing whether the Argentine officials associated a militarized
enforcement in Bolivia with possible spillover consequences in Argentina and whether this
spillover phenomenon would create national security problems, or threats to Argentina. More
general questions were formulated in order to verify whether the interviewed officials believed
drug trafficking to be a national security problem, and what their justifications were for this
belief. The methodology for the elaboration of the questionnaires was “borrowed” from
ethnographic interview methodology that was  designed from anthropological fieldwork.1000
The ethnographic interview method proved to be very useful because it gives a set of
interviewing techniques that allow the interviewer to get to know not only of a particular topic,
but also to do so by understanding the language of the interviewed person (informant), as well
as the meanings attributed to this language within its cultural environment. That is the goal of
knowing about a certain topic is achieved by making the informant talk about his everyday
activities in his everyday language. The ethnographic interview follows a sequence of three
types of questions:
“a. Descriptive questions: This type enables a person to collect an ongoing sample of an informant’s
language. Descriptive questions are the easiest to ask and they are used in all interviews. Here’s an
example: ‘Could you tell me what you do in you do at the office?’ or ‘Could you describe the conference
you attended?’”
                                                          
999See, Wrightson,op.cit.,p.291
1000 “This[field work] means asking questions, eating strange foods, learning a new language, watching
ceremonies, taking filed notes, washing clothes, writing letters home, tracing out genealogies, observing
play, interviewing informants, and hundred of other things” Spradley, James P., The Ethnographic
Interview, Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1979, p.iii. Most of these things apply to my research
experience in the Bolivian tropic however I must say that I also practiced all these activities in the “jungle
of concrete” in Buenos Aires (probably with the exception of eating strange foods and tracing
genealogies).I made lots of questions, I learnt a new bureaucratic language, I certainly washed my
clothes, I ate the best steaks on earth, I wrote e-mails to my dissertation director.
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b. Structural questions: These questions enable the ethnographer to discover information about domains,
the basic units in an informant’s cultural knowledge. They allow us to find out how informants have
organized their knowledge. Examples of structural questions are: ‘What are all the different kinds of fish
you caught on vacation?’ and ‘What are all the stages in getting transferred in you company?’”
c. Contrast questions. The ethnographer wants to find out what an informant means by the various terms
used in his native language [...] Contrast questions enable the ethnographer to discover the dimensions of
meaning which informants employ to distinguish the objects and events in their world. A typical contrast
question would be, ‘What is the difference between a bass and a northern pike?’”1001
The questionnaires used in this dissertation do not follow the ethnographic interview’s
rule in a strict sense. Rather they adopted a similar sequence and type of questions. This allowed
for the understanding of the bureaucratic language, as well as the structures and meanings
shared by the different interviewed officials. In that way, each interview was easier than the
previous one since I had a better idea of what these officials were talking about or the specific
means associated to certain terms, for example, the term “hot border” mentioned earlier.
Interviewed officials were selected according to the structure of each agency dealing with
the formulation and implementation of drug law enforcement and demand reduction or drug
control policies and also with the formulation of the defense (understood in Argentina as
external security) and internal security policies.1002 In that sense, in order to select the
officials, this dissertation follows the flow charts of what, in foreign policy theory, have been
defined as “decision structures”:
“The first major point is that foreign policy decisions are taken by individuals who normally are located
in some kind of decision structure or decision unit. These decisions structures can vary as a result of
numerous factors, including culture and tradition, type of problem, change in regime, and stage of the
decision process. Despite their many forms, all decision structures are configurations of roles and support
facilities that comprise the unit responsible for one or more phases of the problem-solving task. Normally,
they are embedded in the bureaucratic organizations that governments establish to cope with the complex
and varied demands generated by foreign affairs.”1003
                                                          
1001Spradley, op.cit., p.60
1002After Argentina initiated the transition towards, democracy in 1983, a congressional debate arose
upon the reformulation of both the concept and the legislation dealing with national security. The concept
of National Security was, at the Congressional level, finally divided in two fields: external and internal
security, with the clear purpose of avoiding intervention by the Armed Forces in internal affairs (i.e.
counter-insurgency and internal intelligence collection). This is because of the dramatic experience of the
last military dictatorship (1976-1983) when the prevalent concept of national security at the time (the
National Security Doctrine), not only gave an excuse for the Armed Forces intervention in the exercise of
the political power, but also lead to the Armed forces involvement in massive flagrant violations of
human rights. While defense (use of military forces to counter attacks of external origin) is ruled by the
defense law of 1988; internal security,  defined here as the defense and protection of individual freedom,
life and property as well as the protection of the full functioning of the republican, federal and
representative system, is ruled by the internal security act of 1991 (debates started in 1986). For more
information on this topic see: Carasales, Julio C. , National Security Concepts of the States: Argentina,
New York, UNIFIER, 1992, 131p.
1003Hermann, Charles, “Decision Structure and Process influences in Foreign Policy,” in East, Maurice;
Salmore, Stephen; and Hermann, Charles, Why Nations Act. Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative
Foreign Policy Studies, Beverly Hills/London, Sage Publications,1978, pp. 25-49
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Considering that foreign policy is one more area of public policy-making, and that -
because of its utility and accuracy- this term has been adapted to drug control, internal security
and defense policy-making areas. Moreover, we have to take into consideration the fact that
particularly drug control policy making includes decisions that necessarily involve foreign
policy, such as signing treaties with neighboring countries, participating in international
conferences, cooperating with foreign law enforcement agencies and so on.
Even though this study was based on the study of the cognitive maps of officials
belonging to the executive branch, this dissertation also analyzes the congressional debates that
led to the adoption of three fundamental laws for the formulation of drug law enforcement
policies , namely: the national defense law (1988), the narcotics law (1989) and the internal
security act (1991). This was done in order to grasp whether or not the political class defined
drug trafficking to be a national security problem and- if so- how was it defined. The author also
interviewed some officials based on the recommendations and advice of previous interviewees.
For example, a member of the Congressional Commission on Internal Security was interviewed
following the advice of a former minister of the interior because the two usually attended jointly
the meetings of the Internal Security Council created by the Internal Security Law.
The following sections of this chapter will analyze the evolution of the decision structures
in  drug control, internal security and defense areas.
C- ARGENTINA AND THE MEANING OF “NATIONAL SECURITY” IN THE
PERIOD UNDER STUDY
Before analyzing how drug trafficking is defined in Argentina’s national security agenda,
it is worthwhile to explain the meaning attached to national security for the people  interviewed
for this dissertation, and for politicians and non-elected civil servants in general. After
Argentina initiated the transition towards democracy in 1983, a congressional debate arose on
the reformulation of both the concept of national security and the legislation dealing with this
issue.1004 The concept of national security was, at the congressional level, finally divided in
two fields: external1005 (Defensa) and internal (Seguridad Interior) security with the clear
purpose of avoiding intervention by the armed forces in internal affairs (i.e.: counter-terrorism,
counterinsurgency or domestic intelligence collection).1006This is due to the dramatic
                                                          
1004Interview with Representative (PJ) Miguel Angel Toma (Secretary of Internal Security during
Menem´s second term in office and at the time of the interview Vice President of the Low House Defense
Commission and Vice-President of the Bi-Chamber Commission for Monitoring the Internal Security and
Intelligence agencies), Buenos Aires, August, 1997.
1005On the use of the concept “external” security in order to refer to the concept of defense see: Carasales,
op.cit., p.20
1006 The only case of intervention of Armed Forces in internal matters since 1983 (excepting of course
the repression of the military uprisings in 1987,1988 and 1990) happened in February 1989 when a
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experience of the last military dictatorship, (1976-1983) when a particular interpretation of the
prevalent concept of national security at the time (the National Security Doctrine),1007 not only
                                                                                                                                                                         
terrorist group of the small left wing party “Movimiento Todos Por la Patria” attacked and occupied
Army Infantry Regiment Nº 3 in Greater Buenos Aires district of La Tablada. Former ERP leader Enrique
Gorriarán Merlo led the attack. Because it was a military installation the armed forces were authorized to
storm and recover the barracks. In the ensuing battle the armed branch of MTP was dismantled (the
insurgents were either killed or arrested) and the party was declared illegal. Gorriarán Merlo was
extradited in 199... from Mexico. All the leaders and participants were judged in public oral trials and
received severe sentences. This attack led the Alfonsín administration to enact the “ad hoc” (at the time)
secret presidential decree Nº 327 that provided for the “preparation, implementation, and supervision of
measures to prevent and terminate the formation of activities of armed groups capable of jeopardizing the
rule of law under the Constitution or endangering the lives, freedom, property or safety of the inhabitants
of the Nation” and [art.69b] “the President of the Nation shall order the intervention of the armed forces
in cases in which the magnitude or nature of the events or the materials in the hands of the aggressors so
require, and shall appoint the officer commanding the operations”. See, Carasales,op.cit.p.19.  Article 6b
also states that should military installations or bases be attacked, the Armed Forces must immediately
repeal the aggression and request the necessary support of the Police and Security Forces. This decree has
been ruled out by the Internal Security Act 24,059 of 1991 to which I will refer later. It is worth noticing
that in none of the internal disturbances after 1990 (pillages of supermarkets and civil revolts) the armed
forces intervened to restore order. The task (as stated in the legislation) when the provincial police was
overcome, as was the case of Santiago del Estero, the federal government mobilized the Gendarmerie and
anti-mutiny units of the Federal Police which where mobilized in C-130 Air Force planes  (the internal
security act authorizes the armed forces to provide logistical support to the police and security forces).
1007The National Security Doctrine as applied in Argentina was in a sense the local application and
interpretation of the “doctrine of continental security and the ideological frontiers” This doctrine was a
Latin American interpretation of French and U.S. defense counterinsurgent military doctrines from the
late 1950s and early 1960s. The doctrine started to be applied basically as a consequence of the success of
the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and the danger of  a revolutionary expansion towards the rest of the
Western Hemisphere. Basically the doctrine is characterized by:
a) A lack of conceptual difference between national defense and internal security; b) the maintenance of
internal security is part of an ideological confrontation between the West and the East (Soviet Bloc); c)
police and security forces become part of this global confrontation and as such they are subordinated to
the armed forces; d) the armed forces are trained and equipped for countering an internal enemy and only
exceptionally for external attacks; e) the armed forces can and must carry out domestic intelligence. That
is, all necessary means must be employed in a total and permanent war against the communist enemy
because every country becomes a battlefield between the West and the Communist Bloc. The enemy acts
in various fronts and by different means, therefore defense has to be carried out in different fronts and by
different means. Development, for example, also becomes an instrument of defense, since following the
logic of the doctrine, economic backwardness breeds violence, thus leaving an open door for communist
infiltration. Therefore, national development has to be also subordinated to the defense structure of the
state.  The logic implied in this doctrine is basically that in the global war against communism, every
aspect of the national life becomes part of the defense effort, therefore everything must be subordinated to
the organs in charge of defense. If armed forces are in charge of the nation (as it was the case of
Argentina at that time) then everything must be subordinated to them .Conclusion: Defense is everything
and everything is defense. The legal instrument for the application of this doctrine was the National
Defense Act Nº 16,970 of 1966, enacted during the military government of  General Onganía.
Interestingly enough, law Nº 16,970 establishes a National Security Council and a National Development
Council that would coordinate strategies in order to reach security through development. In a sense, more
than a defense law, this act was a norm concerning the administration of the nation. The National Defense
Act of 1966 was ruled  “de facto” in 1983 and “de jure” in 1988 when it was replaced by the National
Defense act 23.554. For a detailed study of the National Security Doctrine see: Ugarte, Manuel,
Seguridad Interior, Buenos Aires, Fundación Arturo Illia para la Democracia y la Paz, 1990; Diario de
Sesiones, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 44th Meeting, continuation of the 5th (special meeting) 28
and 19 December 1987, especially presentation of representative Balbino Zubiri,p.4,692 to p.4693 and
Pion-Berlin, David, “The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception, and the ‘Dirty War’ in
Argentina,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol 21 Nº 3, October 1988,pp.382-407
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provided an excuse for armed forces intervention in the exercise of political power, but also led
to armed forces involvement in massive and flagrant violations of human rights.1008
Defense (external security) is defined in the National Defense Act of 1988 (Law Nº
23,554) as “the integration and coordinated action of all the forces of the Nation in resolving
those conflicts which require the use of the armed forces, as a deterrent or operationally, to
counter attacks of external origin”. This law only contemplates the “traditional” aspects of
security, dealing with military attacks by another state. In its article Nº 15 the Law specifically
forbids the participation of the armed forces in domestic intelligence tasks.1009
Internal Security is ruled by the Internal Security Act (Law Nº 24,059, 18 December
1991) which defines this field of security as “ the state of being based in the rule of law in
which the freedom, life and property of the inhabitants, their rights and guarantees as well as the
full functioning of the representative, republican and federal system established by the National
Constitution are protected” .1010 This law establishes that only the federal and provincial police
and the so-called “security forces” (the National Gendarmerie-a militarized police with the main
task of controlling the national borders- and the Coast Guard)1011, all fall under the authority
of the Ministry of the Interior 1012(with the exception of the provincial polices) and deal with
internal security matters. That is, the police and security forces will assure the “state of being”
stated above. It is worth mentioning that Law Nº 24.059 in article Nº 27 states  that, depending
of the gravity of a situation, the Crisis Committee of the Internal Security Council (in charge of
advising the Ministry of the Interior) can request the logistical support (quartermasters, medics,
veterinarians, engineers, transport, communications) of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air
Force). For that end there is a permanent representative of the Major Staff of the Armed Forces
                                                          
1008 “The Argentine military did not so much reject the NSD [national security doctrine] as it practiced
selective vision, magnifying those components of the doctrine it liked and losing sight of the rest. It
emphasized operational aspects of the doctrine to the exclusion of political ones; it learned the lessons of
direct combat against terror well enough but ignored the indirect strategies designed to influence the
general public; and it redefined the subversive threat to become a catchall for all enemies of the state,”
Pion-Berlin, op.cit.p.402 In the words of one of the authors of the new defense act, under the National
Security Doctrine the Argentine Armed Forces had become “occupation forces in their own country”.
Interview with Dr. Miguel Angel Toma at the time of the interview President of the Defense Commission
of the House of Representatives, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
1009Carasales op.cit. p. 18
1010Article Nº 2 of Law Nº 24,059.
1011Presidential Decree Nº1273 and Law 24,059 Art Nº 7,  The National Gendarmerie is about 15,000
men strong and is equipped with “Shortland” armored reconnaissance vehicles and M-113 armored
personnel-carriers. It has about 20 light aircraft and helicopters (Avro Piper, Cessna, PC-6, Hughes 500,
SA
1012Up to  December 1996 Gendarmerie and the Coast Guards depended organically (within the structure
and for budget purposes) from the Ministry of Defense and operationally from the Ministry of the Interior
(that is for law enforcement purposes). In 1996, through Presidential decree Nº1410/96 the two forces
were entirely placed under the Ministry of the Interior. For the purposes of this dissertation, what is
important to know is that for law enforcement purposes these two forces received instructions from the
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at the Center of Planing and Control of the Subsecretariat of Internal Security of the Ministry.
Also, in exceptional cases and when the security and police forces are overwhelmed by the
gravity of the problem, the President of the Nation (and only the president) can decide to
employ the armed forces in order to reestablish internal security within the National Territory
(Art.31). However, the president can only use the armed forces to reestablish the internal
security after a siege state has been declared (in the whole territory or a certain area). Under the
Argentine Constitution a siege state can be declared by the Congress and by the President of the
Nation if the Congress is in recess (art.32). That is, under the Internal Security Law, the use of
the armed forces for internal security purposes  is limited to very particular and grave
circumstances and subject to conditions established in the National Constitution.
Only after the beginning of the first Menem administration has the need for the adoption
of an enlarged, comprehensive and non-traditional concept of national security been stated by
various officials dealing directly with the national security planning of the country.1013
It seems logical that these new views started to be shared by governmental officials at the
beginning of the 1990s. In first place, with the demise of the Soviet Bloc, the danger of
becoming again a “battle field” of the East-West ideological confrontation disappeared. This
probably induced these officials to become less reluctant to enlarge the meaning of security
beyond the classic notion of defense against an attack by another state because the danger of a
new “anticommunist” crusade on the part of the Argentine military had also disappeared. By
1990 the traditional Argentine security environment had also changed. The danger of a military
confrontation with Brazil (the traditional regional rival) started to vanish as the process of
economic integration that began in 1985 with the signing of the Treaty  of  the Argentine-
Brazilian Integration Act. A big step ahead was also taken concerning  friendly relations with
                                                                                                                                                                         
Ministry of the Interior and they were also at the disposal of  Federal Judges for the enforcement of
federal laws (as it is the case of the Narcotics act).
1013“This approach to the security and defense of the Argentine Republic, centered on the country’s
frontiers and on the deterrent objective of its military policy, has been in effect for many decades. Just
lately however signs have appeared that this traditional approach may be changing [...] In a lecture
delivered at the National Defense School on 13 August 1990 Domingo Cavallo, the [at the time] Minister
of Foreign Affairs and Religion of Argentina, stated that: ‘The perception of defense as an isolated
national territorial exercise is gradually giving way to the realization that there are common security
interests in the Southern Cone, and that it is therefore necessary to respond with one accord to risks and
problems which are also common. The traditional conception of boundary-dispute situations will be
supplanted by more comprehensive and more up-to date approaches, together with an integrative and
shared conception of security’. Some days later, Hubert Romero, the then Minister of Defense,
maintained in the same forum that: ‘today the notion of national defense is taking on a new dimension; its
no longer confined to the field of application of force. Quite the contrary: we assert that this notion should
be viewed as the coordinated and uninterrupted action of all the human, moral and material resources of
the Nation to find the channels leading to the integration or convergence of interests in common with
other countries, at the same time not neglecting to safeguard the vital interests of the Nation and striving
to diminish and if possible eliminate the factors that might lead to conflict situations’. The two Minister’s
words convey the idea that national defense now has another dimension, which makes it necessary to look
beyond the scenarios of the past and seek means of tackling the problems of security, which are different
from those of other periods, jointly with neighboring countries,” Carasales,op.cit.p.22
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Chile through the signings of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship on  November 19th, 1984
which solved a border dispute over the Picton, Lennox and Nueva islands in the Beagle
Channel. This treaty did not erase a long history of mistrust, but it certainly solved a conflict
that had brought both countries to the brink of war in 1978 . The signing of this treaty as well as
the process of democratization that started in 1990 in Chile paved the way for further
cooperation and integration between the two countries. Also, the fact that Argentina resumed
diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom in 1990 and that the dialogue and direct
communications between the governments has been restored, substantially reduced the
possibility of a new armed confrontation over the Malvinas Islands.
This recently perceived need to enlarge the definition of national security, however, does
overshadow the fact that all interviewed officials of both the Menem and Alfonsín’s
administrations maintained a strong consensus concerning the fact that armed forces - in
consistency with the current legislation which was passed with a broad consensus of the two
larger parties at the time -PJ and UCR- must be kept away from any intervention in domestic
security problems. Regarding the particular issue of drug trafficking, this position has been
consistently maintained by the Argentine military since the XVII Conference of American
Armies (held in Mar del Plata, Argentina on November 1987) when, together with the rest of
the Latin American Armies (with the exception of  Chile -still under Pinochet-) rejected the U.S.
suggested idea of becoming involved in counterdrug and counter-narcoterrist operation. The
alleged reasons were the risks of widespread corruption in military ranks1014 As reported,
“The risks they foresee in trying to stay out of the fight against drug trafficking, the Argentine
military are considering not merely the legal issues, but also the risks that the Armed Forces
foresee. A document recently released by the Forum of Retired Generals noted their reservations
about the idea that the Armed Forces should get involved in fighting drug trafficking. They did
not point out merely the legal impediments, but also the impact that such actions could have on
the Armed Forces. ‘The risks are very great’, says General Balza [Head of the Major Staff of the
Army during the Menem administration], who, according to some sources, agrees with Admiral
Marrón and Air Force Brigadier General Montenegro that “the Armed Forces could become
engaged in dangerous contacts with drug traffickers or be dragged into a fight in foreign
territory.’ Both in the ‘retired generals’ document, and in the resistance of the active military
officers, there is evident concern that the Armed Forces may become overly exposed to the risk
of corruption [...] ‘Which view prevails?’ ask General Balza ‘If they are so concerned about
combating drug trafficking, and we have no doubt that such concern exists, then why does the
U.S. Army stay outside or at least not intervene directly within its own borders?”1015
Because of this conceptual differentiation between internal and external security, before
starting each interview I explained each informant what was my the concept of national security
used in my dissertation (most part of the time we agreed on the fact that we were talking about
two different dimensions -internal and external- dimensions of the same problem, namely the
                                                          
1014See, Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.70 and footnotes 31 to 34 of Chapter 4. Also conversations
with a Major Staff Army officer and interview with Major Brown of the General Army Secretariat who
gave me the official position of the Argentine Army on this aspect, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
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existence of threats to the components of the state). Also it possible to see, in the questionnaires
annexed to this dissertation, that in order to avoid confusion the questionnaires for Argentine
officials explicitly asked whether they considered drug trafficking to be either a defense or
internal security problem. In the case of Venezuela the use of the term “National Security” did
not cause any problem since this term is commonly used in both the legislation of the country
and the everyday language. It is worth noticing also that, as shown in Chapter V, Venezuela did
not suffer the same kind of military interventionism that prevailed in the Southern Cone during
the 1960s and 1970s.
D- DRUG TRAFFICKING, BORDER SPILLOVER AND NATIONAL SECURITY
CONCERNS IN ARGENTINA 1976-1994
a)  Night and Fog: Drug trafficking and national security during the military dictatorship
(1976-1983)
During the mid-1970s and the first half of the 1980s, Argentina was neither a main
transshipment point nor an important consumer market for cocaine.1016 However, as explained
in the previous chapter, the beginning of the coca-cocaine boom took place in Bolivia during
that period. Moreover, especially during the period of García Meza (1981-80), Argentina was
the neighbor of a country whose government was directly participating in drug trafficking
activities. This section will analyze the views of some of the relevant members of the military
regime in order to discern whether they ever identified drug trafficking as a national security
problem.
The military rulers considered drug trafficking to be a national security problem
indirectly, mainly due to the suspicion that the guerrilla groups were financing their operations
through (among other illegal activities) involvement in drug trade activities.1017 After the
guerrillas were suppressed in 1978 this threat was no longer under consideration.1018
As stated in the previous chapter, in 1981 the Minister of Foreign Affairs under President
Viola (1980-1981), Dr. Camilión, was particularly concerned that the growth of the cocaine
                                                                                                                                                                         
1015Argentina: Military Role in Fight Against Drugs Opposed, FBIS-LAT-97-064, March 30,1997
1016Interview with Comisario General Armesto (Federal Police), Buenos Aires, July 1997. Comisario
Armesto stated that around 1981 and 1982 seizing a gram of cocaine was a very extraordinary and
uncommon thing, while in 1997 seizing 10 to 20 kilos of this drug was considered normal. Interview with
Prefecto Principal (Coast Guard) Nelson Mandrile (Director of the National Direction of  Coordination
and Control of Illicit Drug Trafficking of SEDRONAR), Buenos Aires, July 1995. Mandrile, who was an
officer in the illicit drugs section of the Coast Guard at the time, starts perceiving a change in the pattern
of drug trafficking (towards an increasing in cocaine trafficking) since 1980.
1017Interview with a former military officer who occupied a position of high responsibility during the
military regime, the officer requested not to be named, Buenos Aires, June 19, 1997.
1018ibid.
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industry in Bolivia could create bilateral problems with that country. He became particularly
worried after he saw an article in Time magazine that showed a map that with star in the
province of Salta (northwest) indicating that drug production might had been taking place in
that area. Dr. Camilión stated that both the Intelligence Service (SIDE) and the Ministry of
Foreign affairs lacked information about the extent of the drug trafficking in Bolivia. For this
reason, he asked the army, Major which has had a large military mission in that country for,
further information.1019 Dr. Camilión was then briefed during a meeting that took place in the
offices of the army’s major staff. The army was absolutely aware and informed about the
situation in Bolivia, and the officers that carried out the briefing were particularly worried about
the possibility that there could be a spillover effect of production and commercialization of
cocaine in Argentine territory. Traffic was not the main concern.1020 During the briefing, the
army officers also manifested  concern that corruption could contaminate the Argentine Armed
Forces.1021 Dr. Camilión however stated that the problem of Bolivia was, at that time, more a
                                                          
1019Interview with Dr. Camilión, Buenos Aires, July 1997.  The fact that Dr. Camilión was unaware of
the situation in Bolivia might be explained by the system of “parallel diplomacies” that existed during the
military dictatorship and particularly during the Viola government. The military regime was a sort of
“collegiate autocracy” in which Armed Service (Army, Air Force and Navy) had a third of the national
administration in all the areas of the state apparatus. That is in every state dependency the administration
of issues was divided in 30% percent for each force. Moreover within each dependency the officials were
not loyal to the president or the head of the dependency but to his own force. (See: Russell Roberto, “El
proceso de toma de decisiones en la política exterior argentina,” in Russell, Roberto ed., Política exterior
y toma de decisiones en América Latina Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, pp.13-59). Covert
operations such as the support for the Bolivian coup through military advisors, were under the direction of
the First Army Corps led by General Guillermo Suarez Mason (who by the way also coordinated the
covert support of the Argentina to the contra in Honduras during the military dictatorship). Considering
that some of the military advisors that went to Bolivia were navy officers of the Naval Intelligence
service, it is also most likely that the navy coordinated part of this covert operation (until 1980
commanded by Admiral Emilio Massera). On this issue see: Dale Scott, Peter and Marshall, Jonathan,
Cocaine Politics. Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America, Berkeley, University of California
Press, 1991, pp.43 and 44; see also: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.55.
1020This concern appears to be justified since in December 1975 (right before the March 1976 coup that
overthrew Ms. María Estela “Isabel” Perón) a report of the Army Intelligence Service revealed that the
Minister of Social Welfare and Chief of the Federal Police, José Lopez Rega, (who also was the leader of
the right wing paramilitary group Triple A) was the head of a drug trafficking organization that processed
cocaine in laboratories hidden in the province of Salta close to the Bolivian border. The drug was then
transported towards Buenos Aires by members of the Federal Police and dispatched by diplomatic
suitcases by members of the diplomatic service. the organization also included among others the Minister
of Foreign Affairs Alberto Vignes , the Senator of Salta, Juan Carlos Cornejo Linares, and the future
Governor of Salta, Roberto Romero. The money obtained from these illicit activities was used for
financing the activities of the Triple A. It is very likely also that the report was exaggerated by the
military in order to further discredit the administration of President María E. “Isabel” Perón. The network
in Argentina was disbanded after the coup, however its connections in Bolivia were used by the head of
the First Army Corps Guillermo Suarez Mason in order to finance foreign covert operations of the
military regime. See: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp.52 and 53; Dale Scott and Marshall,
Cocaine Politics, pp.43 to 50 and Henman, Anthony, op.cit.,p103.
1021 Interview with Dr. Camilión, Buenos Aires, July 1997. These fears were apparently justified since
General Suarez Mason, who was  in charge of the regime’s undercover operations in Bolivia and
Honduras, allegedly financed these operations out of drug trafficking activities. Allegedly also the
officers of the Naval Intelligence Service who were advisors in Bolivia also financed their operations out
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personal concern than a national security issue because he viewed this as a long-term concern
into the future. Drug trafficking at the time did not have the dimension that it later acquired;
moreover, it was not an agenda issue in his ministry since the “second” Cold War
overshadowed any other problem.1022
During the military regime, drug trafficking was not among the main concerns of the
National Security agenda.  Of far greater importance were the following issues:  defeating the
guerrillas, the possibility of a war with Chile, the balance of power with Brazil and negotiations
over Brazil’s construction of the Itaipú dam over the Paraná river (which involved dangers for
Argentina as a downstream country), and-last but not least- the war with the United Kingdom in
1982.1023
As explained in Chapter VI, by September 1982 the government of General Vildoso had
started to apply the Five-Year Plan for the eradication of coca in Bolivia, causing “highs” of
peasant reactive violence in the Chapare. It is very unlikely that this could have caused any
concern in the Argentine military government, led at the time by Army General Reynaldo
Bignone.  After the defeat of Malvinas in June 1982, the navy and the air force retired from the
government, and the responsibility was delegated to the army, which was preparing the hand
over power to the political parties. However, the fact that the problem was overshadowed by
other issues does not necessarily imply that the problem did not exist. It is probable that, as two
Argentine experts stated, the military just decided to “pass the ball” to their civilian successors
at the last moment, either because of lack of capacity or because of fear of digging up their own
crimes.1024
The inter-office commission that was in charge of advising the president on demand
reduction and drug law enforcement policies was called CONATON (National Commission of
Addictions and Narcotics).1025  The commission considered not only drug trafficking but the
drug problem in general (that is involving retailing and consumption) as a public health problem
                                                                                                                                                                         
of drug trafficking. See: Dale Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, pp.44 and 45, and Pasquini and De
Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p. 55.
1022Interview with Dr. Oscar Camilión, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
1023Interview with a former military officer  that occupied a position of high responsibility during the
military regime, the officer requested not to be named, Buenos Aires, June 19, 1997.
1024See: Cardoso, Oscar and Heguilein, Rubén, Argentina y la Cuestión de las Drogas, América
Latina/Internacional, FLACSO Programa Argentina, Vol. 9, Nº 31, January-March 1992,p.476
1025 The Commission was created in 1972 by Decree Nº 452 during the military government of General
Pedro A. Lanusse, it was an inter-ministerial organ under the presidency of the Ministry of Social Wealth
(who by the way, under the -democratic- presidency of  Juan Domingo Perón (1972-1974) and María
Estela “Isabel” Perón  (1974-1976) was no other than ...José Lopez Rega). This commission was not an
executive organ but an advisory one it “planned and proposed” the execution of drug treatment and
prevention and drug law enforcement policies. See Decree Nº 452 “Créase la Comisión Nacional de
Toxicomanías y Narcóticos (CONATON), Boletín Oficial, Buenos Aires, February 7, 1972, p.4 and see
also: Ministerio de Bienestar Social, Comisión National de Toxicomanías y Narcóticos (CO.NA.TO.N),
Decretos 452/ 72; 1053/72 and 1574/75, oficial document of CONATON non dated and signed by Dr.
Carlos N. Cagliotti, Executive Secretary of CONATON until 1985,CONATON, Buenos Aires, 13.pp
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and, at most, a crime against public health.1026 Cocaine trafficking in Bolivia was not a major
source of concern at that time, and the efforts of CONATON  focused on prevention and
medical treatment policies.1027 Their major preoccupation was the abuse of
psychopharmaceutical drugs (such as amphetamines and benzoidazepines), and there was also
an incipient concern about the growing consumption of marijuana.1028 An indicator of the
medical and preventive approach to the problem, and of the fact that drug trafficking was
considered above all to be a social health problem, is the fact that CONATON was under the
direction of the Minister of Social Wealth. This preventive approach was so entrenched that
even the law enforcement agencies became involved in carrying out prevention activities (such
as talks and slide presentations about the effect of drugs at high schools, social clubs etc.).1029
                                                          
1026Interviews with Comisario General (R) (Federal Police), member of the Superintendence of
Dangerous Drugs of the Federal Police and representative of the Federal Police to the CONATON from
1983. Buenos Aires, July 1997; Interview with Prefecto Principal (R) (Coast Guard) Nelson Mandrile, in
the 1970s and early 1980s representative of the Coast Guard to CONATON, Buenos Aires, July 1997;
Interview with Comandante General (National Gendarmerie) Jorge Vazquez, chief of the Dangerous
Drugs Department of  the National Gendarmerie since 1983 and representative of this force to
CONATON, Bahía Blanca, headquarters of the 5th National Gendarmerie Region, and Interview with Dr.
García Fernandez, at the time representative of the University of Buenos Aires to the CONATON,
Buenos Aires, 1997.
Before the coup d’etat of 1976, however, and in the middle of the a bloody civil war, Rasputin-like
Minister of  Social Wealth José Lopez Rega “El Brujo” (and Chief of Police and head of the Triple A)
defined not drug trafficking but drug consumption as a national security problem because drugs were
believed to be used by guerrilla members to stimulate themselves in order to carry out terrorist acts. See:
Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, As a matter of fact Law Nº 20,771 voted by the Congress in
September 1974 severely punished the possession of drugs for personal use (one to six years of prison and
a fine of 1,000 to 100,000 pesos, Law Nº 20,771, article 6, Boletín Oficial, October 9,1974, p.2). This has
been changed by the new narcotics law of 1989 (Nº 23,737), which still punishes possession but reduces
the sentence to 1 month to two years of prison when the small amount and “other circumstances” suggest
that the drug is for personal use, Law Nº 23,737, art. 14, Presidencia de la Nación Argentina,
SEDRONAR, Disposiciones Legales de la República Argentina Relacionadas con el Tráfico Ilícito de
Drogas y su Consumo, section 1.1, p.3
1027 The  Center for National Treatment and Social Reeducation (CENARESO)  was created, together
with CONATON.
1028 This was not the case however in the case of the National Gendarmerie, which because of their role
of patrolling the borders since the early 1980s started to detect an increase in the diversion of  chemical
inputs for the production of cocaine  towards Bolivia, across the northwestern border. Also there was a
concern in Gendarmerie about the coca leaves trafficking for coqueo in the Northwest provinces.
Interview with Comandante General Jorge Vazquez, cited before.
1029Interviews with Comisario General Armesto, Prefecto Principal Mandrile (who participated in these
preventive talks), as previously cited. As a matter of fact the Federal Police has,  since 1971, a unit for the
prevention of toxic addictions that carries out an autonomous program of drug prevention, Interview with
Subcomisario (Federal Police) Jorge Daniel Besana, Second Chief of the Division of Social Prevention of
Toxic Adictions, Superintendence of Dangerous Drugs of the Federal Police, Buenos Aires, July, 1997.
See also:  Policía Federal Argentina, Superintendencia de Drogas Peligrosas, División Prevensión Social
de las Toxicomanías, De tu lado, el de la vida, (informative brochure of the Federal Police) or http\\:
www.pfa.gov.ar. The National Gendarmerie has a similar prevention unit within its dangerous unit
division.
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Flowchart  1. Drug Control Decision Structure 1972-1985:
Comisión Nacional de Toxicomanías y Narcóticos (CONATON)
(Decrees 452/72;1053/72 and 1574/72)
EXECUTIVE POWER AND GOVERNMENT OF PROVINCES 1030
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL ACTION
MINISTER OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL ACTION (PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION)
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
CONATON:
Secretary of Social Action (Min. of Health)
Secretary of Human Development and Family (Min. of Health)
Subsecretary of Regulation and Control (Min. of Heath)
Representative of Ministry of Interior
Representative of Ministry of Foreign Relations
Representative of Ministry of Defense
Representative of Ministry of Education and Justice
Representative of Ministry of Labor and Social Security
Representative of Federal Police
Representative of the State Intelligence Secretariat
Representative of Customs Administration
Representative of the University of Buenos Aires
Representative of the National Center for Social Reeducation (CENARESO-treatment-)
Representative of Secretariat of Public Information
Relationship:
 Direct  Subordination
Advisory Role
Coordination of Policies
Source: Ministerio de Bienestar Social, Comisión Nacional de Toxicomanías y Narcóticos (CONATON),
not dated.
                                                          
1030Argentina is a Federal States Provinces. This decree was enacted during a military government
(General Lanusse 1971-1972). A civilian period followed (1972-1976) then another military regime
(1976-1982) and then the transition 1983. During military periods the country was de facto a centralized
state and provinces were subordinated to policies dictated by the executive power on this (and all) field,
during civilian periods policies where coordinated. Interview with Comisario General Armesto
representative of the Federal Police in CONATON, CONCONAD, CONCONAD II and the first year of
SEDRONAR.
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As a final comment, it is worth noting that if allegations about participation of Peronist
(1972-1976) and military (1976-1983) governments in drug trafficking is true, the fact that
cocaine consumption within Argentina did not expand at that period might be explained by two
factors:
• In the case of the alleged Lopez Rega (aka El Brujo) connection, drug trafficking was
carried out not by a “commercial” organization, but by a political one. The goal was to take
the drugs out of the country and to collect money in order to finance illegal right-wing
paramilitary squads. The probability of leaks towards the internal market were limited
probably because no interest existed in selling the drug within Argentina and second it was
a very close and reduced circle consisting of police agents and diplomats who very
discreetly would take the cocaine out of the country.
• In the case of the military rulers (1976-1983), again this was not only a commercial
operation, but also a political maneuver in order to finance undercover operations
abroad (Bolivia and Honduras).  On the other hand, the “highly paranoid and
ultraconservative”1031 character of the regime probably prevented them of selling
cocaine in “la Patria” (the Fatherland).1032
b)  The end of the beginning: President Alfonsín administration (1983-1989)
This section begins with assertions that would  normally be mentioned in the conclusion
of this section.  It is worth naming them now in order to give the reader a general overview of
the situation when President Raúl Alfonsín started the transition to democracy in December
1983. At the beginning of the Alfonsín administration, drug trafficking was not considered on
the agenda of the main problems of the country, nor was it considered a national security
problem. It is not surprising that drug trafficking had to compete in the “problem ranking” with
the following problems inherited from previous years of mismanagement:1033
                                                          
1031As defined by Anthony Henman in Mama Coca, p.103
1032All police and security forces were, during the military regime, controlled by the armed forces. The
way drug traffickers were treated after their arrest did not differ too much from illegal detentions of
political prisoners. In a sense out of the alleged “official” drug trafficking was highly risky during the
military regime. On this matter see: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, Chapter 2; Levine,
Michael, La Gran Mentira Blanca (Spanish version of “ The Big White Lie, The CIA and the
cocaine/crack epidemic), Buenos Aires, Planeta, 1996, particularly chapters I and II and Cardoso and
Heguilein, op.cit., p.474 (these to authors stress the fact that drug trafficking received the same
ideological-police answer that received all the problems of the country at that time).
1033On this particular issue see: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.199 and McDonald, Scott
B., The Southern Cone, in Mc Donald, Scott and Zagaris, Bruce, International Handbook on Drug
Control, Westport, Conn.& London, Greenwod Press,1992,p.230
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• A  catastrophic economic situation ( a foreign debt of  $40,000 million- became $60,000 in
1991- and an inflation of  1,129% per year)1034
• Holding the military responsible for human rights violations and at the same time keeping
the military under civilian control.
• An overflow of demands from every sector of society and the need to negotiate with strong
corporative sectors such as the trade unions, the industry and the agro-exporter sector
(Sociedad Rural).
Faced with these enormous tasks, the drug problem paled in comparison at the beginning
of Alfonsín’s government.1035 However, as the previous sections of this chapter have shown,
the problem did exist and would gain increasing importance from the mid-80s on, because of
the militarized enforcement being carried out against the industry in Colombia and Bolivia. The
fact that the problem of drug trafficking is incremental in nature was also a cause for the
delayed reaction of the Alfonsín administration.  First it was slow in  noticing the extent of the
issue; second, it was slow to react to it.1036
The situation clearly started to change by the end of the Alfonsín administration when the
problem began to be defined as an “internal security” problem due to the increasing trafficking
across the Argentine territory and above all the possibility of it being used by transnational drug
trafficking organizations. Even if the U.S. diplomatic “push” was important, the changes in the
evolution of the decision structures and policies adopted by the Alfonsín administration
responded more to a local concern than to a response to the “Washington Consensus.”1037
Above all the need to improve the decision-making structures and include the drug issue in the
public policy agenda stem from the fact that drug trafficking was taking national security
dimensions in other countries of the region and Argentina needed to be prepared to avoid these
kinds of situations. In a sense, the officials of the Alfonsín administration reacted because they
“anticipated the issue” and they wanted to be prepared to face it. The general view was that “It
was happening in other countries” and Argentina did not have adequate government agencies to
face the problem. There was a will to “do little but in an articulated, Informed, and rational
way.” In that sense the creation of a new drug control agency  “was not part of a package of
policies dictated by the U.S.” 1038 As reported in an official document,
                                                          
1034Calvert, P.A.R, Argentina, in South America and the Caribbean,London, Europa
Publications,1998,p.52
1035Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti, Executive Vice-President of CONCONAD (1985-1986) and
General Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Justice (1986-1989), Buenos Aires, July, 1997.
1036McDonald, The Southern Cone,p.230
1037 Various Interviews, Buenos Aires July-August 1997.
1038 Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti,  Executive Vice President of CONCONAD 1985-1986  (the
first inter-agency commission created by the Alfonsín administration in order to deal with drug control
policy), Buenos Aires July 29,1997. (original in Spanish) However in his Book, Smoke and Mirrors,
Malamud Goti, attributes the creation of CONCONAD to the pressured of U.S. diplomats over President
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“Taking into account the fact that the main threat stems from the growing activity of drug traffickers in
neighboring countries and its economic and political projection, the Argentine Government has decided to
carry out actions [similar to the policies of the rest of the region] in order to avoid a growth and spillover
of this flow over the whole Latin American region”1039
Interestingly enough, the first inter-agency commission created during the Alfonsín
administration, the CONCONAD (Comisión Nacional para el Control del Narcotráfico y el
Abuso de Drogas, Created by presidential decree Nº 1383 of July 25, 1985), was put under the
presidency of the Minister of Health (as was its predecessor,  the CONATON).  The reasons
alleged for the creation of CONCONAD were “[t]he seriousness of  the problem of drug
trafficking and  drug consumption in the national and international field and its social
implications and consequences.”1040 This already indicates the fact that drug trafficking was
considered a problem that could affect public health.1041 However, in 1988 a new commission,
CONCONAD II (Comisión Nacional Coordinadora para el Control del Narcotráfico y el
Abuso de Drogas, created by Presidential Decree Nº 528, April 28, 1988), was put under the
president’s direction and divided into two commissions (one in charge of drug law enforcement
policies under the Minister of the Interior and the other in charge of prevention, assistance, and
research under the Ministry of  Health and Social Action).The text of the decree now stated that
the creation of CONCONAD II was necessary because “[t]he phenomenon of illicit drug and
chemical inputs trafficking has increasingly acquired importance as a threat to public health, the
illegal channeling of  enormous amounts of money, and as a disruptive factor for external
security and international relations.”1042 It was also stated that the Comisión de Control del
Narcotráfico y Legislación (Drug Law Enforcement Commission) would coordinate the
activities of the specific organs for drug law enforcement, the armed forces1043 and security
forces.  The commission, then, would be responsible for carrying out the necessary actions to
combat drug trafficking, proposing courses of action, and monitoring their effective
                                                                                                                                                                         
Alfonsín to further cooperate in the world’s antidrug campaign, p.x .My interpretation then is that there
even it there was U.S. insistence on a stronger Argentine cooperation  CONCONAD was not the result of
a US “recipe” it was the response to the signal sent by the sudden revelation of the violent and
destabilizing nature of drug trafficking in other countries of the region.
1039Ministerio de Salud y Acción Social, CONCONAD, Plan Nacional de Control del Narcotráfico y
Prevención del Uso Indebido de Drogas, 1986-1989, May 1986., p.6
1040Presidential Decree Nº 1383/85 (Original in Spanish)
1041The members of the Commission in fact considered it a public health problem. Interviews.
1042Decree Nº 528/85 (Original in Spanish)
1043Only for logistical support to security and police forces. Interview with Horacio Jaunarena (Under
Secretary of Defense 12/1983-12/1984; Secretary of Defense 12/1984-6/1986 and Minister of Defense
6/1986-7/1989)
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implementation.1044 This commission also coordinated the intelligence produced by the
“different specific organs” related to drug law enforcement.1045
Two things had changed since 1985.  First, drug trafficking was defined (although
vaguely) as a problem that could affect security. Second, through the its two “sub-commissions”
under the specific and relevant ministries (Interior for Law and Order and Health for...Public
Health), now the commission had an executive character that had been lacking in
CONCONAD; this meant the commission could elaborate and “propose” policies to each
relevant area (Interior, Public Health, Defense, Foreign Affairs). At least on paper, drug
trafficking was being taken more seriously.
This dissertation will now analyze the views of the people responsible for dealing with
drug control policies. As stated before, the analysis will be centered on assessing whether they
did or did not consider drug trafficking per se to be a national security problem. It will also look
at whether they did or did not consider the actual and latent spillover consequences of
militarized enforcement in drug producer countries (especially Bolivia) to be a national security
problem.
b.1 The President of the Nation:
Overwhelmed by the problems mentioned before, President Alfonsín opted for delegating
the drug control policy problem to the inter-agency commission created to that end: the
                                                          
1044Presidential Decree Nº 833, Comisiones de Control del Narcotráfico y Legislación y de Prevención,
Asistencia e Investigación. Misión y funciones. Aprobación, Annex I, point 1.
The Argentine enforcement system involved in combating drug trafficking includes four federal agencies
( Federal Police, National Gendarmerie, Coast Guards, and National Customs Administration) under three
separate ministries (Federal Police under the Ministry of the Interior,  Gendarmerie and Coast Guards
under Defense but operationally under the Interior-that is under Interior for Law Enforcement purposes
and under Defense in time of war. This situation changed in 1996 when both security forces were put
under the Direction of the Ministry of the Interior. Notice that during the military dictatorship, the
Gendarmerie was part of  the Army, Coast Guard was part of the Navy and the Federal Police had a
military chief. Customs are under the Ministry of the Economy). To this we must add twenty-two
provincial police forces with each one counting a narcotics division. As drug trafficking is a federal
offense (which requires the intervention of the federal justice), federal judges conduct drug investigations.
It is the Federal Judge that starts the investigation and request the support of federal or provincial law
enforcement agencies, although the police can request the judge to order an investigation based on
collected evidence. The border guards, are mandated to protect the country’s borders up to 100 kilometers
into Argentina. They share jurisdiction with customs officials, who conduct investigations involving
smuggling. The Argentine Federal Police acts as a technical and judiciary police and conducts narcotic
investigations in the federal districts (the city of Buenos Aires) and over the whole territory upon request
by a federal judge. The coast guard has responsibility for patrolling the country’s waterways and for the
security of seaports, where it shares narcotic enforcement responsibilities with customs officials. To this
we must add a special branch of the air force, the Aeronautic National Police, which since 1991 is in
charge of airport security and therefore can enforce drug laws only within the jurisdiction of National and
International Airports- a fact that,  to a certain extent, violates the internal security act. This particular
aspect will be analyzed later in this chapter.) Upon the request of a federal judge,  the SIDE can collect
intelligence concerning drug trafficking investigations (for instance phone wiretaps), however SIDE
agents are not allowed to carry out arrests.
1045Presidential Decree Nº833 Annex I point 2.
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CONCONAD (nominally under the Minister of Health but actually directed by the Executive
Vice President of the Commission), and later CONCONAD II (he would formally preside over
the commission it but he would delegate his activities to the general coordinator with the rank of
Under Secretary).1046This of course does not mean that the topic was ignored by the president
who, because of his working style, preferred to address this topic (and policy issues in general)
not in cabinet meetings but in private conversations with the relevant officials or experts. The
president also appointed his sister Silvia Alfonsín as his personal delegate to both commissions
who would keep him informed about CONCONAD activities. 1047 Even if his role was
secondary in the formulation of drug control policy during his administration, the views of
President Alfonsín are included here because he was “the supreme chief of the Nation, the head
of government and the political responsible for the general administration of the country,” as
stated in the National Constitution.1048
True, Alfonsín would not raise this issue with the same frequency as his successor, Carlos
Menem, however his statements indicate that he was fully aware of the incremental penetration
of drug trafficking in society and the economy. However, during my investigation, there was no
evidence showing that the president defined drug trafficking as either an internal or external
security problem. This is probably because, as stated before, the problem began to be identified
as a serious internal security issue by the end of his administration. Moreover, it is very likely
that in the midst of his attempts to control the military, the president wanted to avoid
mentioning a topic that may suggest the existence of an “internal enemy” that could justify
interventionist attempts on the part of the military.1049
On August 11 1984 President Alfonsín—together with the presidents of Bolivia, Ecuador,
Colombia, and Venezuela, and representatives of Peru, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panamá and the
U.S.  (Vice-president Georges Bush was an observer)—participated at the Quito Conference
where foreign debt and drug trafficking problems were discussed. In the case of Argentina, it is
very likely the necessity of analyzing the Latin American debt as whole as well as analyzing the
Central American situation (civil war in Nicaragua and El Salvador) came far before drug
trafficking in order of importance.1050 During a very brief bilateral conversation with George
                                                          
1046Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.199.
1047Interview with Aldo Neri, Ministry of Health and Social Action (1985.-1986) and first president of
the CONCONAD. And Interview with Alberto Calabrese, advisor and coordinator of CONCONAD and
CONCONAD II.
1048Unfortunately it was not possible to interview Dr. Raúl Alfonsín during my stay in Buenos Aires and
that is why, in this case, I am using non-interview primary and secondary sources.
1049On the second assumption see: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.199
1050See: Drogas y deuda, temas del cónclave con Bush de países latinoamericanos, Clarín, Buenos Aires,
August 12, 1984 pp.4 and 5. The topic of the diplomatic conflict with the United Kingdom over the
Malvinas Islands was also addressed with Vice-President Georges Bush during the Quito meeting.  On
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Bush in Quito, President Alfonsín addressed the specific issue of Bolivia and stated the need to
economically support President Siles Suazo’s drug control efforts.1051 The Quito Summit was
held in the aftermath of the murder of Minister Lara Bonilla in Colombia. We know that
spillover was already a problem for Venezuela (present at the meeting); however, it was too
early for Argentina as a country to start noticing the effects of the consequent spiral of violence
in Colombia and the displacement of the “cartels” to Bolivia. The expanding European cocaine
market was also too recent to start feeling the effects of   increasing transit of the drug from
Bolivia towards the “Old Continent.” Interestingly enough, Argentina is not among the
signatories of the Quito Declaration against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs (11 August 1984), already
mentioned in Chapter I. The spillover to the south had not yet occurred. But from this analysis
and interviews conducted this author can affirm that after the meeting, President Alfonsín went
home convinced that new threats were arising in the Andes.
On September 28, 1984 at the 8th Congress of Police Chiefs held in Buenos Aires the
president mentioned organized crime, drug trafficking and drug consumption as a source of
concern:
“The government is also committed in definitively banishing or at least controlling as best as possible the
flaw that drug trafficking and drug consumption means for the Argentine society.”1052
Later in July 1986 while operation Blast Furnace was taking place in Bolivia, President
Alfonsín stated the need to combat this problem with “all legal means at hand” and also
manifested his support for economic strategies to reduce its the scope.1053 As reported,
“Alfonsín said referring to the specific case of Bolivia, that he had no objections [to the presence of U.S.
troops in Bolivia] and voiced his support for forming a Latin American economic fund to combat the
marketing of the drug and the drug traffickers’ activities.”1054
 Whereas it seems that President Alfonsín did not directly address the consequences of
enforcement policies in Bolivia (at least from the evidence gathered for this thesis), it is clear
that the problem was identified as a “threat to the new born democracies of Latin America” that
had to be confronted  through a balanced focus on both the demand and consumption sides.1055
                                                                                                                                                                         
the “ranking” of  Argentina’s foreign policy priorities, Interview with Dante Caputo, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 1983-1989, Buenos Aires July, 1997.
1051Conferencia del señor presidente en la ciudad de Quito, Ecuador, el 10 de agosto de 1984,
http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/pr.../argentin/alfonsin/840542.html
1052Discurso del Señor Presidente de la Nación,  Doctor Raul R. Alfonsín, ante el VIII Congreso de Jefes
de Policía, el día 28 de septiembre de 1984,p.63,
http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/project/arl/pm/sample2/argentin/alfonsin/840645.html
1053FBIS, Daily Report, Latin America, 4 August 1986, Vol. VI Nº 149, Argentina, B1.
1054FIBS, Daily Report, Latin America, 4 August 1986, Vol. VI Nº 149, Argentina, B1.
1055Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.204.
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Two years ago (after having left the presidency) Dr. Alfonsín also stated that he was
manifestly opposed to the “militarization” of enforcement in Latin America.  The reason, he
declared, was that in the long term this might cause consequences similar to the ones caused by
the fight against “the international communist movement” (that is, the fight carried out by the
armed forces in the 1970s and early 1980s under the national security doctrine).1056 The logic
would then follow as such:
Drug trafficking is a threat to democracy in Latin America, but the militarization of drug
law enforcement is also a threat to democracy. Therefore, by militarizing drug law enforcement
the medicine becomes worse that the sickness.
b.2. Members of CONATON (December 1983-1985):
From 1984 to July 1985, the organ in charge of advising the executive power and
proposing drug control policies was CONATON, which had been inherited from the previous
regime.
Within CONATON drug trafficking was not believed to be a national security problem,
but a public health problem. Moreover the main concern at the beginning of the Alfonsín
administration was not the abuse of illegal drugs but the abuse of psychopharmaceutical
products and alcohol.1057 Also almost “90 % [of CONATON] activities were [concentrated] in
prevention.”1058 As reported,
“Cagliotti [executive secretary of CONATON] stated that[...] ‘in our country [people] are especially
employing psychopharmaceutical products which are sold in pharmacies at low prices and easily
reachable by young people’[...]Minister [of Public Health and Social Action] Aldo Neri expressed his
concern on this topic adding that ‘I believe that there is a big national business involving the retail and
diversion to illicit channels of [psychopharmaceutical] medicines’.”1059
CONATON was not an agency as such, but rather an inter-agency commission composed
of representatives form different ministries and dependencies (see CONATON chart in the
                                                          
1056EFE, Buenos Aires, January 6, 1997, Quoted in cable addressed to United Nations International Drug
Control Programme (UNDCP) offices in Vienna, Subject: Alfonsín Calificó de “Amoral” la doctrina de la
seguridad continental, January 7, 1997.
1057Interviews with: Dr. García Fernández, at the time representative of the University of Buenos Aires to
CONATON, Buenos Aires, August, 1997. Comisario General Armesto at the time representative of the
Federal Police to CONATON (Comisario Armesto said this was the general view in CONATON as far as
he was concerned, for the police the main problem at this moment was an increase in marihuana
consumption); Interview with Prefecto Principal Nelson Mandrile at the time representative of the Coast
Guards to CONATON, July, 1997; and Interview with Comandante General Jorge Vazquez, at the time
Chief of the Dangerous Drugs Division of the National Gendarmerie and delegate of that security force to
CONATON, July 1997.
1058Interview with Prefecto Principal Nelson Mandrile, July 1990. Interview with Dr. Aldo Neri, at the
time Minister of Public Health and Social  Action and  President of CONATON, Buenos Aires, July
1994.
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previous section). The views of some of these officials concerning drug trafficking and the
consequences of militarized enforcement policies in the Andean countries will be analyzed in
this section.
In the aftermath of the murder of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla (in July 1984), the Executive
Secretary of CONATON, Dr. Carlos Norberto Cagliotti,1060 could already foresee that the
subsequent increase in enforcement against the Medellín Cartel in Colombia and also the recent
increase in consumption in Europe would cause a movement to the south of the region in terms
of production and transportation. As reported,
“Carlos Cagliotti affirmed that  ‘the criminal map in the Southern Cone has changed after the murder of
the Minister of Justice of Colombia’. He added that after the death of  Minister Lara Bonilla and as a
consequence of the ensuing intense repression, ‘there has been a stampide of a lot of agents linked to the
production and trade of narcotics’. He also said that ‘the drug traffickers are looking for suitable areas to
operate specially for money laundering’. ”1061
Carlos Cagliotti used the old Spanish saying “si ves a tu vecino veas rasurar, pon tu barba a
remojar” (if you see they are shaving your neighbor, then start preparing your beard), implying
that Argentina would be affected by events in the rest of the region related to drug
trafficking.1062
Both statements articulate the belief that the increase of enforcement in Colombia would
provoke a spillover effect. Eventually this could have negative consequences for Argentina in
terms of the possibility of the establishment of drug trafficking organizations in the national
territory. The important thing to remark here is that already in 1984 it was believed that there
could be a spillover effect towards the Southern Cone.
During the period under study in this section, events in Bolivia were not yet a source of
concern for the rest of CONATON’s interviewed officials. One exception is the view of the
                                                                                                                                                                         
1059Aumentó el Consumo de drogas en la Argentina, Clarín, Buenos Aires, July 12, 1984. Author´s
translation.
1060Unfortunately two thieves would later murder Dr. Cagliotti, during a hold-up in 1995. The author
esteems that he would had been an invaluable source of information since he had been working in the
formulation of drug control policy since the creation of CONATON in 1972. Dr.Cagliotti is also one of
the pioneers on public drug addiction treatment policies since he proposed the creation of the
CENARESO in 1974. It is worth noticing that when CONATON was dissolved in July 1985, Dr.
Cagliotti was not incorporated as part of the permanent staff of the newly created CONCONAD, because
of his repressive approach towards consumers. (Dr. Cagliotti was in favor of treating consumption as a
criminal law matter, and his ideas contrasted with the liberal views of the rest of the new members, who
favored a more lenient policy concerning drug consumers. Interview with Dr. Aldo Neri cited above. On
the liberal approach of the Alfonsín administration see: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp.
199 to 209.
1061Aumentó el consumo de drogas en la Argentina, Clarín, July 12, 1984, original in Spanish.
1062Archive material collected by the author in UNDCP, Vienna, Manuscript by Carlos Cagliotti, La
responsabilidad primaria del estado en la existencia o no del narcotráfico y sus consecuencias, pp.2 and 5,
Buenos Aires, July 16, 1984.
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representative of the National Gendarmerie. Members of this force of course started noticing an
increase in the outflow of chemical inputs towards Bolivia on the northwestern border.1063
b.3. CONCONAD (1985-1988) and CONCONAD II (1988-1989):
The advantages of CONCONAD and CONCONAD II for my research purposes were
twofold: both were inter-agency commissions involving key areas of national security and
foreign policy, and both had representatives from different areas of government dealing with the
problem of drug trafficking who were willing to share their views with me. The second
advantage was, that with the exception of the president and vice-president of the commissions,
the same people constituted the (very small) permanent personnel of both CONCONAD and
CONCONAD II. This allowed me to follow the evolution of the problem in the policy agenda
through the time. The following charts illustrate the structure of both commissions and will
(hopefully) help the reader to better understand the contents of this section.
                                                          
1063Interview with Comandante General Jorge Vazquez quoted above.
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Flowchart  2. Drug Control Decision-making Structure 1985-1988:
(Decree 1383/85)
EXECUTIVE POWER (PRESIDENT AND CABINET OF MINISTERS)
Comisión Nacional Para el Control del Narcotráfico y el Abuso de Drogas (CONCONAD)
MINISTER OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL HEALTH (PRESIDENT OF THE
COMMISSION)
EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT
COMMISSION:
Subsecretary of Health and Social action (Min. of Health)
Subsecretary of Regulation and Control (Min. of Health)
Subsecretary of Human Development and Family (Min. of Health)
Subsecretary of Social Promotion (Min. of Health)
Subsecretary of the Interior (Min. of the Interior)
Subsecretary of Latin American Affairs of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (Min. of
Foreign Relations)
Subsecretary of Defense (Min. of Defense)
Subsecretary of Educational , Scientific And Cultural Coordination (Min. of Education and
Justice)
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Representatives of NGOs and reputed experts
Ministry of Foreign Relations
Ministry of the Interior
Secretariat of Public information
Secretariat of Sports
Subsecretariat of Regulation and Control
(Min of Health)
Subsecretariat of Justice
Subsecretariat of Educational Guidelines
Borders’ National Superintendent
Federal Police
National Gendarmerie
Coast Guards
CENARESO
University of Buenos  Aires
Customs Administration
Directorate of Mental Health
National Directorates of Medium and Higher Education
Relationship:
 Direct  Subordination
Advisory Role
Coordination of Policies
Source: Edición de Jurisprudencia Argentina, Jurisprudencia Argentina S.A., Buenos Aires, p.1183
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Flowchart  3. Drug Control Decision-making Structure 1988-1989:
(Decrees 528/88 and 833/88)
Comisión Nacional Coordinadora para el Control del Narcotráfico y el Abuso de Drogas
(CONCONAD II)
PRESIDENT OF THE NATION (PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION)
GENERAL COORDINATOR
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:
Minister of the Interior
Minister of Health and Social Action
Secretary of Foreign Relations
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Health
Secretary of Sports and Social Promotion
Secretary of Human Development and Family
Secretary of Intelligence
General Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Justice
COMMISSION OF COMMISSION OF
PREVENTION
DRUG TRAFFICKING CONTROL ASSISTANCE AND RESEARCH
AND LEGISLATION: Minister of Health and Social Action
Minister of the Interior (president of the (president of the commission)
commission) Representatives of:
Representatives of: Secretariat of Education
Secretariat of the Interior Secretariat of Health
Secretariat of Foreign Affairs Secretariat of Sports and Social
Secretariat of Defense Promotion
Secretariat of Finance Secretariat of Human Development and
Secretariat of Justice Family
SECURITY FORCES (GENDARMERIE FUNDS AND SUPPORT FOR
AND COAST GUARDS) PREVENTION, ASSISTANCE AND
FEDERAL POLICE RESEARCH BY PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS
ARMED FORCES
Relationship:
 Direct  Subordination
Advisory Role
Coordination of Policies
Logistical Support
Policies and Guidelines
Sources: Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Decreto Nº 528, April, 26, 1988; Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Decreto
Nº 833, July 5, 1988 and interviews with former members of the commissions, Buenos Aires, June, July
and August 1997.
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In the view of Dr. Aldo Neri, Minister of Health and Social Action (December 1983-
April 1986) and the first president of CONCONAD, during the first CONCONAD drug
trafficking was not evaluated as a internal security problem. It was treated as a social health
problem and the main concern as stated before was the abuse of psychopharmaceutical products
and the diversion of those products towards the black market.1064 Dr. Neri also made it clear
that the issue of the consequences of militarized enforcement policies in Bolivia was not a topic
for open discussion or a priority in his agenda. The possibility of spillover effects caused by an
increase in drug trafficking-related violence did not seem imminent and were not part of his
concern.1065
The Minister also said that most of CONCONAD’s activity was centered in the
“secondary levels” of the commission, which is to say that they were horizontally coordinated
by the executive vice-president and undersecretaries.1066 This is the reason why, even if Dr.
Neri occupied the “highest” position within CONCONAD, the views of officials at the
secondary level will be considered as more relevant to this analysis.
Jaime Malamud Goti, the first executive vice president of the commission from 1985 to
1986 shared the views here. In 1986 Malamud Goti assessed the drug trafficking situation of
Argentina in the following terms:
“We could say that Argentina is in a privileged position due to its geographical location and
probably due to the economic factors which are public knowledge. There are no drug trafficking
organizations strong enough to challenge the government forces. However, I believe that this problem
should be taken seriously since the well being of our neighboring countries depends on the Argentine
cooperation. This problem, one way or another, will also have its effects in our country. I believe that
strictly speaking, our country does not produce drugs. It is a country that does not produce cocaine, and
marijuana production is very small. The marijuana plant is very easy to grow anywhere, but its cultivation
is quite controlled. However, I think that Argentina has a big responsibility because it is an industrialized
country in the Southern Cone. Therefore, it exports substances that are used for various purposes, most of
the legal, but the export of these chemicals also contributes to the production of cocaine.”1067
                                                          
1064Interview with Dr. Aldo Neri, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
1065ibid.
1066ibid.
1067FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, Vol VI, Nº 030, 13 February 1986, B1. Notice that Malamud Goti
recognized the responsibility of Argentina as an exporter of chemical inputs that could be used for the
production of cocaine. The same year the executive power enacted Decree 365/86 , which regulated the
export and import of ten chemical precursors and twenty-five essential chemicals and prohibited the
export of these chemicals through border customs offices. In that sense Argentina was one of the first
Latin American countries to adopt restrictive measures concerning the commercialization of chemical
inputs.
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 During his term in office, Malamud Goti’s view of drug trafficking and drug
consumption problems took a back seat when compared to other problems that required an
urgent solution.1068 As explained by Malamud Goti,
“[f]or  over a year, I engaged in the frustrating task of elaborating policies that most officials thought
were hardly important compared with the economic, health, institutional, and educational catastrophes the
military had left behind. Looking back, they were right.”1069
Events in Bolivia were not particularly addressed in CONCONAD during his term in office as
executive vice-president because drug trafficking was addressed on a global rather than a
country-by-country basis.1070 However his views about Bolivia changed when in mid-July
1988 he visited the country as Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Justice (and member of the
Executive Council of CONCONAD II). It was at that time that he realized the international
dimension of the problem.1071 Malamud Goti visited the Chapare right after the Law Nº1008
had been voted and he believed that armed violence could erupt at any moment “if the peasants
were driven into a corner.” Just as an anecdote, he said that during his trip to the Chapare he felt
so unsafe that he requested a weapon for self-defense purposes.1072 He also noticed a concern
among his Argentine colleagues about the possibility that  either MRTA or Shining Path would
expand from Peru towards Bolivia in defense of the coca-growing peasants.   The fact of having
a guerrilla group operating in a neighboring country alone was also cause for concern.1073
The Jaime Malamud Goti’s successor, Mr. Hector Bertoncello (executive vice president
of CONCONAD from March 1986 to October 1988), noticed the incremental nature of the
seriousness of traffic of cocaine across the Argentine territory.  He also noticed during his term
of office that drug trafficking was not only treated as a public health problem but increasingly as
an internal security problem in the policy agenda.1074 Interestingly enough, he considers the
fact that he was chosen as the successor of Mr. Malamud Goti as an indicator that drug
                                                          
1068According to Malamud Goti, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very busy with Chile and
MERCOSUR [probably referring to the integration with Brazil] and the United States. Defense had the
problem of repositioning the military, Education had to reformulate an inherited ultra-catholic education.
Health was closer [to the drug  problem] but had thousands of different problems. The drug issue was
never authentically really perceived as a real urgency . For example there were almost one million of
alcoholics. Compared to the [at the time] 26,000 potential addicts. Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti,
Buenos Aires, July 29, 1997
1069Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.xi. Dr. Malamud Goti expressed similar views about during an
interview held in Buenos Aires on July 3, 1997.
1070Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti, Buenos Aires, July,29,1997.
1071ibid.
1072Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti, Buenos Aires, August 25,1997.
1073ibid. Why this did not happened and it is not likely to happened has been explained in the previous
chapter however it is important that at some point Argentine officials were concerned about having a
guerrilla group operating in the northern border as a reaction to militarized enforcement.
1074Interview with Mr. Bertoncello, Bahía Blanca,August 19, 1997.
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trafficking was starting to have an internal security dimension. As a matter of fact, before taking
over his position in CONCONAD, Mr. Bertoncello had been (since December 1983) the
Undersecretary of Security for the Province of Buenos Aires. In this position he had had
responsibility over 50,000 men with authority to enforce drug laws.1075
Regarding the consequences of the militarized enforcement in Bolivia, the possibility of an
armed clash between the peasants and the government was a working hypothesis but it was not
a main source of concern. There was the belief that an increase of drug trafficking-related
violence in Bolivia could result in a spillover of cocaine production towards Argentine territory.
However, Mr. Bertoncello believed that this would not pose a threat to Argentina since police
and security forces had good control over the territory.1076 As stated by a government official,
“ [the performance of the security forces] in the fight against drug trafficking turned Argentina into a red
area of danger for drug traffickers and I can affirm that at the moment we do not have a big  mafia as it
happens in other countries. We do have small [criminal] organizations, but the security forces are working
in an optimal way in the entire country.”1077
Dr. Bertoncello did not hesitate to define drug trafficking as an internal security problem
of growing concern. Other members of the permanent staff of both commissions also confirmed
the evolution of drug trafficking in the agenda of CONCONAD (and later CONCONAD II).  In
Dr. José Corsusnsky’s1078 view, drug trafficking began to be viewed as an internal security
problem (and not just as a public health concern) by the time CONCONAD II was created. This
way, drug control policy formulation was specifically divided in two precise areas of drug law
enforcement and drug prevention and treatment.1079 By that time, the influence of
developments in the Andean countries, especially Bolivia (in terms of the rise in cocaine and
not just coca-paste and cocaine base in that country), was of particular concern for the
representatives of the Federal Police and Gendarmerie to the commission.1080  It is important
to remark that in the first big seizure of cocaine in Argentina, 589.98  kilos were seized in a
single police operation, while in 1987 the total seized by police and security forces had been
608.8 kilos. Even more important is the fact that the transportation of the drug had been entirely
planned by members of the Medellín Cartel with a local connection in Argentina. The
                                                          
1075ibid.
1076ibid
1077Statements of  Mr. Bertoncello to the press on March 16, 1987. Quoted in Auredy, op.cit., p. 301.
Original in Spanish.
1078Dr. Corsunsky started as (medical) advisor of the executive vice president in September 1985 and
then was named as coordinator of  policies between CONCONAD  and the provincial drug control
commissions from 1988 on he co-coordinated the general activities of CONCONAD II with Dr. Alberto
Calabrese is the president of the NGO “Fondo de Ayuda Toxicológica” (F.A.T - Toxicological Help
Foundation). Among other activities Dr. Corsunsky was responsible for compiling all the consumption
and law enforcement statistics and communicate them to the international drug control organs (such as
CICAD and UNDFAC).
1079Interview with Dr. José Corsusnsky, Buenos Aires June 28, 1997.
1080ibid
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Colombian traffickers had purchased an estancia (land estate) in the province of Santiago del
Estero to be used as an operational base for landings. The drug was to be transported there by
plane from Santa Cruz de la Sierra (Bolivia), and from there by land to Buenos Aires.  A
shipment concealed in frozen shrimp boxes (the case was known as the Langostino -“shrimp”-
affair), was seized by the Federal Police, with the cooperation of the DEA, and the Colombians
involved in the trafficking operation were arrested.1081
Mr. Alberto Calabrese, Dr. Corsunsky’s colleague and co-coordinator for the activities of
the CONCONAD, stated that the issue of possible consequences for Argentina stemming from
Blast Furnace operation in Bolivia were discussed in the commissions. Also it was believed that
militarized enforcement in Bolivia (especially against the peasants) would cause a displacement
of drug production activities towards “the zone of Salta and Jujuy,” causing a rise in problems
of drug trafficking-related corruption and consumption in these areas. However Dr.  Corsusnsky
did not believe this, nor was this a generalized belief..1082
The views of the representatives of CONCONAD and CONCONAD II from relevant
areas dealing with the security policy of the country and the relations of Argentina with its
neighbors and the rest of the region were analyzed. The representatives include the Ministry of
the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, police and security forces
(Federal Police, Gendarmerie and Coast Guards)1083 and the State Intelligence Secretariat
(SIDE). The beliefs of law enforcement officials will be analyzed at the end of the section
concerning the Menem administration because all the interviewed officials were on active duty
during both administrations.
Mr. Enrique Nosiglia, Minister of the Interior from 1987 to 1989 (and therefore President
of the Commission of Legislation and Control of CONCONAD II), was aware of the fact that
Argentina was gradually becoming a transit route. During his term of office the first big seizures
of cocaine took place. The Ministry of the Interior considered drug trafficking as important as
terrorism in terms of  internal security problems.1084 Mr. Nosiglia stated that the consequences
of militarized enforcement in Bolivia were not a concern in his ministry. However he affirmed
that a hypothetical armed clash between the Bolivian government and the cocaleros should be a
security concern because “a lot” of Bolivian nationals live in Argentine territory and the two
                                                          
1081For a very precise description of the “Langostino” (shrimp) affair as it was came to be know see:
Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante,chapters 4 and 8.
1082Interview with Mr. Alberto Calabrese, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
1083 Even if it has Drug law enforcement powers, Customs (depending from the Ministry of Economy)
has been obviated here because its tasks are concentrated on smuggling investigations. Therefore the
views of customs concerning the spillover consequences (in terms of production, migration for example)
were not considered relevant. As far as it concern drug and chemical seizures I utilized data provided by
the Federal Police’s Central Data Division which centralizes the data provided by all law enforcement
agencies in the country.
1084Interview with Mr. Enrique Nosiglia, Buenos Aires, July 11, 1997.
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countries would have a “hot border.”.1085 Even if he did not link the problem of immigration to
the increase of militarized coca eradication in Bolivia, he stated that the issue of Bolivian
migrants was perceived as a problem for the following reasons:
First, there was an increase in manual labor competing under “unequal” (cheaper)
conditions with the local manual labor force (meaning illegal immigrants). Second, the  massive
inflow of Bolivian migrants became a high added cost in terms of accommodating health and
education public expenditures for these new inhabitants.1086
After the “Langostino” affair (or Estrella de Mar operation, another name given to the
case, in reference to the front fish export company that the traffickers were using), Mr. Nosiglia
was concerned about the possibility of the establishment of the Medellín Cartel in Argentina, in
association with local criminal organizations.1087
Mr. Nosiglia defined drug trafficking as an internal security problem because this activity
is waged by organizations that have an enormous capacity to corrupt political institutions and
because they generate a consumption market by paying “transit” services with drugs that then
remain in the country. However, he denied that the intensity of the threat was high because, he
said, the drug trafficking organizations could not overcome the “fire power” of the Argentine
security forces.1088
The Secretary of the Interior (who was also Vice-President of the Legislation
Commission of, and Control of CONCONAD II from 1988 to 1989), Mr. Larriqueta, defined
his agenda concerning drug trafficking in the following terms (no order of priority is implied in
this list):
1) Health perspective: prevention and fight against addictions.
2) Police perspective: the fight against drug trafficking in its two aspects: supply to local
consumption. and the risk of Argentina becoming a main transit route and a money laundering
center.
And two more reserved issues:
3) U.S. diplomatic pressure; and
4) the offer of significant financial resources from the United States, which created an inter-
bureaucratic competition for a share in the “anti-narcotics” fight. According to Mr. Larriqueta
these factors always were “mixed.”1089
                                                          
1085ibid
1086ibid
1087Interview with Mr. Nosiglia , Buenos Aires, 29 July 1997
1088Interview with Mr. Nosiglia, Buenos Aires, July 11, 1997.
1089Interview with Mr. Larriqueta, July 15,1997.
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Mr. Larriqueta defined drug trafficking as a “low intensity” threat for Argentina when
compared to the extent of the problem in Bolivia, Colombia, or even Brazil. He also mentioned
the fact that from the end of the Alfonsín administration they started to notice increased activity
concerning CHCL production in Bolivia. This was confirmed by the fact that there were
increasing seizures in Salta and by the fact that wealth had significantly increased in cities such
as Santa Cruz in Bolivia.1090
The Vice-Minister of the Interior (1988-1989), Mr. Gil Laavedra, confirmed that drug
trafficking began to be considered a problem that “exceeded the issue of public health” around
1988. The ministry reached this conclusion after reports of the security forces concerning an
increasing movement in the border areas. However drug trafficking was not the top priority of
the ministry. Issues that came before included (in order of importance):
1- Institutional instability (military revolts and terrorist attacks); and
2- Organized crime (in the following order:)
a) Cattle theft,
b) “Highway pirates” (bands that rob cargo trucks on the highways),
c) Organized extortive kidnappings, and
d) Drug trafficking.
The concern about drug trafficking could be paraphrased as, “look at what happened in
other countries,” or “this could eventually happen to us.”  Drug trafficking was considered an
internal security problem but the threat was not believed to be imminent. Developments in
Bolivia in terms of the consequences of militarized enforcement in that country was not “a
current concern” at the time because there were (as mentioned above) “other pending
matters.”1091
Mr. Juan Gauna - representative of the Ministry of Defense to CONCONAD II- stated
that his position was a mere formality because both Gendarmerie and the Coast Guards were (at
the time, and until 1996) dependent on both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the
Interior.1092 Drug trafficking was not an issue on the agenda of the Ministry of Defense.1093
And in reference to the armed forces, the issue was only mentioned in terms of drug prevention
among the members of the three services.1094 Drug trafficking, then, was not considered a
                                                          
1090ibid.
1091Interview  with Dr. Gil Laavedra, August 29, 1997.
1092Interview with Mr. Juan Gauna, at the time Secretary of Defense and as such Member of the
Executive Committee of CONCONAD II, Buenos Aires, July, 1997.
1093ibid.
1094Interview with Mr. Calabrese and Mr. Larriqueta cited above.
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problem of national defense (external security) at the time, and it was treated as a problem of
internal security to be handled by the security forces under the Ministry of the Interior.1095
Later, from 1991 to 1995, Mr. Gauna (UCR) was a member of the Internal Security
Commission of the Lower House. The commission received reports from the Federal Police
affirming that the increasing enforcement in Colombia would cause an spillover effect towards
the south of the region in terms of cocaine production. The main concern in terms of drug
trafficking was a possible increase in consumption as a consequence of increasing transit across
the national territory. Mr. Gauna considered that drug trafficking did not “seriously endanger”
the security of Argentina because he believed that the security forces were prepared to face it.
He also stated that he heard “comments” about the possibility of a movement of coca growing
peasants towards the northwestern border as a consequence of militarized eradication in the
Chapare. But he had no further information on this issue.1096
Even if he did not participate as a representative in CONCONAD, an interview with Mr.
Horacio Jaunarena, Minister of Defense during the Alfonsín administration,1097 provides a
general view on how the drug trafficking problem was placed on the agenda of his agency.
Moreover, the decree creating the Commission of Drug Trafficking and Control of
CONCONAD II states that the commission would coordinate the actions of the security forces
and the armed forces in combating drug trafficking.1098 Mr. Jaunarena stated that drug
trafficking was not an issue at all on the agenda of his ministry because it was considered an
internal security problem.1099 We must reiterate here that authorities did not want any
intervention by the armed forces in internal because of the experience of the past military
regime. Mr. Jaunarena was very clear on that point, stating that the armed forces in Argentina or
anywhere in the world have a doctrine and are equipped for a specific kind of conflict.  This
kind of conflict implies the destruction of an enemy that attempts to advance over the
sovereignty of a country. The security forces, on the other hand, have a doctrine and are trained
to deter a co-national from committing a crime. Using a force to intervene in a problem different
to that for which they were trained, equipped, and indoctrinated will most likely not only not
solve the conflict, but will also provoke “unintended consequences.”1100
                                                          
1095Interview with Mr. Juan Gauna cited above.
1096ibid.
1097The views of Mr. Jaunarena were particularly interesting since he has occupied all the “top” positions
in the Ministry of Defense since the beginning of the Alfonsín Administration. He has been Under-
Secretary of Defense, from December 1983 to December 1984, Secretary of Defense until June 1986 and
Minister of Defense until July 1989.
1098Presidential Decree Nº 833 of July 5, 1988, Annex I, point 1.
1099Interview with Mr. Jaunarena June, 11, 1997
1100ibid
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The consequences of militarized enforcement in Bolivia were not analyzed in Mr.
Jaunarena’s ministry; however, at that time he personally thought that this was a mistake. He
also stated that even though he respects the policy that each country adopts to solve this
problem, he does not personally think that an “absolute repression” of the drug trafficking
phenomenon would be a solution until the socio-economic conditions that lead to the production
of drugs are treated. Mr. Jaunarena also stated that he did not believe that the sovereignty of
Argentina is threatened by drug trafficking, or  that the problem has reached a dimension that
would threaten the survival of the state.1101 At the time of the interview, he considered the
problem a threat to the “individual security” of citizens. However, considering what happened
in other countries in the region and bearing in mind the “corrupting” effect of drug trafficking,
he said that it could became a threat and a state problem (“una cuestión de Estado ”) in the
future.1102 Drug trafficking was not an issue of the Ministry of Defense at the time and this
ministry did not intervene in the formulation of drug control policy during the Alfonsín
administration. In any case, the task of  bringing the military under civilian control was the main
priority of the ministry at that time. The use of the armed forces was only considered in the
event of a need for logistical support for the police and security forces, for example the radar
monitoring of illegal flights by the air force.1103 However, this eventuality never materialized
during the Alfonsín administration.1104
The representatives of the Ministry of Foreign affairs to CONCONAD and CONCONAD
II, as well as the representatives of the police and security forces (above all of the National
Gendarmerie), had clear and well-defined beliefs about the consequences of militarized
enforcement and drug trafficking in Bolivia. This seems natural due to the nature of their job:
the Ministry of Foreign Relations receives information from the Embassy in La Paz, the SIDE is
responsible for foreign and domestic intelligence work and the Gendarmerie has the
responsibility of law enforcement on the border.
After the creation of CONCONAD, there was a joint initiative between this organ and
foreign relations officials for the creation of a specific office in charge of drug trafficking issues
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, a drug unit was created in that ministry
under the supervision of the Under-Secretary of Latin American Affairs.1105
The Minister of Foreign Affairs during President Alfonsín’s administration, Mr. Dante
Caputo (Minister of Foreign Relations and Cult from 1983 to 1989),  was included among the
                                                          
1101ibid
1102ibid
1103ibid
1104Interview with Mr. Gauna cited previously.
1105Interview with Dr. José Corsunsky, cited above. See also Acciones de la Comisión Nacional para el
Control del Narcotráfico y el Abuso de Drogas, CONCONAD, Buenos Aires, December 1985,p.8.
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interviewed officials even if he did not form part of either CONCONAD or CONCONAD II.
The reason for interviewing Mr. Caputo is that, as is clear at this stage of the dissertation, drug
trafficking was not only an issue of increasing regional importance, but also of hemispheric
(because of the relations with the U.S.) and global importance. The preparatory meetings for the
1988 Convention on Illicit Drug Trafficking and the signature of this convention took place
between June 1987 and December 1988, as well as the creation of the Inter American
Commission for Drug Abuse Control of the Organization of American States (CICAD).
As was confirmed by other interviews, drug trafficking was not an issue of concern for
the Minister of Foreign Relations. As stated by the former minister, this was a question to be
managed by the intermediate levels of the ministry. In his personal agenda the topic had an
almost no (nula)  importance.1106 Mr. Caputo remembered that he had participated in meetings
in which he and the rest of the cabinet stated their opposition to the idea of involving the armed
forces in drug-related law enforcement activities. These discussions took place when Mr.
Gelbard was the U.S. ambassador in Bolivia (during the presidency of Víctor Paz Estenssoro)
and were based on the perception that militarized enforcement à la Bolivia in the Southern Cone
was not considered a good idea.1107
According to Mr. Caputo, drug trafficking was not considered important in terms of
Argentina’s international agenda because it was not considered an imminent or urgent issue, and
because “at least at the level of ministers of foreign affairs” there was not an explicit demand by
the U.S. to strengthen policy actions in this area. The topic practically did not exist in his
meetings with U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz.1108 Neither was it a bilateral issue, at
the level of minister of foreign affairs meetings, with Bolivia. As far as he was concerned, the
agenda with Bolivia was reduced to a single topic: natural gas (“it was gas, gas, and gas…”).
We must remember that, faced with the tin crisis, the main export of Bolivia at the time was
natural gas, and Argentina was Bolivia’s main customer.1109
In Mr. Caputo’s view, drug trafficking was an issue of internal security with
“transnational dimensions,” and as such required multilateral mechanisms for the coordination
of policies. He never saw it as a defense issue (external security). However it was not a priority
for him and it was not a topic that was in his mind “when he woke up in the morning and went
to sleep at night.”1110
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1108ibid
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The agenda of priorities of his ministry was defined in the following terms (in order of
priority):1111
1) Avoid any involvement in the east-west conflict regarding the internal politics of
Argentina, as occurred in the 1970s. In the 1970s, the Soviet-Cuban interference on one
side and the `U.S. interference in the other side had amplified the phenomena of internal
political violence and the counterinsurgent campaign to a point that it dominated
Argentine internal politics.
2) The second issue was democratization. Argentina was “encircled” by Chile (a
dictatorship), Bolivia (undergoing an uncertain transition process), Paraguay (another
dictatorship), Brazil (under a military regime until 1985), and Uruguay (which started its
transition in 1985). Argentina was then a “democratic bubble in a place plagued by
dictatorships.”
3) The relationship with the U.S., characterized by a defense of Argentine autonomy,
which had to be conciliated with a good relationship with that country.
4)Economic and political integration with Brazil (the basis for what would later become
MERCOSUR), and the political integration with the Contadora Group and the Río Group,
which at the time had much more international political relevance.
5) The foreign debt, particularly in 1984/85.
6) The solution of the conflict over the Beagle Channel with Chile and the resolution of
the Malvinas question with the United Kingdom.
Faced with these issues, drug trafficking was in a “10 to 1” or “10 to 2” relationship.1112
In that sense drug trafficking was an issue but not a problem because it was not as “big as it is
now [1997].”1113
Following the advice of Mr. Caputo (and also following the organizational chart of
CONCONAD) the author went “down” the decision structure of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. However this move “down” meant a move “up” in terms of the available information
related to the issue of drug trafficking and militarized enforcement in Bolivia. As the former
minister stated, this was definitely a question to be dealt with by the intermediate levels of the
ministry. I then interviewed the following officials:  Ambassador Raúl Alconada Sempé, Under-
Secretary of Latin American Affairs from 1985 to 1989, and the representative of the Ministry
of Foreign Relations to CONCONAD; Ambassador Juan Carlos Olima, Head of the South
American Directorate of the Under-Secretary for Latin American Affairs from May 1986 to
December 1988; and Minister Roberto Palarino, Director of the Drugs Unit of the Ministry of
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Foreign Affairs from 1987 to 1991 (the former had also been interviewed during the research
for this author’s M.A. thesis).
Ambassador Alconada Sempé was very clear on how the events in the early 1980s in
Colombia acted as a warning signal that prompted the Argentine government to take drug
control policy measures and to restructure the drug control decision-making framework. The
loss of territorial control and ungovernability that Colombia had suffered as a consequence of
drug trafficking created a “permanent obsession” of avoiding a similar situation in
Argentina.1114 However such a scenario was viewed as “very far in the future.” Ambassador
Alconada Sempé also had a very active participation in CONCONAD and helped to write the
decree that created the commission.1115
He also confirmed the fact that the prevalent issue in the bilateral agenda with Bolivia
was again “gas, gas and gas, 90% of the time.” However the Ambassador stated that there was a
link between the gas question and the drug question in Bolivia. The gas issue generated a sort of
triangle between the U.S., Argentina, and Bolivia. On one side, the U.S. threatened Bolivia with
economic sanctions and later with de-certification. On the other side, U.S. diplomats requested
that Argentina respect the schedule of gas payments, and even pay higher prices for the gas, in
order to alleviate U.S. economic pressure and to avoid the “total chaos” in Bolivia that would be
generated by the lack of foreign trade income. “While the Americans made a lot of noise about
whether they would give $12 million in aid to Bolivia, we were giving the Bolivians around
$150 million in overpriced gas.”1116 Buying the gas at higher prices and paying punctually was
also a conscious Argentine policy with the very same goal of preventing Bolivia from falling
into socio-economic chaos.1117 The same view was shared by Ambassador Olima also stated
that, in pursing this “gas” policy, the Argentine government prevented the Bolivian economy
from being entirely based on the coca-cocaine industry.1118
Drug trafficking was never considered by the Ministry of Foreign Relations to be a
concrete national security issue. It was considered as an “imminent danger” and as a latent
problem. Ambassador Alconada did not and does not consider it to be an intensive threat;
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1114Interview with Ambassador Alconada Sempé, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
1115ibid
1116ibid.
1117ibid. While the international price of natural gas at the time was $0.22, Argentina it was paying $2.25
per cubic meter. The military government had originall instituted the policy of gas overpayment to
support a “friend authoritarian” regime. The military would pay $4 per cubic meter for gas. Paradoxically,
the Alfonsín administration would ended up adopting the same policy, also paying $4, half in cash and
half in goods, in order to help a newly inaugurated democracy to survive, ibid.
1118Interview with Ambassador Olima, Buenos Aires, August 28,1997.
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however, as stated before, events in neighboring countries made the Argentine government
wary—or, in his own words “flash  a yellow light.”1119
Alconada’s office never analyzed the possibility of a civil war in Bolivia as a
consequence of militarized enforcement. He did, however, consider a possible expansion of the
Shining Path towards Bolivia. In that sense, Alconanda analyzed the possibility of a
“Peruanization” of Bolivia. Ambassador Alconada believed that such a scenario would create a
“hot border” situation in the northwest of the country. The increasing violence in Bolivia (along
with its lack of development) was viewed as the possible cause of an increasing migratory mass
towards Argentina.1120 This would generate a huge cost to the Argentine government (already
facing an economic crisis) in terms of the necessity of building housing, health, and educational
infrastructure for the newcomers.1121  Translated into the terms used in this dissertation, this
can be interpreted as a latent “economic threat.”
Ambassador Olima stated that “peaks” of violence caused in Bolivia by militarized
enforcement caused concern because of the possibility of having  a conflictive border with
Bolivia. When asked about the possible consequences of a complete militarization of
enforcement in the Chapare, he responded that this would create a “Vietnam style” scenario.
Similar beliefs concerning the situation in Bolivia were expressed by Minister Roberto
Palarino (Director of the Drugs Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1987-1991).
Minister Palarino stated that, during the episodes of violence preceding the enactment of Law
Nº 1008 and the aftermath of its passage in Bolivia (1987-1988), his office believed that the
increase in violence could develop into either a civil war or the rise of a local guerrilla group,
which could cause an overlap of activities of armed groups across the border and a massive
outflow of refugees towards Argentina. This was considered a latent national security problem.
However, drug trafficking was not treated at the level of his ministry as a national security
problem but as an international issue (above all, because of the relationship with the U.S.), as a
serious public health problem, and as a police problem.1122
Minister Palarino also expressed that, at the time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
certain that the adoption of enforcement strategies in Bolivia would cause a spillover of drug
production (at the process stage) from producer countries to other countries, including
Argentina. This belief was based on the fact that the supply control operations for heroin and
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1120Ibid.
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1122Interview with Minister Roberto Palarino, Argentine Embassy, Washington D.C., January 27, 1995
and interview in Buenos Aires June 30, 1997.
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marihuana in the 1970s had provoked a spillover of plantations and laboratories to other
areas.1123
For Dr. Facundo Suarez, who was Secretary of Intelligence of the State (head of the
SIDE) from 1984 to December 1989 (and as such, member of the Executive Committee of
CONCONAD II), collecting intelligence about drug trafficking was not the main priority of his
agency. All intelligence efforts were concentrated on the preservation of constitutional order
and avoiding military uprisings. At the time, Dr. Suarez considered it a “moral committment” to
include drug trafficking as an issue on his agenda.1124
Dr. Suarez does not consider (during his office term and in 1997) drug trafficking as a
serious internal security problem; however, he believes that it will eventually become a serious
threat.1125 He dismissed the importance of the consequences that militarized enforcement in
Bolivia could have for Argentina, but warned of the danger of the increasing economic decay of
the northwestern provinces.  In his view, this could create an increase in drug production in
bordering areas. Following the example of neighboring Bolivia, the unemployed could turn to
the “shadow” side of the economy.
c)  Development of Cognitive Maps 1983-1989
This section will focus on the development of the cognitive maps corresponding to the
officials responsible for drug control policy, internal security, and defense from 1983 to 1989.
These are cognitive maps about the beliefs of government officials concerning the consequences
of militarized enforcement in Bolivia for the security of Argentina.1126 To a lesser extent, they
also represent their beliefs about militarized enforcement and spillover of drug trafficking
activities at the regional level.
This dissertation elaborates cognitive maps corresponding to different groups of people,
rather than concentrating on the cognitive map of each official. In that sense it deviates from the
cognitive map method, which is designed for the analysis of the causal assertions of individuals,
not groups.1127 However, the cognitive maps developed here are based on the Argentine
                                                          
1123Palarino, Roberto, Tráfico Ilícito Internacional de Drogas: Régimen de Control, Situación regional y
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p. 47.
1124Interview with Dr. Suarez, Buenos Aires, August, 1997.
1125ibid.
1126This is why I am not developing cognitive maps concerning the beliefs of officials during the military
dictatorship. In fact as explained before, the escalation of militarized enforcement in Bolivia started in
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administration.
1127 As stated by Robert Axelrod, “ A cognitive map is a specific way of representing a person’s
assertions about some limited domain, such as a policy problem. It is designed to capture the structure of
the person’s causal assertions and to generalize the consequences that follow from this structure.,” The
Analysis of Cognitive Maps, p.55 on this issue also see: Smith, Steve, Belief Systems and the Study of
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officials’ causal assertions analyzed above; that is, they summarize the individual beliefs of
several people.
As shown in the previous sections of this chapter—and according to the evidence
gathered for this thesis—neither President Alfonsín nor the Minister of Health,1128 the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense had anything to say about the consequences of
militarized enforcement in Bolivia for the security of Argentina. We have seen that drug
trafficking was not among President Alfonsín’s main policy priorities, and that he had delegated
all matters concerning drug control policies to CONCONAD I and II, and especially to the
executive authorities of these two commissions. This was also the case for the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Dante Caputo, who stated that drug trafficking issues were not among his
priorities, and that policies concerning drug control were treated at the “intermediate” levels of
his ministry.  Whereas the president of CONCONAD I was in charge of politically orienting the
commission, policy-making was horizontally coordinated between the executive vice-president
of the commission and officials at the second level of other agencies (that is, secretaries and
sub-secretaries). The Minster of Defense clearly stated that drug trafficking control was not the
responsibility of his ministry and therefore was not part of his policy agenda.
This following section delineates the cognitive maps of the two groups of officials.
The first group is composed of officials with “executive roles” concerning the
development and implementation of drug control policies; these include the executive vice-
president, general coordinator, and permanent staff of CONATON, CONCONAD I and II, and
the “second level” officials of the agencies that formed part of  CONATON, CONCONAD I
and II  (secretaries and subsecretaries), except for the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign
Relations, the police and security forces and the State Intelligence Secretariat.
 A second group is formed by officials from the foreign service and the intelligence
service who were part of the inter-agency drug control commissions. The reason they are
analyzed as a separate group is that, as explained before, they had more clear and well-defined
beliefs about the consequences of militarized enforcement in Bolivia.
The cognitive maps of the police and security officials will be analyzed in a separate
section at the end of this chapter. The reason is that all the interviewed officials were in active
duty during the whole historical period analyzed here (1983-1995). During that period they
were not only in charge of drug law enforcement, but also formed part of the government’s drug
control policy-making structure as technical advisors.
                                                                                                                                                                         
International Relations, in Little, Richard and Smith, Steven, Belief Systems in International Relations,
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988, p.19.
1128And president of CONATON and CONCONAD I from 1983 to 1986.
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c.1. Cognitive maps of civilian officials with “ executive roles”  1983-1989:
We have seen that some officials of the Alfonsín administration believed that the increase
in enforcement actions against drug trafficking would provoke a spillover of cocaine production
and money laundering activities to Argentine territory. For example, Doctor Cagliotti,
Executive Director of CONATON, foresaw in 1984 what would, years  later (during the Menem
administration), come to be known by some Argentine officials as the “south effect.” That is,
the increasing enforcement actions against the Medellín cartel in Colombia would cause a
spillover of activities towards the Southern Cone, including Argentina. Other officials such as
Mr. Bertoncello (Executive Director of CONCONAD II, 1986-1988) and Mr. Nosiglia
(Minister of the Interior, 1987-1989) expressed that they were concerned about the possible
establishment of transnational drug trafficking organizations in Argentina as a result of
militarized enforcement in Bolivia (Colombia was also mentioned by Mr. Nosiglia) however,
both discarded that this could become a national security problem because these organizations
could not overcome the firepower of the police and security forces which, in their view, exerted
a strong control of the national territory. A similar statement was made by the former Secretary
of Defense (1986-1989).
The cognitive map of this group of officials on this particular issue is represented as
follows:
A: increase of  militarized enforcement in Bolivia (and Colombia).
B: drug trafficking-related violence in Bolivia.
C: spillover of cocaine  production activities towards Argentina.
D: security of  Argentina.
                      +                   • B
                                                 +
A•                                                             0
                          +               • C             • D
The cognitive map above indicates that a spillover of cocaine production to Argentina
was not believed to be a threat to the territorial centrality in terms of governmental control over
the territory. However, as stated in the previous section, one of the members of CONCONAD I
and II (Dr. Calabrese) remembered during the interviews that, even though this was not a
generalized belief in the commission, some of its members believed that it could cause a shift of
cocaine production to the provinces of Salta and Jujuy which could lead to an increase in drug
consumption and drug trafficking-related corruption in that area of the country. For the purposes
of this dissertation an increase of  drug consumption and the existence of widespread cases of
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drug trafficking-related political corruption are defined as societal and political threats,
respectively. Now if we consider that most of the officials interviewed considered corruption
and a rise in drug consumption to be the two most important threats stemming from drug
trafficking, it is possible to consider  that although an expansion of cocaine production to
Argentina would not threaten the territorial centrality of the state, it would cause political threats
stemming from drug trafficking-related corruption and it would cause societal threats stemming
form a rise in cocaine consumption.
These causal assertions be then represented in the following way:
A: increase of militarized enforcement in Bolivia;
B: spillover of  cocaine production towards the northwestern border of Argentina;
C: drug trafficking-related political corruption areas bordering Bolivia;
D: cocaine consumption in areas that share a border with Bolivia;
E: security of Argentina .
                                                        +                    C •            _
                 +                  B
A•                               •                                                             • E
                                                        +                        D •          _
It is interesting to keep in mind that whereas a spillover of cocaine production towards
Argentine territory was not believed to threaten the territorial centrality of the state, the
possibility of the overlap of drug trafficking-related violence was considered a potential security
problem, at least at the level of the Minister of the Interior (Mr. Nosiglia, who also was member
of the Executive Committee of CONCONAD II and head of the Sub-Commission of Control
and Legislation). This is due to the fact that a large number of Bolivian citizens live in
Argentina.
c.2. Foreign Affairs officials:
We have seen before in this chapter that the mid levels of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
had more concrete beliefs about the security consequences for Argentina stemming from an
increase of militarized enforcement in Bolivia.
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On one hand, some officials (such as Minister Palarino, for example) stated that they
believed an increase in militarized enforcement in Bolivia could develop into a civil war with a
local guerrilla group. They also believed that the violence generated by militarized enforcement
(above all in eradication activities) would provoke a massive outflow of refugees to Argentina.
These problems were considered to be latent national security problems. Other officials (such as
Ambassador Alconada Sempé) believed that an increase in drug trafficking-related violence
(above all as a consequence of forceful eradication) could have provoked an expansion of
Shining Path operations from Peru to Bolivia. Interestingly enough, Ambassador Alconada
Sempé also believed that a massive migration from Bolivia to Argentina would represent an
enormous economic burden for a state that was already suffering from an economic crisis. A
refugee could, in the end, be considered a “forced migrant.” From this point of view, militarized
enforcement would cause (according to these officials) two kinds of security problems. The first
stems from the overlap of drug trafficking-related violence (guerrilla groups). The second stems
from an overflow of refugees, which would create a serious burden for the Argentine state and
therefore has been defined here as an economic threat.
A: increase of militarized enforcement (forceful eradication).
B: reactive violence from the peasants.
C: flow of refugees and migrants across the borders.
D: formation of guerrilla groups or expansion of  Shining Path to Peru.
E: overlapping activities of armed groups across the border.
F: economic burden for the Argentine government.
G: security problems for Argentina.
                            +
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d ) It takes two to tango: President Menem’s first term of office 1989-1995
d.1. A brief but important note on Menem’s foreign policy:
This dissertation analyzes the beliefs of relevant governmental officials on drug
trafficking as a security problem and the consequences of militarized enforcement in producer
countries. It is important to point out that in the Menem administration there is a factor that was
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absent during President Alfonsín’s government, namely: a policy of alignment with
Hemispheric and global policies of the United States.
The Menem administration broke with a cycle of “mutual distrust and mutual hostility
alternating with relatively brief periods of rapprochement and collaboration” between the two
countries.1129 Traditionally Argentina has always followed a policy of confrontation with U.S.
goals in Latin America. For example: Argentina refused and boycotted the U.S.-sponsored Pan-
American project at the beginning of the century, maintained its neutrality during the two World
Wars, and boycotted the Rio Conference (1941), destined to form a Pan-American front against
the Axis. In the 1950s, Argentina developed its own nuclear power facilities as well as the
capacity to build nuclear weapons and did not ratify neither the Tlatelolco Treaty nor the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Argentina also participated actively in the Non-Aligned Movement and as
“la cérise sur le gateau” attempted to recover the Malvinas Islands from the UK (a NATO
member and a historical ally of the U.S.) by force in 1982. During the democratic transition, the
Alfonsín administration condemned U.S. policy in Central America and the Argentine Air
Force, together with Egypt and Iraq, developed a long-range missile (the Condor II). The
Menem administration was aligned with the U.S. in all the issues that were important to the
foreign policy agenda of the United States: world environmental pollution, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, the Cuban embargo, Pan American open trade and drug
trafficking issues. As explained by two analysts,
“[t]he Menem government continued to follow the same lines of policy towards the United States which
had been laid down in 1989 i.e., an unambiguous realignment with that major power and leader of the
Western Hemisphere. This represents a significant change from the foreign policy of its Radical
predecessors. The later administrations, despite having progressively lowered their level of
‘methodological dissent’ from the Reagan administration, placed special emphasis on allowing room for
differences [...]. In contrast, the Peronist administration prizes its relations with the United States,
emphasizing the elimination of each and possible area of conflict on their joint policy agenda as well as
increasing cooperation with the U.S. government on various global issues, such as drug-trafficking or
problems of the environment.” 1130
Since 1989, and in the period under study, Argentina re-established diplomatic relations
with the United Kingdom, deactivated its ballistic missile program CONDOR II, ratified both
the Tlatelolco and NPT treaties, signed agreements of confidence-building measures with Brazil
on nuclear non-proliferation issues, signed the Mendoza treaty banning the manufacture and
utilization of chemical weapons, sent warships to enforce the UN-imposed blockade against Iraq
in 1990, and still contributes actively in many peacekeeping operations around the world. The
                                                          
1129See, Vacs, A delicate balance: confrontation and collaboration between Argentina and the United
States in the 1980s, p. 23 and see also: Escudé Carlos, “La política exterior de Menem y su sustento
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1130Russell Roberto and Zuvanic, Laura, Argentina: Deepening Alignment with the West, Journal of
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rational behind this policy is to recognize the position of the U.S. as the hegemonic power in the
western hemisphere, as well as the situation of Argentina as a peripheral, non-powerful
state.1131 The goal would be to avoid, at all costs, sanctions by powerful states and to improve
the “wealth and development” of the Argentine people by following a pragmatic policy oriented
to the defense of the immediate material issues for Argentina, such as commercial issues.1132
As stated by Carlos Menem,
“My concept of foreign policy is simple and clear: our jog is to see that Argentina has a foreign policy
that puts national interest, meaning the welfare of all Argentines first. Above all this calls for realism
because we know that only economic growth and a higher standard of living will assure our presence on
the world’s stage. The idea is to create an appropriate climate for free trade and capital movement and to
actively pursue direct investments that stimulate growth in the world economy and provide benefits for
national economies[...]In pursuit of these goals, we have been, and will continue to be, present in any
forum where the problems affecting our country, whether political, economic or finance-related, are
discussed, without assuming any obligations we are not prepared to fulfill. We will not cede our right to
demand what is our due and what is just. In this context we assign great importance to our relations with
the United States.”1133
This alignment with the U.S. has led to a double standard in discourse and policy, in terms of
national and international drug trafficking control policies. On one hand, Argentine officials
accepted the war on drugs crusade rhetoric and supported the idea of using the armed forces in
enforcement operations against drug trafficking . As an example, the Argentine government
donated three counterinsurgency IA-58 “Pucará” planes to Colombia in the aftermath of the
assassination of  Roberto Galán in 1989. They were to be utilized in counterdrug operations by
the Colombian Air Force. In addition, Vice-President Eduardo Duhalde supported and
suggested that Organization of American States multilateral police and military forces could
assist Colombia in its total war against drug traffickers in 1989. Vice-President Duhalde also
offered to send Argentine troops to Colombia.1134 At the time, President Barco prudently and
kindly refused any foreign intervention in Colombia.1135 President Menem discreetly
moderated Vice-President Duhalde’s militaristic rhetoric, and there was no support for the
involvement of the military in  drug trafficking control efforts either at home or abroad. This has
stated been several times (and often humorously) by President Menem:
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“President Menem confirmed today that the Armed Forces in Argentina are not in a position to
participate directly in drug enforcement. Menem told Radio Rock and Pop [name of station in English] :
‘In Argentina, the Armed Forces are not in a position to become involved in drug enforcement. This is
something for the security forces: the National Border Police, the Argentine Coast Guard, the federal
police and the provincial police. The president noted: I don’t see why the Army or the Armed Forces have
to become involved in this issue. They have other duties, except for situations that are very difficult to
control, which I do not believe will be the case in our country [...]Asked what would happened if the
United States recommends the Armed Forces’ involvement in drug enforcement, Menem answered: ‘It
would be merely be a recommendation’. Menem emphasized: ‘I would ask if, in the United States, the
Army or the Armed Forces are involved in drug enforcement, bearing in mind that, at this moment, it is
the largest consumer.”1136
On the other hand, in international fora such as the UN General Assembly or the
Interamerican Commission for Drug Abuse Control of the OAS, it is maintained that the
international community should enhance economic support to create the conditions for the
development of alternative crops in the producer countries.1137 The Argentine government has
always supported a balanced approach between drug law enforcement and demand reduction.
“I also mentioned above the possibility of cooperation with U.S. law enforcement organizations in order
to encourage, extend, and perfect controls on the chemical agents used in drug production, money
laundering, and simultaneous police operations in several countries, among other activities. But
prevention is undoubtedly the key to wining the drug war. Capturing and prosecuting the guilty is an
uphill struggle. [...] Thus, while recognizing the importance of law enforcement in the war on drugs, our
position is to create awareness that prevention through education is the best way to contain this apparently
unstoppable tide.”1138
Despite the “drug crusader” rhetoric of some officials, as far as  Bolivia was concerned,
the Menem administration maintained a coherent position that resembled the policy of the
previous administration.
First, Argentina never sent any troops or police forces to Bolivia in to participate in
enforcement activities against drug trafficking. (Some police officers were sent as observers,
however.) In 1989, a treaty with Bolivia was signed in order to enhance cooperation in drug
trafficking control matters through coordinated police operations in each country (without the
participation of these forces on foreign territory). The treaty also emphasizes the need for
alternative development in Bolivia. Second, the “gas policy” that had begun under the previous
administration continued under Menem, who resumed regular and punctual payments of
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Bolivian gas even if the conditions were inconvenient for Argentina.1139 In spite of the
discovery of new natural gas reserves, Argentina renewed purchase agreements in 1989.1140
Argentina stopped purchasing of gas when, in 1992, Bolivia signed an agreement for the
construction of a gas pipeline for Brazil.1141 This indirectly maintained the social and economic
stability of Bolivia, relieving the country of another political burden. Finally, the Argentine
government shared a multilateral initiative to strengthen subregional cooperation (with Bolivia
in this case) against drug trafficking through non-military means. In 1994, two transit states
(Argentina and Chile) and two producer countries (Peru and Bolivia) signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) to execute
subregional cooperation programs. Argentina has been particularly active within the framework
of this MOU in training law enforcement officials.1142 This policy seems coherent with the
foreign policy goals stated above. If the national interest has been defined in terms of the
“welfare of all Argentines first” it would be against the national interest to support a policy that
would worsen the spillover of production, shifting drug trafficking routes towards Argentina
with all the consequences explained before in this chapter. In the drug trafficking issue there is a
limit to the alignment with the U.S. on the drug trafficking issue which is marked by Argentine
law (National Defense Act and Internal Security Act) and by the national interest.
d .2 Changes in the drug control policy decision structures:
The  policy of alignment has, to a certain extent, influenced some of the drug control
decision structures adopted during the Menem administration. One of President Menem’s first
acts of government was to create (in November 1989) the Secretariat for Programming and
Coordination of Drug Addiction Prevention and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking
(SEDRONAR).1143 In April 1991, SEDRONAR was reorganized along lines that were very
similar to the original plan, and its name was changed to Secretariat for Programming for Drug
Addiction Prevention and Fight against Drug Trafficking.1144  SEDRONAR’s organizational
chart is displayed below. SEDRONAR was an attempt to recreate the U.S. Office of National
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Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), or the “drug czar's” office, a U.S. government office that
depends directly on the president and is led by a director. The ONDCP produces a yearly
publication entitled “National Drug Control Strategy” and coordinates all drug control efforts in
the United States. The office was created in 1988 by the Anti-Narcotics Act of that same
year.1145
The goals of SEDRONAR are:1146
(i) Elaborating policies and planning strategies and actions for the fight against the illicit use
and trafficking of drugs, narcotics and psychotropic substances, coordinating the application of
these policies and strategies with other government areas at the national, provincial and
municipal levels, and elaborating the “National Plan against the Use of Drugs and Illicit Drugs
Trafficking.”
(ii) Intervening in the elaboration of law projects, in the promotion of technical and social
studies, and in the training of specialized human resources; also giving technical assistance to
other powers of the state.
(iii) Implementing international treaties related to the goals of SEDRONAR and representing
the national government in meetings and decisions of specialized international organs also
centralizing specific documentation and technical information.
More than a mere reflection of its American counterpart, SEDRONAR completed a cycle
of centralization of the drug control decision structures that had been initiated by the Alfonsín
administration. The fact that drug control policy formulation was placed under the responsibility
of an autonomous secretariat under the President of the Nation also shows the evolution of the
importance of the problem. From the model of multi-agency commissions under the Ministry of
Health (CONATON and CONCONAD), the national drug control decision structure has
evolved into a multi-agency commission under the President of the Nation where drug law
enforcement was considered by a sub-commission under the auspices of the Ministry of the
                                                                                                                                                                         
1144Presidential Decree Nº 649/91 Aprobación de la Estructura Organizativa de la Secretaría de
Programación para la Prevencióin de la Drogadicción y la Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico de la Presidencia
de la Nación, Buenos Aires, April 12, 1991.
1145See Cardoso and Heguilein, op. cit., p.478; and Corigliano, op.cit., p. 12. On information about
ONDCP see Mendel, William W. and Munger, Murl D., Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat, A joint
Study Initiative by the National Interagency Counterdrug Institute, The Strategic Studies Institute U.S.
Army War College and The Foreign Military Studies Office Fort Leavenworth Kansas, August 1997, p.
24.
One main difference between SEDRONAR and ONDCP is that the Argentine agency does not develop
requests  and executes a “National Drug Control Budget” as its American counterpart. That is
SEDRONAR can request its own budget for its own programs and staff but does ont control the budget of
other Federal Agencies applying the drug control policies elaborated by SEDRONAR. Interview with Dr.
Javier Ortiz, at the time member of the staff of the National Direction of Coordination for the Control of
Illicit Drug Trafficking, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
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Interior, and treatment and prevention fell under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health
(CONCONAD II). As a matter of fact, when CONCONAD was transformed into CONCONAD
II, there was an attempt by some officials to put all the national drug control policy formulation
under the Ministry of the Interior. The reasons for this attempt were operative. Other officials
resisted this decision because they thought it would “eclipse” the public health dimension of the
problem.1147 The concentration of all the aspects concerning drug control policy formulation in
a single agency was also persistently requested by the security forces, who preferred to working
with a single interlocutor when it came to receiving drug control policy guidelines.1148 With
the creation of SEDRONAR, then, all aspects of drug control policy formulation are
concentrated in a single government agency. SEDRONAR does not execute drug law
enforcement policies. The Secretary formulates policies that are received by the Ministry of the
Interior (for the Federal Police, Gendarmerie and Coast Guards), the Ministry of Defense (for
the armed forces’ logistical support to the police and security forces), and the Ministry of
Economy (for customs officials).  The drug law enforcement policies are applied by the police
and security forces.
SEDRONAR also promotes the coordination of counter-drug operations through a Joint
Strategy Commission, which brings together representatives of the security forces, (federal and
provincial), the police forces, and the armed forces.  The commission meets every two weeks (in
practice meetings are more sporadic) and is coordinated by the National Director of
Coordination of Control of Illicit drug Trafficking. Among the reasons cited in the Decree of
Approval of the Structure of SEDRONAR were:
• The serious increase in the availability of dangerous drugs, which in turn is generating a
growing demand that makes the penetration of drug trafficking organizations easier.
• The growth of drug dependence, which involves the risk of a rise in common crimes
linked to drug trafficking,  as well as a rise in administrative corruption and the danger
of  “narcoterrorist” actions.
The reasons for the creation of SEDRONAR are thus clearly stated in internal security
terms. The decree also establishes that SEDRONAR is an agency linked to the security and the
defense of the nation. The Internal Security Law also indirectly defines drug trafficking as a
security problem in its article 11, which establishes the head of SEDRONAR as a permanent
member of the Council of Internal Security.  The latter is an organ presided over by the Minister
                                                                                                                                                                         
1146Decree Nº 649/91.
1147Interview with a former member of the permanent staff of CONCONAD and CONCONAD II. The
official considered this comment as “quasi-confidential” for that reason his name will not be quoted.
1148Interview with Comandante General Jorge Vazquez quoted before.
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of the Interior with the goal of planning all the policies concerning the internal security of the
country.
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Flowchart  3. Drug Control Decision Structure 1989-1995
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Relationship:
 Direct  Subordination
Advisory Role
Coordination of Policies
Logistical Support
Policies and Guidelines
Source: PRESIDENCIA DE LA NACIÓN ARGENTINA, SECRETARÍA PARA LA PREVENCIÓN
DE LA DROGADICCIÓN Y LA LUCHA CONTRA EL NARCOTRÁFICO, Disposiciones Legales de
la República Argentina Relacionadas con el Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas y su Consumo, Subsecretaría de
Planeamiento, Control y Legislación, Buenos Aires, 1994, xvii- 240 p.
In the creation of SEDRONAR presented a two-sided coin. On one side was a certain
emulation of the U.S. drug policy system. On the other side was the incremental nature of the
problem and the need to operationalize drug control policy formulation. This was a local
concern as expressed by the interviewed officials. However there were clear examples of  “pure
and simple” emulation. One example of this was the attempt by the first head of SEDRONAR,
Mr. Alberto Lestelle, to create a Federal Service Against the Illicit Drug Traffic, modeled after
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The service, called SEFECONAR (Servicio
Federal Contra el Narcotráfico),  would incorporate former law enforcement and military
personnel in drug law enforcement related intelligence. SEFECONAR was created in 1991 by
secret presidential decree Nº 791/91 and responded directly to SEDRONAR.1149 In a sense it
was a s a “bad copy” of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA carries
out investigations at the national and international levels. Its members carry out drug-related
intelligence and have law enforcement powers. The DEA functions under the Ministry of
Justice and carries out the policy guidelines established by ONDCP; it is not, however, under
the direction of ONDCP. SEFECONAR was put under the direction of SEDRONAR rather than
the Ministry of the Interior, which is in charge of law enforcement and also in charge (through
the Federal Police and security forces) of enforcing drug laws. SEFECONAR was competing
with the already established intelligence services of the Federal Police, the National
Gendarmerie, the Coast Guard, the Provincial Police drug services, and the SIDE (also under
the Presidency of the Nation).  Moreover, it was performing a task that SEDRONAR was not
entitled to do:  intelligence collection.
SEFECONAR was in fact a corps of a hundred agents and was never authorized by the
Congress to carry out drug law enforcement activities (the original idea of Mr. Lestelle).
Instead, its role was limited to drug-related intelligence collection.1150 By creating
SEFECONAR, Mr. Lestelle not only “mis-imported” the U.S. model but he also imported the
                                                          
1149See: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp.303- 304.
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sometimes unproductive rivalry between government agencies that play a part in drug-related
intelligence and drug law enforcement efforts. Inter-bureaucratic competition can be beneficial
in the sense that it can enhance outcomes as a result of the search of “institutional prestige.” But
it can also be counterproductive when there is a fierce fight for budget resources, overlapping
jurisdictions, or when (as with the case of the CIA and the DEA) two agencies with different
organizational goals are assigned overlapping responsibilities. This kind of competition leads an
agency to “put a stick in the wheel” of a rival agency in order to discredit their work.1151 As
explained by a group of analysts,
“ ‘Turf wars’ are another pattern of bureaucratic politics that leads agencies to protect or expand
their missions and their budgets. Among drug agencies, turf battles are given a particular character
by the drug strategy itself. They reflect the way the strategy fragments the war on supply and users
into multiple missions, assigned to dozens of agencies with separate interests and diverse
operational approaches. More importantly, the flaws in the drug strategy ensure that the drug-
budget “pie” will never be large enough and that dozens of agencies will find themselves with ill
conceived and overlapping missions. Bureaucratic competition for drug war turf can be intense:
agencies point fingers, question allocations to other agencies, and even refuse to cooperate. Each is
maneuvering not only for a bigger piece of the drug budget pie but also for turf control or even a
lead role among other agencies with similar missions.”1152
This “destructive” inter-agency rivalry allegedly marked the end of SEFECONAR in
1992, under very scandalous and, at this writing, mysterious circumstances. In November 1992
a Paraguayan/Argentine citizen, Mario Noguera Vega, declared to a Brazilian judge in Rio de
Janeiro that he had been engaged by SEDRONAR to carry out “dirty jobs.” Allegedly Noguera
Vega had been hired by a member of the staff of SEDRONAR in order travel to Rio de Janeiro,
kidnap and kill an Argentine drug trafficker called Francisco Difiori. He also accused Mr.
Lestelle and members of his organization of being involved in drug trafficking activities. As
reported,
                                                                                                                                                                         
1150See: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p. 307, and interview with Dr. José Luis Manzano,
Minister of the Interior from 1991 to 1992, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
1151This topic exceeds the limits of this dissertation and will not be analyzed in depth here.  For further
information, see: Bertram, Eva; Blachman, Morris; Sharpe Kenneth; and Andreas, Peter, Drug War
Politics, The Price of Denial, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1996, specially
Part II, Chapter 6;  Youngers Coletta, La DEA en Latinoamérica: Más Allá de los Límites de la
Legalidad, Enlace. Política y Derechos Humanos en las Américas, Vol.7, Nº 2, July 1997, pp. 1,4,5,6 and
7 and Youngers, Coletta and Zirnite, Peter, El peor enemigo de sí mismo:La guerra antidrogas de
Washington en América Latina, in Jelsma, Martin and Roncken, Theo (eds.), Democracias Bajo Fuego.
Drogas y  Poder en América Latina, Transnational Institute, Ediciones de Brecha, Acción Andina,
Montevideo, 1998,pp.209-274.For a historical perspective and specific cases see:  Block, Alan, Failures at
Home and Abroad: Studies in the Implementation of U.S. Drug Policy in  McCoy, Alfred, War on Drugs:
Studies in the failure of US narcotics policy, Westview Press, 1992, pp. 39-68; and Smyth, Frank,
Conflicto de Intereses: La CIA en la guerra antidrogas, in Jelsma and Roncken (eds.),op.cit., pp.275-288.
For a detailed study of inter bureaucratic drug law enforcement competition  in Argentina see: Pasquini
and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, Chapter 9.
1152 Betram, Blachman, Sharpe and Andreas, Drug War Politics, p.130.
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“Radical legislators Juan Pablo Baylac, Gastón Ortiz Maldonado and Luis Losada, arrived in
Brazil a day after two interior Ministry and Drug Prevention Secretariat (which is led by Lestelle)
officials also traveled to Brazil. Noguera Vega accused Lestelle of hiring him to kill or abduct
Argentine citizen Sergio di Fiori [sic], an alleged drug trafficker who reportedly is linked to
Argentine government officials. Lestelle denies the charges and claims that Noguera Vega is ‘a
dangerous international criminal’.”1153
When this information was leaked to the Argentine press, a huge scandal exploded and
Mr. Lestelle was put under congressional and judicial investigation. None of Noguera Vega’s
accusations were ever proven to be true, and  then-President Menem and his Vice-President,
Eduardo Duhalde, vehemently defended Mr. Lestelle.1154 Mr. Noguera Vega (who had a
notorious criminal record, was a prison convict, and had participated in para-police death squads
during the military dictatorship) vanished in Rio as mysteriously as he had appeared, and could
not be interrogated further by the Brazilian federal justice. Mr. Lestelle remained in his position
and was finally acquitted of all charges on June 22, 1995 by a federal judge.1155 This episode
did, however, put an end to SEFECONAR, which was dismantled in late 1992.1156 In fact, the
Noguera Vega affair took place at a time in the context of fierce competition between
SEDRONAR and SIDE, whose members perceived that SEFECONAR was invading their area
of responsibility as the national agency in charge of intelligence and counter-intelligence
(including drug related intelligence). The possibility that the Noguera Vera affair was part of a
“turf war” between intelligence services cannot be discarded.1157
Even if all the aspects concerning drug control policy formulation during the Menem
administration were centralized in SEDRONAR, the views of officials from other relevant
government offices--such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs--will be analyzed. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible under
law Nº 24059 for the internal security of the country.1158 As a matter of fact, from July 1994 to
                                                          
1153Trafficker Claims Knowledge of Israeli Embassy Blast, FBIS-LAT-92-229, November 27,1992, p.18.
1154Mr. Lestelle finally resigned in October 1995 when he denounced that several members of Congress
consumed cocaine in the toilets of the National Congress. This time he could not prove his accusations.
Facing a new scandal, President Menem retired his support for Mr. Lestelle, who had no other option than
to leave office.
1155Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p. 313.
1156Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante,p. 314.
1157Mr. Lestelle claimed that the Noguera Vega affair was the result of the capture and indictment of a
SIDE counter-intelligence agent and two of his informants, which had been caught with 17 kilos of
cocaine. The Coast Guards, via intelligence provided by SEDRONAR staff, had arrested the agents. Also
law enforcement officials privately admitted the hypothesis of this affair being part of an inter-
bureaucratic fight. See: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p. 313.
1158Law Nº 24,059, article Nº 8 and also Decree Nº 132, Ministries’ Law, January 9, 1984, art.17 and
Decree Nº 438/92 reforming Nº 132, Ministry’s Law, Article 16. -secretariat’ reporting directly to
himself. This project, widely held to have been the brainchild of his economy minister, Domingo Cavallo,
was recently put back burner after running into heavy opposition from within Menem’s own cabinet. On
July 19, Menem issued a decree creating the Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección a la Comunidad, whose
head will, in cases of emergency, have command of the federal police, the Prefectura Naval and the
Gendarmería about 60,000 men in all. This effectively removes the former from the jurisdiction of the
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December 1996, internal security responsibilities were transferred to a newly created Secretariat
of Security and Protection of the Community (SSPC), directly under the President of the Nation
(Presidential Decree Nº 1193/1994, of July 19, 1994). The creation of SSPC was a coup de
theatre decided in the aftermath of the bombing attack that destroyed the AMIA building,
killing 86 people on July 18 1994. As reported,
“The bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita (AMIA) has provided President Carlos Menem
with the excuse to go ahead with one of his pet projects: a security ‘super-secretariat’ reporting
directly to himself. This project, widely held to have been the brainchild of his economy minister,
Domingo Cavallo, was recently put back on the burner after running into heavy opposition from
within Menem’s own cabinet. On July 19, Menem issued a decree creating the Secretaría de
Seguridad y Protección a la Comunidad, whose head will, in cases of emergency, have command
of the federal police, the Prefectura Naval and the Gendarmería - about 60,000 men in all. This
effectively removes the former from the jurisdiction of the interior ministry and the latter from that
of the defense ministry, placing a formidable force under the President.”1159
This Secretariat was short lived, mainly due to organizational resistance to change by the
Ministry of the Interior, as well as the police and security forces.  Further, the fact that the
AMIA affair has not been completely clarified marked the end of the SSPC, which in December
1996 (by Presidential Decree 1419/196 of December 12, 1996) was transformed into the
Secretariat for Internal Security (SSI, a supportive organ to the Council of Internal Security
under the Ministry of the Interior and basically the equivalent of the Sub-secretariat of internal
security originally created by Law Nº 24059).1160
The Ministry of Defense could, under Law Nº 24059, provide logistical support
(through the armed forces) to law enforcement agencies. To that end, in May 1991, the Ministry
of Defense created a Unit for Coordination and Operative Programming for the Fight against
Drug Trafficking, placed under the Ministry’s Under Secretary of Technical Planning.1161 The
role of the Ministry of Defense in the drug control decision structure is particularly conflictive
because some of the decisions by the Menem administration could place the armed forces on the
edge of illegality. The Defense Act of 1988 specifically forbids the participation of the military
                                                                                                                                                                         
interior ministry and the latter from that of the defense ministry, placing a formidable force under the
President,” Latin American Weekly Report, 4 August 1996, p 346. This Secretariat was short lived
mainly due to organizational resistance to change by the Ministry of the Interior and the police and
security plus the fact that the AMIA affair has not been completely clarified marked the end of the SSPC
which in December 1996 (Presidential Decree 1419/196 of  December 12, 1996) was transformed into the
Secretariat for Internal Security (SSI, a supportive organ to the Council of Internal Security under the
Minister of the Interior and basically the equivalent of the Sub-secretariat of Internal security originally
created by law Nº 24,059). For an analysis of the causes of the “death”  of the SSPC see, Salinas Juan,
AMIA, El Atentado. Quiénes son los autores y por qué no están presos, Buenos Aires, Planeta Espejo de
la Argentina, Chapter 16.
1159Latin American Weekly Report, 4 August 1996, p 346
1160For an analysis of the causes of the “death”  of the SSPC see, Salinas Juan, AMIA, El Atentado.
Quiénes son los autores y por qué no están presos, Buenos Aires, Planeta Espejo de la Argentina, Chapter
16.
1161 “Apoyo Militar para la lucha contra la droga,” La Nación Edición Internacional, May 6, 1991, p.1.
and “Nuevo Impulso a la lucha contra el narcotráfico,” La Prensa, May 3, 1991.
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in domestic intelligence activities. However, in May 1991 for example, the Under-Secretary of
Technical Planning of the Ministry of Defense announced that the army and the air force would
carry out activities in support of the security forces.  Activities included satellite and air
photographic coverage in order to localize airstrips, illegal plantations, and laboratories as well
as interception of radial communications. The information collected would be submitted to the
security forces.1162 These activities basically imply “collecting information and putting it
together to see what it means,”1163 which is technically intelligence, a task that the armed
forces are forbidden by law to carry out within the Argentine territory. It is true that the Internal
Security Act in its article 31 allows the President of the Nation to use the armed forces in order
to reestablish internal security. But it does so only in exceptional cases in which the internal
security system would not be sufficient for the purposes established in the law, and only after
the “siege state” has been declared (Internal Security Law, art. 32).1164 It is also true that the
security forces do not have the sophisticated means required for activities such as satellite and
air intelligence collection. As far as the interception of radio communications is concerned, this
author hopes that the National Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard have the appropriate means to
do so.1165 Allowing the armed forces to intercept the communications of citizens would open
the door for the military to carry out exactly what the legislators wanted to prevent: their
involvement in police activities. In this author’s view, the current Argentine legislation has a
“lacuna” in terms of exactly defining which kind of domestic intelligence should be forbidden
to the armed forces. There is also an implicit contradiction between forbidding the participation
of the military in domestic intelligence activities and articles 31 and 32 of the Internal Security
Act mentioned above. In this author’s view, in order to avoid breaking the law, either these
                                                          
1162Similar statements were made several times by Ministers of Defense and the President during the
Menem administration. Most of the time, they either confused logistical support tasks with intelligence
tasks. However, at least officially, these kind of drug law enforcement military intelligence collection or
logistical support to the Security Forces has been never implemented, at least in the period under study.
“‘We respect the political authorities, and we will follow their instructions,’ said Gendarmerie officials.
They admitted that ‘officially, the logistical support of the Armed Forces has not yet been implemented’.
No Directives Yet These sources refrained from expressing an opinion on whether it is appropriate for the
Armed Forces to participate directly in enforcement activities against drug trafficking. They stressed that
‘institutionally , the issue has not been addressed and we have not received directives from the Interior
Ministry or from the Defense Ministry’,” Role of the Military in Drug Fight Discussed, FBIS-LAT97-
046.
1163Treverton, Gregory F., Intelligence, in Joseph, William; Khaler, Miles; Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges;
Stallings, Barbara and Weir, Margaret , (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 428.
1164As a matter of fact in the midst of the “Yomagate” and the Catamarca crises, President Menem
ordered the air force to carry out intelligence activities.  At that time the country was not under a “state of
siege,” so the order given to the air force was not legal.
1165And as a matter of fact they do have the means since successful drug law enforcement operations of
the National Gendarmerie, like “Operación Tambor” in 1991, were possible thanks to the interception of
the telecommunications of  Bolivian drug traffickers by the gendarmerie. Interview with Comandante
Mayor Jorge Vazquez, Bahía Blanca, August 1997.
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lacuna and contradictions should be resolved through a modification of the law or the security
forces should be provided with aerial and satellite reconnaissance material.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs represents Argentina in matters dealing with the drug
trafficking problematique at the bilateral and multilateral levels, and keeps SEDRONAR
informed about the evolution of this issue at the a bilateral and multilateral levels.1166
d.3. The President of the Nation:
 President Menem adopted an approach different from that of his predecessor concerning
the issue of drug trafficking. First of all, he continuously mentioned it during his presidential
campaign and also included this problem as foreign policy issue.1167 As stated by Menem,
“Our economic program, conversations with Great Britain on the subject of the Malvinas Islands,
the provision of spare parts and arms, the foreign debt, the scourge of drugs and drug trafficking,
our donation of three Pucará planes to Colombian government [for counter-drug operations], and
the Central American crisis were the main topics in my dialogue with my North American
counterpart [President Menem is referring to its first interview with President Georges Bush on
September 27, 1989].”1168
At the level of the presidency, the issue was given greater importance than in the
preceding administration. This was in part because the problem had become more serious in
terms of consumption and trafficking and drug trafficking-related corruption, and in part
because of the policy of alignment with the U.S. adopted by the Menem administration.
However it is also true that, as shown in previous sections, in terms of consumption, transit and
drug trafficking-related corruption, the problem had worsened considerably by the end of the
1980s, when President Menem took over (July 1989). In the statement below it is possible to
identify a clear assessment of the drug situation in Argentina and also the will to “walk
alongside of the U.S.” in the “war on drugs” effort. As stated by President Menem,
“We can be thankful that Argentina does not have the kind of drug problems the United States
does, and that is why, ever since I became president , my intention has been to lend all the aid I
can to our North American brother suffering from this affliction. This resolve has been uppermost
                                                          
1166Since 1989 Argentina has Drug Sections in diplomatic representations in Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay,
Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Argentina also has a Special Drugs Section in the United States which is in
charge of bilateral matters and multilateral matters (OAS and UN- New York, there is also a Drug Section
in Vienna for issues dealing with UNDCP and  the Commission of Narcotics Drugs of ECOSOC). All
these sections are in charge of members of the permanent diplomatic service. See: Circular Telegráfica de
la Dirección de América del Sur (MRE), Actualización situación internacional argentina en materia de
tráfico de drogas,” 18 June 1991.
1167Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.290. These two authors argue that the drug trafficking
(including the request of death penalty for drug traffickers) was included by Menem as an issue during the
campaign in order to dismiss accusations from the opposition and independent journalists about his
possible links with drug traffickers.  See Pasquini and De Miguel, pp.214-230 and p. 290.
1168Menem, Carlos, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem, Buenos Aires, Ed. Ceyne, 1990,
p.21.
396
among my priorities from the minute I took office [...] The increased consumption of illegal drugs
like marijuana, cocaine, L.S.D., etc. in Argentina has been accompanied by the growing abuse of
over-the-counter tranquilizers, sleep inducing drugs, pain killers, antiallergenic and anti-
depressants.[...] And this is not all. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome cannot be omitted
from the total picture, since the much-feared AIDS is intimately related to drug abuse because the
most potent illegal drugs are administered intravenously which increases the risk of contracting the
disease .The consequence s of this are well known. In addition to the destabilizing effect of drug
abuse (sic) on political institutions and the economy, the list includes: deterioration of mental and
physical health, mal-functioning of the psychomotor system, disturbances in the growing-up
process, poor performance in school, anti-social behavior [...] all this within the context of the
deep socio-economic crisis that Argentina has been suffering for so long.”1169
Curiously, at the beginning of his administration, President Menem indirectly defined not
drug trafficking but drug consumption (which as seen was in part a result of the increasing
traffic through Argentina)  as a national defense problem because it decreases the “fighting”
capability of the society in order to provide defense against enemies at home and abroad.  None
of the other officials expressed this type of concern. This problem assessment resembles the
argument used by the Venezuelan armed forces in the late 1970s in order to define drug
trafficking as a threat to national security. The difference is that the while the event of a war
with Colombia was a likely scenario for Venezuela, the event of a war with a neighboring
country or the UK (because of the Malvinas dispute) was, as signaled earlier, only a very remote
possibility. As far as enemies at home are concerned, paradoxically at that historical moment,
the only conceivable internal enemy was an ultra-nationalist and Catholic fundamentalist group
of the armed forces themselves. The movement was literally crushed in a bloody coup attempt
in December 1990.  His expressions on those concerns are a political gaffe in  that he is not
making a distinction between national defense and internal security. In that sense he is violating
a kind of taboo among the Argentine political class. But they are useful in that they show that
the president considers drug trafficking to be a national security problem. As argued by
President Menem,
“Considered from a global point of view, the drug problem is a product of a regional structural
crisis, affecting different countries in different ways, depending on whether they are producers,
consumers or transshipment points. From this perspective, drugs are a problem that also involves
national defense, because a country with a drug problem is less able to defend itself against
enemies at home and abroad that undermine established order founded on human values, thus
weakening a society’s capacity to defend against them.”1170
President Menem also referred to drug trafficking as a,
                                                          
1169Menem, Carlos, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem, p.127.
1170ibid, p.137.
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“flaw that threatens with becoming in an element capable of affecting regional security and of
compromising the stability of our democratic institutions.”1171
On May 1, 1991--in the aftermath of the federal intervention of the province of
Catamarca, and in the midst the money laundering scandal involving his private secretary -and
sister-in-law- and members of his administration already mentioned in this chapter--Menem
referred to corruption and drug trafficking in his annual message to the National Congress as
“seditious acts” that “go against the democratic order.”1172 In his statements, however,
President Menem considers the threat posed by drug trafficking relatively low compared to the
situation of other countries in the region. As reported,
“Asked if the Armed Forces would become in drug enforcement in case of  a drug-trafficking
scenario resembling those prevalent in Bolivia or Colombia, Menem pointed out: ‘There is a huge
difference between what unfortunately is happening in Colombia, Venezuela, or Bolivia and what
is happening in Argentina.’ ”1173
No primary or secondary evidence that would elucidate President Menem’s beliefs
concerning the consequences of militarized enforcement in Bolivia has been found. However it
is important to note that he was aware of the spillover effect caused by enforcement in producer
countries and he believed that it would have consequences for Argentina. As argued by Menem,
“The primary concern of the United States [referring to a previous  meeting between the head of
SEDRONAR and Melvyn Levitsky (head of the International Narcotics Matters office of the U.S.
Department of State)] was that coca growing and processing going on in Bolivia might move to
Northwestern Argentina as a result of drug war successes in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. As has
already been described, following my meeting with George Bush in late September 1989, Foreign
Minister Domingo Cavallo, Ambassador Guido Di Tella, Ambassador Francisco Pulit, and my
spokesman, Mr. Humberto Toledo and I had a friendly dialogue with Mr. William Bennett,
director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP] at the time. During this meeting I
brought up my concern that the drug cartel (sic) might move their operations south, specifically to
Argentina.”1174
Referring to Bolivia, and most probably bearing in mind the statements above, President
Menem emphasized economic development strategies over enforcement as a means of
controlling the problem.  As reported,
                                                          
1171Speech of President Menem at the Third Meeting of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and
Concerted Political Action (Group of  Eight), Celebrated at Ica, Peru, quoted in La Nación, Buenos Aires,
October 12, 1989, p. 4.
1172Al Inaugurar el 109° período legislativo. Ratificó Menem la lucha contra la corrupción y el
narcotráfico, La Prensa, Buenos Aires, May 2, 1991, p.2.
1173Argentina: Menem Opposes Armed Forces Involvement in Drug Enforcement,FBIS-TDD-96-0150L,
April 12, 1996.
1174 Menem, Carlos, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem, p.136.
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“Argentine President Carlos Menem today stated that his country is being used for the transit of
drugs coming from Bolivia, and asked  the United States to implement a sort of  ‘Marshall Plan’ to
aid in the struggle against drug trafficking. Menem said this during his one-day visit to the town of
Tarija (in southern Bolivia) after meeting with Bolivian President Jaime Paz Zamora.[...] ‘The
United States must understand that drug trafficking will be not eliminated unless support is granted
to the Andean nations that are involved in cocaine production’- Menem stated.”1175
“President Menem has been an outspoken supporter of drug enforcement and demand reduction
programs at the International Conference of Mayors Against drugs (Buenos Aires, 1992) President
Menem condemned drug trafficking, called for a “Marshal Plan” for crop substitution in countries
such as Bolivia, and pushed for the death penalty for serious crimes committed by drug
traffickers.”1176
d.4. The Vice-President (1989-1991):
 President Menem personally assigned his first Vice-President,  [and Governor of the
Province of  Buenos Aires from 1991 to 1999] Eduardo Duhalde,1177 responsible for dealing
with the planning of the drug control policy of the country. As stated by President Menem,
“ I delegated part of the responsibility to two men in whom I have the utmost confidence and who
are ideally suited for the job: Argentine Vice-President Eduardo Duhalde and former Congressman
and present Secretary of State with ministerial Status, Eugenio Alberto Lestelle.”1178
In doing so President Menem probably emulated former U.S. president Ronald Reagan,
who had delegated the coordination of  the South Florida Task Force to Vice-President George
Bush, however there is no evidence that would confirm this “inspiration.”1179 As a matter of
fact former Vice-President Duhalde had experience in drug control policy at the local level. As
Mayor of the Greater Buenos Aires district of Lomas de Zamora (1984-1989), he had conceived
a “community based” demand reduction program known as the “Lomas Model.”1180 As Vice-
President, his main role in the drug control policy was to be a sort of Argentine “ambassador” in
bilateral and multilateral meetings related to this topic.  All other aspects of drug control policy
                                                          
1175Paz, Argentina’s Menem on Regional Issues, Drugs, FBIS-LAT-90-074, April 17,1990.
1176Drug Enforcement Administration, Southern Cone Situation Report, Drug Intelligence Report,
Washington D.C., November 1994, p. 3.
1177I am referring here to a particular person Eduardo Duhalde and not to a decisory role. Therefore the
position of the Vice-President will be considered only until 1991 when Mr. Duhalde abandoned the vice-
presidency in order to run for Governor of the Province of  Buenos Aires.
1178Carlos Menem, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem, p.358.
1179 “This program became a prototype for the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program,
a center piece of the domestic drug strategy. Thirteen such task forces were set up by 1984, each bringing
multiple federal agencies into the drug war effort in different regions of the country, including assistant
U.S. attorneys and agents from the DEA, Customs the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Coast Guard, and the U.S. Marshals Service,”  Bertram,
Blachman, Sharpe and Andreas, Drug War Politics, p. 112 Vice-President Duhalde was ont given these
kind of responsibilities.
 1180See: Duhalde, Eduardo, Politicians and Drugs. Towards a National Program, Buenos Aires,
Honorable Senado de la Nación, 1989, p.10.
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formulation were concentrated in SEDRONAR, whose creation he strongly supported.1181 As
argued by Menem,
“It was clear to the three of us [President Menem, Vice-President Duhalde and Mr. Eugenio
Alberto Lestelle] that the areas of drug prevention and law enforcement must be concentrated in a
single agency answering directly to the President; otherwise, each area would tend to provide
partial solutions according to its area of expertise, and a balanced policy would be
impossible.”1182
Mr. Duhalde can be considered the rhetorical anti-drug “warrior” of the Menem
administration. On several occasions, he suggested the use of the Argentine Armed Forces
within and outside the national territory.1183 However, this seems to be more part of the double
standard pro-U.S. rhetoric described above than a clear policy pattern. As a matter of fact, in
several statements made by former Vice-President Duhalde, it is possible to see that he was
fully aware of the spillover consequences of a further militarization of enforcement in
neighboring countries. In this sense he believed in the “south spillover effect,” specifically to
Argentina, caused by harsher enforcement measures in Colombia.1184 In June 1990 Vice-
President Duhalde warned that “there is a need to be alert” because of a possible “displacement
of drug trafficking activities to Venezuela or Argentina.” Such an outcome would be possible,
he argued, due to the “systematic attack against drug trafficking in Bolivia and Colombia.”1185
There is clearly a causal link between increasing enforcement against the industry and spillover
(corrimiento) towards neighboring countries, specifically Venezuela or Argentina.
Paradoxically as aware as he was, Mr. Duhalde was still in favor of utilizing the wrong
medicine for this problem:  further militarization. Mr. Duhalde in a sense expressed the
rhetorical paradox in which the Menem administration is entangled: it is nearly impossible to
defend a specific Argentine security interest without bothering the U.S.
                                                          
1181 Echague, El Otro, p.127.
1182Menem, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem, p.128.
1183See “Duhalde se entrevistó con el embajador Todman. La Argentina está dispuesta a enviar tropas a
Colombia,” La Nación, Buenos Aires  1989, p.;  “Reunión en la fragata “Sarmiento”. Habrá intervención
militar en la represión del narcotráfico,” La Prensa, Buenos Aires,1990, p.4.; “Según el Vicepresidente
Duhalde. Los militares harán tareas de inteligencia contra el narcotráfico,” Clarín, Buenos Aires, April
10, 1991, p. 6.
As President Menem, governor Duhalde was suspected of having close collaborators that allegedly had
links with drug trafficking activities. It is very likely, then, that his vehement position against drug
traffickers responded in part to the need to dismiss these accusations (which in fact have been never
proven). See Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante p.220; Echague, Hernán , El Otro. Una biografía
política de Eduardo Duhalde, Buenos Aires, Planeta Bolsillo, 1997, chapter 8, and Cerruti, Gabriela, El
Jefe. Vida y Obra de Carlos Saúl Menem, Planeta Espejo de la Argentina, Buenos Aires, Planeta, p. 369.
1184See Duhalde Eduardo, El Pensamiento de Duhalde. Los Políticos y las Drogas. Hacia un Programa
Nacional, Taller 4 Editorial, Buenos Aires, 1989, p. 83; Advertencia del Vicepresidente Duhalde, La
Nación, August 25 1989.
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In a sense this “war on drugs” rhetoric reproduces an old practice of local officials (Vice-
Roys, Governors, General Captains and Mayors) during the times of times of the Spanish
empire: “obedezco pero no cumplo” (I obey but I do not carry out). This practice would repeat
itself, with Argentina voluntarily aligned with U.S. global and hemispheric policies.
d.5. SEDRONAR:
The first Argentine “drug czar,” Dr. Alberto Lestelle (1989-1995), defined drug
trafficking from the very beginning as a threat to Argentina’s institutions, population, and
territorial integrity.  That is, he defined it as a national security problem. When as a
Congressman he became the head of the Drug-Addiction Commission of the House of
Representatives, he warned about the incremental nature of the problem: 1186
“Since some years ago our country has fallen into the category of transit state, and not so long ago
it reached the condition of small consumer. Regrettably in the last three years consumption has
increased at an alarming rate [...] When a country begins to consume a lot of drugs, it comes closer
to the condition of producer country, and when it produces and consumes drugs it becomes
Colombia...”1187
Already as head of SEDRONAR Dr. Lestelle was one of the strongest supporters of the
“South Effect” hypothesis. He believed that the harsh repression in Colombia provoked by the
assassination of  Liberal Leader Luis Carlos Galán and the negotiated surrender of the Medellín
cartel would bring about a displacement of drug production activities towards the south of the
continent including Argentina.  As stated by Lestelle,
“ Argentina runs the risk of becoming, with Ecuador and Venezuela, one of the new centers of
cocaine processing in Latin America. The warning comes from Alberto Lestelle, the government’s
secretary for the prevention of drug trafficking and drug addiction. He believes that Colombia’s
cocaine cartels, as they seek an understanding with the Gaviria government on the strength of his
promise not to extradite them to the U.S., have been trying to establish themselves elsewhere [...]
An attractive target, Argentina, says Lestelle, is a tempting target. Not only it does it share a border
with Bolivia, one of the two largest coca growing areas, but its industry has long been a supplier of
the chemicals used for the first stages of processing, the preparation of coca paste and cocaine
base. ”1188
“After the  disbanding of the Medellín cartel, middle-level members of that organization came to
Peru and Bolivia. This is called the ‘South Effect’. ”  1189
                                                                                                                                                                         
1185 “Polemiza Duhalde acerca del papel de las Fuerzas Armadas en la lucha antidroga,” El Cronista
Comercial, Buenos Aires, June 6, 1990.
1186Dr. Lestelle was one of the creators of the this Congressional commission in 1987. Interview with Dr.
Lestelle, Buenos Aires, July 10, 1997.
1187Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Reunión 61°, February 22, 1989, p. 7756 (Spanish in the
Original). Debates for the approval of the new narcotics law Nº 23,737.
1188Latin American Weekly Report, April 4, p. 4
1189 Narcotics Official Admits Narcotics Transit, World News Connection, Document JPRS-TDD-95-
004, February 13, 1995. This hypothesis was shared by other officials of SEDRONAR as for example the
National Director of  Planing and Legislation of  SEDRONAR Comisario (PFA)(R) Amilcar Parkinson
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Large-scale cocaine production never took place in Argentina. However there was a
spillover of production towards Brazil and Colombia.  We have also seen that Colombian cartels
have attempted to establish permanent bases in Argentina for the transit of multi-tone shipments
towards Europe. In that sense, Lestelle’s fears about the possibility of Argentina becoming a
center for money laundering activities were justified.
Dr. Lestelle warned that drug trafficking organizations had chosen Argentina as a
potential base of operations. In 1994 Dr. Lestelle made a five year prognosis on the possible
evolution of the problem and warned that if effective “containment” measures were not taken,
“latent threats” would become “overt problems” affecting the “social body of the nation” and
the “institutions of the Republic.”1190 He predicted that drug-trafficking-linked corruption
would grow (as it indeed did), and he also foresaw a worst-case (but not necessarily
unavoidable) scenario characterized by “lack of order, chaos, and aggression” as had occurred
in other Latin American countries.1191
Dr. Lestelle also expressed his concern about a “growing pressure over the Argentine
borders” caused by the expansion of the activities of Colombian “cartels” towards Bolivia. 1192
This phenomenon would be aggravated by the presence of large numbers of Bolivian,
Paraguayan, Peruvian, and Colombian citizens in various parts of the country with no
“documentation, jobs or housing.”1193 Referring to the specific case of Bolivia, Dr. Lestelle
warned about the possibility of an expansion of “Shining Path” activities towards Bolivia or the
growth of a local terrorist group strengthened by the  “drug for weapons exchanges” that take
place in that country.1194
Dr. Lestelle believed that further militarization of forced eradication would only cause an
increase in violence that eventually could provoke an increase in the migratory flow towards
Argentina.  He also stated that every enforcement policy in Bolivia must be balanced with a
policy of alternative development in the coca producing areas, as well as a policy of general
development and education in the rest of the country, in order to break the vicious circle of drug
production.
                                                                                                                                                                         
who was in charge of  the training of Argentine and foreign law enforcement officials. Comisario
Parkinson participated in the negotiations and signature of the MOU between Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Peru and UNDCP, interview realized in Buenos Aires, August, 1997.
1190Lestelle, Alberto, Defendiendo el Futuro,  Buenos Aires, 1994, p.34
1191Lestelle, Defendiendo el Futuro, p. 34.
1192ibid, p. 32.
1193ibid, p. 32.
1194ibid, p.18.
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In the view of the National Director of Coordination for the Control of Illicit Drug
Traffic,1195 Prefecto Principal (R) Nelson José Mandrile, drug trafficking is a latent threat for
Argentina. In his view the country is encircled by “one million kilos of drugs” that is “leaking
through a crack [the border]” that could become bigger and bigger. The possibility of a “drug
flood” is, in his view, immediate both in terms of time and space.1196
Specifically referring to a possible national security problem for Argentina stemming
from the violence provoked by militarized enforcement, Prefecto Mandrile said that he does not
believe that an increase in drug trafficking-related violence could spill over to Argentina or pose
a threat to the country. He affirmed that he believes that in the event of an escalation of violence
or even a civil war in Bolivia there could be a massive migration of Bolivians to Argentina. He
did not, however, define this possible outcome as a security problem.1197
In his personal view, drug trafficking will only become an internal security problem the
moment Argentina has powerful drug trafficking organizations established in its territory. This
seems to be a latent possibility, but he did not consider that it was the case at the moment the
interview was conducted.
Concerning Bolivia, similar beliefs were shared by the National Director of International
Affairs of SEDRONAR since 1992, Dr. Eduardo González.1198 Dr. González dismissed the
importance of drug trafficking-related violence in Bolivia as a national security problem for
Argentina but stated that having a “hot border” would certainly be a matter of concern for this
country.
d.6. : The Ministry of the Interior and the SSPC:
In order to indicate the security dimensions of drug trafficking, Dr. José Luis Manzano,
Minister of the Interior from 1991 to 1992, called drug trafficking an issue that ranks “above
internal security and below defense.”1199 He did not consider drug trafficking to be a “high
intensity threat” because large drug trafficking organizations were not established in the
country, and there was not collusion between drug trafficking organizations and the
                                                          
1195Prefecto Mandrile has been an official of SEDRONAR since the creation of the agency in 1989 and
National Director of Coordination for the Control of Illicit Drug Traffic since 1993. According to the
current legislation his  primary responsibility is to coordinate  the activities of the law enforcement
agencies in charge of drug law enforcement. He also heads the meetings of the Joint Strategy
Commission. Decree Nº 649/91, April, 12, 1991 and  Resolution Nº 5 of  SEDRONAR , October 23,
1989.
1196Interview with Prefecto (R) Mandrile, Buenos Aires, July 15, 1997.
1197ibid.
1198The Director of International Relations was in charge of  the relations of SEDRONAR with its
counterparts in other countries and  with international organizations.
1199Interview with Dr. Manzano, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
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government. He remembered that in cabinet meetings the issue of the growing power and
independence of the Bolivian “families” was mentioned, and that Secretary Lestelle mentioned
the possibility of a spillover of production and traffic to Argentina because of the increasing
enforcement in Bolivia and Colombia. This concern led him to propose build-up of radar
coverage of the northern border (a policy that has not been fully implemented yet) in order to
control and detect incoming illegal flights.  He also agreed on the fact that persistent rates of
structural unemployment could provoke an increase in criminal activities including drug
production in the northwest. The consequences of militarized enforcement against drug
trafficking in Bolivia, and the reactive/preemptive violence generated by it, was not included as
an issue in the agenda of his ministry and he did not receive information in that respect.1200 Dr.
Gustavo Béliz, Minister of the Interior from December 1992 to August 1993, also confirmed the
fact that events in Bolivia in terms of drug trafficking-related violence were not an issue in the
agenda of the Ministry of the Interior.1201As stated by a high-ranking official, events in Bolivia
caused  problems beyond the maintenance of internal security.1202 This lack of attention to the
issue of the consequences of militarization in Bolivia  (probably due the fact that the primary
mission was to keep internal order) was also confirmed by the complete absence of statements
on this issue by the other ministers of the interior during the period under analysis.1203
Officials of the SSPC (which, as shown before, was later put under the direction of the
Ministry of the Interior and renamed the SSI ) were aware of the spillover effect caused by the
enhancement of enforcement in Colombia.  They received news of a “wave” of Colombians
coming to Perú, Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil with the goal of
transplanting their drug-related activities:  opening new centers of production, investment,
trafficking routes, and personal contacts.1204 In that sense the SSPC (later SSI) officials shared
(and confirmed) the “South Effect” hypothesis of SEDRONAR officials.
A high ranking official of the SSPC/SSI confirmed the fact that even if drug trafficking-
related violence in Bolivia was not a major source of concern for his office, the SSPC/ SSI
ordered the adoption of stricter border controls whenever there were lasting episodes of violence
in the Chapare. He stated however that these measures were adopted in accordance with
                                                          
1200ibid.
1201Interview with Dr. Béliz, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
1202Interview with a high ranking official of the SSI (and previously of the SSPC), Buenos Aires, July
1997.
1203Mr. Carlos V. Corach, who is Minister of the Interior since March 1995, referred to the issue of drug
trafficking as especifically related to the problem of lack of control over the three border area between
Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil mentioned before.
1204Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección a la Comunidad, Dirección General de Coordinación e
Inteligencia, Análisis de la Situación del Narcotráfico y Lavado de Dinero en la República Argentina,
Buenos Aires, June 20, 1996, p.3.
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information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Relations. In that sense the SSPC and the
Ministry of the Interior do not (and are not entitled to) monitor events in Bolivia.1205
d.7: The Ministry of Defense:
Let us leave aside for now the debate concerning the participation of the armed forces in
drug law enforcement logistical and intelligence support (which, in the opinion of this author,
have been exaggerated and magnified by the press). This author’s interviews with officials of
the Ministry of Defense of the Menem administration showed  continuity with the position
adopted by their counterparts of the previous administration. Neither was drug trafficking
control considered a responsibility of the Ministry of Defense nor was it considered an issue in
the agenda of the Ministry. If the issue was considered at all, it was only because of the double
dependency of the security forces (operationally from Interior and organically from Defense),
which lasted until 1996.1206 Within the Ministry of Defense, drug trafficking was then
considered a problem of internal security.1207 Moreover, Ambassador Oscar Camilión,
Minister of Defense from  April 1993 to 1996 stated that for police security reasons (avoiding
leaks) National Gendarmerie officials would not provide information of their drug law
enforcement operations to officials of the Ministry of Defense or to “anybody else.”1208 In any
case federal criminal investigations (as is the case for drug cases) are conducted by a federal
judge and law enforcement officials report to the federal judge during the investigation. Also for
law enforcement purposes, the security forces as stated before were subordinated to the Ministry
of the Interior.
Already in 1986, long before becoming Minister of Defense and while the operation Blast
Furnace was taking place in Bolivia, Ambassador Camilión stated that the evolution of the drug
trafficking situation in the neighboring country was important for Argentina from a security
point of view. He also stated that past experience had demonstrated that enforcement in one
country had provoked a spillover to other countries. In the same article, Ambassador Camilión
stated that the possibility that Argentina could become a base for the commercialization and
potential production of illegal drugs as well as a consumption center had to be included among
the political and diplomatic priorities of the country.1209
Ambassador Camilión believed drug trafficking to be a threat of growing intensity. He
did not believe that it could threaten the territorial integrity of Argentina because there is no
                                                          
1205Interview with a high-ranking official of the  SSPC/SSI.
1206Interview with Ambassador Oscar Camilión, Minister of Defense from  1993 to 1996, Buenos Aires,
July, 1997.
1207ibid.
1208ibid.
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drug production within its territory. However, he warned about the risk of corruption of the
state powers due to the fact that the country is increasingly being used for money
laundering.1210 Referring to the possible consequences of militarized enforcement in  Bolivia,
he said that this was neither analyzed (during his term as Minister of Defense) nor was it
analyzed by the Joint Major Staff of the Armed Forces.1211 During the Menem administration
the Argentine Army also did not analyze the potential consequences in an increase of militarized
enforcement in Bolivia.1212
d.8: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
There was a main difference between the Alfonsín administration and the Menem
administration.  Within the former, the issue of drug trafficking was not important at the level of
the minister of foreign affairs (although it was at the middle levels of the ministry).  In the case
of the latter, the minister of foreign affairs considered the issue of drug trafficking as a foreign
policy issue and a potential national security problem.  This should not come as a surprise:  as
shown before, the Menem administration adopted a radically different foreign policy, and of
course there is the question of the alignment with the United States. Also the security
environment of Argentina and world politics itself had changed. By the time Menem became
president, the possibility of a military conflict with Brazil decreased as economic integration
became stronger. In the case of Chile, relations had improved continuously since Pinochet left
power in 1990. Last but not least, a very important factor had also changed:  the Cold War was
over. Fears of becoming “trapped” within the East-West confrontation had disappeared. It is
almost natural that once the traditional security problems started to vanish other potential
security problems would occupy their place in the agenda.
 In August 1990, during the seminar “Las mutaciones de las relaciones internacionales  y
su vinculación con la defensa” (Mutations in International Relations and their link to Defense)
held at the National Defense School, Dr. Domingo Cavallo (Minister of Foreign Affairs from
1989 to 1991) stated that
                                                                                                                                                                         
1209Camilión, Oscar, Drogas y Seguridad en América Latina,  Revista Argentina de Estudios
Estratégicos, Nº7, January 1986, pp.15-20.
1210Ibid.
1211ibid.
1212Interview with Mayor Brown from the General Secretariat of the Major Staff of the Argentine Army,
Buenos Aires, August, 1997.
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“We have to re-think the concept of defense in function of the changes in the international and
regional arena. We must articulate different concept of security for a space and time that are also
different [...] The security and defense agendas had acquired in this historical stage new profiles and
new components. Our country and our region are confronted to risks and problems that up to now
only deserved secondary or null attention and to old ones that persist under diverse ways[...] Threats
of predominantly economic and social nature are acquiring more and more relevance to our security
[...] The drug question compromise the values, institutions and the quality of life of the peoples of our
region. Its implications are equally serious for the producer, consumer and transit countries, because
this is a transnational flaw and no country can consider itself in safety from it....”1213
As in the previous administration, there were middle level diplomats who held concrete
beliefs about the possible consequences of militarized enforcement in Bolivia. The beliefs
prevalent among officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are basically the same as those of
the previous administration: an increase of militarized enforcement in Bolivia will cause an
increase of violence on the part of coca growing peasants as well as a possible spillover towards
Argentina.1214
A cable of the Directorate of  South America of the Minister of Foreign Affairs warned in
1991 that,
“[a]ll action of coca eradication must be complemented by an economic cooperation which would
allow the social impact in these areas in order to avoid violent conflicts, in particular in bordering
countries. The new trend of using the local military forces in this action [eradication] makes
presuppose that these conflicts will become acute in the following years .”1215
 d.9 Law enforcement agencies:
“ Effective drug law enforcement must be 70% intelligence, 20% honesty and 10% of uniformed
personnel. Within the 70% of intelligence personnel you need at least 30% of absolutely honest
people.”1216
“The shorter route is not necessarily the safest route.”1217
Because of their primary responsibility for guarding Argentina’s borders the gendarmes
(members of the National Gendarmerie) were a source of invaluable information as far at it their
beliefs about possible consequences of militarized enforcement in Bolivia were concerned.
Particularly important was my interview with Comandante Mayor Jorge Alberto Vazquez.
Comandante Mayor Vazquez was head of the Dangerous Drugs Division of the National
Gendarmerie from 1983 to 1995; as such he was also the representative of National
Gendarmerie to CONATON, CONCONAD, and CONCONAD II. He participated with a team
                                                          
1213Discurso del  Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto Doctor D. Domingo Cavallo,
Seminario del 13 al 23 de Agosto de 1990, Revista de la Escuela de Defensa Nacional, Buenos Aires, Nº
40, August 1990, pp. 42-44, original in Spanish.
1214 Palarino, op.cit., pp.46 and 47.
1215Circular Telegráfica de Dirección de América del Sur, June 18, 1991.
1216Comisario General (R) Armesto (PFA), interview Buenos Aires, July 1997.
1217Prefecto Principal (R) Mandrile (Coast Guard) interview, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
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of experts in the formulation of drug control policy (for example, in the preparation of decree
365/86 on the control of chemical inputs) and received policy guidelines fixed by SEDRONAR
once this agency was created.1218
Comandante Mayor Vazquez remembered that the “shift” from considering drug
trafficking as a problem related to public health to a problem that affected national security
started by the end of the Alfonsín administration (“the final stage of CONCONAD”).1219
Referring to the case of Bolivia he stated that in the mid-1980’s and especially during
Operation Blast Furnace (1986), he believed that the increase in militarized enforcement in
Bolivia would provoke a shift of coca-paste “factories” (fábricas)1220 towards Argentina. This
belief was based on the fact that Argentina produced all the necessary chemical products for the
processing of coca leaves.1221 An article co-published by Comandante Mayor Vazquez in 1988
about the consequences of operation “Blast Furnace over the Argentine border, warned about
the fact that on September 27 the National Gendarmerie detected a  fábrica in Argentine
territory. The presence of this fábrica in Argentine territory was, according to the article, a
consequence of the interdiction operatives in the Bolivian department of Santa Cruz.1222
Time however proved that this phenomenon did not happen. Instead, cases of “kitchens”
or small laboratories for processing coca-paste and cocaine base into cocaine were discovered in
the northwest provinces, and Buenos Aires.1223
Regarding the consequences of the militarization of coca eradication in the Chapare,
Comandante Mayor Vazquez stated that peasant reactive violence was not a major source of
concern.  However he also said thought that further militarization of eradication campaigns
would have a consequence for Argentina in terms of an increase in Bolivian immigration that
could further worsen the already high rates of structural unemployment in the country.
My interview with Comisario General (R) Antonio Raúl Armesto from the Federal Police
was also very insightful and important. Comisario General Armesto has been a high-ranking
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1219Ibid.
1220This is the term used by the National Gendarmerie to refer to coca-paste maceration pits.  For a
definition  this term see: Presidencia de la Nación, SEDRONAR, Manual de Instrucción Contra el
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Principal Bioquímico, Ricardo Rodolfo López,  “Influencia de la Operación ‘Blast Furnace’ sobre la
frontera argentina,” Revista de la Escuela Superior de Gendarmería Nacional, January-June, 1988, p. 127.
1221This hypothesis was discarded by other interviewed law enforcement official, Retired Prefecto
Principal Mandrile, who stated that for the traffickers is easier to smuggle chemical inputs  to the Beni
that bring “a lot of kilos of coca leaf” to Argentina. Interview with Prefecto Principal Mandrile, Buenos
Aires, July, 1997.
1222Lopez and Vazquez, op. cit. ,p.136.
1223Interview with Comandante Mayor Vazquez, Bahía Blanca, August 1997.
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officer of the Dangerous Drugs Superintendence of the PFA from 1983 to 1991, when he retired
from the force. He has been representative of the PFA to CONATON, CONCONAD, and
CONCONAD II and member of a team of experts of CONCONAD. Comisario Mayor Armesto
was very critical and skeptical about the effectiveness of military enforcement operations such
as “Blast Furnace”. He also considered that further militarization of interdiction and eradication
in Bolivia would certainly produce (as in the past) resistance from the peasants and a “hot
border” in the northwest of Argentina.1224 He stated that it would be more useful to
concentrate efforts in police operations against the traffickers based on a previous, meticulous,
police intelligence effort. A procedure that could be more useful than sending airborne troops in
search and destroy operations against laboratories, he said, would be for example the utilization
of beepers in the barrels containing chemical inputs in order to trace them and localize the
laboratories.1225 On the expansion of Shining Path towards Bolivia, Comisario General
Armesto said that they would not follow a foreign guerrilla group on the basis that Bolivians are
very nationalist and that “they would have the same fate as Che Guevara.”1226
e)  Development of cognitive maps II (1989-1995)
As shown in the previous section, there was a clear consensus among authorities during
the Menem administration  on the “South Effect.”. That is, all the officials related to drug
trafficking control policies shared a strong belief about the fact that the increase of enforcement
activities in cocaine producer countries would provoke a spillover effect towards the south that
would eventually affect Argentina. This seems natural given that this south effect was taking
place precisely at that moment. It has been shown in previous chapters that due to increasing
militarized enforcement in Colombia, the independence and power of Bolivian organizations
had grown and also Colombian drug trafficking organizations had moved their operations to
Bolivia (particularly the Medellín Cartel). Also drug trafficking through Argentine territory was
rapidly growing and from 1988 on the Argentine law enforcement agencies were detecting the
use of Argentine territory by transnational criminal organizations for the coordination of their
cocaine operations towards (mainly) Europe and the United States.
There was, then, a shared consensus on the causal assertion that “increase of militarized
enforcement leads to spillover of drug trafficking activities.” There are two groups of officials
that had clear beliefs about two particular issues: first, the consequences of militarized
eradication in Bolivia in terms of the rise of drug trafficking-related violence; and second, the
consequences of a rise of militarized enforcement in Bolivia for the security of Argentina.
                                                          
1224Interview with Comisario General Armesto, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
1225ibid.
1226ibid.
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On the first issue the group with the clearest views is again the officials of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, with responsibility for international drug trafficking control issues.1227 As has
also been shown in the previous section, foreign relations officials also believed than an
increase in militarized enforcement would lead to spillover of cocaine refining to other countries
including Argentina. This can be represented as follows:
+
A•                                                                 • B
                                             +
                                                                     •C
Where,
A is an increase in militarized enforcement in Bolivia,
B is violent conflict and,
C is a spillover of  cocaine refinement activities.
Now, what would be the consequences of  “B” and “C” for the security of Argentina?
This is a question that is answered by the officials of SEDRONAR, specifically by Mr. Lestelle,
the highest ranking authority within this agency. The path of causal assertions by Mr. Lestelle is
particularly interesting.  He believed that an increase of law enforcement actions against drug
trafficking organizations in neighboring countries would cause a spillover of cocaine production
in Argentina.  As stated above in this same chapter, this “installation” of the cartels in Argentina
would cause serious threats to the “social body” and to the institutions of the republic as well as
corruption in every level.  If this happened, the country might find itself in a situation of
“disorder, chaos, and aggression.” These kinds of beliefs were also shared by Prefecto Principal
Mandrile who said that drug trafficking would only became an overt threat to Argentina if
powerful drug trafficking organizations became established in its territory.
                                                          
1227Just as an anecdote:  of all the diplomatic cables from the Argentine Embassy in Bolivia to the
Direction of South American Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Relations), the ones referring to episodes of
violence between the coca growing peasants and UMOPAR in the Chapare were sent with a “VERY
URGENT” (MUY URGENTE) priority. And copies of them were also sent to SEDRONAR. This most
surely means that this issue required an urgent analysis. See for example: Cable de Embajada de Bolivia,
010564/97-Nuevos incidentes en el Chapare, may  9, 1997; Cable de Embajada de Bolivia,  010498/97-
Tres muertos en enfrentamientos en el Chapare, April 21, 1997; Cable de Embajada de Bolivia, 010250,
Narcotráfico: incidentes en el Chapare, February 27, 1997; Cable de Embajada de Bolivia, 010501/97-
Situación en el Chapare, April 22, 1997, Cable de Embajada de Bolivia, 011839/96, Erradicación de
cocales;  November 13, 1996.
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Starting with the “C” of the previous cognitive map, the causal assertions of the
SEDRONAR officials would be represented in the following way:
+ •D
+
C•  F •        +   +                    +
+  G •   •I
        +  +
   +
E • • H       +
+
Where,
C: installation of cartels in Argentina (cocaine production activities)
D: level of threats to the social body and the institutions of the Republic
E: corruption
F:disorder
G:chaos
H:aggression
I: possibility of declaring drug trafficking a national security problem.
Both Lestelle and Mandrile asserted that an increase in militarized eradication in Bolivia
might cause an increase in the migratory flow from Bolivia to Argentina. In the case of
Mandrile an increase in the migratory flow from Bolivia would not represent, in and of itself, a
security problem for Argentina. However in the specific case of Mr. Lestelle, we have seen that
he considered that the potential of a spillover of drug trafficking activities to Argentina
(including production) would be aggravated by the presence of Bolivians, Paraguayans,
Peruvians, and Colombians “without documentation, job or permanent address.” It would be
possible to infer, then, that in Lestelle’s view, an increase of a migratory inflow from Bolivia
would increase the possibility of the installation of the operations of  transnational criminal
organizations in Argentina.1228
A: increase of militarized eradication in Bolivia
B: immigration from Bolivia
                                                          
1228I am taking here the liberty of articulating causal assertions obtained from two different sources: a
book written by Lestelle, and an interview I conducted in Buenos Aires (both cited in the previous
section). During interviews I realized in February 1995, during the research for my M.A. thesis, two
411
C: potential for spillover of drug trafficking activities towards Argentina
D: security of Argentina
                                               •B
                     +                                            0
A•                                        C •                                        • D
                                                                   +
f) The cognitive maps of law enforcement and (civilian) intelligence officials (1983-1995)
In terms of the spillover consequences of militarized enforcement in Bolivia, my
interview with Comandante Mayor Jorge Vazquez was particularly interesting. This stems from
the fact that the primary role the force he commanded (the National Gendarmerie) is to guard
national borders; therefore, he had better information about developments in the Bolivian-
Argentine border area. In the period 1983-1989, his major concern was the possibility of the
establishment of fábricas de cocaína in border areas with Bolivia.  This spillover would have
been provoked by militarized interdiction operations such as “Blast Furnace.” However,
Vazquez did not believe that this would have challenged the territorial centrality and the
political stability of Argentina because the Argentine law enforcement system is strong enough
to detect and avoid the establishment of illicit drug production facilities in Argentina. Also the
fact that there are several provincial and federal police and security forces instead of a single
national police, in the view of Comandante Mayor Vazquez, makes it more difficult for drug
traffickers to carry out their operations.1229 This belief changed in the 1989-1995 period
because the spillover of the entire cycle of cocaine into Argentine territory did not take
place.1230
It is worth noting however that, as we have seen before, Mr. Suarez, the Secretary of
Intelligence of the State (1983-1989), stated that due to the high economic depression and
unemployment in the northwestern provinces (the area where the spillover of cocaine
production is likely to occur –were it ever to occur on a large scale-), there is a latent threat that
                                                                                                                                                                         
officials of SEDRONAR told me that the increasing number of illegal migrants from Bolivia and Peru
was a source of concern in terms of the possibility of an increase of drug trafficking related crimes.
1229Interview with Commander Mayor Vazquez quoted before.
1230Comandante Mayor Vazquez stated that during the period 1989-1995, law enforcement officials did
not share the view of Mr. Lestelle about the possibility of a spillover of cocaine production towards
Argentina. In fact they considered that this spillover was more likely to occur towards more uncontrolled
areas, such as the Amazon forest. (In this case, that would involve neighboring coutntries Bolivia, parts of
the territories of Brazil, and Paraguay--not Argentina) ibid. Prefecto PRINCIPAL (R) Mandrile who,
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a large underground economy linked to cocaine trafficking could develop. This has been
identified in the scope of this dissertation as an “economic threat” in the sense that Argentina
would have an area in its territory whose economy would depend on illegal activity.1231
These beliefs would be represented in this way:
A: increase of militarized enforcement in Bolivia
B: spillover of  entire cycle (excluding coca growing) CHCL production towards
Argentina
C: threats to the effective control of the national territory
D: dependence of the economy of the northwestern provinces on drug trafficking
activities
E: Security of Argentina
  +                                    0
A•                                      •B                                         • C
                               +                                      +                           _
 • F     +       D•    •E 
Comandante Mayor Vazquez stated that reactive violence by the coca growing peasants
resulting from an increase in militarized eradication in Bolivia could provoke a increase of
Bolivian immigration to Argentina.  This would worsen the already serious problems of
structural unemployment of this latter country. This is also an economic threat. The massive
Bolivian immigration is represented with letter “F” above.
E- CONCLUDING REMARKS
Considering the analysis above, it is possible to say that in its political and societal
dimensions, drug trafficking has become increasingly a significant threat for Argentina. Cocaine
consumption and its consequences for the integrity of the human resources and social fabric of
Argentina have become (in the period under study) an overt threat of growing intensity. The
growth of an internal market is –as explained above-- a consequence of the fact that increasing
law enforcement in Colombia produces an increasing independence among Bolivian traffickers,
as well as an increase of Colombian activities in Bolivia. Argentina became a route towards
Europe; prices dropped because of a supply increase, and because some “services” were paid
with cocaine to be sold within Argentina. Another overt threat is the political corruption
                                                                                                                                                                         
during the interviews said that instead of moving down towards Argentina, cocaine production operations
had moved up north in the Bolivian Amazon forest, also shared this view.
1231Similar statements were made by Major Brown (Argentine Army); he does not, however, have drug
control responsibilities.
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stemming from the expansion of the cocaine business to Argentina. The intensity is growing and
there are signs of collusion at both the local and federal levels between elected and non-elected
officials and drug traffickers. This situation has not yet precipitated a crisis of the regime, or a
breakdown of it. But considering the experience of other countries, and keeping in mind
Argentina’s recent past, the possibility is latent.
The possibility of the development of an underground criminal economy is an overt fact
and will increase in intensity if a solution to the current situation of persistent unemployment is
not solved. Also the growing gap between the have and have-nots may lead an increasing
number of people to turn to drug transportation, retailing and processing (at the cocaine base
and paste level) in order to survive and improve their social condition, in that order.
No military-traditional threat stems from Bolivia as a drug producer and potentially
violent neighbor. The danger of territorial control by drug traffickers in Argentina is a latent
possibility and a very remote threat. The state has shown itself to be capable of dealing with
situations of possible penetration of provincial administration by criminal organizations (as
demonstrated by the “Catamarca affair”). The Argentine territory is controlled by local and
federal security forces to an extent that it would make it very difficult for drug traffickers to
defy the sovereignty of the state.
Diplomats, intelligence officials, and border guards believed that militarized enforcement
in Bolivia  was a threat because of three factors. The first was the possibility of a spillover of
production towards Argentina (that proved to be a remote possibility).  The second was an
increase in immigration that could overwhelm the already limited capacity of the state and
aggravate the unemployment crisis. The third factor was the possibility of having a “hot border”
with Bolivia, that is a country with armed groups that could use Argentina as a safe heaven. All
these possibilities were seen as remote, but also as certain if militarized enforcement were to
increase in Bolivia, especially in the eradication effort.  In almost all cases, authorities
recognized that increased militarization would certainly entail a reactive violence from the coca-
growing peasants.
In short, drug trafficking is in some ways a significant threat for Argentina. It does not
represent, at least in the short term, a lethal threat to the state and the consequences of
militarization of enforcement in Bolivia (particularly eradication) are generally believed to be a
potential security problem for Argentina. However this scenario is not believed to be an overt
threat.
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CHAPTER IX:  TACKLING THE INDUSTRY:  NON-MILITARY
STRATEGIES FOR THE CONTAINMENT OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN
SOUTH AMERICA
A- INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters have demonstrated that in trying to “roll back” the problem of drug
trafficking with the use of military power, the remedy has proved worse than the disease. The
cocaine industry has not been eradicated from the region, and the availability of illegal drugs in
the main consumption centers of the world has not decreased. Moreover, markets have
diversified and expanded, the industry has become more sophisticated, and its “transnational
firms” have expanded their operations all over South America. The militarization of
enforcement activities against drug trafficking has not only produced a balloon effect in terms of
production but has also created both latent and present national security problems for countries
that neighbor drug producer countries. In the latter case, the escalation in militarization has also
produced an escalation in drug trafficking-related violence, while strengthening tactical links
between the drug industry (at the upstream and downstream level) and local insurgent groups.
Moreover, as shown below, the flow of cocaine continues unabated.
Graphic 1. Seizures of cocaine by region, in kilograms, 1994-1998.
In descending order from largest seizures, 1998
Source: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, ODCCP Studies on Drugs and
Crime, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001, Vienna, ODCCP, 2001, p.169
What to do then? This chapter will suggest a multilateral containment of the problem in
the supply side of the cocaine market. The immediate question that comes to mind is: what
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about the demand side? This author acknowledges that the harm caused by drug trafficking will
not be reduced unless a parallel and balanced effort in the demand side is undertaken, however
an analysis of demand reduction policies far exceeds the goals of this dissertation. Thus far the
dissertation has been concerned with showing the problem caused by militarized enforcement
policies. This chapter aims to show alternative multilateral drug trafficking containment
policies. A regional organization, the Organization of American States,1232 and an international
organization with universal representation, such as the United Nations,1233 (the main goal of
both institutions is maintaining peace and security) have non-military mechanisms to cope with
drug trafficking as a non-military transnational problem of security. This chapter will explain
these mechanisms and show how they work.
B - THE PROBLEM OF  FACING THE PROBLEM
The need for the containment of drug trafficking--as opposed to a “total victory” over it
(meaning a completely drug-free society)—has been expressed  in other works.1234 As stated
before, most of the time the U.S. officials refer to the “drug threat” in traditional military terms.
This is a mistake. An analogy would be useful here in terms of helping understand this mistake.
Let us turn to, then, a more tangible threat that the western world has confronted in the past: the
Cold War.  The United States and its allies were able, in part, to win the Cold War by
implementing a patient, long-term, and multi-faceted containment policy. The Soviet Union was
contained with economic (i.e. the Marshall Plan in Europe and “Alliance for Progress” in Latin
America), political, and—only when deemed necessary--military means. Trying to rollback the
Soviet Union would have brought about unwanted consequences for the western world,
especially after nuclear parity was achieved in the 1950s. Trying to win a nuclear war would
have implied admitting the possibility of a non-win situation; but this would have been suicidal.
In a sense, coping with the problem of drug trafficking in South America presents certain
                                                          
1232Interamerican Commission for Drug Abuse Control (CICAD).
1233United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP). As part of the administrative
reforms carried out by UN Secretary Koffee Annan, UNDCP has been put together with the United
Nations Centre for International Crime prevention, under the coordination United Nations Office for Drug
Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP). The goal of this reorganization is to enhance the capacity of the
United Nations to address the interrelated issues of drug control, crime prevention, and international
terrorism in all its forms. UNDCP stills dealing with the control of drug trafficking as an specific kind of
transnational organized crime. On this issue see: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime
Prevention : About Us , [on line] http//:  www.odccp.org/about.html
As “cosmetic” as this change might seem, it is step forward in the UN’s attempt to develop executive
programs to cope with global transnational threats in a non-military way.
1234 “By progress, we do not mean total victory or a drug free society, but rather movement toward the
more modest and realistic goal of effective containment of the negative economic, social, and political
consequences of the U.S.-Latin American drug trade in all its dimensions,” Bagley, Bruce and Tokatlián,
Juan, Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of the U.S.- Latin American Drug Policies, in Hartlyn,
Jonathan, Shoultz, Lars and Varas, Augusto (eds.), The United States and Latin America in the 1990s:
beyond the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press, 1992, pp.214- 234.
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similarities to the Cold War situation.1235  Following this analogy, law enforcement could be
assimilated to the military component of containment during the Cold War. The militarization
of law enforcement (at all levels) could be assimilated to military escalation with the Soviet
Union. Whereas the use of limited conventional military power was, in some cases, useful (as in
the case of Korea and the blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis), the use of nuclear weapons
was not an option. Also, anticommunist  “crusades,” as in the case of Nicaragua (where Soviet
expansion was not a clear possibility), provoked non-win outcomes. Going back to the problem
of drug trafficking, law enforcement is, of course, a key component in the containment of the
cocaine industry, but it is not the main component. Law enforcement must be utilized correctly
and carefully, otherwise the solution might be worse than the problem itself. The capture or
death of notorious drug kingpins, such as Rodriguez Gacha and Pablo Escobar in Colombia or
the members of the Santa Ana Cartel in Bolivia, were the result of police intelligence (allegedly
with U.S cooperation) and the utilization of special forces as the “Bloque de Búsqueda” (Search
Team) in Colombia or UMOPAR in Bolivia. These “successes” were not the result of the entire
mobilization of the Colombian and Bolivian armed forces. Well-trained and well-equipped
special police units (like UMOPAR or the Bloque de Búsqueda -which is a mixed army/national
police elite team-) are sufficiently prepared to carry out airborne operations against drug
laboratories. As far as drug interdiction is concerned, the use of the Peruvian Air Force in “air
bridge denial” operations has shown limited effectiveness in intercepting illegal flights.1236
The use of militarized police forces or the military for coca eradication, however, has proven to
be a failure. Coca production remains stable or actually increases under these circumstance,
because whenever a coca plantation is eradicated in a place, another coca plantation (or more) is
started somewhere else to replace it. At the same time the support base of guerrilla groups
(Colombia and Peru) has increased and peasant reactive violence has risen (Bolivia). All this is
to say that law enforcement can be efficient depending on when and how it is used. Otherwise,
it can be more of a damnation than a blessing. This “cat and mouse” game of forceful
militarized eradication is both expensive and inefficient when used indiscriminately. It can also
reinforce a sense of “defeat” in the so-called war on drugs.
                                                          
1235 A similar analogy between the irrationality of trying to “rollback” the Soviet Union with nuclear
weapons (during the Cold War) and trying to “completely eradicate” drug trafficking was made by Juan
Tokaltián in De Drogas y Dinosaurios in, Krathausen, Ciro and Sarmiento, Luis Fernando, Cocaína & Co.
Un Mercado ilegal por dentro, Bogotá, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1991, p.12 and 13. Tokatlián however
made this analogy for the specific case of Colombia and also suggested a policy of  “containment” of the
drug industry for Colombia, ibid., p. 13. Here I am using this analogy for the application of  regional and
global cooperation policies for the containment of the illegal drugs industry in South America.
1236This is not however the panacea since the traffickers have turned to flying  under the radar
interception level or transporting the drugs by rivers or land in jungle areas in the Peruvian Amazon. In
any case, if Air Force interdiction seems to work, in the case of Bolivia for example, resources should be
channeled more to new Air Force capabilities (the backbone of the Bolivian Airforce still being old T-33
jets form the Korean war time!!!) than to supporting eradication operations.
417
Operation Blast Furnace and successful air interdiction operations in Peru’s Upper
Huallaga valley have proven successful in the sense that a “glut” was produced in the demand
side for coca leaves and coca paste. This led to a substantial decrease in coca production.  In the
case of Peru, air interdiction has been an almost constant effort.1237 In the case of Bolivia, the
use of UMOPAR and U.S. military units in interdiction activities produced a drop in coca prices
during the six months of the operation. After a while, however, as shown in previous chapters,
the situation returned to normal.
Table 1. Coca prices in Bolivia 1986-1987
-Dollars per 100 pounds- (Operation Blast Furnace took place between July and November 1986):
1986 1987
Jan 44.1
Feb 72.2
Mar 100.7
Apr 149.6 104.9
May 58.6 48.5
Jun 104.1 82.1
Jul 14.0 95.2
Ago 53.2 79.3
Sep 53.1 48.5
Oct 63.3 72.3
Nov 73.6 77.1
Dec 101.4 40.9
Source: Sistema Educativo Antidrogas y de Movilización (SEAMOS), Datos y Cifras: Selección de
Cuadros Estadísticos de los Temas Hoja de Coca, Narcotráfico, Uso Indebido de Drogas, Desarrollo
Alternativo, Niños y Juventud. Dossier Hemerográfico, La Paz, SEAMOS, Centro de Información, 1996.
The conclusion seems fairly clear: constant and persistent harassment of cocaine
traffickers (destruction of CHCL production sites for example) can be at least partially
successful. UMOPAR efforts in Bolivia should thus be concentrated on interdiction operations
(which is what UMOPAR units are actually trained to do), and not  on eradication activities.
This being said, it must also be emphasized that efficient law enforcement is not by itself
the panacea for the drug trafficking problem. As stated before, drug trafficking is basically an
economic problem with security dimensions. The law enforcement side of containment must be
accompanied with development policies on the production side. If no attractive economic
alternatives are available for the people working in the cocaine industry, all law enforcement
efforts will be fruitless. Drug trafficking in all its aspects is driven by high economic profit.
Traffickers are highly adaptable to law enforcement and often have superior intelligence and
counter-intelligence capabilities (in terms of communications equipment such as satellite,
portable phones, or the ability to intercept law enforcement communications). They can also
corrupt local authorities and shift to other means of transportation. Experience has shown that in
                                                          
1237With some interruptions due for example too diplomatic problems caused by  Fujimori’s self inflicted
coup d’etat in 1992 and the war with Ecuador in 1995. The U.S. momentarily curtailed  radar support to
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areas where air interdiction was effective, traffickers have shifted to river routes.  In other cases
traffickers have shifted from “mule traffic”--or air traffic in small airplanes--to concealment of
multi-ton shipments in commercial containers. As far as the upstream side of the industry is
concerned, the advantages of coca have been mentioned before. Even if coca prices go down,
there is always the hope that interdiction will slow down and prices will go up again. Also, coca
is a crop that can be turned into cash with little delay. In the case of other legal products, on the
other hand, peasants must seek buyers and offer their produce under often adverse commercial
conditions (i.e. lack of infrastructure). In the case of coca and coca paste, the buyer goes right to
the spot and pays immediately.  Experience has also shown that successful interdiction and
eradication have provoked a displacement of production towards other areas. This was the case
in both the expansion of coca production in Colombia (a former downstream producer country),
and the expansion of cocaine production in Bolivia, Peru (traditionally downstream producer
countries), and Brazil.
As stated at the beginning of this dissertation, drug trafficking is a global problem in the
sense that it affects almost every nation in the world. Further, drug trafficking is not a problem
that can be solved by any single state, regardless of the military and economic resources at its
disposal (the U.S. is probably the best example of this).1238  Containment of drug trafficking
requires multilateral cooperation at both the regional and global level. The issue of  “shared
responsibility” to face drug trafficking has been repeated over and over again in different
multilateral fora ever since the signing of the 1988 Convention on Illicit Drug Traffic. U.S.
government officials have also recently expressed the need for multilateral drug control
strategies.1239 This could be an indication that the 21st century will start with a policy change
in the U.S.-led bilateral approach to the drug trafficking problem in South America. However,
there are several ways of multilateralizing drug trafficking containment efforts.
                                                                                                                                                                         
the Peruvian Air Force (thus leaving Peruvian planes “blind”) as a sanction to Fujimori’s undemocratic
practices. In the second case all efforts were momentarily concentrated on the war effort.
1238In the case of cocaine, for example, there are growing consumption markets in Eastern Europe,
Russia, Japan and Australia. Not to mention the growing tactical alliances between Russian criminal
organizations, Japanese criminal organizations (Yakima), Chinese criminal organizations (Triads), and
Latin American drug trafficking organizations. On these matters see Stares, Paul, Global Habit. The Drug
Problem in a Borderless World, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, pp. 37-46.
1239On this issue see: Executive Office of the President Office of National Drug Control Policy, Report to
the Congress, Volume I: United States and Mexico Counterdrug Cooperation; Enhanced Multilateral
Drug Control Cooperation; Enhanced Truck Inspections, Washington D.C., Executive Office of the
President Office of National Drug Control Policy, p.4
419
C- MULTILATERALIZING FAILURE? PROJECTS FOR A MULTILATERAL
COUNTER-DRUG FORCE
a) Who wants to bring in the Blue Helmets?
There have been numerous recommendations in academic works to utilize UN
peacekeeping forces in drug interdiction and illicit crops eradication operations. UN
peacekeeping forces were created in 1956 as an ad-hoc (and later institutionalized) practice of
deploying a lightly armed neutral military force as a buffer between the forces of two
contending parties. The goal of this force was to avoid the resumption of hostilities after a
cease-fire had been established between the two parties (usually states). Yet another component
of this institutionalized practice was the fact that peacekeeping units could only be deployed
upon request of at least of one of the parties, and they had to be withdrawn at the request of at
least one of the parties. The use of force was only allowed in self-defense. This is the scheme
that prevailed during the Cold War. The end of the East-West confrontation and the demise of
the Soviet Union gave way to the resurgence of conflicts that had either remained “frozen” or
been overshadowed by the bipolar character of world politics up to then. Moreover, during that
period, peacekeeping forces were not deployed to  areas in the sphere of influence of either
superpower,  because of the veto power either of them could exert in the Security Council. The
end of the Cold War gave rise to a new generation of peacekeeping operations or “second
generation peacekeeping operations.” These new Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) are also an
ad-hoc practice that adapts to intra-state conflicts (El Salvador, Cambodia, Somalia,
Mozambique) stemming from the disintegration of multi-nation states (such as the former
Yugoslavia), or from the formation of new ones (such as Namibia). The novelty of these
peacekeeping operations lies mostly in the following facts:
a) they are now often deployed even before a cease-fire is established, and sometimes even
before the belligerent parties have requested UN intervention; and
b) they are not necessarily lightly armed.
The most distinctive feature of these “second generation operations” is that their mandate
has been enlarged to fulfill new tasks such as humanitarian relief, protection of humanitarian
relief agents, and  “peace building” measures such as support to elections, institution-building
and public security functions. That is, more than guaranteeing a cease-fire, these operations are
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often deployed either to promote the conditions for a cease-fire, or to help build the conditions
for a long-lasting post-conflict peace.1240
Having provided the above clarifications, I can now analyze the academic works that
suggest utilizing UN peacekeeping operations in enforcement operations against drug
trafficking. As explained at the beginning of this dissertation, after the end of the Cold War, part
of the academic community started to focus on the myriad of new, emerging transnational
security problems. A group of authors enthusiastically embraced the idea that the UN Security
Council could mandate that UN peacekeeping missions participate in drug trafficking control
activities such as interdiction and eradication. While some of them explained in detail what
these peacekeeping forces should do in terms of drug trafficking control, others merely
described very vague concepts. Interestingly enough, some authors later reviewed their views on
this matter and argued against the utilization of UN peacekeeping forces in counterdrug
operations along lines that resemble the arguments used in this dissertation.1241 This chapter
will concentrate on the analysis of concrete proposals, rather than vague suggestions on the use
of UN peacekeeping for drug trafficking control purposes. 1242
As far as concrete proposals go, authors such as Major-General (Ret.) Indar Jit
Rikhye1243 (former military adviser of UN Secretary General U Thant, and Peace Keeping
Operations commander), Paul F. Diehl, and Chetan Kumar enthusiastically suggested that it
would be a good idea to utilize UN peacekeeping forces for drug interdiction and illegal crop
eradication purposes. 1244
Rikhye, for example, argues that peacekeeping operations would be a more effective way
to connect multilateral military efforts for countering drug trafficking. As he argues,
                                                          
1240See: Ghébali, Victor-Yves, “Le développement des operations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU
depuis la fin de la guerre froide,” Le Trimestre du Monde, Nº 20,1992, pp. 67-85; Abi-Saab, Georges, “La
deuxième génération des opérations de maintien de la paix. Quelques réflexions préliminaires,” ibid.,
pp.87-97 and same author, “United Nations Peacekeeping Old and New: An Overview of the Issues,” in
Warner Daniel (ed.) New Dimensions of Peace Keeping, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995,pp
1-13  see also: Weiss, Thomas, “New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda
For Peace,” The Washington Quarterly,Vol 16, Nº 1, Winter 1993, pp. 51-66.
1241As we will see, this happened in the case of   Dr. Paul Diehl.
1242 One example of what is implied here as a “vague suggestion” is given by Sir Brian Urquhart, who
suggests that “Less specifically, some peace keeping techniques might prove useful in the control of the
drug problem, provided an international strategy could be argued upon.” Urquhart, Sir Brian, Beyond the
Sheriff’s Posse,” Survival, vol. XXXII, Nº 3 May/June 1990, p. 205.
1243See: Rikhye, Indar Jit, “The Future of Peacekeeping,” International Peace Academy Occasional Paper
Number 2, New York, International peace Academy, 1989,pp. 24-25 and same author, “The Future of
Peacekeeping” in Rikhye, Indar Jit and Skjelsbaek, eds., The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results,
Limitations, and Prospects-The Lessons of 40 Years of Experience, New York, St. Martin’s, 1991,
pp.171-99.
1244 See: Diehl, Paul F. and Kumar, Chetan, “Mutual Benefits from International Intervention: New Roles
for United Nations Peace Keeping Forces,” in Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 22 (4), pp. 369-375 and
Diehl, Paul F., International Peace Keeping, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993,
pp.143-165.
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“Satellite imagery, high-level aircraft photography, aerial surveillance, coastal and land patrolling
are all in use [for drug interdiction purposes]. Many of these tasks overlap with peacekeeping
functions. whereas search-and-destroy missions of drug-producing fields and factories are police
functions outside the limits of peacekeeping norms. A multilateral surveillance system of drug
interdiction could be developed on the basis of present experience. Across land frontiers, joint
patrolling and surveillance has been employed and could be greatly improved by a para-military
force; and in critical situations, ground troops supported by air, as well as naval patrols in
territorial waters, could be effectively used.”1245
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Rykhye’s proposals seem to make a distinction between “satellite
imagery, high-level aircraft photography, aerial surveillance, coastal and land patrolling” that
could be performed by peacekeeping forces, and “search-and-destroy missions of drug-
producing fields and factories,” which are police functions. As far as surveillance and patrolling
is concerned, it is true that UN peacekeeping forces have performed land and naval patrolling in
the past. Basically, their function has been to prevent goods from passing across borders. That is
the case, for example, in ONUCA (United Nations Observer Group in Central America) where
UN naval peace-keeping forces patrolled the Gulf of Fonseca in order to guarantee the
Esquipulas II peace agreement by preventing arms trafficking to irregular and insurgent forces.
However, this was performed after a cease-fire took place and with the consent of the host
states. Any action without the consent of a drug producer state would resemble, by analogy with
traditional military security problems, a peace enforcement operation. Such an operation should
be mandated by the UN Security Council, and it is unlikely that the non-permanent members
from drug producing areas would cede the majority required for such a resolution, precisely
because many of them could become the target of these kinds of operations.1246 As a matter of
fact an attempt, by Great Britain and the U.S. to treat the problem of drug trafficking in the
Security Council was frustrated in informal consultations by a coalition led by Brazil. In that
sense, a “veto of the non-powerful states” would take place. Paradoxically for Bolivia,
Colombia, or Peru, the security threat posed by drug trafficking would be worsened by the latent
possibility of multilateral intervention.
“ The U.S and Britain had wanted the discussions [the Special Session that finally led to the
adoption of a Global Plan of Action Against Drugs within the framework of the General Assembly
in 1990] to be held in the Security Council where they had a disproportionately powerful voice,
thereby forcing the agenda to remain in drug production and interdiction. Brazil succeeded in
moving the session out of the Security Council into the General Assembly.”1247
                                                          
1245Rykhye, The Future of Peacekeeping, p. 24.
1246As we have seen before, in several UN documents drug trafficking has been defined as a “threat to the
security of states” in the UN Security Council. This argument, then, could be used in order to declare drug
trafficking in a specific country or region as a “threat to peace or breach to peace.” Chapter VII of the UN
Charter is vague enough to allow for such a scenario.
1247Tullis, LaMond, Handbook of Research on Illicit Drug Traffic, p. 102.
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“An attempt by Britain in 1989 to inscribe narcotics issues on the agenda of the Security Council,
a small organ to which the major powers willingly entrust serious business, aroused opposition
among the UN’s general membership, which resents the exclusivity and big-power control of the
Council. The British had hoped that Security Council attention would raise the profile of the drug
issue, but developing countries were suspicious that involvement by the Security Council would
lend an unwholesomely military and security-oriented flavor to consideration of the problem.”1248
“Brazil was instrumental in moving the recent UN narcotics session [1990 Special Session] from
the Security Council, where the U.S. and Great Britain preferred to hold it, to the General
Assembly, where all members have an equal vote. Though there was no return to the sharp verbal
nth-south clashes that have marked may General Assembly debates in the past, poorer drug -
producing nations emphasized that they regard the drug problem as a development issue.  They
said they expect and deserve aid in their efforts to persuade farmers to change crops.”1249
A multilateral paramilitary force for drug interdiction and surveillance “à la Rikhye”
would not constitute a peacekeeping operation in either its old or new forms.  Rather, it would
be a multilateral UN mandated police operation. It is true that most of the second generation
peace-keeping operations have had and continue to have a large civilian police component
(CIVPOL). This component is mandated to guarantee public security, not by directly exerting
law enforcement but by monitoring, training, and re-building local police forces.1250 A force
such as the one proposed by Rikhye should be invited by a government and should have a clear
police mandate. In the absence of an international criminal code, such a the force should help
the host government to enforce local drug laws and should be formed by experienced law
enforcement personnel, not by military forces.
Some small Caribbean countries such as Jamaica have called for the creation of a United
Nations drug enforcement unit that could be sent to any country whose government fears that its
law enforcement apparatus will be overwhelmed by drug traffickers entering and operating from
its territory.1251 However, the Andean countries have not expressed any support for such a UN
drug unit.1252 A study carried out by the United Nations Association for the United States of
America also recommends the formation of such a UN police unit. However this study
recommends that the use of such a force (under request) should be limited to very small
countries incapable of deploying forces strong enough to take on powerful mafias. The
                                                          
1248The United Nations Association of the United States, The Global Connection. New International
Approaches for Controlling Narcotic Drugs, New York, 1991, p.31.
1249Mouat, Lucia, UN Session Plots Global Antidrug Strategy, The Christian Science Monitor, February
27, 1990, p.5.
1250 On this issue see:  Sismanidis, Roxane D.V., Police Functions in Peace Operations: Report from a
workshop organized by the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1997, 22 pp. and Broer,
Harry and Emery, Michael, “Civilian Police in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations,” in “Policing the New
World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security,” Oakley, Robert B.; Dziedzic, Michael J. And
Goldberg, Elliot M., Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security;
Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, 1998, pp. 365-398.
1251UNA-USA, the Global Connection, p.15.
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recommendation again refers to the Caribbean and not to South America. As argued in this
document,
“ 4. International assistance to strengthen indigenous enforcement capabilities should focus
primarily on upgrading polices, rather than rely unduly on the military. 5. A UN organized drug
enforcement unit with personnel drawn from a number of countries should be created to assist
small countries incapable of fielding strong enough to take on powerful drug mafias. 6. Such a
unit should be established on a trial basis for a specific region only, probably the Caribbean. A
small permanent staff in headquarters should be responsible mainly for monitoring changing
trafficking patterns and for recruiting from police agencies of appropriate members states the
personnel who are to be deployed on a specific mission. 7. For a UN narcotics unit to be credible
it should operate under the same rules of self-defense  as does any national police force.
Operational decisions for any mission should be entrusted to a unit chief empowered to act
quickly, within the framework of the unit’s mandate.” 1253
Deploying a multilateral police force instead of traditional military peace-keeping forces
would have several advantages (in the hypothetical case that such a thing could occur). First,
policemen are basically trained to enforce the law and to combat crime by conducting
investigations, while the military have not –as a norm- received such training. Second, for law
enforcement officials, crime is necessarily and intrinsically a bad thing, and while this does not
necessarily render them immune to corruption, they have at least been trained to resist it and to
be aware that, eventually, the temptation will arrive.1254 Military personnel, on the other hand,
are trained to destroy an enemy, and the eventualities of countering crime are not part of their
training. Experience has shown the involvement of South American Armed Forces in combating
drug trafficking to be extremely damaging in terms of the resulting corruption. What would
specifically enable the military personnel of UN peacekeeping forces to resist corruption by
drug traffickers? The scandal caused in 1998 by the involvement of Dutch Marines deployed in
the Antilles in Europe-bound drug trafficking is an alarm signal that should be considered
before suggesting the utilization of PKO’s for drug control purposes. (Holland is one of the
countries that traditionally contributes troops to Peace Keeping forces.) 1255
Diehl and Kumar go a step further than Maj. Gen. (ret.) Rikhye in enumerating possible
advantages to using UN peacekeeping forces for interdiction and eradication purposes. But their
arguments are neither based on experience nor are they convincing in their justification:
                                                                                                                                                                         
1252ibid.
1253 UNA-USA, The Global Connection, p. 21.
1254Interview with Ambassador Camilión, Buenos Aires, July 1997. Ambassador Camilión was as
minister of Defense of simultaneously in charge of the Security Forces (Gendarmerie and Coast Guards)
and the Armed Forces and made this distinction between  personnel of Gendarmerie and military
personnel.
1255See: Netherlands: Wire: “3 Dutch Marines Arrested as Drug Smugglers,” Media Awareness Project
[on line] http://www.mapnic.org/drugnews/v98.n573.a03.html
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“The use of peace-keeping forces as drug enforcers represents a positive-sum game for countries that
grow most of the narcotics as well as for those that provide markets for the products. Host countries
frequently cannot eradicate illegal crops on their own. Yet getting direct assistance (e.g. personnel and
equipment) from narcotic consuming states can cause serious domestic political problems, and drug  lords
are frequently able to make nationalistic appeals against drug eradication efforts. United Nations peace-
keeping troops can provide the assistance necessary, but without the political cost associated with outside
intervention. UN intervention provides a greater moral authority, and one likely to generate more
domestic support than efforts sponsored by a drug-importing country. The symbol of the world
community conducting the operation bults jingoistic appeals by the opposition. Furthermore, drug
interdiction and eradication efforts by the United Nations are less likely to be linked to other controversial
issues, such as criminal extradition, that might undermine those efforts [...] The disputes that the United
States has had with Colombia, Peru and Bolivia might be ameliorated if UN peace-keeping forces troops
were introduced into the drug war.”1256
Lets start with Diehl’s and Kumar’s proposed role for UN peace keeping forces. They
propose that these forces should be used as drug law enforcers. This immediately raises a
question: What would they be enforcing? In the absence of an international criminal code, they
should be enforcing local drug laws (Colombian, Peruvian, or Bolivian laws in this case). As
stated before, the 1988 UN Convention does not establish an enforcing mechanism. States that
signed and ratified the Convention are supposed to adopt it as part of their national legislation
and to pass domestic laws in accordance with the Convention. However they are not susceptible
to sanctions if they do not do so. This already assumes that Blue Helmet drug enforcers would
be deployed (as occurs with classical PKOs) at the request of the host government. As we have
seen before, there are historical precedents of an Andean Country asking for foreign support for
interdiction purposes. In 1986 Bolivian President Paz Estenssoro did make such a request to the
U.S. and the result was Operation Blast Furnace , which brought with it all the negative
consequences for the Bolivian political stability that we have already seen. Whether a UN
intervention would have been more legitimate or not still has yet to be proved. However nothing
could differ more from PKO than operation Blast Furnace. The U.S. special forces that took part
in the operation participated in combined search and destroy operations with Bolivian
Leopardos (UMOPAR), and were under the constant risk of engaging in combat with drug
traffickers. This kind of operation (even when carried out by military personnel) is a police
operation.  Again, by analogy to traditional security concerns, this is more akin to peace
enforcement than to peace keeping. In this case the difference would probably be between
“public security” units such as CIVPOL and “law enforcement” operations.
There is another factor to be considered: nationalism. It is true that Diehl and Kumar are
making a generalized proposal, however nationalistic feelings in the Andean countries and
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especially in Bolivia cannot be ignored.1257 Whether under the U.S. or the UN flag, a military
operation would always be perceived as a foreign military intervention by the local population,
and therefore there would be a great deal of opposition. The fact that Diehl and Kumar propose
the use of UN Peace Keeping units for illegal crops eradication is particularly disquieting. First,
they claim that the use of peacekeeping forcers as drug enforcers would be beneficial because
they cannot eradicate illegal crops on their own. This is not quite true: Andean governments
cannot (forcibly) eradicate drug crops on their own because of several obstacles that would not
disappear if UN Peace Keeping forces were employed. In the case of Peru and Colombia, coca
producing areas are effectively controlled by guerrilla groups and forcible eradication only
increases peasants’ support for the insurgents. The top priority for the armed forces of these
countries is to defeat the guerrillas. Should the Blue Helmets, then, be used for
counterinsurgency as well? This opens a completely different (and more dangerous)
problematique. In the case of Bolivia effective forcible eradication would only be possible at the
cost of the bloodbath that would result from the clash between military forces and the peasant
trade unions. One could certainly question the legitimacy of Bolivian soldiers shooting at their
own people in order to eradicate a coca bush. Now just mentally picture the image of UN Blue
Helmets shooting on Bolivian peasants in order to eradicate a shrub. Is that the mission of the
UN? The argument that UN forces would have more legitimacy than local military forces for
coca eradication purposes is, in the view of this author, nonsensical. For coca growing peasants,
coca provides a means of survival and as also a source of relatively substantial income. There is
so much at stake, then, that coca growing peasants would oppose any attempts to forcibly
eradicate their coca. This opposition would not be altered by the fact that the eradicators wear a
blue helmet, or not. As stated before, in Bolivia for example the UNDCP enjoys respect among
the coca growing population in the Chapare. This respect has been earned through UNDCP’s
commitment to alternative development programs. UNDCP personnel also enjoy the trust and
support of grassroots peasant community leaders. If UN forces are used to forcibly eradicate
crops or even to enforce the law in drug producer areas, there is the risk that every UN
representative would be perceived as potential threat by the local population. Under these
circumstances,  all the successful efforts of the UN in the field of alternative development could
fade away.
Particularly surprising is the fact that Diehl and Kumar state that
                                                                                                                                                                         
1256Diehl and Kumar, Mutual Benefits from International Intervention, pp. 374 and 375.
1257Interviews with Argentine law enforcement officials that have been detached to Bolivia, Buenos
Aires, June, July and August 1997.
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“[T]he disputes that the United States has had with Colombia, Peru and Bolivia might be 
ameliorated if UN peace-keeping troops were introduced into the drug war.”1258
As stated above, in the case of Bolivia, peasants would not perceive coca eradication as
“gringo intervention” but as “UN intervention.” Therefore both the Bolivian government and
the UN would be facing serious problems such as a lost of prestige on the part of the United
Nations.  In the case of Colombia and Peru, to date the U.S. military presence has been limited
to the presence of military advisors (mostly special forces) and technicians such as radar
operators and air support personnel. There was never a U.S. full-scale intervention (requested or
not) for enforcement operations against drug trafficking (as it was the case in Bolivia in 1986).
Should a U.S. military intervention occur, it would be welcomed as a blessing by the guerrilla
groups operating in Peru and Colombia. What better argument for a leftist insurgent group than
an anti-imperialistic fight against a foreign intervention force? As a matter of fact, part of the
strategy of the Shining Path in Peru was to provoke such a situation that was so chaotic that
foreign intervention would be inevitable. Once foreign intervention occurred, Shining Path (a
Maoist movement) would initiate a fight against a foreign occupant, which in the mind of
Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán, would have represented the equivalent of Mao’s war
against the Japanese occupation.1259 Now, a “UN Peace Keeping Drug Enforcement”
operation would be probably more legitimate in the eyes of the international community than a
U.S. or a U.S.-led unilateral intervention, but would it also appear more legitimate to the local
population? Insurgent groups could also exploit a UN operation, portraying it as a foreign
military intervention. Moreover, if this UN force were to engage in crop eradication activities, it
would certainly earn the enmity of the peasants and most likely would enlarge the support base
of guerrilla groups.
Two years after the publication of the suggestion listed above, Dr. Diehl seems to have
reconsidered his proposals along similar objections to the ones made in this dissertation. In 1993
Dr. Diehl wrote:
“The use of peacekeeping troops to fight drugs trafficking is certainly one of the more interesting
applications, but is also one fraught with peril[...]Opposition from drug lords is only one problem.
Farmers who grow the coca plant or opium poppies may also turn against the force. These people
depend on growing the crops used to make narcotics for their livelihoods. Unless some program in
conjunction with the peacekeeping operation provides price support for alternate crops, the farmers
                                                          
1258Diehl and Kumar, Mutual Benefits from International Intervention, p.375.
1259On this issue see: Hearing Before the  House of  Representatives, Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The
Threat of the Shining Path to Democracy in Peru and United States Policy, Parts I and II, Washington
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, 160 pp. and Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Western
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives one Hundred Second Congress,
Second Session, The Shining Path After Guzmán: The Threat and the International Response, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1992, 71 pp.
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will assist the drug lords  made alliances with rebel or guerrilla groups operating in the host
country; the drug lords receive protection, and those opposed to the government gain access to
money and weapons. Such has been the case with the Shining Path rebels and drug producers
operating in Peru. When this occurs, peacekeeping forces would be thrust in to the middle of a
civil war in which one side and its allies are determined to defeat peacekeeping efforts at drug
eradication [...] The peacekeeping forces will be operation at a disadvantage in rugged terrain
against an enemy familiar with the territory. Furthermore, in order to have any chance of success,
the peacekeeping will need specialized training in drug eradication and will almost assuredly
abandon restrictions on carrying only light arms and using force only in self-defense- the
alternative might be suicide. Yet in relaxing those limitations the force begins to lose its character
as a peacekeeping force, and one begins to wonder whether a traditional military unit with
specialized training might not be more effective than a mutated peacekeeping force.”1260
I fully agree with Dr. Diehl’s objections on the direct engagement of UN Peace Keeping
forces in drug law enforcement operations in drug producing areas. In my view, a UN mandated
“traditional military unit with specialized training,”  would face the same kind of obstacles as a
Blue Helmets unit, and would also contribute to damaging the image of the UN in the eyes of
the local population, especially the coca growing peasants. In short, engaging UN military
forces in direct counter-drug operations would just add more fuel to the fire in an already violent
area of the world.
To the knowledge of this author, there is only one official UN document that mentions
proposals for the engagement of UN peacekeeping forces. The brief mention in articulated in
very vague terms and hidden among other proposals for,
“ [t]he use of United Nations multinational forces as a peace-keeping instrument to strengthen 
confidence, promote law and order, and ensure universal security.”1261
Neither is the issue of engaging peace-keeping operations in drug trafficking control
mentioned in subsequent meetings of this special committee, nor has this author found any
evidence that the matter has been discussed in other organs of the United Nations, and
specifically not in the Security Council.  The main reason is probably the fact that the
organization has largely rejected the idea of directly participating in drug interdiction
efforts.1262 It would not be surprising if such functions were rejected along the line of the
objections raised above.
                                                          
1260Diehl, International Peace Keeping, p.155 and 156.
1261This document is the Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations,
“Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their
Aspects”(A/45/330), which recommends that the organization should consider the “Use of operations in
combating illicit drug trafficking” without specifying under which circumstances and for which specific
functions. A/45/330 p. 18.
1262See: Diehl, International Peace Keeping, p. 180.
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b) Multinational strike force? What?  How? When? and...Who?
This section will analyze other proposals for the implementation of military or police
multinational forces that would not necessarily act within the framework of the United Nations.
There are two key drug control laws of the United States that clearly state the need for a
multinational regional “anti-narcotics force” in the Western Hemisphere.1263 According to
both laws, this force should be implemented within the framework of the Organization of
American States. However the text of both laws is unclear as to whether this “strike force”
should be a police force or a military force. It is also unclear which kind of task (interdiction,
eradication, or money laundering investigations) this force should perform. The laws refer to its
functions in vague terms as a “multinational force to conduct operations against these illegal
drug smuggling organizations,”1264 or as “ a paramilitary force to combat the drug
cartels.”1265
Such a multilateral regional force had already been conceived; its sphere of action was to
be  Bolivia.1266 As a matter of fact, U.S. State Department officials resisted the formation of
this force within the framework of the OAS,  questioning the feasibility of implementing it and
the problems that this force could face. One question posed by a Department State official
summarizes the reason that this force did not take place:
“Would the U.S. be willing to do the same, accepting deployment of the strike force in our territory?”1267
The answer is obviously “no,” even considering that in the United States there are also
criminal organizations that participate in drug trafficking activities or are associated with South
American criminal organizations and that a considerable part of the world’s money laundering
activities take place in the United States.1268
Other more technical reasons were also presented in order to reconsider the feasibility of
a regional drug strike force:
“ The USG [U.S. Government] needs to have firm indications of substantial regional support
before committing our country to back such a force.  If we examine multinational force models
                                                          
1263Public Law 100-690-Nov. 18, 1988 “National Narcotics Control Act of 1988” and Public Law 101-
231, “International Narcotics Control Act of 1989”.
1264PL 100-690, 102 STAT 4263
1265PL 101-231, 103 STAT 1962
1266See: Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotic Efforts: 1989-1992, p.226.
1267Testimony of Acting Assistant Secretary Mark Dion, Acting Assistant Secretary for International
Narcotic Matters, Department of State, in Cocaine Production in the Andes, Hearing Before the Selected
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, House of Representatives on Hundred First Congress, First
Session, June 7, 1989, p.47.
1268 See: Koutouzis, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, p.215.
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applied elsewhere for peacekeeping missions, the difficulties appear to be serious and the
implications far reaching.
- Poorly defined goals and authorities;
-insufficient political support by contributing members;
-scant support or active hostility by regional powers frequently neutralize peace keeping missions.
It may be more practical for the USG to support existing enforcement organizations in major
producing or transit states, perhaps with greater participation by UNFDAC, OAS,[…]in training
and equipping these units..."1269
The fact that an analogy with UN peacekeeping operations is made suggests that probably
the legislators were thinking along these lines when they proposed the creation of an OAS drug
strike force. As an objection to that it could be said that although successfully implemented, the
OAS has had very limited experience in deploying military peacekeeping forces.1270  In the
1990s, the OAS participated in two missions in collaboration with the UN.  A mission in
Central America (CIAV/OAS operation 1990-present) had the goal of disarming, demobilizing,
and reintegrating former combatants.  A second mission in Haiti (OAS/UN International
Civilian Mission in Haiti, MICIVIH 1993-94) was to monitor the restoration of democracy.
However, whereas these OAS missions where composed by civilian monitors, the military and
police components (including the protection of OAS and UN civilian personnel) where handled
by United Nations peacekeeping forces (ONUCA in the case of Central America and UNMIH in
the case of Haiti).1271 As stated by two analysts,
                                                          
1269Dion, Mark, op.cit., p.48.
1270The only time the OAS mandated the deployment of military peacekeeping forces was in 1965 after
the invasion of Santo Domingo by the United States. After the assassination  of dictator Rafael Trujillo in
Juan Bosh was elected president of Santo Domingo, accused by the Dominican military of conniving with
the communists in 1963 a military coup deposed Bosch, but other officers soon tried to restore him to
power. This provoked a U.S. military intervention on April 24, 1965, because of the fear of  Santo
Domingo becoming a “new Cuba”. “On May 1, 1995 the MCMFA ( Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs) took place in Washington. It decided to appoint a special committee -Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama- that went to the Dominican Republic to reestablish peace and
security. Its powers were : (1) to offer its good offices to all political groups in the country; (2) to arrange
a cease fire; (3) to evacuate all persons who had found asylum in diplomatic missions, and (4) to
investigate all aspects of the situation in Santo Domingo. The results of the negotiations, in which the
parties accepted the establishment of a security zone in the capital, bound them to respect this zone [....]
On May 6, 1965, the tenth MCMFA agreed to request the governments to set up an inter-American force,
its sole purpose being to restore order in the Dominican Republic, and thus to make it easier for the
United States to eventually withdraw from its unilateral approach,” Stoezer, op.cit., p.287 Finally the
force withdraw after general elections where celebrated in 1966.
1271On this issue see: Tacsán, Joaquín, Searching for OAS/UN task-sharing opportunities in Central
America and Haití, Third World Quaterly, Vol. 18, Nº 3, 1997, specially pp.498-506; Baena Soares, João
Clemente, Síntesis de una gestión, 1984-1994, Organization of American States,1994,pp.206 and 207,
United Nations, Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations
Peace-Keeping, Third Edition,  United Nations, 1996,pp. 415-421 and pp. 613-638. and Mujica San
Martín, María Eugenia , La Organización de los Estados Americanos y el sistema de seguridad
hemisférico,in Mejía Tirado, Álvaro (ed.), Visiones de la OEA, 50 Años 1948-1998, Fondo Editorial
Cancillería de SanCarlos,p.270-271.
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“The Haiti crisis is a good example of complexity, because the OAS provided leadership in the 
protection of democracy and basic peace making, while the UN was responsible for
peacekeeping and authority peace enforcement.”1272
“It should be noted that in recent years the OAS has been involved in some activities that fall 
somewhere between unarmed peacekeeping and democracy building. For example, since its 
creation in 1990 the Comisión Interamericana de Verificación (Interamerican Verification 
Commission-CIAV-OAS) has been overseeing the disarmament and social reintegration of the 
ex-Contras in Nicaragua [...] The CIAV-OAS has been involved not only in disarming, feeding, 
and protecting the former Contras as they returned to Nicaragua from camps in Honduras but 
also in extending humanitarian services to ex-Sandinista fighters. Most importantly, the CIAV-
OAS international staff in Nicaragua, which by early 1993, was reduced to twenty-three 
persons, has played a key mediation role between the armed opposition and the Nicaraguan 
government.”1273
With the exception of the naval blockade to Cuba during the Missile Crisis in 1962,  the
OAS has had no experience in collective military enforcement.1274 Moreover, this author
considers that all the objections to the utilization of UN mandated military forces for drug
control operations would apply to OAS mandated operations.
Assuming that this strike force would be a police force, one could think of a multinational
OAS police investigative force that could resemble EUROPOL. However in the view of this
author the Americas have not yet reached the level of political and economic integration that
would allow such an organization to exist. In any case an organization resembling EUROPOL
would not be a strike force ready to act across the borders and “kick down doors” to arrest drug
traffickers. 1275  Such a strike force faces serious problems of sovereignty. Why would a state
                                                          
1272Tacsán, op.cit., p.499
1273Muñoz, Heraldo, Collective Action for Democracy in the Americas, in Muñoz, Heraldo and Tulchin,
Joseph, Latin American Nations in World Politics, London, Westview Press, 1996p.31. Actually the OAS
carried out similar tasks in Suriname (1992) where, “at the invitation of the Surinamese government, the
OAS became involved in the formalization and safeguarding of a durable peace in the interior of that
country. The two specific objectives agreed upon between the government and the OAS were (1) to assit
the peace process and (2) to collaborate in the promotion and strengthening of democracy. Peace
negotiations assisted by the OAS between the government and rebel groups culminated in August 1992,
and demobilization ensued,” See: Muñoz, op.cit., p.31. This was also a civilian OAS mission.
1274 “In its second meeting of the same day, the COAS (Council of the OAS), acting provisionally as the
Organ of Consultation, called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles
and other weapons of offensive capability and also recommended member states, according to Articles 6
and 8 of the Rio Treaty, to take all necessary steps to ensure that the Cuban government would not
continue receiving military material from the Soviet Union,” Stoetzer, Carlos, The Organization of
American States, p.281 in that sense “The OAS action thus converted a unilateral move by the United
States into a collective measure and provided a multilateral basis for air surveillance of Cuba, though only
the US carried out flights. Twelve Latin American countries however, did offer to provide military
assistance, naval units, and port facilities to support the operation,” See: Cox, Arthur, Prospects for
Peacekeeping, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution,  1967, p.58.
1275The establishment of Europol was agreed in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union of February 7,
1992 with the goal of improving co-operation between member States in the areas of drug trafficking,
terrorism and other serious forms of international organized crime. This organization was created in June
1993.  Based in The Hague, its main roles consist of the following: Supporting the European Union
Member states by: facilitating the exchange of data (personal and non-personal), in accordance with
national law between Europol liaison officers seconded by the Member Sates as representatives of the
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accept the possibility of a non-national law enforcement agency acting within its borders? Some
indeed would: as a matter of fact, as seen before, Jamaica suggested this possibility. But some
others (such as the United States itself) would apparently not. At most one could imagine an
organization that, like EUROPOL, promotes information sharing and coordinates investigations
between law enforcement agencies of different member states of the European Union. I consider
that in the absence of similar laws, legal procedures, and compatible judiciary systems it would
be difficult to implement a Western Hemisphere Regional Investigative Unit. 1276 Until there is
some kind of law and law enforcement system “compatibilization,” the best that can be done is
improving information sharing between law enforcement agencies.  For that purpose there
already exists an organization whose reach is as global as the problem of drug trafficking
requires: INTERPOL.1277 There is no need to duplicate a task that is being already fulfilled by
INTERPOL.
There have more been recent proposals to multilateralize regional drug law enforcement
efforts. Many of these proposals, however, are either ambiguous or have been resisted by some
Latin American states.  Some Latin American states see the proposals as an attempt by the
United States to assure a military presence in the region. U.S. military presence had declined
after the retreat of the U.S. South Command from Panama in 1997 and the return of the
administration of the Panama Canal to Panamanian authorities in the year 2000 according to the
Carter-Torrijos pact.
c) Getting real: How and when could a multilateral force against drug trafficking could
work?
This author does not believe that every UN or OAS multilateral force against drug
trafficking would be always doomed to failure. Its success would depend on the nature of its
mandate and on the kind of personnel recruited for the mission. Ideally, the personnel of these
forces should be recruited from national law enforcement agencies (gendarmeries, police
                                                                                                                                                                         
different national law enforcement agencies to Europol; providing operational analyses in support of
Member States’ operations, general strategic reports and crime analyses on the basis of information and
intelligence supplied by Member States, generated by Europol or gathered from other sources and
providing expertise and technical support for investigations and ongoing operations carried out by law
enforcement agencies of the Member States under the supervision and legal responsibility of the Member
States concerned. See: Finjaut, Policing Western Europe: Interpol, Trevi and Europol, Police Studies,
Fall, 1992, pp.105-106 and EUROPOL, The European Police Office -Fact Sheet- , Nº 1 October 1998, 2p.
and EUROPOL DRUGS UNIT, Report on the Activities of the EUROPOL, Drugs Unit in 1996-
Summary, The Hague, 13 March, 1997, 6p.
1276We are talking here about the entire western hemisphere, where there are countries with Napoleonic
Code systems (Hispanic America and Brazil), British Customary Law ( most of the Caribbean Islands and
Canada), customary law (U.S.), and very different kinds of police organizations that do not necessary
have equivalent counterpart in other countries.
1277 Anderson, Malcolm, Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International Police Co-
operation, Oxford, Claredon Press, 1989, pp.105-126.
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departments, coast guards, customs etc.). Only in very specific tasks, such as air interdiction or
naval interdiction on the high seas, should the military be employed. This author believes that,
with a specific mandate (for example, searching for drugs or chemical inputs at check points or
boarding suspect freighters), these kind of operations could be performed as part of a
peacekeeping operation with a secondary drug interdiction mandate, or as part of a UN police
operation with a clear and specific drug control mission. After all, some of the so-called second
generation peace-keeping operations (post-cold war peacekeeping operations) include civilian
police personnel and mandates when deployed in countries where the state lacks the capacity to
enforce law and order. However these operations have been deployed in either “collapsed
states” or “failing states,” where the UN performs police activities simply because the
institutional base of the state has disappeared and needs to be rebuilt (Cambodia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Haiti), or because it never existed and needs to be created from scratch (Namibia).
It is true that in some South American countries, the state has lost control over parts of its
territory and has been replaced by competitors (Colombia and until recently Peru); but by no
means has the capacity of the state to enforce law and order disappeared. If a multilateral drug
law enforcement force is ever deployed, it should be under request of the host state and most
likely as part of peacekeeping operations with a larger mandate. Taking the hypothetical case of
Colombia, assume that the government and the guerrillas finally reach a peace agreement, and
also that the Colombian government requests a neutral force to be deployed in order to
guarantee the peace agreement. In that case (again a hypothetical case), a peacekeeping
operation with a drug interdiction component could be deployed in Colombia. This could be a
UN force, a OAS force or even a joint UN-OAS peacekeeping force. The force could have a
drug interdiction component simply because it would be operating in coca-cocaine producing
areas. It could, for example, search and confiscate illegal drugs, chemical inputs, or coca leaves
in checkpoints. For the reasons stated before, it would be however a secondary role, the main
one being keeping the peace. There are previous examples of OAS peacekeeping operations in
Latin America.1278 In that sense, the organization could do the job. There are also examples of
joint OAS-UN cooperation in peacekeeping operations with a peace building and
democratization component, as for example in Haiti (MICIVIH/ UNMIH) and Central America
(CIAV/OAS and ONUCA). The case of ONUCA is particularly interesting because part of the
mandate of the UN force was to prevent firearms from reaching the contending sides. For that
goal, a small naval force was deployed in the Gulf of Fonseca to patrol the area and search for
illegal weapons shipments. In a sense, this task could resemble a maritime interdiction force.
Again in the view of this author this kind of force should not be called “peacekeeping” but
“multilateral police force” and should be carried out by coast guard units with military support
                                                          
1278Such as the operation in Santo Domingo in 1965 mentioned before in this Chapter.
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for intelligence and logistical support.  A drug interdiction maritime multilateral police
operation would have more chances for success than either a land operation or a unilateral
maritime operation. The disadvantages of deploying a multilateral counter-drug force have been
largely explained before, and multilateral naval interdiction would probably have some of the
advantages enumerated for the supporters of multilateral enforcement. Unilateral naval drug
interdiction actions tend to be associated by the drug producer country with a naval blockade: as
shown before, that was exactly the case when in 1990 the U.S. was about to deploy a flotilla in
Colombian territorial waters. The situation would be different should, under request by the
Colombian government, a multilateral naval force be deployed near Colombian territorial
waters. The force would be legitimized either by the fact that it was deployed with the consent
or by the request of the host country, or that it was composed of units from countries other than
the United States, including if possible other Latin American states. In that sense the force
would not be seen  by the local population as “Yankee imperialism.” It could be either a UN,
OAS, or joint force.  Using a naval force would also be advantageous in that it would avoid the
risk of entanglement of multilateral forces in the Colombian civil conflict (there is no such
thing as an “insurgent navy”). Such a proposal also skirts the possibility of clashes with coca
producing farmers, and because of the firepower of naval vessels, the traffickers would probably
think twice before initiating an armed clash. This author’s view is that this is the only kind of
multilateral drug military interdiction that would have some chance of success (by success I
mean fulfilling the goal of seizing drugs without creating further security problems).
Multilateral air interdiction (with of course the consent of the host country) would be a second
best option. We must recall, however, that the risk of being in direct confrontation with drug
traffickers would certainly increase, as both insurgents or criminal organizations could also
exploit nationalistic claims. At the time of this writing a U.S. military plane was shot down over
a region controlled by the FARC in Colombia. Also in 1992, under very mysterious
circumstances, a Peruvian fighter plane shot down a U.S. C-130 over Peruvian air space. It is
worth noting that some analysts believe that some insurgent groups operating in coca-producing
areas are armed with Stinger missiles and that in the late 1980s the Medellín cartel attempted to
purchase SAM missiles from Cuba.1279 From the point of air interdiction (as in the case of
police), the key is simultaneous and coordinated operations in two or more countries. Also the
possibility of mistakenly shooting down a legal flight will always exist, and this is a risk that not
too many nations are probably willing to take.
Multilateral naval interdiction would not solve everything, as experience has shown that
when interdiction of speedboats or small ships is effective, traffickers shifted to the concealment
of illegal drugs within legal cargo. Given the intense commercial traffic in the Caribbean it
                                                          
1279Interview with a CICAD official, Washington D.C., October 1997 and Castillo, Fabio, La Coca
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would be impossible to search for drugs in every container carrier ship. Also routes have shifted
to land routes across Mexico.
D- CONCLUDING REMARKS: ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEED
FOR A COOPERATIVE SECURITY APPROACH
By now it should be clear that the “stability, security and sovereignty”1280 of South
American states is threatened by the cocaine industry. The United States and Western European
countries  (the main consumer centers) can define this problem as a national security issue only
in terms of “societal security;” that is, as a threat to the long-term deterioration of their social
fabric. Even though the cocaine industry is a security problem in South America, it is not a
military problem. Rather, it is a non-military issue that requires a non-military solution. The
dilemma of South America as a region is that an extra-regional hegemonic power, the United
States, has opted for a “traditional” military component as part of its response to the problem.
This has resulted in pressure on the South American states to militarize their enforcement
policies. Because of their combined burdens of underdevelopment and foreign debt, these
countries depend on international support in order to cope with the drug trafficking problem.
More and more sophisticated weapons and more military training provokes more spillover of
production and more political violence. As an example, the only change in the Clinton
administration policy concerning the military component of the U.S. international drug control
policy was a shift from major interception effort in transit routes (e.g. the Caribbean and
Mexico) towards major efforts of eradication and interdiction in source countries. For Argentina
and Venezuela, whose problems stem from the balloon effect in producer countries and the
political consequences of militarized enforcement in neighboring countries, this is not a good
perspective. The great paradox is that, as shown in this dissertation, the problem of drug
trafficking on the supply side stems from the underdevelopment of the main source countries
and their own lack of capacity to generate alternative legal economies. Thus, the main
component of the containment of the industry must also be economic in order to target the roots
of the problems instead of only targeting its symptoms.
If over-excitement and craving for immediate results seems to be a common pathology in
the western world, this also seems to be the case for modern “media” democracies. True,
suggesting a “blitzkrieg” on drugs might reassure the electorate over two-year (for mid-term
elections) or four-year (presidential elections) periods. However, experience has shown that as
the “blitzkrieg” becomes a “trench war,” the harm produced by drug trafficking is not only not
reduced, but it is often also expanded. Heads of state around the world must accept the truth and
                                                                                                                                                                         
Nostra, pp. 300-340.
12801988 Convention Against Illicit Dug Trafficking, p.1.
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must explain it to the citizens of their countries: there is no short-term solution for the drug
trafficking problem in South America. One could also think of solutions that are less violent
than forcible eradication or the use of herbicides to curtail the coca production problem. Two of
these possible solutions are already available. U.S government and UN experts have analyzed
one of them, biological control of coca.1281  The other one would be the creation of an
international fund to buy substitute crops from coca growers at the same price that traffickers
pay for coca crops.1282 In the former case, the remedy would most likely turn out to be worse
than the disease (as in the case of forcible manual eradication and the use of herbicides, with or
without military support). If the coca-cocaine business remains profitable and relatively
attractive, coca producers and traffickers will certainly shift to other locations or find ways to
overcome the attempted remedy.  In the second case, the proposal sounds interesting and
certainly noble but it also seems to be unfeasible, for a very simple reason: how long could the
international community continue to buy goods that are in an unfavorable competitive position
with coca? And above all, how long would (and could) the international community entangle
itself in a price war with the traffickers?  It has to be considered that given the high profits
produced by the cocaine trafficking the traffickers may be willing to offer better prices to the
peasants. This would create a ridiculous situation in which governments would be competing
with traffickers over the purchase of goods that would become more and more expensive and
above all that could be purchased at lower prices in other parts of the world.
Biological control (biocontrol) refers to the use of living organisms or their byproducts to
reduce a target pest population to a tolerable level. Biocontrol methods are categorized by agent
source and application criteria. The primary categories include:
“ *Classical-importation of exotic species and their establishment in a new habitat;
*Augmentative-augmentation of established species through direct manipulation of their
populations or their natural products; and
*Conservative-conservation of established species through manipulation of the environment.”1283
To simplify things, biocontrol of coca would imply the introduction or enhancement of
animals (i.e. coca eating insects and/or bacteria), plants, fungi, or viruses that specifically target
                                                          
1281See: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA),Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies
in the Andean Region , 1993, pp.28-32 and chapter 6; Greaves, M.P., Environmentally Safe Methods of
Eradicating Illicit Narcotic Drug Plants, Department of Agricultural Sciences, University of Bristol,
AFRC Institute of Arable Crops Research, 1991, 39pp. and E/CN.7/1990/CRP.7, Report of the Expert
Group Meeting on Environmentally Safe Methods for the Eradication of Illicit Narcotics Plants held in
Vienna from 4 to 8 December 1989, p.19.
1282This proposal was made by President Chirac to at the time Colombian president Samper during a
latter’s official visit to France in August 1996. See: Keesing’s Record of World Events, News Digest for
August 1996, p. 41226 ; FBIS-TDD-96-028-L; FBIS-TDD-96-025-L and FBIS-LAT-96-160. To the
knowledge of this author there was not a follow up of this proposal.
1283ibid
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coca in illegal producing areas in order for them to destroy the coca. To the knowledge of this
author, these methods have never been employed in South America and never left the
experimental stage in laboratories. Up to date, much of the coca crop in the Upper Huallaga
Valley is being destroyed by a variant of the long-present fusarium oxisporum. The plague
moves downstream following the course of the Huallaga River. The consequence is that
peasants have moved to other areas such as La Convención and Lares, where legal coca
production (for ritual and traditional uses) was taking place. A disquieting fact, however, is that
the fungus is also affecting and destroying legal crops. There is no evidence that a human
purposefully provoked the expansion of this fungus. In any case, the fungus is endemic to the
area and it spreads in monoculture zones. However, the fact that peasants just moved away from
the direction of the spread shows that biocontrol would not be a panacea. Also the fact that the
fungus is killing crops other than coca shows how dangerous bio-control techniques could
be.1284
“In Peru, production costs have risen sharply because of the losses due to the fusarium oxysporum
fungus. The fungus first appeared in 1987-1988 and now causes 40 to 60 percent crop percent crop
loss. Fusarium spreads through soil-borne spores that are specifically adapted to a particular plant
species. Monoculture creates excellent conditions for this fungus to get established and then
spread. At least two genotypes have become specific to coca, even though the mayor of Uchiza
(the worst hit area) says that since 1991, the fungus also has affected legal crops (to a lesser extent
than coca). Fusarium is particularly difficult to eradicate; it can be expected to remain in the area
for years. The spread of this fungus, which occurred rapidly in the early 1990s, has been an
important reason behind the population movements out of the valley.”1285
It should be stated that the case of Peru cannot be particularly taken as an example. In
1991 the Peruvian Criminal Code was reformed and the cultivation of coca was excluded as a
crime. This is part of the so-called “[President] Fujimori Doctrine.” One of the goals of this
strategy is to prevent the peasants from supporting the insurgent group Sendero Luminoso in the
Upper Huallaga Valley. This proved to be successful: when coca eradication stopped, the
peasants stopped supporting the guerrillas (their source of protection) and began to collaborate
with the army.1286 Since 1991 coca eradication is limited to seedbeds and not to mature coca
(it should be kept in mind that a coca bush can live 18 years and yields up to six crops per
year).1287 It should also be considered that after the apparently unstoppable decline of Sendero
Luminoso (provoked by effective rural counter-insurgency and the capture of its leader and the
party’s “cúpula” in 1992), there is no considerable force the traffickers and peasants could
oppose to aggressive eradication programs. (Peruvian trafficking organizations are relatively
                                                          
1284See: OTA, op.cit., p. 209
1285Clawson and LeeIII, op.cit., p. 154
1286See, Dreyfus, Pablo, When all the Evils Come Together, pp. 381-389.
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weaker and smaller than their Colombian and Bolivian counterparts.) However this is not the
situation in Colombia and Bolivia. In the first case the guerrillas effectively control entire
departments of the country with the backing of coca growers and in the second case, the peasant
trade unions wield considerable political power. Also, as shown (and predicted), successful
programs in Peru just led to increased coca production in Colombia.
The use of biocontrol would face several obstacles and could certainly have unintended
damaging consequences. Arguments against bio-control could be classified in three categories:
legal, ecological and political. In the first case, in countries such as Bolivia, the only legally
recognized method of eradication is manual eradication. All other methods are banned by law.
Should biocontrol be used, it would be part of clandestine drug control operation. With all the
background given in this dissertation it would not be difficult for the reader to imagine the
reaction of the coca-growing trade unions if they discovered that such an operation was taking
place in the Chapare. In the view of this author, the reaction would be the same that the
utilization of chemical herbicides would provoke.
“The United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) investigations into
potential narcotic crop control opportunities highlight host country involvement and agreement.
Currently, UNDCP is evaluating biocontrol potential through expert group meetings. Any
activities that might result from these investigations will be conditional on host country agreement
and cooperation in all phases. The U.S. Department of State notes similar agreements would be
sought for U.S. bilateral eradication activities in the Andean region but currently little likelihood
exists for obtaining them.”1288
As far as technical matters are concerned, it is expected that given the profits generated
by the industry, farmers would resort to an excessive use of pesticides in order to control exotic
insects or diseases. This would certainly lead to environmental damage that would turn an
“environmentally safe” method in to an unsafe one.
“Although, it is recognized that classical biological control is environmentally benign, the
establishment of an exotic insect or disease may lead farmers to using pesticides for their
control.”1289
“As long as coca remains an attractive crop, it is likely farmers would take measures to protect
their investment.”1290
“[i] f heavy damage ensued, countermeasures would likely be undertaken by growers. Insects and
mites generally can be controlled effectively with pesticides, particularly where there are no
restrictions on the choice of materials or application rates. Stem borers and soil-dwelling root
borers are more difficult to control, although there are chemical and cultural means for their
                                                                                                                                                                         
1287There are indications that some mature coca eradication resumed in 1996 most probably under
American pressure and surely encouraged by the military defeat of Shining Path.
1288OTA, op. cit., 29
1289Greaves, op.cit., 15.
1290OTA, op. cit., p.28.
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control. Pesticide resistance is likely a critical requirement for these types of biocontrol agents.
Pathogenic fungi are becoming increasingly useful in classical biocontrol of weeds. However, they
also can be controlled with pesticides [...]  Viruses may offer the greatest potential because they
cannot be controlled chemically, either before or after infection[...] However, there is a general
lack of biocontrol workers trained in virology and little has been done in this area of biocontrol.
Further, currently very little is known about viral diseases of coca, or potential vectors.”1291
“[many]  coca producers already use insecticides to control such pests as Eloria Noyesi.”1292
“The environmental concerns over biocontrol focus on the potential for effects on non-target
species and the likelihood of increased use of pesticides by coca producers. Additional concerns
relate to the lack of knowledge of the role of coca in the Andean ecology and the potential for
adverse effects resulting from its removal. Incomplete knowledge of Andean ecology further
means that comprehensive screening and host specificity testing of potential agents are likely to be
difficult.”1293
The potential political problems stemming from the use of  biocontrol methods were
mentioned above. The utilization of herbicides in Peru became a powerful tool in the hands of
guerrillas, who won enormous support from the peasants. What better image to garner support
than the “imperialist Yankees” spraying toxic substance over peasants? The use of herbicides
also produced violent clashes between coca growing peasants and the Colombian Army three
years ago. It also solidified the FARC’s base support in the Guaviare. This author believes that
if peasants or traffickers find out that biocontrol programs are underway the reaction and the
consequences would analogous to the situation just described: it would only add more fuel to
the fire.
“A biocontrol program will face many obstacles, the most obvious being sociopolitical and economic
constraints. The bulk of experience with biocontrol efforts has been in the realm of  controlling unwanted
pests. Coca is not a weed-it is a valuable crop and a source of income. Thus, coca biocontrol programs are
likely to meet resistance from participants in the cocaine economy.”1294
The second suggested “painless” short-term solutions:  offering competitive prices for
alternative products. Generally suggested as potential alternative crops include: macadamia
nuts, rubber, pineapple, black pepper, oranges, hearts of palm, coffee, cacao, bananas, achiote
and corn. Coca’s advantages vis-à -vis these products have been explained elsewhere in this
dissertation. Would the international community be willing to pay up to 15 times the market
price for products that have such clear comparative disadvantages? On top of this, we must also
                                                          
1291OTA, op.cit.p. 192.
1292OTA, op.cit, p. p. 196 The Eloria Noyesi is a moth common in Bolivia and Peru whose caterpillar
feeds on leaves, stalks and tender tips. OTA, op.cit.,p. 194  “The larva of the moth feeds on coca leaves
and is a principal natural pest of coca. With a short lifecycle (30 days) and repeated breeding throughout
the year, larval populations can be sustained relatively easily. Eloria noyesi was reported to “swarm” and
destroy almost 20,000 hectares of coca in Peru, causing losses to drug traffickers estimated to be at least
$37 million,” OTA, op.cit., p. 201.
1293OTA,op.cit., p. 199
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bear in mind that, whereas some countries do provide the necessary political and infrastructure
conditions that would allow legal products such as pineapple, bananas or palm tree hearts to be
produced and exported, other countries like Peru and Colombia cannot offer such conditions.
Paying a higher price for alternative products would not change the fact that, under adverse
conditions (i.e. absence of roads, presence of guerrillas), coca would remain a more reliable
source of income than any of the above products.
Table 2. Profitability of Coca Per Hectare (ha) compared to Other Crops in the Upper Huallaga Valley
Crop or
Product
Production
kg
Production
Costs US$
Sale Price
Per Kg US$
Gross
Income US$
Net
IncomeUS$
Profitability
%
Bananas 10,000 1,566.82 0.64 6,400.00 4,833.18 308.47
Citrus
Fruits
30,000 2,200.75 0.192 5,760.00 3,559.25 161.00
Beans 1,000 592.82 1.53 1,530.00 937.17 150.08
Rice 5,000 1,294.67 0.47 2,350.00 1,055.33 81.51
Corn 3,800 1,061.02 0.38 1,444.00 382.98 36.09
Yucca 20,000 2,941.60 0.192 3,840.00 898.40 30.54
Cacao 800 670.32 0.935 748.00 77.68 11.58
Coffee 800 646.16 0.83 664.00 17.84 2.76
Agriculture 7,000 7,989.54 3.20 22,400.00 14,410,46 180.36
Coca 2,700 1,097.09 1.91 5,157.00 4,059.91 370.06
Source: Upper Huallaga Valley Project (PEAH) reproduced from Lee III, Rensselaer and Clawson,
Patrick, Crop Substitution in the Andes, Washington, ONDCP paper, 1993, p. 34.
Table 3. Per Hectare Yields in Colombia UNDCP Project Areas, Early 1993
Crop Gross Income ($) Costs ($) Net Income ($) Percent Profit
Sugar Cane 1,185 931 254 21
Coffee 1,385 1,077 308 22
Bananas 369 277 92 25
Maize 288 264 19 7
Yucca 492 385 107 22
Cacao 184 154 30 16
Vegetables 31 28 3 10
Coca (cocaine
base)
4,462 2,676 1,784 40
Opium Poppy 7,388 2,767 4,615 62
Source: UNDCP, Bogotá and Popayan. Reproduced from Lee III and Clawson,  Crop Substitution in the
Andes, p.41
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Table 4. Revenues, Costs, and Probability Per Hectare (ha) Planted to Coca and Alternative Crops:
Bolivian Chapare (in U.S. Dollars)
Gross Revenue Per ha
(in $)
Cost of Production Per
ha (in $)
Net Income Per ha (in $)
Macadamia (1) 4,640 1,000 3,640
Black Pepper (2) 3,360 2,413 1,217
Rubber (3) 2,750 736 2,014
Cacao (4) 1,500 912 588
Corn (5) 447 301 146
Coffee (6) 2,250 1,343 907
Annatto (7) 720 308 412
Banana (8) 560 403 157
Plam Heart (9) 2,200 1,129 1,071
Pineapple (10) 3,750 2,071 1,679
Oranges (11) 1,980 824 1,156
Coca (12):
at $40 per carga 1,490 to 2, 381 1,455 to 1,786 485 to 595
at $50 per carga 2,426 to 2,977 1,455 to 1,786 970 to 1,191
at $60 per carga 2,911 to 3,572 1,455 to 1,786 1,455 to 1, 786
(1) Macadamia begins producing commercially in the seventh year after seeding, and reaches full
production in the ninth year.
(2)  Black pepper begins producing commercially in the fourth year after seeding, with full production in
the fifth year.
(3) Rubber begins producing commercially in the 10th year after seeding, with full production in the 15th
year.
(4) Cacao begins  producing commercially in the fourth year after seeding , with full production in the
eight year.
(5) Corn begins producing in the first year after seeding.
(6) Coffee begins producing commercially in the fourth year after seeding, with full production in the
sixth year.
(7) Annatto begins producing in the third year after seeding and reaches the maximum in the fifth year
(8) Banana begins producing the second year after seeding.
(9) Palm heart begins producing in the first year after seeding, with full production in the fifth year.
(10) Pineapple begins producing in the first year after seeding, with full production in the second year.
(11) Oranges begins producing in the fourth year after seeding and reach the maximum in the seventh
year.
(12) Coca begins producing in the second year after seeding, with full maturing after twenty-four months.
Output is 2.2 to 2.7 metric tons per year. Cost of production is assumed to be $30 per 100-pound carga.
Note: Production and cost figures assume medium technology. Cost figures include amortization of initial
investment.
Source: Clark, J. Aid Mission La Paz. Data for Alternative crops developed by Aid agronomist Hernan
Muñoz. (Note: Prices for legal crops are actual or estimated  Chapare prices as of mid-1990).
Reproduced form : Clawson and Lee III, Crop Substitution in the Andes, p.35.
 Last but not least, this chapter was written at the time when the so-called “banana war”
was taking place in the WTO between the U.S. and the European Community. Subsidizing
products that compete with coca might be a noble intention but goes against the prevalent free
trade agreements and international regimes. What would be the reaction of big fruit
transnational corporations to this lack of fair play in international trade? Moreover, what would
be the reaction of other African, Caribbean and South American producers of, say, banana,
pineapples and coffee? Coca, as compared to other agricultural crops, is an expensive
commodity. Why would other producer exporters of fruits and coffee accept the fact that
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Bolivian, Peruvian and Colombian producers are being paid much better prices than they
receive?  In short this proposal would not work.
Once the (military and non-military) options are discarded, the road now is clear for
proposing long term strategies that focus on the root of the illicit drug production problem: the
absence of alternative economic activities for the people working in the cocaine industry. The
containment of illicit drug trafficking requires what has been defined as a  ‘cooperative security’
approach; that is, the problem has to be approached with an integrated strategy and through
multilateral cooperation. The containment of drug trafficking certainly requires law enforcement
but also requires development strategies in the producer countries and demand reduction
strategies.
“The virtue of cooperative security as a descriptive term is that it does embrace and effectively
capture the whole content of both ‘common security’ and ‘collective security’, neither of which is
by itself tells the whole story: at the same time, ‘cooperative security’ picks up some of the
multidimensional flavour of ‘comprehensive security’ as well. Cooperative security has been
usefully described as a broad approach to security which is multi-dimensional in scope and
gradualist in temperament; emphasises reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than
exclusive; is not restrictive in membership; favours multilateralism over bilateralism; does not
privilege military solutions  over non-military ones; assumes that states are the principal actors in
the security system, but accepts that non-state actors may have an important role to play; does not
require the creation of formal security institutions, but does reject them either; and which, above
all, stresses the value of creating ‘habits of dialogue  on a multilateral basis.”1295
The concept of  ‘cooperative security’ is particularly useful, bearing in mind that both the
United Nations and the Organization of American States were created in order to face and
manage traditional military security problems. The core functions and means of the United
Nations are based upon the concept of  ‘collective security.’ The charter of the Organization of
American States, however, privileges peacemaking approaches over peace enforcement
approaches for the solution of intra-American conflicts. The OAS is, at the same time, both a
regional collective security organization and a collective defense organization.1296 While the
goal of the UN was avoiding a new world conflict through effective collective security
(guaranteed by the five victorious powers in the Security Council), the OAS was primarily
intended as a collective defense mechanism against extra-hemispheric powers (particularly the
Soviet Union) and as a collective security mechanism to manage inter-state disputes in the
Western Hemisphere.
                                                          
1295Evans, Gareth, Cooperating for Peace, The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, St. Leonards,
Allen & Unwin, 1993, pp.15 and 16.
1296The basis of the OAS is the Inter-American Treaty of  Reciprocal Defense signed in 1947 which
contains provisions for the collective defense against an attack by an extra hemispheric power as well as
collective security measures in case of a conflict between two American states. See Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, and
8 of the Treaty.
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As stated by other authors, while the evolution and enlargement of the concept of
international security has been recognized in the framework of both organizations, both of them
still have security organs and rules focused on the traditional concept of collective security.1297
The next chapter will show, however, that both the United Nations -as a universal
organization- and the OAS -as a regional organization- have the necessary tools for dealing with
the drug trafficking problem following a non-military strategy and a cooperative security
approach. From that point of view, the collective security mechanisms of the United Nations
(Chapter VII of the Charter) and collective security and defense of the OAS (Chapter VI of the
OAS Charter) can be avoided in favor of more appropriate and effective tools. The tools I am
referring to are the United Nations International Drug Control Programme and the Executive
Secretariat of the Interamerican Commission for Drug Abuse Control (CICAD) of the OAS.
Both organs are executive non-deliberative organs with the capacity to implement their own
programs and strategies (following of course the guidelines of the Economic and Social Council
in the case of the UN and of CICAD in the case of the OAS).  Further, both not only have their
own budgets but also base their activities in the contributions of donor countries for specific
target-based programs. Both organs engage in a broad scope of activities, such as: institutional
support for judiciary systems; support for money laundering control strategies; support for
demand reduction strategies; elaboration of money laundering, small arms, explosives and
chemical inputs model regulations.  As explained earlier, this chapter will concentrate in a very
specific policy tool: alternative development. This tool targets what is considered here as the
root of the upsurge and growth of the cocaine industry: lack of alternative economic activities.
Alternative development has been defined in similar ways in both the United Nations and
the OAS frameworks.1298 In general lines alternative development can be defined as
“a range of activities designed to limit or reduce cultivation of illicit drug crops: crop replacement
programs, improvements in physical infrastructure, and introduction of facilities or services
designed to improve the quality of life of local residents and improve governance. In its narrow
                                                          
1297For the enlargement of the concept of security beyond interstate conflict see: Bouthros-Ghali,
Bouthros, An Agenda For Peace 1995. Second Edition With the New Supplement and Related UN
Documents, New York, Department of Public Information, 1995, p.42 and  Gaviria, César, A New Vision
of the OAS (working Document presented by Dr. César Gaviria to the Permanent Council, on Thursday,
April 6, 1995, adapted for Internet), Section III Hemispheric Security and the Fight Against Drug
trafficking. Available Internet http://www.oas.org/EN/PINFO/hv3e.html. On the aspect of the focus of
UN and OAS security organs of the UN and the OAS see: Ghébali, Victor-Yves, Options for the United
Nations, in The United Nations Disarmament and Security. Evolution and Prospects, New York, United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1991, pp.123 and 124 for the case of the UN and  Mujica
San Martín, María Eugenia, La Organización de Estados Americanos y el Sistema de Seguridad
Hemisférico, in Tirado Mejía, Álvaro, Visiones de la OEA. 50 Años 1948-1998, Bogotá, Fondo Editorial
Cancillería de San Carlos, pp.257-276.
1298Actually CICAD took the concept from the UN and adapted it to the needs of the Western
Hemisphere. See: OEA/Ser.L/XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.10/93, Inter-American Meeting of Experts
on Alternative Development, Alternative Development: A critical dimension of Illicit International Drug
Traffic, September 13, 1993.
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sense, it means inducing farmers to grow crops other than coca by providing knowledge, materials
and facilities than make other crops more attractive. It can also mean providing coca growing areas
with roads, schools and other amenities as a means of integration with the rest of the economy, so
as to encourage non-agricultural substitute activities. It can also include activities that build local
government management capacity and other nation-building activities that increase the
government’s access and control over zones dominated by guerrilla groups and drug producers. In
a broader sense, it can also mean improving the attractiveness of other areas of the country, so as
to induce migration of people out of areas which have comparative advantage in few crops other
than coca or opium. In its broadest sense, the concept comprises economic policies that promote
diversified economic growth and job creation throughout the national territory, including
employment opportunities in urban areas.”1299
Most of the alternative development efforts carried out by UNDCP as well as the
technical support provided by CICAD have taken the narrow approach of the definition given
above. USAID and the European Union have also concentrated bilateral efforts in developing
areas that expel migrants towards coca producing areas (also called “expulsion areas”).1300
This dissertation does not attempt to diminish the importance and significance of development
efforts in expulsion areas; however, insofar as coca and cocaine production remains a highly
profitable activity, concentrating in “expulsion areas” amounts to putting “the horses in front of
the chariot.” The approach employed by UNDCP (which actually plans and carries out
programs, whereas CICAD limits its activities to technical support and advice) is to link coca-
cocaine producing areas to the rest of the economy and into international markets so that the
production and commercialization of alternative legal goods becomes viable. In so doing, these
alternative development programs (in the narrow sense) create the conditions for private
investment in these areas. Only after an alternative industry develops in coca-producing areas
will a national scale program contain the emigration to these areas. It is not possible to go back
to the past and modify the events that led to the upsurge of the cocaine industry in the Andean
countries. Among the stronger arguments against this rural integrated development work in
“expulsion areas,” there are two that stand out: 1. they focus on the development of agricultural
products that will not be able to compete one-to-one with coca; and  2. they tend to be localized
projects thus ignoring the existence of a bigger cheap labor reservoir for the coca-cocaine
industry in the rest of the country.
                                                          
1299World Bank, Illegal Drugs in the Andean Countries: Impact and Policy Options, Country Department
III, Latin American and Caribbean Region, January 22, 1996, p.26.
1300Interview with a high raking official of  UNDCP’s  Latin American and Caribbean section, Vienna
headquarters, January 1997.
This was for example the case USAID alternative efforts in Bolivia “ [a] team of mostly North American
experts carried out extensive research in 1986-1987 and concluded first, that migration to the Chapare
stemmed from a long standing problem facing a large portion of small holding farmers in the central
valleys [of Cochabamba], namely their inability to support themselves through agricultural production;
second, that the Chapare was merely the latest addition to the number of migratory destinations attracting
poor rural Bolivians; and finally, that migration had become a self-perpetuating dynamic, driven by
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“[a]t the very least, there was room for considerable doubt as to whether the main aim of the AHV
[Associated High Valleys in Cochabamba Bolivia] project - to stem migration to the Chapare-
could ever be achieved given the huge reservoir of cheap labor available near the Chapare, let
alone more distant parts. There were many observers  who argued that for this reason alone, the
shift of emphasis from the Chapare had been miscalculated and that alternative development
money should be redirected as soon as possible back to the coca farmers there.”1301
In the view of this author, progress will be made the day people migrate to the Chapare in
order to work in the production of bananas, pineapples or timber--instead of coca. Finally, the
nation-building and local government management capacity component of alternative
development programs can only be implemented once a state has successfully displaced
guerrilla groups or drug producers as the dominant force in a specific area (that is, once the state
has established its monopoly over the use of force). It is very unlikely that an alternative
development program will be successful in an area effectively controlled by guerrilla groups or
drug traffickers (unless the success of the program in question was in the interest of these
groups). Moreover, the risk would be too high for alternative development projects to be
implemented. Experience has shown in the past that peasants in the UHV have collaborated
with Shining Path in blocking highways and blowing up bridges in order to prevent the army
and law enforcement forces from reaching the area. The sabotage of oil pipelines in areas of
Colombia controlled by guerrilla groups is an everyday fact. What would prevent the guerrillas
from destroying highways, electric lines, and bridges? The same could be said of areas
controlled by private militias in Colombia: paramilitary forces could force the peasants not to
support the alternative development programs. The case of Bolivia is different. Cocaine
production takes place not in the Chapare (the target area for alternative development) but in the
Beni jungle, where the traffickers actually hide with armed protection. As far as state presence
is concerned, the Bolivian state managed to impose its presence in the Chapare. The image of
lawless “wild west” towns, such as Sinahota where coca paste was freely sold in the streets,
ceased to be a reality in the mid-1980s. In a sense the state is present but “besieged” by the local
population for the enforcement of certain legal mandates as for example the eradication of
excess coca. The situation is fragile but manageable. Above all, trade unions are legally
recognized organizations and it is possible for the state to negotiate and dialogue with their
leaders. It is true that towns in the Chapare are politically controlled by trade union leaders, but
these have largely come to power through the legally established institutional mechanisms of
the national political system - that is, through open elections. As a matter of fact, UNDCP and
USAID programs have helped to reaffirm state presence in the area (mainly through the
construction of a road system).
                                                                                                                                                                         
interrelated processes of economic stagnation and environmental destruction,” Painter, Bolivia and Coca,
p.119.
1301Painter, op.cit., p.122.
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Let us turn now to the definition of alternative development within the UNDCP and
CICAD frameworks. One important clarification is that “alternative development” must be
differentiated from “crop substitution.” The latter is the strategy adopted by the United Nations
Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC)1302 in South East Asia1303 in the 1970s, and refers
to the replacement of an illegal crop by a legal substitute without carrying out any other
substantial activity.
“The idea of a connection between illicit drug crops and socio-economic development first
received serious attention around 1970s, when work began on the first “crop substitution projects
targeting opium poppy in northern Thailand [...]Crop substitution projects were based on the
premise that the elimination of the economic imperative to grow an illicit crop would within a
reasonable period of time lead to elimination of the illicit cultivation within the targeted area. The
activities would then spread to adjoining growing areas and eventually cover the entire zone of
illicit cultivation. The areas for which this hypothesis was felt to be appropriate were primarily
traditional growing areas where subsistence economies prevailed.”1304
However this approach soon showed limitations as an effective drug control strategy
above all in terms of its ability to develop an alternative economy that would be able to compete
against an already established illegal industry with a market and a commercial circuit.
“The 1970s served as the testing period for this methodology. It became clear that various crops
were feasible substitutes on agricultural grounds, but that challenges posed by marketing  (in
contrast, opium poppy poses no storage and marketing problems) and by the ability of traffickers
to adjust the price paid for opium placed considerable limitation on the ultimate success of  ‘crop
substitution’ as a methodology.”1305
 Based on that experience, the United Nations drug bodies approached the coca problem
in South America with a larger strategy that involved programs aimed at,
“[i]mproving the overall quality of life of the target population by addressing not only income but
also education, health, infrastructure and social services.”1306
The idea was to create the necessary infrastructure to allow peasants to integrate the
products that they cultivated into the market. The goal was not only to replace coca with other
crops, but also to develop a legal alternative economy in coca producing areas. This approach
would be called “integrated rural development,” and targeted traditional coca growing areas. As
                                                          
1302 Three preexisting drug units were unified into UNDCP in 1990.  These were: the United Nations
Narcotics Drugs Division, UNFDAC, and the International Narcotics Control Board.
13031303USAID had already started to apply crop substitution in Bolivia in the mid 1970s. See Painter,
op.cit,pp.105-126.
1304UNDCP, Technical Information Paper, Alternative Development as an Instrument of Drug Abuse
Control, 1993, p. 1.
1305ibid.
446
coca began to be cultivated in “non-traditional” or “opportunistic” zones, the approach would
later evolve into “alternative development,” an approach characterized by rural development on
a larger geographic scale.1307 These large scale development strategies target spillover
production areas and involve the collaboration of local governments with UN development
agencies and organizations such as the United Nations Programme for Development (UNDP),
the United Nations for Operations and Services (UNOPS) and the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO). This approach was inaugurated by UNDCP after its
creation in 1990.
“The approach [integrated rural development] proved to be relatively successful in traditional
growing areas in several Asian countries as the 1980s advanced and served as the basis for the
development of initial projection the coca-producing areas of Latin America. It combined
relatively heavy infrastructure investment with a wide range of other inputs, aiming in most
general terms to ‘open up’ these remote, under-developed areas of traditional cultivation and to
promote their integration into the economic and social mainstream. In the course of the 1980s,
however, especially in Latin America, it became evident that cultivation would be introduced by
traffickers into new, non-traditional areas to meet a growing market and to offset any gains made
in traditional areas. A methodology based on high-cost investment in hard-core growing areas
could not ultimately expect to cover all these new areas. Furthermore, attention would need to be
given to the overall development of entire zones, so as to counter and ultimately prevent the
spillover effect [...] The much expanded objective was recast as “alternative development” as the
activities entered the 1990s, taking on additional inputs with the creation of a consolidated UN
agency, UNDCP, in 1991.”1308
 Put simply, “alternative development” is an enlarged version of “integrated rural
development” that goes beyond traditional producing areas. Thus alternative development
projects do have a crop substitution component but go beyond the mere replacement of one crop
                                                                                                                                                                         
1306ibid
1307 “Until the end of the 1970s it was generally recognized  that illicit poppy and coca cultivation were
traditional crops. During the 1980s the need was felt, as a result of the expansion of cultivation into new
areas, to make a distinction between  “traditional” cultivation zones and “non-traditional” or
“opportunistic” cultivation zones. In traditional zones the producers had historically practiced poppy or
coca cultivation, initially without intending to contribute to illicit traffic in the raw materials or their
derivatives. In these zones, opium poppy or coca most often constituted the only cash crop. To a large
degree the poppy or coca cultivation and the local “traditional” use of opium or coca leaf were felt to be
integral parts of the local culture and should be treated as such, at the same time as careful efforts were
made  to eliminate what might be called a “diversion of production for non-traditional uses”.
“Opportunistic or “non-traditional” cultivation was a different matter altogether. Its roots and its day-to-
day reality wee based uniquely on the desire to make a profit from the growing demand for drugs in the
growing demand for drugs in the illicit traffic. “Opportunistic” producers were themselves conscious of
the harmful and illegal nature of what they were doing.” UNDCP, Alternative Development as an
Instrument of  Drug Abuse Control, p. 16.
Examples of traditional areas in South America are “La Convención” and “Lares” valleys in Peru and the
Yungas of La Paz in Bolivia. Examples of “non-traditional” areas are the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru
and the Chapare in Bolivia. In the case of Colombia, with the exception of a few spots in the south of the
country were the Paez Indians grew coca for traditional use all other areas can be considered “non-
traditional areas” specially after 1995 when due to successful interdiction in Peru coca started booming in
Colombia.
1308UNDCP, Alternative Development as an Instrument of Drug Abuse Control, pp. 1 and 2.
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by another to include the entire development of the area in terms of infrastructure building and
the generation of marketing conditions for alternative products.
In the case of the Organization of the American States--that is, CICAD--alternative
development has been defined along similar lines. The definitions used by CICAD are inspired
by definitions used by UNDCP. Following the UNDCP definition in September 1993, for
example, the first Inter-American Meeting of Experts on Alternative Development1309
organized by CICAD defined alternative development as:
“those [programs] designed to assist the efforts of developing countries to eliminate the production or
processing of illicit drug in their national territory. These programs may assist those governments in
finding and extending alternative socio/economic strategies to farmers engaged in the production of drug-
producing crops that the governments want to eliminate. They may also serve to ease, and thus encourage,
the transition of an entire country from an economic dependency on narcotics production and/or
trafficking to a non-narcotics based development strategy.”1310
Later on, the Interamerican Plan of Alternative Development (Plan Interamericano de
Desarrollo Alternativo), adopted in March 1996, defined alternative development strategies as
an ensemble of actions aiming at generating legal incomes for the producers and at preventing
the expansion of drug trafficking. Alternative development must also aim at eliminating illicit
crops within an environmentally sustainable framework and must be capable of incorporating
the populations identified by each country to the legal economy.1311 A recent meeting of the
alternative development experts group of CICAD broadened this definition to include
development activities in areas in which extreme poverty causes migration towards illicit crops
areas.1312 The official position of CICAD and UNDCP is that they are not rural development
agencies, but rather drug control agencies with a mandate limited to that purpose. In the view of
both agencies, alternative development activities must concentrate in drug-producing areas but
                                                          
1309 “The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), of the Organization of American
States (OAS), at its tenth regular session in October 1991 unanimously adopted a proposal of the
Government of Peru to hold an Inter-American Meeting of Experts on Alternative Development in Lima,
Peru[...]CICAD has convened the Meeting at the expert level for September 13-17, 1993, and specified its
objectives as: 1. To study and evaluate world-wide experiences of efforts to date on crop substitution and
alternative development; 2. To suggest to the governments of the member states of the OAS appropriate
strategies to eliminate illicit cultivation and to prevent the opening up of these new areas to such
cultivation; 3. To recommend to CICAD and other multilateral institutions and organizations, especially
UNDCP, the role which they should play in supporting governmental efforts for this purpose.,”
OEA/Ser.L/XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.36/93, Inter-American Meeting of Experts on Alternative
Development, Final Report, p.1.
1310OEA/Ser. L/ XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.10/93, Alternative Development: A Critical Dimension
of Illicit International Drug Traffic, 13 September, 1993, p.1.
1311OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.19, CICAD/doc.782/96 add.2, Plan de Acción Interamericano de Desarrollo
Alternativo, 8 March 1996, p. 4.
1312OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.23, CICAD/doc.955/98, Informe Final del Grupo de Expertos de la CICAD en
Desarrollo Alternativo, 21 April, 1998, p.5.
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at the same time are considered part of the larger development activities promoted by their
respective organization (UN or OAS).1313
There have been several criticisms regarding the efficacy of the alternative development
strategy as an effective drug control program. Most of these criticisms are based on the limited
results obtained by this strategy so far. They point to the fact that, in spite of the implementation
of alternative development projects in the Andes, and the relative successes achieved in certain
areas, the overall production of coca and cocaine production has increased.1314 But even if
these criticisms are essentially are right, they are also based on a conceptual mistake: unlike
crop substitution which only proposes the replacement of one crop by another, alternative
development is not a short term drug control reduction strategy.  Rather, it is a long-term drug
control strategy that seeks to lay the foundations for the development of an alternative economy
as a whole. Such an undertaking takes time and can only be effective if supported by a
continuous and consistent effort.
USAID alternative development programs in the Andean countries only started in the mid
1980s. UNDCP programs in non-traditional areas like the Chapare only started in the late 1980s
(1988, to be exact). In the case of USAID, we have seen that alternative development and
economic support is the “carrot” subordinated to the accomplishment of eradication quotas by
the Andean countries. This was clearly shown in chapter VI in the case of Bolivia, where most
of the time coca was voluntarily eradicated and then either the promised $2000 economic
compensation or the economic development established by law never arrived or arrived too late.
Naturally peasants would just resume coca growing or just take the money and go somewhere
else. Alternative development can act as a complement to voluntary eradication and has to be
parallel to it. Of course some kind of quid pro quo must be in place in order to ensure that
peasants will not fool the alternative development agency by failing to eradicate the coca
afterwards. According to a study by Rensselaer Lee III and Patrick Clawson, between 1987 and
1992 nearly 7,000 hectares of coca reportedly were voluntarily eradicated by farmers in the
UNDCP project area. In the period between 1985 and 1995, 3,000 hectares of coca were
eliminated in the Cauca-Nariño UNDCP project area in Colombia.1315 It is expected that 2,000
hectares of coca will be eliminated by 1999 during the second phase of the project I visited in
                                                          
1313Interviews with UNDCP officials of the Latin America and Caribbean Section of UNDCP, Vienna,
January 1997. Also see: CICAD, Plan Interamericano de Desarrollo Alternativo, p.3 and UNDCP,
Alternative Development as an Instrument of Drug Abuse Control, p. 26.
1314 For examples of these critiques see: Ambos, Kai, Control de Drogas. Política y Legislación en
América Latina EE.UU. y Europa. Eficacia y Alternativas, Bogotá, Ediciones Jurídicas Gustavo Ibáñez,
1998, Chapter IV;Riley; Kevin Jack, Snow Job? The Efficacy of Source Country Cocaine Policies, Santa
Mónica, RAND Graduate School, specially pp.112 to 117; Clawson and Lee III, The Andean Cocaine
Industry, chapter 5.
1315Clawson and Lee III, Crop Substitution in the Andes, P.47
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Bolivia in August 1997 during my field research.1316 This quid pro quo can be made in every
day local, case-by-case negotiations. As also observed by these two analysts,
“Yet the UN experience suggest that substitution on a small scale can occur via negotiation and 
dialogue. Furthermore, UNDCP does not compensate farmers for coca hectarage eradicated (a 
practice that only ‘corrupts that farmers and detracts from community organization’ according 
to one UNDCP official); on the other hand UNDCP projects provide significant infrastructure 
and services to coca growers in an effort to wean them away from illicit activities.”1317
As a matter of fact, several times during the field research in the Chapare I have
witnessed this kind of quid pro quo negotiations between field officials of the FAO-UNDCP
program on agroforestery and the leaders of peasant communities. Most of the time these
negotiations took the following form (what follows is a recreation of what this author witnessed
– it is not an original dialogue):
--FAO/UNDCP official-We built this road so that it would be easier for you to deliver alternative
products, (the progress made in terms of crop substitution was really outstanding in some parts)
but we have noticed that in area X there is new coca being grown.
--Peasant ‘dirigente (local sindicato leader)’-Well we would need an improvement of the bridge
leading to the area in order to allow the trucks to come for the timber.
--UNDCP official- Well, if you want the bridge we would like to see all these new coca eradicated
first otherwise there is no bridge. Look at what happened with community Y for example, they
eradicated Z hectares and they got the new bridge and a portable sawmill.
--Peasant ‘dirigente’- OK. I will talk to the compañeros and the bases.
--UNDCP official- I will be back here in about a week and we can see what the compañeros said.
Peasant ‘dirigente’- Sure...”1318
Not a single shot was fired. No helicopters. No  tear-gas. No stones. No burned cars. As
far as this author’s experience is concerned, these kinds of negotiations work. If the coca is
eradicated, a bridge is built, and coca will be gradually replaced by other products.1319 It is a
slow process, and it requires patience and negotiation skills, but this author believes that it is
worth trying it on a larger scale. Evidence of the success of this strategy in the case of Bolivia
will be shown in the next chapter.1320
                                                          
1316Management, Conservation and Utilization of Forest Resources in the Cochabamba Tropics-Phase II.
1317ibid,  p.48
1318Since the members of this peasant community could be coerced by both the Trade Unions (for
cooperating with alternative development projects) and the police (for planting coca) I preferred to keep
antonym the names of the communities.
1319Conversation  with an official of the Agroforestery project in the Chapare during to visit to a very
distant peasant community in the Province of Chapare, August 1997. According to an e-mail interview
(November 1999) with a UNDCP official posted in La Paz, this UN Programme has no estimates of the
total of hectares eradicated as a result of the implementation of  alternative development projects in the
Chapare. The current agroforestery project in place (AD/BOL/97/C23) aims at reducing 4,000 hectares of
coca .
1320According to Lee III and Clawson, Between 1987.
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When this author presented these kinds of arguments at a discussion panel during a
conference on multilateral drug control cooperation in Washington D.C., a high ranking official
from the U.S. Department of Justice stated that the bad guys need to be punished anyway. The
official was referring to coca growing peasants that do not eradicate illegal coca. 1321   True,
bad guys must be punished, but some bad guys are worse than others and this author considers
that punishing reckless and murderous drug traffickers would be more “fair” than going after
poor (although well organized) peasants. It would be also more effective for the reasons
explained before.
When this quid pro quo is carried out as part of a global policy, namely as part of a
country certification process by the U.S. government, the result is the vicious circle described in
previous chapters. That is: the governments of the Andean countries try to rush to fill
eradication quotas in order to “pass” certification, this promotes violence and a deadlock,
eradication quotas are not respected, economic help does not come, the peasants get
disappointed and, without any alternatives, and coca growing resumes. For this reason, the
activity of a “neutral” international organization is important. The UN  is not perceived as the
tool of a particular country (namely the U.S.) and its programs are not, at least at the national
level, conditioned to government enforcement policies. UNDCP’s quid pro quo strategies are
pursued not by interacting with governments but rather by enlisting the participation of peasant
communities. In that sense there are “mini-certifications” at the level of the local peasant
communities.
Another problem with judging alternative development programs is financial. The amount
of resources invested by the U.S. (as the leading country in promoting and supporting
enforcement activities in the region) in alternative development through USAID pales in
comparison with the amount of economic resources invested in support for the armed forces of
the Andean countries for operations against drug trafficking. The contribution of (mostly
European Countries) to UNDCP for alternative development projects in the Andean countries
also pales in comparison with the U.S. military support budget.
As stated several times before, this dissertation does not argue that all economic support
for drug control should go to development efforts. Law enforcement is necessary, and is one of
the components of the proposed containment. It is, however, just one of many components, and
not the most important one. No matter how many drug traffickers are arrested, laboratories
destroyed, hectares of coca destroyed, chemical products interdicted, small arms seized, the
drug industry will continue exist--as long as there is a demand for the product, and as long as no
attractive economic alternatives exist for the people working in that industry. The need for a
more balanced approach in international drug control strategies has been recently encouraged
                                                          
1321 Department of State and Office of  National  Drug Control Policy Conference on Multilateral
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and recognized in the framework of the UN and the OAS. It is time to put this balanced
approach into action.
The U.S. is one of the biggest UNDCP donors, however the U.S. has a completely
bilateral approach concerning alternative development in South America.1322 U.S. donations to
UNDCP do not go to alternative development projects in the region. These kind of activities are
implemented by USAID and are part of the international drug control strategy implemented by
the State Department. Alternative development is a foreign policy tool for the accomplishment
of policy goals measured in terms of the reduction of drug flow towards the U.S.. This is
understandable, given that since the early 1980s, the main priority of the United States in terms
of drug trafficking is cocaine--meaning South America. Channeling resources for alternative
development through UNDCP would certainly reduce the coercive capacity of the U.S. over the
Andean countries, but could also enhance the effectiveness of alternative development
programs. The fact that UNDCP is perceived by the coca-growing peasants as “neutral” could
enhance their cooperation for alternative projects. Also if the more U.S. funds for alternative
development are administered by UNDCP the continuity of the projects would be less
challenged by the patterns of U.S. diplomatic pressure. The investment would have higher
returns in terms of the reduction of size of the cocaine industry.
The figures below show the huge difference between the U.S. investment in militarized
enforcement efforts against drug trafficking and the USAID and UNDCP combined resources
for alternative development.
Table 5. Investment made in alternative development projects in the Andean Countries up to 1996
UNDCP(*) Other donors (mainly USAID) Total
US$ 171 million US$ 350 million US$ 521million
(*) Investment between 1985 and 1996 (80US$  million Bolivia, US$ 20 million invested in Colombia
and US$40 million invested in Peru, US$ 30 million correspond to additional cash and in kind
contributions by governments and beneficiaries for UNDCP).
Source: UNDCP, Alternative Development: UNDCP Experience and Policy Implications, UNDCP, July
1996, p.1.
                                                                                                                                                                         
Cooperation, Washington, D.C., November 17-19,1997.
1322Interview with a high ranking official of the Latin American and the Caribbean section of UNDCP,
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Table 6. Military Aid to Bolivia, Colombia and Peru from 1984 to 1994 (in $ US millions) 1323
Country Aid
Bolivia 144,401,000
Colombia 342,232,000
Peru  49,648,000
Total 536,372,000
Sources: Youngers, Coletta, The Andean Quagmire: Rethinking U.S. Drug Control Efforts in the Andes,
WOLA Briefing Series: Issues in International Drug Policy, Washington D.C., WOLA, 1996, p.4, United
States of America, Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal years 1981 to
1996.
Another problem is the use of self-defeating expressions and terms in the language of the
international organs dealing with the application of alternative development programs. This is
probably just a syntactic problem, but has serious practical repercussions in terms of negative
evaluations of these programs. The words “eliminating,” “completely eradicating,” “liberating
humankind of ” the “drug scourge” should be eliminated from the official language of UN and
OAS documents.  The international community must realize that drug trafficking and drug
abuse is an evil that humankind will have to learn to live with. Hence the previous reference to
the need for a “harm reduction” approach in international drug control strategies. An analysis of
the social conditions that lead people to consume psychoactive substances is beyond the scope
of this dissertation. However it must be said that as long as these conditions exist and as long as
there is a demand for these drugs there will an industry that will satisfy this demand. It would be
very naïve to aim at completely eradicating the drug industry. Instead, policies can be developed
to reduce its magnitude. A feasible international harm-reduction policy could be to reduce the
degree of drug production dependency in the economy of the Andean countries. Alternative
development is the perfect tool for such a task when combined with voluntary eradication.  As
stated before, Bolivia has the conditions for the application of such harm minimization policy an
aspect that will be analyzed in the last section of this chapter.
Chapter VI showed that choosing Bolivia as a “laboratory” for militarized enforcement
strategies was a mistake. The next chapter will show that Bolivia, however, presents several
conditions that would guarantee the success of alternative development multilateral policies.
Paradoxically, some of these conditions are precisely those that in led the U.S. to adopt bilateral
militarized approaches in the past. The Chapare has most of the conditions that allowed both
UNDCP and CICAD to carry out their work. There are no active guerrilla groups operating in
                                                          
1323Through analysis of the  Congressional Presentations  for Security Assistance Programs, it is possible
to notice that form 1985 on  the argument used to justify the request of  budgetary allocations for military
assistance to Bolivia, Colombia and Peru is the need to improve the anti narcotics capacity of the armed
forces of these countries. The main sources of assistance are the Foreign Military Financing allocations
(FMF) and International Military Education and Training allocations (IMET).  The FMF program
provides grants and loans help countries to purchase U.S. produced weapons, defense equipment, defense
services and military training. The IMET is a financing mechanism through which the United States pays
for the training or education of foreign military and a limited number of civilian personnel.
453
the area, and access to the Chapare is not difficult for the commercialization of legal products
especially after the improvement of the road system thanks to the implementation of alternative
development policies. The region is also close to markets and consumption centers for legal
products (Cochabamba and Santa Cruz), and it is connected to southern Brazil and the north of
Argentina through a highway system. An Argentine, Bolivian, Brazilian, Paraguayan and
Uruguayan project for improvement of the riverine transportation system is also being
contemplated.1324 This improvement will improve prospects for the commercialization of
Bolivian products through Argentine maritime ports.1325 However, the region presents much
better conditions than its counterparts in Colombia and Peru, where the lack of infrastructure,
geographic isolation, and the presence of guerrilla groups backed by the peasants make the task
of developing these areas far more difficult. This does not mean that the successful
implementation of alternative development strategies in Colombia or Peru is hopeless. The
possibility that an alternative legal economy may grow in areas as the Guaviare (Colombia) or
the Upper Huallaga Valley (Peru) appears less likely because these areas are either controlled by
guerrilla groups (Guaviare) or because their presence is significant (Upper Huallaga Valley).
Either through peace negotiations or by an effective counterinsurgency strategy, both Colombia
and Peru will have to find a solution to their political violence problem before an effective
alternative development strategy can be implemented. In these two countries, drug trafficking
worsens already existing problems:  insurgent groups and the threat of paramilitary militias. As
stated by a seasoned Argentine diplomat, in Peru and Colombia, instead of the state having
advanced over private actors (as in 15th and 16th century Europe), private actors are advancing
over the state and challenging its monopoly of violence and its control over the territory.1326 In
the case of Bolivia in the 1990s drug trafficking is the security problem, and facing it with
military means could open a Pandora’s Box that would unleash problems similar to those of
Colombia and Peru.
                                                          
1324 The project is called “Hydrozoa” (hydroway) and the Interamerican Development Bank funds the
studies for its implementation. On this issue see: Sgut, Martín, Integración en el sector transporte en el
Cono Sur. Puertos y vías navegables, Interamerican Development Bank, Institute for Latin American and
Caribbean Integration, Buenos Aires, 1997 [on line].Available internet http:
http://www.iadb.org/intal/publicaciones/puertos.pdf
1325 The Bolivian government is encouraging private investment for the improvement of Puerto Aguirre
and Puerto Busch over the Paraguay river (both ports are linked to the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway
). The Bolivian Maritime Company (ENABOL) is also improving the port infrastructure in the area of the
Canal Tamengo. The goal is to improve the export of agricultural goods, especially soja produced in the
Santa Cruz departments. These improvements would however also make possible the exports of
alternative goods produced in the Chapare area.
On this topic see: Sgut, op.cit. http://www.iadb.org/intal/publicaciones/puertos.pdf
1326Interview with Ambassador Oscar Camilión, Buenos Aires, July 1997. As a member of  Inter-
American Dialogue, Ambassador Camilión signaled this facts in meetings of this organization in the early
1980s. This idea of an advance of organized crime over the state’s attributes was developed by Susan
Strange (in collaboration with Letizia Paoli) in Power diffused: state and non-state authority in the world
economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,p. 110-121.
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The fact that the bilateral alternative development efforts carried out by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) in South America are not analyzed in depth
here does not mean that these policies have not been important. Moreover, most of the
alternative development efforts in the Chapare have been carried out by USAID.  In a sense,
USAID arrived before anybody else did.1327 However, beyond the good intentions of USAID
on-site personnel, the strategies of this organization are linked to the stick-and-carrot policy of
the U.S. State Department.  Development policies are thus subordinated to, and not necessarily
coordinated with, law enforcement efforts. They are also obstructed by the opposition of U.S.
interest groups which oppose those programs that would encourage the development of crops
that would compete with U.S. export goods such as soy and soy meal.1328 As stated by a U.S.
analyst (who had been posted in Bolivia as a government official),
                                                          
1327 “USAID implemented the Agricultural Development in the Coca Zones Project between 1975 and
1980, spending 1.9 million. The Chapare Regional Development Project (CRDP) began in August 1983
after the return to civil government, the U.S. having withdrawn from the region between 1980 and 1983.”
Lee and Clawson, Crop Substitution in the Andes, p. 44 UNFDAC/ UNDCP alternative development
activities in the Chapare started in 1988. See:Painter. Bolivia and Coca, pp. 108 to 132.
1328“ There is a serious disagreement between the U.S. Mission to Bolivia and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture over the desirability of supporting soybean products in Bolivia as an alternative to coca leaf.
The Mission believes it is an excellent near term alternative. USDA has opposed any support that would
increase Bolivia´s soybean exports, currently at about 1 percent of U.S soybean exports […] because they
would compete with the U.S. product on world markets.” United States General Accounting Office,
Testimony, Restrictions on U.S. Aid to Bolivia for Crop Development Competing With U.S. Agricultural
Exports and their Relationship to U.S. Anti-Drug Efforts, Statement of Allan I. Mendelowitz, Director
International Trade, Energy, and Finance Issues National Security and International Affairs Division,
Before the Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research and Foreign
Agriculture and Subcommittee on Wheat, Soybeans, and Feed Grains, House of Representatives, pp. 2
and 3.
“During 1988-1990 the Agency of International Development´s (AID) mission in Bolivia proposed to
provide assistance for growing soybeans and citrus as alternatives to growing coca. In 1990 the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation proposed that it be allowed to consider providing aid to citrus projects in
Andean countries. The proposals were not approved. The Department of Agriculture opposed such
assistance. The department of Agriculture opposed such assistance. Since passage of legislative of
legislative exemptions in late 1990, the AID mission in Bolivia has begun to provide small amounts of aid
to soybeans and citrus. In 1991 a high-level interagency team proposed that the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation be allowed to assist soybean and citrus projects in Andean countries. The
proposal was not approved [….] The AID mission and the U.S. embassy in Bolivia tried to persuade the
interagency group to not prohibit soybean aid. However, AID headquarters was concerned that if any AID
financing were used to help Bolivia produce soybeans for export, the American Soybean Association
might persuade Congress to enact more restrictions. Such action could have repercussions for AID efforts
in its agriculture and export sector development worldwide. The soybean case was considered to be
highly politically sensitive. AID headquarters, viewed the Association as having led a successful effort to
reduce AID´s 1986 budget by 100 million,”  United States General Accounting Office, Report to
Congressional Requesters, Drug Policy and Agriculture. U.S. Trade Impacts of Alternative Crops to
Andean Coca,  Washington D.C., GAO, 1991.pp.3 and 4.  On this issue also see, Painter, Bolivia and
Coca, p.136.
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“ [t]he U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA), fearing undue competition with the U.S. soybean
producers, forced AID, beginning in 1989, to exclude Bolivian soybeans product. In 1990 and
1991 the U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia argued against this and the U.S. Accounting Office (GAO)
concurred, that one could not hope to take effective action to destroy Bolivian coca production,
leaving 300 thousand or more producers jobless, unless some adequate substitutes in the form of
employment, income and foreign exchange were generated on behalf of Bolivia.  As it was
explained, even if Bolivia realized its considerable soybean potential, its exports would only equal
about 3 percent of the actual world market (the U.S. accounts for 38 percent of the world soybean
market today). Despite this analysis and the U.S. government’s own position that drug trafficking
was a threat to national security, USAID found itself unable to convince the DOA that there was
little or not threat to the U.S. soybean economy from Bolivian soybean export competition.”1329
Locals tend to associate USAID with law enforcement efforts and even more with DEA
agents and there is a great deal of mistrust on the part of the peasants.1330 The personal
experience of this author during his visit to the Chapare can confirm that, to coca-growing
peasants in local isolated communities, the mere fact that one is perceived to look “gringo”
(U.S. citizen) is equated with being a DEA agent. The situation immediately changes when
development personnel are wearing identifying UN uniforms or badges (such the blue UN cap
or blue UN stickers in the car). In the eyes of the peasants, the UN logo transforms the “ugly
American” into the “good American,” and in this case, this is good for business. It is worth
stating here that it would be a better strategy for the U.S. government to channel the bulk of
alternative development resources through multilateral agencies, and especially through
UNDCP--an executive program with a long experience in the field. As stated elsewhere, “some
parts of the UN work”1331 and UNDCP does its job discretely and very efficiently. There are
also compelling budgetary reasons to increase the role of the UNDCP. With the exception of the
U.S. and Canada, all other members of the Organization of the American States are developing
countries. Even though their contributions can be important, they will never be able to match the
amount of money that rich countries as Japan or European Union members can donate to
UNDCP, an organ within an organization with universal representation. As far as alternative
development is concerned, CICAD should keep concentrating on a technical-supportive role for
national drug control agencies. Of course, funds for alternative development would always be
conditioned by, and subordinated to, the national interest of donor states. However, placing
conditions on the distribution of funds from multilateral diplomatic organizations could be done
(and in fact it is done) in a less crude way and would be less perceived as pressure by the drug
producer countries. From this point of view, USAID has become an inter-governmental tool
meaning: “aid from the U.S. government will come only if the Bolivian government eradicates
                                                          
1329 Menzel, Fire in the Andes, p. 62.
1330Centro de Estudios de las Relaciones Internacionales y el Desarrollo (CERID), Desarrollo
Alternativo: Diagnóstico de Comunicación Social, La Paz, Ediciones CERID/UNDCP,1994, p.38.
1331 See: Williamson, Richard S., “The United Nations: Some Parts Work,” Orbis, Spring 1988, pp. 187-
197.
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X hectares of coca per year”; or “the roads will be built only if the Bolivian government
destroys X number of laboratories per year”; or “USAID will now stop building roads because
they might be used for the traffickers.” UNDCP as a multilateral agency not representing any
particular government, and above all not receiving instructions from any particular government,
is better qualified for on-the-spot negotiations. These negotiations can of course condition
development aid for concrete progress in, for example, coca eradication. However this “tit for
tat” would be based on mutual trust.  Consider the following facts: First, UNDCP officials are
permanently on site during projects during their duration. Second, most part of the time UNDCP
technical officials are recruited in Bolivia, speak either Quechua or aymara and do not represent
the Bolivian government or any other government, that is they are perceived as “neutral” in the
“war on drugs.” Third a UNDCP project is already a guarantee that the project will not be
stopped because of imposed eradication quotas at a national level; therefore, peasants can expect
an improvement of their situation in the long term.
The reason the Bolivian government’s alternative development policies will not be
analyzed here is very simple: it is very difficult to talk about “national” alternative development
programs. Of course Bolivian alternative development agencies exist (this author has even been
physically into the office of one of them, the Subsecretariat for Alternative Development
SUBDESAL), and they do carry out projects. Law 1008 explicitly names alternative
development as a basic instrument of drug control. However, as persistently shown in this
dissertation, Bolivia is a particularly underdeveloped and dependent country. Virtually all the
funding for these projects is provided by the U.S.1332 That means that “national” alternative
development activities are subject to the U.S. pressure circle described before in this
dissertation. If there is U.S. pressure for the completion of eradication quotas obviously
alternative development will be momentarily abandoned in favor of forced eradication, and the
cycle continues.
“Funds from the Bolivian government are negligible compared to the large amounts earmarked by
USAID. Indeed USAID provides virtually all the funding for the nominally Bolivian organizations
in charge of the eradication and alternative development effort, namely 
SUBDESAL,PDAR(Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo Regional- formerly known as PDAC),
IBTA-Chapare (Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuaria), and DIRECO. When the  U.S.
food aid program PL-48o, which administers the credit scheme is, is added to the list, it is perhaps
no surprising that Bolivian observers complain that USAID has created a “superstructure of
alternative development” in which the Bolivian state has little control and little capacity to decide
its own development priorities or projects.”1333
                                                          
1332It is interesting, though, that local officials both in interviews and in official publications insist that
national alternative development and economic compensation (the famous US$2,000 per hectare) are
executed with national funds. Whether this is a product of national pride or a denial of reality remains a
mystery to this author. Obviously remarks on this issue were not made to Bolivian officials in order to
avoid offending them.
1333Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p. 108.
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“U.S. cash aid to the Bolivian government, called Economic Support Funds (ESF), was made
conditional on progress in eradication; the various other targets, such as economic reform
measures that were supposed to be met, never influenced release of the cash aid. Even though the
Bolivian government had launched a courageous program of economic reform in 1985, ESF
support was small until the eradication program got going. This fact indicates that the hollowness
of claims made by U.S. government officials that ESF supports Bolivian reforms. ESF funding has
been carefully calibrated each year according to an agreed schedule of so much money for so may
hectares eradicated. However, despite the U.S. Government claim that ESF does not finance
compensation, in practice, the ESF provides enough to cover the compensation costs and to give
extra cash to the Bolivian government as an incentive to carry out the politically unpopular
eradication program.”1334
In an ideal situation, international support for alternative development, including U.S.
support, should be channeled through UNDCP to the national Bolivian agencies. And the
coercive U.S. pattern should be abandoned in favor of a long-term national development
strategy. The UN is going in that direction: that is investing more money on strengthening
national alternative development agencies and providing funds for them to execute a coherent
alternative development strategy.
However in my view, this approach will not work if the U.S. persists in having a parallel
bilateral and coercive approach in South America. It is time for the U.S. to work hand in hand
with other big consumer countries, such as the EU states. Even if the U.S. is the biggest
consumer country in the world, we have seen that cocaine consumption and drug trafficking-
related crime is a growing problem in Europe. The problem requires a coordinated and
cooperative approach.
                                                          
1334Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.221.
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CHAPTER X:  INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL MULTILATERAL
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
A- INTRODUCTION
This chapter explains the approach used by two multilateral agencies: the Interamerican
Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS-CICAD), and the United Nations International Drug
Control Programme. This part of the dissertation also suggests a shift in economic resources
towards the implementation of alternative development efforts through these two agencies.
B- THE INTER-AMERICAN DRUG ABUSE CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (CICAD)
The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission was the result of a Special
Interamerican Conference on Illicit Drug Trafficking, convened by the General Assembly of the
OAS. The General Assembly took place in Brasilia on November 17th, 1984, and was convened
to respond to mounting concern over the threat posed by drug trafficking activities to the
“economy, the public health, the social wealth, the political stability of the governments, and the
sovereignty of the affected states in the Western Hemisphere.”1335 This was the first time in
the history of the OAS that drug trafficking was included in the agenda of the organization’s
General Assembly.1336 It is not a coincidence that the Quito Declaration, mentioned before in
this dissertation, was cited as a precedent in the resolution that convened this conference. Nor it
is accidental that both the Quito Declaration and this reaction of the OAS General Assembly
occurred right after the assassination of Colombia’s Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in
April 1984.1337
In a sense the OAS was most probably “awakened” by the violence that cocaine
trafficking organizations proved they could unleash against the state. From then on the “drug
problem” increasingly ceased to be viewed as just a consumption problem of the gringos.
According to one analyst,
                                                          
1335AG/ RES.699 (XIV-0/84) , Convocatoria de una Conferencia Interamericana sobre Narcotráfico, p.16
in the original.
1336Useche Gomez, Ximena and Reales, Clara Elena, “La OEA y el Tráfico Ilícito de Estupefacientes”, in
Tirado Mejía, Álvaro, Visiones de la OEA. 50 años 1948-1998, República de Colombia, Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores, 1998, p. 307.
1337According to M.J. Dziedzic,
“The Quito Declaration served as a springboard for the OAS to take up the issue at its fourteenth 
regular General Assembly session held in Brasilia in November 1984”
Dziedzic, The Organization of American States and Drug Control in the Americas, in McDonald, Scott
and Zagaris, Bruce, International Handbook on Drug Control, p.400.
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“Differences between drug-producing and drug-consuming states began to narrow during the 
latter part of the 1980s when it became clear that Latin American nations were liable to suffer 
dearly from the ravages associated with the drug trade. The deepening tragedy in Colombia was 
an object lesson for all nations in the region. After an attorney general, a justice minister, 
multiple Supreme Court justices, innumerable policemen and soldiers, and ultimately a leading 
presidential candidate fell prey of narco-terrorism in Colombia it became abundantly clear 
that the United States was not the only prospective victim of this transnational phenomenon. 
Indeed, the consequences were so extreme that this activity came to be recognized as a bona 
fide threat to regional security.” 1338
The conference was finally convened in April 1986 in Rio de Janeiro. The outcome of
this conference was the Program of Action of Río de Janeiro (see appendices). This program
constructed a framework of recommended actions for members states to follow up on their own
efforts to cope with the drug problem.  It also called for the next General Assembly to create a
commission that would coordinate the efforts of member states in this regard.1339 The result of
these recommendations was the creation of CICAD in November 1986 at the sixteenth regular
session of the General Assembly, held in Guatemala
The Commission enjoys technical autonomy to carry out its functions, and has the basic
objective of coordinating, evaluating, and monitoring the Program of Action of Rio de
Janeiro.1340 CICAD is composed by all member states of the OAS that, at their request, are
elected by the General Assembly.1341 The membership of CICAD is 34 states. This
Commision has two component parts: a deliberative one and an executive one. The deliberative
part is the Commission itself. Each member state has the right to one vote and all decisions are
adopted by an absolute majority of the member states present when agreement cannot be
reached by consensus.1342
Put simply, CICAD is an organ that plays a supportive role. Its goals are to promote
cooperation between states and to provide technical support to OAS member states. CICAD
activities seek to cope with every link in the drug chain by promoting inter-American action.
As explained before, this chapter will only concentrate on the analysis of CICAD
activities concerning alternative development programs. This of course does not mean that all
other efforts in reinforcing institutions, law enforcement, and legal issues do not play a
fundamental part. However, alternative development goes to the socio-economic core of the
problem instead of attacking the symptoms, which is why this chapter will focus on this kind of
strategy. It is worth mentioning that the Commission has made enormous progress in terms of
the development of Legal Model Regulations concerning the control of chemical inputs,
                                                          
1338Dziedzic The Organization of American States and Drug Control in the Americas, p.401
1339 See: Dziedzic, ibid, pp. 400 and 401
1340CICAD, Statute of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) [On-Line].
Available http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/cicad-basic-documents-regulations.htm, Article 1.
1341CICAD, op, cit, article 3.
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machines, and materials (adopted in June 1990); money laundering (adopted in May 1992); and
the international movement of firearms, their part and components, and ammunition (adopted in
June 1998). If adopted by all states in the Western Hemisphere there will be a legal
compatibility and homogeneity concerning these matters that will facilitate international
cooperation. These regulations are not binding agreements. Member states are free to adopt
them as part of their national legal system. With the exception of Guyana and Haiti, all
countries in the hemisphere have adopted the money laundering regulations as part of their
national legislation. However the situation is not the same throughout. For instance, in countries
like Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Bolivia only punish money
laundering of profits from “serious crimes” like arms smuggling, corruption, chemical inputs
deviation, etc. Some other countries like Argentina, Uruguay, Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala,
and Honduras only penalize the laundering of money coming from drug trafficking. 1343
Alternative development was not immediately incorporated as a priority in the lines of
action of CICAD. As a matter of fact, a 1992 official informative CICAD document only
included “Legal Development,” “Drug Abuse Prevention Education,” “Community
Mobilization,” “The Inter-American Data Bank and the Inter-American Uniform Statistical
System,” and the “Inter-American Drug Documentation and Information Center and System” as
the priority lines of action of this agency.1344
CICAD has displayed a self-restrictive position as far as alternative development is
concerned, most probably due to its recognition of the previous work undertaken by UNDCP
and USAID in the region, and also due to the budgetary restrictions of this agency. The
budgetary issue will be addressed later in this chapter, but it is worth stating at this point that the
total budget of CICAD amounts to less than that of a single UNDCP alternative development
program. As argued in a CICAD working document,
“CICAD, since its creation in 1987, has designed and implemented five priority lines of action: 
education for prevention, community mobilization against drugs, legal development, the unified 
Inter-American drug statistical system and the Inter-American Drug Information System 
(IADIS). On Alternative Development, CICAD decided in 1988 to limit its activities to
compiling information on and evaluating world-wide experience on eradication, crop 
substitution and alternative development in light of the extensive work already underway by 
UNDCP and the Agency for International Development of the Government of the United States 
of America (AID).”1345
                                                                                                                                                                         
1342CICAD, Statute of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, [On-Line]. Available
http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/cicad-basic-documents-regulations.htm, Chapter III,  article 10.
1343E-mail interview with a CICAD official, July 1999. The situation however changed in Argentina after
the  new law against money laundering was passed in  April 2000. The new law also penalizes money
laundering from other crimes such as arms smuggling and child pornography and prostitution.
1344CICAD, The CICAD Program, p. 3
1345CICAD, Alternative Development: A Critical Dimension of Illicit International Drug Traffic,
OEA/Ser.L/XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.10/93, September 13, 1993, p. vii.
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The role of CICAD in alternative development (as well as its role in general) has been
limited to supportive tasks. CICAD does not execute development programs; rather, it carries
out studies on how to implement them and gives advice to governments concerning the
implementation of alternative development strategies. In short its role is limited to technical
assistance. 1346
The following tables provide information both about already implemented and ongoing
Alternative development projects of CICAD’s Executive Secretariat:
Tables 1-3. Alternative development projects of CICAD’s Executive Secretariat
Table 1
Project Name Integrated Pest Management
Responsible
Institution
CICAD
Sponsor
Institution
CICAD and U.S. State Department
Funding Source CICAD  and U.S. State Department
Geographic Area Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru.
Summary of the
Project
The goal of this project is to reduce the production of illicit coca by rehabilitating the existing
agricultural economy in an area through a program of crop varietal introduction, integrated pest
management and technology transfer/extension.
CICAD , in conjunction with the United States Department of Agriculture, has designed a
program for pest management activities in support of legitimate crop production, agricultural
rehabilitation, and national capacity building. The project is being implemented in the Upper
Huallaga Valley of Peru. It will address the specific issue of pest management which is currently
a major obstacle to increasing the quantity and quality of existing crops in the Tingo María  area.
The crops that form the basis of the replacement crop program include cacao, coffee and rice
[....]The pilot program will have three components: surveys, integrated pest management
development, and technical subprojects including the development of extension programs,
germplasm introduction center(s), and epidemiological monitoring. The project direction and
implementation will be handled by a plant pathologist hired for the initiative. It is expected that it
will be possible to apply the information compiled in this program to other illicit growing regions
in OAS member states, with the aim of reducing illicit crop cultivation in those areas.
Status Completed (started in February 1997)
Source: Inter-American Drug Information Center (IADIC), PROJECT DataBase [On-Line]. Available,
internet http://bases.ucol.mx/cgi-bin2/cgidosX. EXE and CICAD/OAS, Integrated Pest Management [On-
Line]. Available internet http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/supply_reduction/pest.htm
                                                          
1346Interview with a CICAD official at CICAD’s headquarters in Washington D.C., July 24, 1998.
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Table 2.
Project Name Generalized Instrument of Evaluation and Management of  Soil Utilization (GLEAM)
Responsible
Institution
CICAD
Sponsor
Institution
CICAD
Funding Source CICAD
Geographic Area Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia.
Summary of the
Project
The focus of the project is to develop a tool which maps both legal and illegal existing land-use
activities, through rapid data acquisition, assimilation, assessment and integration via a
geographic information system (GIS) and a computerized image analysis (IA). It will rely on
commercially available satellite imagery, aerial photography and on-site verification from which
information will be integrated with a wide variety of other datasets regarding resource and
economic potential of the area under review. The pilot project will focus on the dense coca-
growing region of the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru. With the GLEAM tool it will be possible
to map existing land use, identify infrastructure in place and the potential for new infrastructure
development, assess the environmental impact of current land-use, and legal base for land
titlement. Upon conclusion of the project, the GLEAM tool will be transferred to the host
government where officials will be trained to use it and replicate the review as required. The
information gathered will provide a common base for discussion regarding the extent and impact
of illicit drug cultivation and serve to support proposals for economic redevelopment.
Status Ongoing
Source: Inter-American Drug Information Center (IADIC), PROYE Data Base [On-Line].
Available, internet http://bases.ucol.mx/cgi-bin2/cgidosX.EXE and OAS/CICAD, Generalized
Land -Use Evaluation and Management Tool (GLEAM) [On-Line]. Available internet
http://www.cidad.org/en/supply_reduction/gleam.htm
Table 3.
Project Name Building Market Links for products form Alternative Development Projects
Responsible
Institution
CICAD
Sponsor
Institution
CICAD and U.S. Department of State
Funding Source CICAD and U.S. Department of State
Geographic Area Illicit coca growing areas in Peru
Summary of the
Project
In consultation with Agricultural Cooperative Development International, CICAD plans to
identify and build on market opportunities for alternative crops by linking producers with markets
for their goods. For producers in illicit cultivation areas, this means looking not only at
production, but the cultivation of crops with demand, competitive cost structure, and the right
services to get the products to the market while returning profit to the farmer. For potential
buyers and co-investors in the United States.
Status Ongoing
Source: Inter-American Drug Information Center (IADIC), PROYEC Data Base [On-Line]. Available,
internet http://bases.ucol.mx/cgi-bin2/cgidosX.EXE  and OAS/CICAD Building Market Links for
Alternative Development Projects [On-Line]. Available online, at:
http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/supply_reduction/links.htm
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The Executive Secretariat of CICAD has also compiled a public directory of experts and
organizations responsible for alternative development programs and initiatives. The directory
was completed in late 1997 and updated during the course of 1998.1347 As an example of
CICAD’s role in promoting the financing of national alternative development programs, in June
1997, the government of Peru sought the auspices of CICAD to convene a Consultative Group
in order to seek international donor assistance with financing alternative development projects
and prevention and rehabilitation programs totaling US$ 192 million. Consequently CICAD, in
conjunction with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) invited the international
community to participate in a consultative group meeting, which was held at the headquarters of
the European Community in Brussels from November 10th to November 11th, 1998.
Representatives of the UNDCP, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the
Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF) attended the meeting in Brussels. At the close of the
meeting assistance was pledged totaling US$ 277 million.1348 When this dissertation was being
written Bolivia had not requested CICADs assistance.1349 It is worth noticing however that of
the three Andean countries Bolivia is the main receiver of USAID and UNDCP assistance for
alternative development.
Alternative development was finally incorporated as a priority line of action according to
the recommendations of the first Inter-American Meeting of Experts on Alternative
Development celebrated in September 1993 in Lima.1350 This first meeting of experts took
place as a result of a movement within CICAD led by Bolivia, Perú, and Colombia, which
demanded a more balanced approach in favor of alternative development activities.1351 As a
matter of fact, in 1991 CICAD had unanimously adopted proposal of the government of Peru to
hold such an Inter-American meeting.1352 Following to the recommendations of the group of
experts, CICAD declared alternative development to be “a priority line of action” and requested
that the Secretariat draw up a program of action on alternative development.1353 The
Interamerican Action Plan on Alternative Development (Plan de Acción Interamericano de
Desarrollo Alternativo) was finally approved by CICAD during its XIX ordinary period of
                                                          
1347OAS, CICAD 1998 Annual Report [On-Line]. Available internet
http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/cicad_annual_report/1998.htm, p.14.
1348ibid, p. 15.
1349Interview with a CICAD official at Washington DC headquarters, October 1997.
1350See: OAS/Ser.L/XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.36/93, Inter-American Meeting of Experts on
Alternative Development, Final Report (preliminary version), September 1993 and OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.14,
CICAD/doc.565/93 corr.1, Final Report of the Fourthteen Regular Session (Provisional Version), October
1993, p.4.
1351Useche Gomez, Ximena and Reales, Clara Elena, La OEA y el Tráfico Ilícito de Estupefacientes, p.
324
1352OAS/Ser.L/XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.36/93, p.1.
1353OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.14, CICAD/doc.565/93 corr.1, p. 7.
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sessions.1354 The Interamerican Action Plan on Alternative Development is a key document
because it clearly shows the will to implement a complementary task sharing with other
organizations already carrying out alternative development activities in the Western
Hemisphere. As a policy guideline, then, CICAD activities are restricted to those areas in which
the organization has a clear comparative advantage.1355 This is a very pragmatic and sensible
approach in view of CICAD´s budget limitations when compared to other international drug
control programs such as UNDCP. As shown above, CICAD clearly has a supportive role to
national alternative development plans. According to the Plan of Action CICAD must act as a
linking mechanism with the following objectives:
• Promote the exchange of specialized knowledge and information and the identification of
specific requests and offers for cooperation. CICAD can also support the formulation of
programs and projects from member states in order to present them to other organs of
international cooperation in particular to financial institutions.1356
• Encourage cooperation among OAS member states as well as between member states and
international financial institutions that may support national alternative development
efforts.1357
• Promote the increase of financial resources from private and public institutions for the
execution of alternative development projects, including social and economic infrastructure
building as well as the commercialization of alternative products.1358
• Provide financial cooperation (upon request of a government) for the institutional
strengthening and consolidation of the national agencies in charge of the planning and
implementation of alternative development programs and projects.1359
As stated before, none of these activities actually imply a direct involvement by CICAD
in the financing or execution of the alternative development projects. In a sense, CICAD’s self-
appointed role is to facilitate the cooperation between states, “opening doors” for financial
support by bringing member states’ projects before international financial institutions, and by
providing technical and (limited) financial support to the national organs in charge of alternative
development.
                                                          
1354OEA, Ser.L/XIV.2.19, CICAD/doc.782/96 add.2, Plan de Acción Interamericano de Desarrollo
Alternativo, March 1996.
1355ibid, p.3.
1356ibid, p.6.
1357ibid.
1358ibid.
1359ibid.
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These action guidelines were confirmed in both CICAD’s Anti-Drug Strategy in the
Hemisphere1360 and the latest meetings of CICAD’s Working Group on Alternative
development.1361 CICAD’s Executive Secretariat is also carrying out research on how to
encourage private sector investment in illicit crop producing areas.1362
Just as an anecdote, as early as 1978 (long before drug trafficking became an issue in the
agenda of the OAS), the Department of Regional Development (DRD) of the OAS designed an
integrated rural development project in the Chapare region in Bolivia.1363 This was not a drug
control project, as its goal was the preparation of a dossier with proposals for the integration of
a recently colonized area (Chapare) to the rest of the country. However, one of the concerns of
the Bolivian government was the development of the area in order to prevent new settlers from
turning to coca as their preferred agricultural crop.1364 The DRD study ended in April 1980
with the presentation of a final report with policy recommendations. However, the
implementation of the plan was abandoned after García Meza’s coup in 1980. The importance
of this project lies in that it has been subsequently cited as an example for alternative
development activities in that area. As reported,
“The Department of Regional Development of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
worked with the Bolivian government between 1978 and 1980, to formulate an ambitious 
development strategy for the Chapare that included identifying investment opportunities for 
immediate implementation. First and foremost, the strategy provided a framework for 
coordinating the activities of some 5 international regional and private institutions 
promoting development in the Chapare at the time. The OAS plain remains the standard from 
which all subsequent Chapare development activities have been drawn, and included seven
areas: 1)technology transfer, 2) provision of agricultural credit; 3) promotion of agroindustry; 4) 
zonal market development; 5) secondary road construction; 6) electrification; and 7) 
installation of potable water systems....OAS acknowledged that coca leaf production might 
expand in response to development investment over the short-to-medium term. However, 
it felt that only as economic development opened opportunities to earn a reliable income 
through other activities, would the importance of coca leaf and cocaine diminish.”1365
                                                          
1360 “The countries of the hemisphere recognize that alternative development is an important component
for generating and promoting lawful, viable and sustainable economic options that will make it possible
to overcome the factors that give rise to the phenomenon, and lead to a reduction in the supply of illicit
drugs. In this connection, in reinforcing their national plans on this subject, they call upon the community
of nations and the specialized international organizations to cooperate vigorously in attaining that goal
and work in close cooperation with the OAS/CICAD to ensure that the best experience in the region is
employed in planning and developing these programs,” CICAD, Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere
[On-Line]. Available internet http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/ciad-basic-documents-strategy.htm, paragraph
22.
1361OEA/Ser.L/XIC.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.13/97 rev.1, September 1997 and  OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.23,
CICAD/doc.955/98, April 1998.
1362ibid., p.2
1363 Which would be the equivalent to the UN’s United Nations Developement Programme (UNDP).
1364See: Department of Regional Development, Secretariat for Economic and Social Affairs,
Organization of  American States, Integrated Regional Development Planning: Guidelines and case
Studies from OAS experience, DRD in cooperation with National Park Service, USDI and USAID,
Washington D.C., January 1984, p. 183.
1365OTA, op.cit., p.85.
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We have seen that the CICAD has adopted a “task sharing” policy characterized by a
restriction to activities in which the organization has a comparative advantage in technical
support and fund seeking for projects. It is also worth noting that CICAD activities are seriously
restricted by its limited budget. With the exception of the United States and Canada (the latter
only became a member of the OAS in 1992), all other members of the organization are
developing countries, most of which have serious foreign debt problems. This situation is
worsened by the fact that in Latin America most of  U.S. support (the U.S. being at once the
first illicit drugs consumer and the richest member of the organization)  for alternative
development and drug control in general is strictly bilateral (USAID). Budget shortages were
particularly serious in the 1980s because of a halt in U.S. payments. Indeed U.S.
interventionism in Central America and the U.S. bilateral approach to the foreign debt issue
were difficult to reconcile with multilateral diplomacy. The Reagan administration chose OAS’
budget restrictions as a way to indicate that. As an example, the funding provided for CICAD´s
entire operations in 1987 was of only US$775,000.1366 As stated by an analyst,
“The present financial crisis of the Inter-American System stems in part from the action of the 
U.S. in the 1970s to reduce its portion of the quota, presently 66 percent, and the large arrears 
($30million) of the U.S. that the Reagan administration had allowed to accumulate. It also 
stems in part from debt fatigue and the inability of the other American countries to meet their 
obligations. At its core, the issue of the 66 percent U.S. quota is a spurious one since the U.S. 
pays 60 percent of the NATO budget without flinching.”1367
The situation might change with the recent U.S. acceptance and call for a more
multilateral approach, however in terms of the scope of this dissertation it is probably too early
to evaluate consider this a shift in the U.S. international drug control policy. The U.S. is
currently approaching Latin American countries bilaterally in order to test their willingness to
intervene with military forces in Colombia given the military successes of the FARC forces
(which, as has been discussed before, control the main coca producing areas). But this does not
necessarily indicate a shift in policy.
As stated above, CICAD’s total budget pales in comparison with that of even a single
UNDCP alternative development project. The UNDCP’s total biannual budget is US$
109,112,400.1368 The UNDCP project “Agroindustrial Development in the Chapare,” for
example, totaled US$ 3,162,656. And another project, “ Support for the Management,
                                                          
1366 Dziedzic, The Organization of American States and Drug Control in the Americas, in McDonald,
Scott and Zagaris, Bruce, International Handbook on Drug Control, London,  Greenwod Press,
1992,p.403.
1367See Scheman, L. Ronald, Rebuilding the OAS: A program of its second century, Inter-American
Review of Bibliography, Vol. XXXIX, Nº4, 1989, p. 533.
1368See E/CN.7/1997/CRP.1, Commission on Narcotics Drugs, Administrative and Budgetary Matters,
Proposed Revised Budget for the Biennium 1996-1997 and Proposed Outline for the Biennium 1998-
1999, Fund of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme and Programme Support Cost,
p.7. Of this amount, in the biennium 1996-1997, US$41,183,600 was assigned for projects in the Latin
America and Caribbean Sector, ibid. p.8
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Conservation and Utilization of Forestry Resources in the Tropic of Cochabamba,” 1369 which
was in its final phase at the time this author visited the Chapare in August 1997, totaled US$
1,467,900.1370 In 1998, CICAD’s total budget for all areas (supply reduction, legal
development, information exchange, evaluation of national strategies, and demand reduction)
was US$ 6,190,050, taking OAS regular funds and foreign contributions.
This wide budgetary difference between both organs is not surprising for the following
reasons:
First, UNDCP is an executive agency of an organization with universal representation, so it is
natural that the European countries that started having a serious cocaine consumption problem
in the mid 1980s would choose an organization in which they were directly represented.
Second, UNDCP’s predecessor, UNFDAC, had been directly carrying out alternative
development activities in the region since 1985. UN teams had already acquired an accumulated
experience and they were also already present in the field. Third, considering the fact that drug
trafficking is a global problem, there is nothing wrong with the fact that  the UN has a bigger
share of the pie of contributions for drug control projects. As far as alternative development in
South America is concerned, and for the sake of efficiency, in the long term the U.S. should
abandon its bilateral pattern and should “share its responsibility” together with other big donors
within the framework of UNDCP.
This commentary opens the door for an analysis of the UN comparative advantages and
potential in the effort to contain the scope of drug trafficking in South America.
C- THE UNITED NATIONS DRUG CONTROL MACHINERY
Due to space concerns this section will not deal with a detailed history of the evolution of
the UN’s drug control agencies. Rather, this part of the dissertation will explain what actual
tools the UN possesses and is able to utilize in order to contain the problem of drug trafficking
in South America through the development of alternative economic options in drug producing
areas. This section will also show that the UN has the necessary tools to deal with a non-
military transnational security problem through non-military means. Again, and even at the risk
of sounding repetitive, these tools can be useful only as a way to channel efforts aimed at
reducing the scope of the problem, not at totally eliminating it. As stated before, as far as drug
trafficking is concerned, goals posed in absolute terms are self-defeating by nature and can
exacerbate the problem.
                                                          
1369Project BOL/93/818, organized and planned by UNDCP, funded by the Italian government and
executed by the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development (UNIDO) the project started in
November 1993 and finished in  December 1995.
1370Project AD/BOL/92/582, financed through UNDCP with funds from the German government and
executed by  the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.
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a) The United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP)
The United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) was established in 1991 in
accordance with General Assembly resolution 45/179 of December 21, 1990. If CICAD  was
born out of the guidelines established in the Program of Action of Rio de Janeiro, UNDCP is the
direct result of the guidelines of the Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action
adopted by the General Assembly at its seventeenth special session (A/RES/S-17/2). This
document focuses on the question of international cooperation against illicit production supply,
demand, trafficking, and distribution of psychotropic substances.  As stated in the Global
Programme of Action,
“Intensification of efforts at the national level and increased intergovernmental co-operation 
require a commensurate strengthening of the United Nations drug control organs and their 
secretariats. Against this background, the functioning of the United Nations structure for drug 
abuse control needs to be reviewed and assessed, in accordance with the mandate given to the 
Secretary-General by the General Assembly [...] for the purpose of identifying alternative 
structural possibilities, the end result being the establishment of a stronger, more efficient 
United Nations drug control structure with enhanced status.”1371
UNDCP is the culmination of a process that started with the adoption in Vienna of the
Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline (1987) and the 1988 Vienna Convention on Illicit
Drug Trafficking, as discussed in chapter I.1372 The difference between the OAS and the UN
lies in that, whereas the OAS created organs to face for the first time the problem stemming
from drug abuse and trafficking, the UN updated and improved the already existing machinery
in order to cope with a problem that had adopted new and worse political, economic and social
dimensions to the point of becoming a security problem.
UNDCP integrated  the structure and functions of the three former UN drug control units
into a single program, namely the Division of Narcotic Drugs (UNDND), the United Nations
Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), and the International Narcotics Control Board
Secretariat (INCB).  UNDCP (based in Vienna) was entrusted with the exclusive responsibility
of coordinating and providing effective leadership for all United Nations drug control activities,
which are guided by nine operational priorities. Only those priorities considered relevant within
the scope of this dissertation are listed below:
• Promoting north-south and south-south cooperation:
                                                          
1371A/RES/S-17/2,Global Programme of Action, Section H, paragraph 93.
1372The Quito Conference of 1985 also played a “pushing “ in leading to a reform and an improvement of
the available UN mechanisms to cope with the problem of drug trafficking. Already in 1985 after the
Quito and New York declarations the United General Assembly decided to take the decision of convening
an international conference on drug abuse an illicit drug trafficking (which was finally celebrated in
Vienna in 1987).
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“Drug abuse is no longer a problem unique to any one region or group of states. Developing an 
industrialized countries alike suffer from shortages of human and financial resources. What 
tends to differentiate them are their disparate level of socio-economic development and the 
means they are able to dedicate to drug abuse control. Within all countries there are 
nevertheless technical  and human resources that can be encouraged and mobilized. UNDCP 
will help developing countries in this respect so that they can assume full responsibility for 
their own drug abuse control activities consistent with their cultural, social of political realities.
UNDCP will increasingly mobilize and facilitate technical exchange between ‘north’ and ‘south’
and between countries in the ‘south’ and will promote the twinning of countries, institutions and
NGOs.”1373
• Fund raising:
“While playing an increasingly vigorous ‘broker’ role, UNDCP will also assume a more 
increasingly responsibility in the evaluation of projects and programs so as to ensure the 
best use of available funds.”1374
• Coordination
“Within the United Nations system, UNDCP will give greater attention to directing 
coordinating, and rationalizing all drug abuse control activities, seeking always to prevent 
duplication and make the optimum use of resources around agreed upon  goals and 
objectives.”1375
UNDCP consists of two main operational divisions: The Division for Treaty Affairs and
Support to Drug Control Organs and the Division of Operation and Analysis. The latter is of
greater interest for this dissertation because it manages UNDCP technical cooperation
worldwide. It assists governments and other institutions in the development and implementation
of national, subregional, and regional programs for combating the illicit cultivation, production,
manufacture, traffic, and abuse of drugs. The Division coordinates technical cooperation
strategies at the regional and global levels and considers all requests for assistance received by
UNDCP. The Division has four regional bureaus, which are based in Vienna and deal with:
1. Asia and the Pacific;
2. Europe, North America and the Middle East;
3. Africa and the Pacific; and
4. Latin America and the Caribbean.
There are also sixteen national and subregional field offices that form an integral part of the
Division and participate in the planning and management of technical cooperation projects. This
division is then in charge, through its regional section, of planning, coordinating, and
channeling funding for alternative developing projects.
                                                          
1373E/CN.7/1992/7/Add.1, p.6, paragraph 14.
1374ibid., p.8, paragraph 20.
1375ibid,p. 8, paragraph 22
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UNDCP is funded through the regular budget of the United Nations, as well as from
extra-budgetary resources under the Fund of UNDCP. The regular budget of UNDCP represents
approximately 10 %  of UNDCP’s resources and essentially covers normative activities in the
areas of treaty implementation and legal affairs as well as some advisory services. The Fund
budget represents approximately 90 % of the resources, and is financed through voluntary
contributions by governments and other sources such as NGOs. The Fund is geared towards
assisting developing countries in meeting their obligations to implement provisions of  the
international drug control treaties. This assistance is provided through UNDCP headquarters, its
field offices network and by projects carried out by executing agencies other than UNDCP
itself. The utilization of this Fund in alternative development support activities will be the focus
of this section.
As part of the administrative reforms implemented by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,
UNDCP has been grouped together with the United Nations Center for International Crime
Prevention (CICP), as part of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
(ODCCP). 1376 Under this reform UNDCP and the CICP were assigned under the same
Executive Director, who is responsible for the activities of both agencies as well as their
administration and acts on behalf of the UN Secretary General. The goal of  this restructuring is
to enhance the ability of the UN to address the interrelated issues of drug control, crime
prevention and international terrorism. Basically, the functions of UNDCP remain the same and
there is no overlapping of  functions. As stated by Secretary General Kofi Annan,
“The same means of communication and personal mobility that make it possible for actors to 
function globally also enable ‘uncivil society’ actors to so. In this world of increasingly porous 
borders new threats have emerged to national security, economic development, democracy and 
sovereignty in the form of transnational networks of crime, drug trafficking, money-laundering 
and terrorism. By consolidating the several relevant functions into one single Office for Drug 
Control and Crime Prevention, based in Vienna, and by appointing Mr. Pino Arlacchi, an expert 
                                                          
1376 CICP “[a]assists Member States in the use and application of crime prevention and criminal justice
standards and norms. These standards range from principles on the independence of the judiciary to
minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners, a code of conduct for law enforcement officials, principles
on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials and principles of justice for victims and
abuse of power. More than 120 countries worldwide rely on these standards for the formulation and
application of modern and fair domestic policies  in crime prevention and criminal justice. The Centre is
responsible for United Nations technical cooperation activities within its sphere of competence. It
promotes the fundamental principles of the maintenance of the rule of law through integrated national,
regional and interregional policies. The Centre strengthens the capacity of Governments to reform
legislation and criminal justice systems; helps in establishing institutions and mechanisms for the
detection, investigation, prosecution and adjudication of various types of crime; and upgrades the skills of
crime prevention and criminal justice personnel.  The technical cooperation activities of the Centre are
currently focussed on three areas of priority concern for the international community: anti corruption,
control of organized crime and illicit trafficking in human beings. Particular attention is devoted to post-
conflict situations, developing countries with economies in transition.”  United Nations Office for Drug
Control and Crime Prevention, Centre for International Crime Prevention [On-line]. Available internet
http://www.ifs.univie.ac.at/~uncjin/CICP/Index.html
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on organized crime, to lead it, I have sought to reposition the United Nations to help contain the 
growing threat.”1377
As in the case of OAS, the UN also displays a division between a
deliberative/representative organ, the Commission of Narcotics Drugs (CND), and an
executive/operational one, the UNDCP. The difference is that while the Executive Secretariat of
OAS/ CICAD is an integral part of the commission, in the case of the United Nations, UNDCP
is a program that depends on the Secretary General, but acts as the executive secretariat of the
CND, which is one of the functioning commissions of the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC). The CND was created in 1946 and was entrusted with international economic,
social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters.1378 The CND is the central policy
making body within the United Nations system for dealing with all drug-related matters, a body
which analyzes the world drug abuse situation and develops proposals to strengthen
international drug control. Membership in the Commission grew from 15 states in 1946 to 21 in
1961, 24 in 1966, 30 in 1972, 40 in 1983, and 53 in 1991. Its growth in fact reflected the
worldwide expansion of the drug abuse phenomenon.
Let us now go back to the executive/operational organ, the UNDCP, which is the focus of
this chapter. As explained before, the analysis will be limited here to UNDCP’s actions in
alternative development. It should be noted however that the activities of this agency comprise
all the aspects of the drug problem, including demand and all the aspects of the supply side that
is: production, transportation, and money laundering.
Since its establishment UNDCP has maintained a balanced and comprehensive approach:
“Whether formulating general strategies or selecting individual projects, UNDCP has adopted a 
comprehensive vision, recognizing the interlinkage between drug production, trafficking and 
consumption; efforts to control one manifestation of the problem will have little effect without 
parallel efforts to control the others. Supply and demand are two aspects of the same problem 
and must be dealt with at the same time...The Programme has attempted to include measures to 
deal with each of the complex aspects of the drug problem, with an appropriate attack on the 
various links in the drug chain.”1379
                                                          
1377Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization [On-Line]. Available at
internet http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report97/97rep2.htm, p.15
1378Under article 68 of the Charter,the Council has set up various functional commissions since 1946.
The functional commissions of the Council include the following: the Statistical Commission, the
Population Commission, the Commission for Social Development, the Commission on Human Rights,
The Commission on the Status of Women, the Commission on Narcotics Drugs, the Commission on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the Commission on Science and Technology for Development
and the Commission on Sustainable Development.
1379E/CN.7/1992/7, General Debate, Report of the Executive Director of the United Nations International
Drug Control Programme, March 1992. For more examples on this emphasis concerning a the balanced
approach strategy between demand and supply and between the different links in drug trafficking see:
E/CN.7/1999/6, Activities of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Report of the
Executive Director, January 1998, p.1, p.3; E/CN.7/1998/?(check again), Policy Issues for Action by the
United Nations International Control Programme, Activities of the United Nations International Drug
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This balanced approach is better reflected by the evolution of the budget assignment of
the Programme from 1991 to 1998, which is shown in the tables below:
Table 4. UNDCP commitments 1998-1999, initial estimates and final estimates 1996-1997
(Thousands of U.S. dollars where 1,000 = 1,000,000)
 1996-1997
final estimates
Commitments for
1998-1999
as of Sept. 1997
1998-1999
initial estimates
Programme
  Sub-Saharan Africa 4,858.9 866.1 9,499.9
  North Africa and the Middle East 1,504.1 1,141.9 3,265.9
  Central and Eastern Europe 5,279.0 1,424.0 9,060.6
  West and Central Asia 11,120.9 16,871.6 24,221.9
  South Asia 2,330.3 1,359.9 3,952.8
  East Asia and the Pacific 11,236.9 5,559.0 17,001.2
  Latin America and the Caribbean 23,934.3 9,096.3 27,999.7
  Intercountry 14,278.5 6,728.1 15,500.0
TOTAL 74,542.9 43,046.9 110,502.0
Sector
  Prevention and reduction of drug abuse 21,137.5 10,528.6 21,945.9
  Elimination of illicit crops 20,307.9 18,321.8 29,375.3
  Suppression of illicit drug trafficking 17,753.5 8,680.6 40,063.4
  Intersectoral 15,344.0 5,515.9 19,117.4
TOTAL 74,542.9 43,046.9 110,502.0
Source:  United Nations, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, E/CN.7/1997/CRP.1, Administrative and
Budgetary Matters, Proposed Revised  Budget for the Biennium 1996-1997 and Proposed Outline for the
Biennium 1998-1999, Compendium of Ongoing Projects During the Biennium 1996-1997, p.8.
                                                                                                                                                                         
Control Programme, Report of the Executive Director [On-Line] http://www.undcp.org/document_1998-
01-27_1.html, p. 2, paragraph 2,  E/CN.7/1997/2, General Debate, Activities of the United Nations
International Drug Control Programme,  Report of the Executive Director, January 1997, p. 1, paragraph
1; E/CN.7/1996/2, General Debate: Government Action to Implement the Global Programme of Action
and Policy Directives Addressed to the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Including
follow-up to General Assembly Resolution 48/2. Activities of the United Nations International Drug
Control Programme, Report of the Executive Director, March 1996, p. 3, paragraph 1.
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Table 5 Resource Mobilization for ongoing activities
1996-1997 and 1998-1999
 Volume of ongoing
programme activities
1996-1997 and
1998-1999
(Thousands of US$)
Resource mobilization (%)
Unearmarked
(General-
purpose)
Earmarked
donor
(Special-
purpose)
Earmarked
cost-sharing
(Special-
purpose)
Programme
  Sub-Saharan Africa 5,725.0 30.9 69.1 --
  North Africa and the Middle East 2,646.0 26.4 73.6 --
  Central and Eastern Europe 6,703.0 37.2 62.8 --
  West and Central Asia 27,992.5 21.4 78.6 --
  South Asia 3,690.2 34.2 65.8 --
  East Asia and the Pacific 16,795.9 23.2 76.8 --
  Latin America and the Caribbean 33,030.6 11.3 75.6 13.1
  Intercountry 21,006.6 25.9 74.1 --
TOTAL 117,589.8 21.5 74.8 3.7
Sector
  Prevention and reduction of drug
abuse
31,666.1 19.7 72.1 8.2
  Elimination of illicit crops 38,629.7 17.4 78.1 4.5
  Suppression of illicit drug trafficking 26,434.1 26.4 73.6 --
  Intersectoral 20,859.9 25.7 74.3 -
TOTAL 117,589.8 21.5 74.8 3.7
Source:  United Nations, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, E/CN.7/1997/CRP.1, Administrative and
Budgetary Matters, Proposed Revised  Budget for the Biennium 1996-1997 and Proposed Outline for the
Biennium 1998-1999, Compendium of Ongoing Projects During the Biennium 1996-1997, p.8.
There is clear regional imbalance between regions covered by UNDCP operations.
However, the fact that activities concerning Latin American and Asia receive more funds seem
natural since these two regions are the foremost producer areas of those drugs (cocaine in the
case of  Latin America, and heroin in the case of Asia )  that are most widely abused throughout
the world and especially in the donor countries (the United States and Western European
countries) .
This “regional disproportion” has led some authors to criticize UNDCP on the basis that
this agency is predominantly geared towards supply reduction instead of giving a balanced
attention to all the aspects of the drug problem.
 “The enforcement [of Conventions] orientation of UNDCP is seen in its devoting most of its 
resources to the chain of production, processing and delivery of drugs to the end user 
(including through promotion of substitute crops)-that is , giving the user no alternative to 
obeying the law-rather than on reducing the demand exercised by the user.” 1380
                                                          
1380Seccombe, Ralhp, Troublesome Boomerang. Illicit Drug Policy and Security, Security Dialogue,
Vol.28(3), p.295.
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This kind of criticism most likely stems from a misinterpretation of UNDCPs budget
allocations. The budget may be debalanced along a producer/ consumer regions axis but is
clearly balanced among different priorities within each region. This kind of criticisms also
overlook two important factors:
First, one of the goals and priorities of  UNDCP is to promote North-South and South-
South cooperation. This priority is based on the assumption that developing countries (where
most of the illegal drugs are produced) have less resources than developed countries do to cope
with their drug problem.
Second, these criticisms overlook the way in which UNDCP projects are funded. In fact,
activities in the field receive  donor funding on a case-by-case. The existence of funding is thus
subordinated to the interest of the donor country in providing funds for such a project. Also
most of the time it is the government of a South American producer country that requests that
UNDCP carry out a specific type of project.1381 Needless to say, UNDCP plays an important
role in defining the project and in then persuading the donor of its usefulness it in order to
obtain the necessary funds. The UN is a representative organization and in the end it is what the
member states decide to make of it. As reported,
“Donors may contribute funds with no limitations on how they funds with no limitations ho how 
they are spent -as Sweden has consistently done- or earmark funds for specific types of projects
in specific countries. Moreover, they may actively involve themselves in monitoring its
implementation.”1382
The truth of the matter is that rich donor states prefer to take care of their demand
reduction strategies on their own and donate money for the implementation of drug control
strategies (including demand reduction) in the main producer countries.1383 As reported,
“Many countries are now reformulating their policies on education and health care in line with the 
need to discourage drug use. There is international consensus on the need to reduce demand 
yet, ironically, the opportunities for international action in this area are severely restricted. 
Education , health care and the other long-term, incremental social policies implied by demand 
reduction are almost entirely determined along national lines, subject to the priorities and 
spending limits of governments. Demand reduction is and will remain the preserve of national 
policy notwithstanding efforts to disseminate information and encourage coordination among 
countries. As such, the issue of demand reduction is qualitatively different from supply 
reduction, where the international policy is based on countries’ interdependence in addressing 
cross-border crime. National policies on consumption can also impede policy harmonization 
                                                          
1381E-mail interview with an official of  UNDCP’s section on Latin America and the Caribbean, August
1999.
1382IRELA, Cooperation in the Fight against Drugs: European and Latin American Initiatives, Dossier
Nº55, October 1995,p.15.
1383Interviews with UNDCP officials in Vienna and Bolivia, January and August 1997.
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among countries. Greater toleration of drug use in the Netherlands generates concern among 
neighboring EU Members States.”1384
On the other hand, these contributions are made following the principle of  “shared
responsibility,” and in recognition of the fact that demand expands in producer and transit
countries (thus blurring the consumer/producer distinction and making it necessary as a
consequence to also adopt demand reduction strategies in the “South”) because the trafficking
of drugs increases as a response to drug demand in the rich countries of the North.   In view of
the fact that the production of synthetic drugs in the CEI and Eastern Europe is a growing
problem the European share of the budget is likely to increase in the future.1385
UNDCP is an almost perfect framework for mainly consumer countries to channel
resources into a long term, non-military, supply-reduction strategy through a minimization of
those economic causes that lead to drug production. Moreover, in order to see this strategy
succeed (and “success” should be read here as containment instead of total elimination), the
main cocaine consumer in the world, the U.S., should abandon its bilateral and coercive
approach in South America.  Instead, it should channel increasing alternative development
resources through UNDCP.
b) The System-Wide Action Plan and a short comment on UNDCP-CICAD cooperation
UNDCP is in charge of providing the guidelines and coordinating the activities of all
other UN agencies involved in international drug control efforts. As a matter of fact, as
illustrated in the last section of this chapter, many of UNDCP’s projects are actually executed
by other UN agencies and organizations of the UN system. This coordinated strategy, called
System-Wide Action Plan  (SWAP), was adopted in May 1990 (before the actual creation of
UNDCP), with the goal of avoiding the duplication and overlap of activities in drug control
efforts and promoting a more effective cooperation among various United Nations Agencies.
The SWAP is annually updated and is basically an interagency division of labor under the
coordination of UNDCP. Since 1990, these agencies and organizations are comprised of the
ACC Subcommittee on Drug Control, which meets annually to orchestrate the coordination of
drug control within the UN system. The table below shows the drug control activities addressed
by each of these agencies.
                                                          
1384IRELA, Cooperation in the Fight against Drugs: European and Latin American Initiatives, Dossier
Nº55, October 1995,p.8.
1385Juppin de Fondaumiere, Betrand, Structures et Normes de l’ONU, in Bettati, Mario, L’ONU et la
Drogue, Paris, Pedone, 1995,p.49
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Table 6. Participants other than UNDCP in the SWAP
Agencies and Organizations with a major
involvement in drug control:
World Health Organization (WHO) Aims to reduce the abuse of all psychoactive
substances, i.e., alcohol, tobacco and volatile
inhalants as well as narcotic drugs, and
psychotropic substances, within the context of
promoting universal health; it is the only agency
which is given a specific role by the international
drug control treaties;
International Labor Office (ILO) Deals with prevention and drug-related problems in
the work place as well as vocational rehabilitation
and social reintegration programs;
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice Division (CPJD)
Deals with the linkages between crime and illicit
drugs, including areas such as money laundering
and judicial system reform;
Agencies/Organizations whose mandates have a
drug control perspective:
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO)
Assists in projects aimed at raising income levels of
farmers and reducing incentives to cultivate illicit
crops, and in the potential use of remote sensing
techniques and satellite imagery in detecting illicit
crops;
United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO)
Assists governments and the private sector to
establish and managing agro-industrial
development in illicit crop areas;
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO)
Integrates preventive education concerning drug use
into school curricula as well as in out-of -school
educational activities;
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Incorporates drug abuse prevention work in its
activities, targeting specially vulnerable groups of
children and young people;
United Nations Joint Programme on AIDS
(UNAIDS)
Addresses the linkages between intravenous drug
injection and the spread of the HIV virus;
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Promotes the inclusion of appropriate drug control
elements in its development activities;
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Integrates drug abuse prevention messages in its
education programs;
United Nations Interregional Crime  and Justice
Research Centre (UNICRI)
Undertakes research on the relationship between
criminal behavior and drug use.
As of 1999 UNDCP has signed memorandums of understanding (MOU) with all these
agencies and organizations. UN agencies and organizations with a major involvement in drug
control carry out activities on their own (in coordination with UNDCP) or as partners of
UNDCP in joint programs. The other agencies and organizations can assist UNDCP projects or
execute projects funded and designed by UNDCP.
The SWAP has not turned out to be the perfectly efficient and coordinated machine it was
designed to be at the moment of its creation. Coordination problems exist and have been
recognized by the organization. However, for the purposes of this chapter, it is important to note
that, at the operational level in the field there exists indeed an efficient cooperation between
UNDCP and UN organizations and agencies that have the capability and necessary know-how
477
to execute UNDCP’s agricultural and agroindustrial alternative development projects. These
relevant agencies and organizations are: UNIDO, UNDP/OPS and FAO. The examples provided
in the last part of this chapter will show that field level cooperation in specific cases has been
productive. In that sense the Secretary General’s  call for a “bottom up” approach to
coordination instead of a “top down” approach is a good suggestion that may lead to better
results in the future.
As of 1999, cooperation between UNDCP and CICAD in the specific area of alternative
development was limited to the joint organization of two Regional Alternative Development
Meetings (Lima, September 1993-analyzed in the CICAD section of this chapter- and October
1994). Both meetings were extremely important for the exchange of technical information and
for the improvement of the activities of CICAD’s Working Group on Alternative
Development.1386
In the view of this author, as has been stated previously in this dissertation, there exists a
tacit division of labor between CICAD and UNDCP. We have seen that CICAD has decided to
restrict its activities to technical advice and intermediation with financial institutions and
governments. This self-imposed constraint was in part motivated by CICADs lack of resources,
but also by the recognition of existing field work by national (USAID) and international
organizations in alternative development projects (UNDCP). It is considered here that there is
nothing wrong with CICAD’s self-limitation of activities. Moreover, in order to achieve
concrete long term results it would be very useful for the United States to abandon its bilateral
support and to channel resources through UNDCP together with other western countries (i.e. the
European Union) that are already supporting alternative development projects through this UN
agency.
There is no need to divide efforts when one organization such as UNDCP already has the
know-how, capability, and reputation to do the job. The fact that drugs produced in South
America are also consumed outside the Western Hemisphere reaffirms the need to coordinate
alternative development strategies within a global organization such as the UN. As one author
has remarked, the OAS is an ideal setting for norm creation.  As argued by one analyst,
                                                          
1386UNDCP, Brief Summary of Status of Cooperation Between Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission of the Organization of American States and the United Nations International Drug Control
Programme, Paper prepared by UNDCP for the Third General Meeting between representatives of the UN
System and OAS, New York, 17-18 April 1995, p.2.
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“The OAS is an ideal setting for both normativism and norm creation. The term ‘normativism’ is
used here to depict excessive production of norms that are not usefully applied for the purposes
created. These norms remain in a mythic condition because they only exist on paper and not as
operational law. In contrast norm creation is the learning process by which a body of consensual
norms is created by members to resolve practical needs and fit new institutional goals, even if such
innovation may imply a redefinition of other principles, norms and procedures.” 1387
The fact that OAS member states are adopting CICAD model regulations as part of their
national legislations suggest that these consensual measures are an example of norm creation
instead of normativism. The efficacy of these regulations will of course depend on the capacity
of each state to enforce their laws.
The organization is good at that, and should improve this goal. CICAD has proved its
ability to elaborate drug trafficking and drug trafficking-related model regulations that OAS
member states can agree on.  Having said that, the following section will explain the evolution
the UN alternative development activities in South America.
c) UNDCP’s alternative development activities
Alternative development is the main illicit crops control instrument utilized by UNDCP,
and according to the latest  “Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of
illicit crops and on alternative development,” this will be a main illicit crops control tool in the
next century.1388
“Alternative development is an important component for generating and promoting lawful viable 
and sustainable economic options to illicit drug crop cultivation and is one of the key 
components of the policy and programmes for reducing illicit drug production that have been 
adopted within the comprehensive framework of the global strategy of the United Nations. The 
development and implementation of alternative development is primarily the responsibility of 
the State in which illicit drug cultivation takes place. However, States with illicit drug crops will 
need continued funding, on the basis of shared responsibility, to support national efforts to 
eliminate drug crops....The international community and the relevant United Nations 
Organizations, in particular the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, should 
assist States in countering illicit drug production by providing assistance for alternative 
development, with the objective of reducing and eliminating illicit drug crops. Such assistance 
should be provided within the context of the national strategies of recipient States.”1389
However, the resolution clearly states that in order to be effective, alternative
development should be accompanied by law enforcement measures. The timing and conditions
that this resolution establishes for the implementation of such law-enforcement measures clearly
                                                          
1387 Tacsán, Joaquín, Searching for OAS/UN task-sharing opportunities in Central America and Haiti,
The Thirld World Quaterly, Vol. 18, Nº 3, p.494.
1388A/RES/S-20/4, Measures to enhance international cooperation to counter the world drug problem,
adopted by the UN General Assembly during the Twentieth Special Session on the “World Drug
Problem,” June 10, 1998.
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indicate that the resolution was drafted with the clear intention of avoiding a the recurrence of
mistakes made in the past.
“(a) Law enforcement measures are required as a complement to alternative development 
programmes in order to tackle other illicit activities such as the operation of illicit drug 
laboratories, the diversion of precursors, trafficking, money-laundering and related forms of 
organized crime, both in areas where alternative development  programmes are implemented 
and elsewhere along the trafficking chain;
(b) Comprehensive law enforcement programmes can affect the profitability of illegally 
cultivated drug crops and, in so doing, make alternative sources of legal income more 
competitive and attractive.
30.When there is organized criminal involvement in illicit drug crop cultivation and drug 
production, the measures, such as eradication, destruction of illicit crops and arrests, called for 
the 1961 Convention as amended and the 1988 Convention are particularly appropriate.1390
31.In areas where alternative development programmes have not yet created viable alternative 
income opportunities, the application of forces eradication might endanger the success of 
alternative development programmes.
32.Eradication efforts should utilize available research and ensure that environmentally safe 
methods are employed.”1391
And earlier in the same resolution says,
“ 21. States should design alternative development programmes, taking into account the regional 
context. States should cooperate through bilateral, regional and multilateral means to avoid 
displacement of illicit cultivation from one area, region or country to another.”1392
The message is fairly clear and it is (fortunately) oriented in the same direction as the
analysis carried out in this dissertation. In order to avoid the counterproductive mistakes of the
past, these recommendations should be regarded as the five commandments of every state
engaged in drug control policies in the supply side of the industry:
• Interdiction (without the use of the military) must complement eradication in order to
force coca prices down.
• Only use forced eradication when illegal crops continue to be cultivated in an area even
though other suitable economic alternatives are available for the those engaged in illegal
cultivation.
                                                                                                                                                                         
1389A/RES/S-20/4, Section E-II, paragraphs 8 and 10.
1390This is the case in Colombia, where parcels of about 15 hectares are financed and owned directly by
drug traffickers who pay peasants for the production of coca. In that sense the land (capital) and the
peasants (labor) form part of the drug trafficking organization as such. However this integration of coca
growing as part of the criminal organization is very rare. Usually peasants own their own small plots (no
more that 2 hectares) and then commercialize the coca leaves to a retailer. Some peasants however also
participate in the production of coca paste and thus in drug production. The discovery of maceration pits
near “old coca” (planted before enactment of Law 1008) is usually a pretext for coca eradication by
UMOPAR/DIRECO teams in Bolivia. In Peru , as explained before, the Criminal Code has been
reformed in a way in which  coca growing peasants is not defined as part of the criminal chain of drug
trafficking.
1391A/RES/S-20/4, Section E (V).
1392A/RES/S-20/4, Section E (III).
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• Do not use forced eradication in areas in which the peasants do not have any other
attractive and viable economic alternative.
•  Do only use environmentally safe methods for eradication.
•  Respect your neighbor, give warning as to what you are doing, and avoid spreading the
problem across the border.
The UN (at that time the UNFDAC) started its alternative development activities in the
Andean countries in 1985. At the beginning, the projects were centered on the so-called
“traditional” coca producing areas. The main goal of these projects was to gradually reduce coca
production to prevent a diversion of coca towards cocaine production. In the late 1980s, when it
became evident that coca production had expanded to other areas as a result of the combined
action of growing demand and law enforcement, the UN expanded its operations to “non-
traditional” areas.
This section will review all completed, ongoing, and pipeline UNDCP projects in the
three major coca producing countries, namely Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. This review will be
carried out using a table format and with the sole purpose of informing the reader about past
accomplishments and plans for the future. An in-depth analysis and evaluation of alternative
development activities will be only be undertaken in the next section for the specific case of
Bolivia. As explained before, Bolivia has the characteristics that would allow a further
economic development and integration of the Chapare region once alternative development
activities are completed.
As will be discussed in coming pages, the Chapare displays what UNDCP officials
consider to be the ideal conditions for successful alternative development strategies:
“1. Effective control of the area by central government and an absence of counter pressure from
insurgent groups.
2. The provision of an enabling, sustainable economic environment and the national and
international level which facilitates the presence of market forces that make illicit cultivation less
attractive.
3. Consistently applied disincentives through law enforcement and crop eradication.”1393
This is not the case in the main coca-cocaine producing areas in Colombia and Peru. In
the first case the area is effectively controlled by guerrilla groups that are waging a successful
military campaign against the government. In the second case, in spite of successful military
actions, against Shining Path (especially after the capture of  its leader, Abimael Guzmán, in
                                                          
1393Korenblik, Anja, Theme: Alternative Development-Drug  control through rural development, ACC
Network on Rural Development and Food Security [On-Line], Available internet
http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/sustdev/rdfs/accooi6.htm, Posted 20 January 1999.
481
1993), guerrilla cells remain active and retain their capacity to confront the government’s
security and military forces.
“In many regions of the Amazonian foothills, the reduction of illegal crops in the absence of
concomitant economic development has led to an upsurge in Shining Path activities, reinforced by
new recruits of poverty-stricken young farmers. this has been particularly visible in the upper
Huallaga Valley and in the Apurimac and Ene-Tambo valleys. On October 12, 1997, a group of
about 100 guerrillas took over the town of San Miguel, capital of La Mar province in the
department of Ayacucho.A week later, another commando murdered the officer heading the Tingo
María anti-terrorist units and two officers from the antidrug police on the road to Aguaytía, Upper
Huallaga.  On April 15, 1998, a group of several dozens guerrillas ambushed a military patrol near
the Palo Blanco barracks in Lambayeque. On April 21, 1998, Shining Path occupied the village of
Sachavaca, as well as Palo Huimba in the Tingo María area. Peru’s other main rebel organization ,
the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which was hard hit by the hostage-taking at
the Japanese embassy in Lima, has apparently resurfaced in the Moyobamba region [Central
Huallaga Valley].”1394
As far as it concerns the loss of territorial centrality that the Colombian state has suffered,
most of the southeast part of the country is controlled by the FARC and by paramilitary groups.
Geographical isolation and lack of adequate infrastructure is a problem in both cases.
“Geographical remoteness is another problem in the coca-growing regions. Until 1994 the trip 
from Lima to Tingo María, us inside the Upper Huallaga Valley took at least fourteen hours, 
rain, frost, or (most frequently) guerrilla sabotage often increased the travel time several fold. 
To reach UNDCP projects in Guaviare and Putumayo in Colombia requires, respectively 
fifteen to twenty-five hours and twenty five-hours to travel from Bogotá.”1395
This does not mean that no alternative development activities are being carried out in
these two countries. Alternative development  projects are currently underway and some have
reached completion. In spite of this, however, in the absence of government presence,
infrastructure, and last but not least, the lack of personal safety guarantees, it is highly unlikely
that private legal investment will follow alternative development. Above all, it will not be
possible for the peasants to transport and sell their production out of the region. UNDCP (and
other organization’s) projects in this area will continue to be pilot and isolated projects unless
the political violence and geographical isolation problems are solved. Particularly in Colombia,
there are no incentives for peasants to abandon the cultivation of coca or for them to shift to
other crops since they are in a guerrilla controlled zone. Thus the peasants can produce coca and
coca paste in relative safety as they are outside the reach of law enforcement. In short, no
negative incentives exist that could induce the peasants to either abandon the area or shift to
other alternatives products. The situation in the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru was similar.
However the outbreak of a highly destructive fungus (fusarium oxisporum) epidemic, the
military defeat of Shining Path, and the effective air-bridge denial campaign (which caused a
glut in coca and coca paste and therefore a drop in prices), have brought about a decrease in
                                                          
1394Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, Annual Report 1998 [On-Line], p.188.
1395Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 148.
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production and emigration out of the area. Nevertheless, coca and cocaine production have
shifted to other regions. This, coupled with the fact that the government is resuming forcible
eradication policies (which had been stopped by President Fujimori in order to win the support
the peasants’ support against the Shining Path), may lead to an increase in peasant support for
the Shining Path (thus strengthening the movement again). In the view of this author, prospects
for a development of the area will remain low until the guerrilla problem is solved and until
suitable arrangements for voluntary eradication of coca are reached between the government
and the peasants.
UNDCP’s evaluation about the possibility of a consolidation of and future sustainability
for the development of its projects in guerrilla-controlled areas in Peru and Colombia are quite
negative. The conclusion of a UNDCP report on a project finished in the Upper Huallaga Valley
in 1996 was that, even though concrete results have been achieved, further development of the
areas will not be possible until violence subsides and both law and order are established.1396
The success in settling the bases for the development of an alternative economy in coca
producing areas in Peru and Colombia is questionable. However, there can be no doubt
regarding the courage of UNDCP personnel on the field and the political influence by bringing
(as partners) state institutions to these isolated areas and by showing the peasants that there is an
alternative to illicit drug production. According to some experts this could, in the long term,
weaken peasants’ support for guerrilla groups.
“UNDCP’s effort has had and is likely to have little impact on the Colombian coca scene. Most 
plantations are grown on large (15 hectares or more) trafficker-financed plantations in areas that 
are both geographically remote and (even for the UN) politically impenetrable [...] To give 
credit where it is due: UNDCP officials have chosen to work in a politically contested region in 
which the influence of guerrilla groups is strong. They have taught farmers organizational and 
technical skills, reduced the isolation of rural communities, and possibly changed peasant’s 
attitudes toward the Colombian state and the Colombian system. Such achievements must be 
weighed in the balance when contemplating the net effects of crop substitution programs.”1397
As a matter of fact, when asked if he could make a balance sheet of the results achieved
by UNDCPs alternative development projects in the Andean countries, a high-ranking official
of UNDCP’s Latin American and Caribbean section answered that he preferred to give a
qualitative analysis over a quantitative one. He stated that, in his opinion, the projects had been
successful from the point of view that, after having participated in alternative development
projects, an increasing number of peasants were willing to live a healthier, more dignified and
safer life.1398 As a matter of fact this author was able to verify, both through direct observation
and through interviews, that peasants are indeed very proud of their work after having
                                                          
1396 UNDCP, Evaluación de Proyecto: Perú, AD/PER/93/749 “Convención y Lares” and AD/PER/93/759
“Huallaga,” Lima, 1996,42 p. plus annexes, pp. 31 and 41.
1397Clawson, Patrick and Lee Rensselaer, Crop Substitution in the Andes, Office of National Drug
Control Policy, December 1993, p.47, Similar statements were made by the same authors three years later
in The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 163.
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successfully shifted to legal activities (such as the production of bananas and palm tree hearts in
Bolivia). Their situation is different from those peasants in Colombia and (in a different scale
due to recent “pacification”) Peru where, paraphrasing Thomas Hobbes, life is still “brutish and
short” and no legal production or trade can take place due to the absence of a state authority and
the situation of internal warfare.1399
What follows is a descriptive and chronological list of all UNDFDAC/UNDCP
alternative development projects implemented in Bolivia and Colombia the cases that have been
previously analyzed in depth in this dissertation.1400
(i) Bolivia:
Project title Agricultural diversification and agro-industrial development in the Yungas of  La Paz
(BOL/405)
Duration 1/1984-12/1993
Executing
agency
UNOPS
Summary This large-scale project introduced into the region of  Los Yungas various
alternative/improved crops to coca bush cultivation, such as some 2,300 hectares of
high-yield coffee varieties, fish farming, passion fruit, pork meat production, and other
agricultural produce. In this connection, the project strengthened the small-scale agro
industrial infrastructure, improved some 550 kilometers of rural roads, built water and
electricity systems and offered credit schemes and extension services for farmers.
Following the implementation of Law 1008 in 1988 codifying the country’s drug
control policy, project activities were shifted to the so-called transitional areas of coca
cultivation of La Asunta and Carnavi. Direct beneficiaries include some 5,000 coca
farmers and their families.
Budget
(in US$)
21,817,023
Expenditure
(in  US$)
21,553,971
Funding European Economic Community-3.8%; Italy-91.1%; General Fund 1%
Status Completed
Source: E/CN.7/1993/14, Administrative and Budgetary Matters, Fund of the United Nations
International Drug Control Programme, Proposed Final Programme Budget and Performance Report for
the Biennium 1992-1993, Report of the Executive Director, 21 October 1994, p. 105.
                                                                                                                                                                         
1398Interview at UNDCP’s Vienna headquarters, January 1997.
1399An CICAD official interviewed in October 1997, described how in official trips to Peru and
Colombia,  visits had to be made in armoured and armed Army helicopters. The situation was particularly
tense in Colombia where helicopters are frequently attacked by guerrillas (as a matter of fact the
helicopter of  at that time Swiss General Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte was attacked during an official visit
to Colombia in 1996). The official said that during his visit he was particularly nervous because he had
been informed that guerrillas operating in the area (Guaviare) were armed with Stinger missiles.
1400 For in formation about UNDPC´s alternative projects in Peru the reader can consult: UNDCP,
UNDCP-PNUFID, Alternative Development in the Huallaga Region, 1984-1993, Lima, UNDCP,1994,
16 p.;  UNDCP, UNDCP-PNUFID, Alternative Development in the Valleys of la Convención and Lares,
Cuzco, 1984-1993, Lima, UNDCP, 1994,  20p.; UNDCP, UNDCP-PNUFID Activities in Peru 1984-
1993, Lima,UNDCP, 1994,16 p. and COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, E/CN/1997/CRP.1,
Administrative and Budgetary Matters, Proposed Revised Budget for the Biennium 1996-1997 and
Proposed Outline for the Biennium 1998-1999, Fund of the United Nations Internationational Drug
Control Programme and Programme Support Cost: Compendium of Ongoing Projects during the
Biennium 1996-1997, Vienna, March 1997,188 p.
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Project title Provision of integrated services for rural sanitation-Los Yungas and Chapare (BOL/411)
Duration 1/1988-12/1997
Executing
agency
UNOPS
Summary The project focused on the Chapare peasant farmer’s dependence on the coca cocaine
economy. It provided safe drinking water and sanitation facilities to rural communities
with the objective of improving their living conditions and reducing their dependence
on illicit coca production. The project has benefited  approximately 45,000 persons in
the Chapare area. The final phase of the project mainly focuses on the long-term
sustainability of the water and sanitation systems by improving them technically. The
project benefited peasant farmers safe drinking water and sanitation services and the
attendant local maintenance and management techniques. Some 70,000 persons
benefited from the project, including 17,500 persons who will have individual sanitation
facilities.
Budget
(in US$)
9,225,913
Expenditure
(in  US$)
9,208,601
Funding United Kingdom
Status Completed
Source: E/CN.7/1997. and information provided by UNDCP staff in Vienna, January 1997.
Project title Alternative development of the tropic of Cochabamba (BOL/412)
Duration 1/1988-12/1996
Executing
agency
UNOPS
Summary This project focused on the Chapare peasant farmer’s dependence on the coca cocaine
economy, in particular road infrastructure improvements, agro-industrial development,
electrification and socio-community development. To date [1997] the project has
improved over 350 kilometers of rural roads, provided rural electrification, constructed
dome 10 bridges and set up, with full participation of the beneficiaries, seven small
agro-industrial plants. In its consolidation phase, the project’s aims to consolidate the
infrastructure and  agriculture support services in order to fully transfer sustainable
activities to local government, cooperatives and other entities. This will guarantee the
long-term functioning of these services. The beneficiaries are some 10,000 peasant
farmer families.
Budget
(in US$)
18,346,827
Expenditure
(in  US$)
no data available
Funding Italy
Status Completed
Source: E/CN.7/1997 and data provided by UNDCP personnel in Vienna, January 1997.
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Project title Support service production and agro-industrialization in the tropic of Cochabamba
(BOL/418)
Duration 1/1991-12/1996
Executing
agency
UNOPS
Summary The project was designed in three phases. The project’s first phase stretches over 18
months and is aimed at (a) assessing the economic viability and sustainability of each of
the 10 agro-industrial pilot plants established since 1990 in various localities of the
Chapare region, from raw material production Through processing and final market
potential (the plants were funded by UNDCP under two UNDP/UNPOs- executed
projects, namely, AD/BOL/88/412 and AD/BOL/90/418) and (b) drawing up and agro-
industrial development plan for the Chapare region to attract new investments from
external sources, including the private sector. Upon completion of the project’s third
phase (48 ) it was envisaged that the project would have contributed to a net reduction
of at least 6,000 hectares of coca bush in the Chapare region.
Budget
(in US$)
1,750,000
Expenditure
(in  US$)
no data available
Funding Italy/ European Community
Status Completed
Source: E/CN.7/1997 and data provided by UNDCP personnel in Vienna, January 1997.
Project title Alternative development for transitional areas in the Yungas of  La Paz (BOL/429)
Duration 3/1991-12/1997
Executing
agency
Government
Summary This project, which started in 1991, was implemented in the areas of La Asunta and
Caranvavi and their direct areas of influence. The immediate objectives are: (a) the
creation of a management unit comprised of a national director and sectorial
coordinators as well as an administrative office; (b) the maintenance of secondary and
feeder roads with the project’s heavy duty equipment, with the participation of peasant
federations; (c) the improvement of coffee production and processing in order to market
biological, hand-selected first-quality coffee in the international and local market; (d)
the diversification of agricultural production; (e) the use of sericulture as an alternative
for the substitution of coca crops; (f) the rationalization of pork production; (g) the
development of the agriculture production at Los Yungas; (h) the marketing of
agricultural products; and (i) the industrialization of tropical fruits.
Budget
(in US$)
3,415,6000
Expenditure
(in  US$)
3,136,986
Funding Italy
Status Completed
Source: E/CN.7/1997 and data provided by UNDCP personnel in Vienna, January 1997.
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Project title Management of forest resources threatened by coca cultivation (BOL/582)
Duration 3/1991-12/1997
Executing
agency
FAO
Summary The project is aimed at restoring areas and contributing to the conservation of natural
resources and ecosystems in the Chapare region. The project will establish two
demonstration centers to provide training in management, conservation and exploitation
of livestock and forestry resources in the Chapare region; and establish an integrated
management plan for the Isiboro-Secure National Park and halt activities relating to the
coca economy which are threatening the area. The beneficiaries and approximately 5000
(check) people in the area of Chapare already targeted by UNDCP projects (area
between Villa Tunari, Chimoré, Ivirgazama, Puerto San Francisco and Eteramzana).
Approximately 5,000 people are expected to benefit indirectly. Focusing on
environmental degradation through illicit drugs production, the project will have a
positive demonstration effect for similar future activities.
Budget
(in US$)
1,467,900
Expenditure
(in  US$)
1,428,455
Funding Federal German Republic
Status First phase completed in June 1997/ II Phase of the project in progress since October
1997.
Source: E/CN.7/1997; UNDCP, FONADAL and FAO, Proyecto “Apoyo al Manejo, Conservación y
Explotación de los Recursos Forestales en el Trópico de Cochabamba,” Una Breve Reseña del Proyecto,
February 1997 and data provided by UNDCP personnel in Vienna, January 1997.
Project title Rural electrification for Cochabamba (BOL/789)
Duration 9/1993-12/1997
Executing
agency
UNOPS
Summary This project is the concluding phase of the rural electrification component of the
UNOPS-executed project AD/BOL/88/412. The project extended the existing electricity
grid to reach communities which were not envisaged for electrification in 1988 but
which have since become the location of UNDCP-financed agro-industrial plants, as
well as schools and basic sanitation centers. The project outputs are (a) electricity
supply through the public network extended to 31 rural communities, 10 rural hospitals
and schools and 10 pump-fed water systems in Chapare (27 kilometers of secondary
lines and 33,4 kilometers of primary lines); and (b) a monitoring and evaluation system
established for activities, results and objectives of the project. The beneficiaries are 31
rural communities composed and about 650 peasant farmer families (approximately
3,300 people) currently participating in alternative development in the Chapare region.
Budget
(in US$)
392,000
Expenditure
(in  US$)
391,308
Funding Italy/GPC (?)
Status Completed
Source: E/CN.7/1997 and data provided by UNDCP personnel in Vienna, January 1997.
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Project title Equipment and transfer of the Ivirgarzama hospital (BOL/927)
Duration 2/1995-12/1996
Executing
agency
WHO
Summary In order to provide a minimum of basic health care, project AD/BOL88/415 (concluded
in December 1993) provided for the construction of a hospital in Ivirgazama (15-bed
capacity) to attend to most illnesses in the Chapare. With the termination of the above
project, the equipping of the hospital became a pending matter in the Chapare. In 1994,
the hospital building is scheduled for transfer to the local health authorities under a
national health programme executed by SHO/PAHO. The purpose of the present project
was to provide the Ivirgarzama hospital with essential medical equipment. The national
health secretariat will take charge of the hospital with essential medical equipment. The
national health secretariat will take charge of the hospital and provide the necessary
medical and administrative personnel to guarantee its effective long-term operation.
UNDCP involvement will terminate once the basic equipment has been delivered.
Budget
(in US$)
377,000
Expenditure
(in  US$)
no data available
Funding GPC
Status Completed
Source: E/CN.7/1997 and data provided by UNDCP personnel in Vienna, January 1997.
(ii) Colombia:
Project title Alternative development in the departments of Cauca and Northern Nariño, phase II
(COL/426)
Duration 1/1985-12/1996
Executing
agency
UNOPS
Summary The project aimed to contribute to the reduction and eradication of coca cultivation (ca.
4,000 hectares) in the project area through promotion of alternative income sources and
the development of skills among peasant farmers. Activities included the promotion of
livestock farming, traditional crops; the provision of loans, technical know how and
training in improved farming and agricultural methods; the setting up of collection
centers and farmers’ marketing cooperatives; the support of community development
and provision of training.
Budget
(in US$)
11,024,196
Expenditure
(in  US$)
data not available
Funding Federal German Republic
Status Completed
Source: E/CN.7/1997 and data provided by UNDCP personnel in Vienna, January 1997.
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Project title Alternative development in the Caquetá (COL/627)
Duration 1/1990-12/1996
Executing
agency
UNDCP; Associated: UNOPS
Summary The aims of the project  were to substitute illicit crops by other marketable agricultural
and livestock produce; to encourage farmers to participate in decision-making and
community life; to improve the quality of life for the target community; to bring under
livestock production approximately 3,000 hectares currently planted  with coca and
increase  productivity on another 15,000 hectares; to substitute plantain, yucca, sugar
cane, rubber fruit and other crops for illicit coca plantations; to set up fish farms; to
establish four centers for the collection of produce and distribution of basic materials;
and to carry out community development activities to improve recreation, primary
health care, nutrition and housing. Two thousand families benefited from community
development activities.
Budget
(in US$)
3,926,511
Expenditure
(in  US$)
data not available
Funding European Community
Status Completed
Source: E/CN.7/1997 and data provided by UNDCP personnel in Vienna, January 1997.
Project title Alternative development in Putumayo (COL/629)
Duration 1/1990-12/1996
Executing
agency
UNDCP; Associated: UNOPS
Summary The aims of the project  were to substitute illicit crops by other marketable agricultural
and livestock produce; to encourage farmers to participate in decision-making and
community life; to improve the quality of life for the target community; to bring under
livestock production approximately 3,000 hectares currently planted  with coca and
increase  productivity on another 15,000 hectares; to substitute plantain, yucca, sugar
cane, rubber fruit and other crops for illicit coca plantations; to set up fish farms; to
establish four centers for the collection of produce and distribution of basic materials;
and to carry out community development activities to improve recreation, primary
health care, nutrition and housing. Two thousand families benefited from community
development activities.
Budget
(in US$)
3,926,511
Expenditure
(in  US$)
data not available
Funding European Community
Status Completed
Source: E/CN.7/1997 and data provided by UNDCP personnel in Vienna, January 1997
D - CONCLUDING REMARKS
Drug trafficking is a transnational problem that has acquired global dimensions. Strong
international cooperation is then required to reduce the scope of this problem. We have seen that
bilateral approaches that put the bulk of the efforts in enforcement policies have largely failed.
This chapter has presented two tools that can be used by the states in order to multilaterally
implement development policies in the drug producing countries in order to reduce the
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magnitude of drug trafficking. These multilateral development strategies are not presented as a
panacea. They are a necessary although not sufficient condition. Therefore development must be
development strategies works efficiently in areas where the government has assured its
presence. Whether this territorial control is assured by force or through peace negotiations with
non-state groups is a matter outside the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, it is important to
re-estate here that the mere use of force against drug trafficking will be useless something is
done about the socioeconomic conditions that lead people to work for an illegal industry.
The next chapter will analyze the case of Bolivia as a relative success story in the
implementation of  alternative development projects in an area were the government is being
able to assure its territorial control: the Chapare region.
490
CHAPTER XI:  BOLIVIA, THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL
A- INTRODUCTION
This chapter evaluates the progress of UNDCP’s alternative development activities in the
Tropic of Cochabamba (or Chapare) in Bolivia, the third largest coca (and coca paste)
producing region in South America. The reason the Chapare was chosen is that this region
already had a set of conditions (i.e. road infrastructure, access to international and local markets,
absence of armed groups controlling the territory) that facilitate the implementation of
alternative development projects, and bring private investment as well as the development of an
alternative legal economy.
B- THE CHAPARE: ADVANTAGE AND POTENTIAL FOR THE SUCCESS OF
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
a) The area
The Tropic of Cochabamba, a region commonly called “el Chapare” is located in the
foothills of the eastern Andes and is formed by the provinces of Chapare, Tiraque and Carrasco,
which are within the jurisdiction of the Department of Cochabamba. The Chapare has an
extension of about 35,0000 square kilometers and an average altitude of 300 meters. The
average temperature in the area is 20 to 30 degrees centigrade and precipitations during the
rainy season is about 4,000 to 7,000 mm.1401 There is dense tropical vegetation and the region
is irrigated by several rivers.1402 However most of the soil is classified as ulitosoles, entisoles,
inceptisoles and oxisoles; that is, soils are poor in both phosphorus and potassium and have a
high acidity. This makes this area apt for both forestry and agroforestery (forestry combined
with other kind of tropical production as bananas or pineapples), however it also makes it an
ideal area for high quality coca leaf cultivation for cocaine production. The Chapare is in fact
the third largest coca producing area in the world.1403 Chapters III and VI explain how and
when and why the Chapare was colonized, and the way in which a coca-cocaine economy
developed in the area. This section will show that besides its advantages for coca (and coca
paste production), the region (fortunately) also has an enormous potential for the development
of an alternative legal economy that could compete with the coca-cocaine complex and
                                                          
1401Observatoire Géopolitque des Drogues, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, Paris, PUF, 1996, p.108.
1402The region is irrigated by the basin of the Mamoré river which is subsided in two sub-basins: the
Isoboro-Sécure river which covers an area of 6,168 sq. km and the sub-basin of the Chimoré-Chapare
rivers which covers and area of 4, 809 sq. km, Prefectura de Cochabamba, Secretaría de Desarrollo
Sostenible and GTZ, Plan de Desarrollo Sostenible del Trópico de Cochabamba, December 1996, p.23
1403 The Chapare was the second foremost coca-producing area in the world until the increase of coca-
production in Colombia in the mid 1990s.
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eventually minimize its importance.  The alternative development projects that have taken place
in the Chapare have not only improved the economic potential of the area, but have also created
new conditions that will allow legal private investment. This section will show which are the
comparative advantages of the Chapare. The following sections will show which is the value
that can be added to these comparative advantages.
First, the Chapare is a relatively peaceful area when compared to coca-producing regions
in Perú and Colombia. True, cycles of violence do erupt occasionally as a resistance to forced-
eradication campaigns by very well organized (and legally recognized) trade unions. So far,
violence stops when the government steps back from confrontation. The region is not under the
effective control of any guerrilla or paramilitary groups whose goals may include challenging
the power of the state, as it is indeed the case in Colombia and Peru. While traveling around the
area this author could verify that the state is present in the main towns of the region (Chimoré,
Villa Tunari, Sinahota). Every town has a police station and a school. This is not the case of
course in more isolated communities, but at least the region has lost the “wild west” image that
it had in the early 1980s.  This is, in part, due to the efforts of the state to consolidate its
presence in the area (mainly for counter-narcotic activities) and in part by the infrastructure
work by UNDCP and USAID.
Second, the Chapare is almost equidistant from two of Bolivia’s largest cities:
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. These two cities are potential consumption markets for legal
agricultural products produced in the Chapare. Moreover, the region is crossed by the
“backbone of the Bolivian paved road system;” that is, by the 560 km Cochabamba-Santa Cruz
highway, which was built in the late 1950s and repaved in the late 1980s with funds from the
Inter-American Development Bank. Links from the Chapare region to neighboring countries are
also being improved by the development of the Santa Cruz-Puerto Suarez highway (to Brazil)
and the Santa Cruz-Yacuiba highway (to Argentina). Both highways are being improved with
funds from the World Bank and the IDB.  That is there is infrastructure for the transport of
alternative goods to international markets.
Third, the kinds of soils present in the area are ideal for both forestry and agroforestery
production.1404
Fourth, the region has oil and natural gas resources, both discovered relatively recently
(1992). Oil wells are located in the province of Carrasco with a production capacity of
3,517.417 barrels per year. Reserves have been quantified in 67 millions of oil barrels and 818
million cubic meters of gas. The exploitation of oil resources promotes the growth of a services
economy and the consolidation of urban centers in the Chapare. A good example of this is the
growth-taking place in the Entre Ríos region (located between the Chapare and Santa Cruz
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department).1405 An oil and gas pipeline is being built for the export of these goods to southern
Brazil.
  Fifth, the Chapare region has 1,165,000 hectares of productive forests (with a rational
forestry management). These forests are home to 72 different tree species with high commercial
value. At the time of my field research, forestry production in the department of Cochabamba
covered 60 % of the national demand for wood (commercialized in Oruro, La Paz and Potosí)
and the forestry sector represented 18% of the department’s PNB.
There are already twelve timber companies in the Chapare region and fifty more in
Cochabamba’s high valleys that use raw material from the tropic of Cochabamba. Only 15% of
the installed capacity of these companies is now in use. The potential for industrial development
is therefore important.1406 The issue lies in training and organizing the settlers of the region for
a rational utilization of local resources (i.e. replanting trees) so that this activity (combined with
the exploitation of other legal products) can gradually replace coca.
Sixth, because of the natural beauty of the place, there is a high potential for the
development of tourism.
b) Giving credit where it is due: USAID alternative development achievements in the
Chapare
The reasons why an extensive analysis of USAIDs alternative development activities has
been excluded from this dissertation were explained in the previous chapter. However, credit
must be given where it is due. Combined activities of  USAID, the (USAID funded), the
Bolivian government (as a partner), and UNDCP created conditions for a possible self-sustained
alternative economic development in the Chapare region.
USAID has a crop substitution program in Bolivia, which is actually the largest of these
programs in the whole Andean region.1407 The activities of USAID in Bolivia began in 1975
and since then (leaving aside the problems posed by the coercion/aid double standard that
guided U.S. policy and the pressure of U.S. lobbies against the development of competing
foreign goods), this agency has gone through a trial-and-error process that has allowed it to
improve its methods and to achieve better results.
                                                                                                                                                                         
1404GTZ, Prefectura de Cochabamba, Prefectura de Cochabamba, Plan de Desarrollo Sostenible del
Trópico de Cochabamba, p.51.
1405ibid.p57.
1406ibid, p.62.
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“USAID began in 1975 with the $1.9 million Agricultural Development in the Coca Zones Project
[activities were stopped in 1980 due to García Meza’s coup]. It followed up in 1983 with the
Chapare Regional Development Program (CRDP). The project got going slowly, with continuing
personnel problems and clashes until mid-1989. Opposition by pro-coca organizations severely
limited the work in the Chapare until 1990, when the price of coca plummeted [mainly due to the
crush on the Medellín Cartel] and farmers became very interested in alternative crops. About $38
million was spent by the time CRDP was replaced in 1992 with the more ambitious Cochabamba
Regional Development Project (CORDEP), which will spend $80 million between 1991 and 1997.
Whereas CRDP had focused on the individual farmer, CORDEP places much more emphasis on
the marketing chain. By late 1995 it has financed twenty six centers for the collection, selection,
and packing of bananas and pineapple as well as twelve processing plants for various
products.”1408
This approach --emphasizing the improvement of marketing conditions for the
commercialization of alternative products--resembles the alternative development model
adopted by UNDCP. This author could witness the impressive infrastructure built in the
Chapare in terms of roads, bridges, and electricity lines, all of them displaying either the
UNDCP or USAID logo. The Chapare is, by no means, an isolated area and conditions for the
production and commercialization of legal products is expanding rapidly.
USAID and UNDCP have also nurtured farmer’s mutual aid associations for legal crops.
The goal is to form effective peasant cooperatives that will place the farmers in a better position
for the negotiation of prices and the commercialization of the products. There is of course a
political goal: to counterbalance the influence and power of the coca-grower trade unions in the
region.
“The marketing component of CORDEP is designed to overcome constraints in the entire market
chain from the producer to the consumer. It also seeks to facilitate investment in agroindustrial
endeavors opened up by project activities. The goal of the project is to increase the investment,
productivity, income, and employment in licit activities as Bolivia transforms its coca based
economy.”1409
Products such as bananas and palm tree hearts are the most successful legal products in
the Chapare. These two, along with pineapple, are now being produced on a substantial scale.
Bananas for example are successfully exported to Argentina and Chile, where they have found a
permanent market. This situation has improved further with the construction of the Buenos
Aires-Santa Cruz Road.
                                                                                                                                                                         
1407Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 160.
1408Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 160.
1409 Picha, David, Evaluation of the Marketing Component of the Cochabamba Regional Development
Project, Washington D.C., Chemonics International INC prepared for USAID/Bolivia, October 1996,
p.iii. Bold and underline by the author.
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“More important has been the $36 million spent from 1983 through 1993 on roads  spent from
1983 through 1993 on reads, not only have trucker’s transport  charges dropped, but so have losses
and damage to fruit in shipment. Thanks to better transport, better fruit varieties, and better
packing the farmer’s income from oranges rose from 2 to 3 bolivianos per hundred in 1992 to 8
bolivianos for the local oranges or 15 bolivianos for the improved Valencia variety in 1994.”1410
“As a result of alternative development efforts, illicit agricultural production in the Chapare now
represents 1.7% of Bolivia’s gross domestic product. Access to markets is no longer a constraint
due to the infrastructure and market development assistance provided by USAID. To date, over
3,000 kilometers of roads have been maintained or improved to all weather standards, and
approximately 100 bridges built, making the Chapare the area with the largest concentration of
road infrastructure in Bolivia. Even with a dramatically increased output of legal products,
competition has not reduced farm-gate prices because product quality is better and improved roads
have opened new domestic and export markets. Additionally, the area has benefited from private
sector investments of about $10 million in off-farm agribusiness from over 25 different
companies.”1411
I will let the following tables illustrate the progress made by CORDEP in terms of
preparing the way for a self-sustained economic development in the Chapare.
Table 1. Post-harvest Technologies implemented by CORDEP (The USAID contracted Development
Alternatives Inc. had prime responsibility for the marketing part of the project) in the case of
bananas and pineapples
Activity June 1992 1996
Field fruit collection * Inefficient handling of crops
from field to roadside in
wheelbarrows
*No system in place for
consolidating fruit at packing
centers or pickup points
*Cost benefit analysis completed
for alternative methods of hauling
fruit
*Improved field-to-roadside
hauling procedures implemented
on eight farms
*Roadside-to-packing shed
transport for immediate export
organized and paid for by private
sector
Use of supervised packing
facilities
* All packing done at farm site
* No centralized packing
facilities fulfilling export
***phytosanitary requirements
*Six packing sheds constructed
and in use
* Packing sheds have received
***phytosanitary approval from
the Argentine government
Adoption of standards for
packing
* Fruit packed without regard for
customer standards and industry
norms
* Standards and norms
established for pineapples and
bananas for export
Private sector participation * No dedicated private sector
involvement in field collection,
grading, and packing.
* WINNEX S.R.L [a Bolivian
export private company] handles
a large share of  farm-to-market
operations for banana and
pineapple exports to Argentina.
Source: Picha David, Evaluation of the Marketing Component of the Cochabamba Regional Development
Project, p.20
                                                          
1410Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry,p.160.
1411USAID Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 2000, Activity Data Sheet, Illegal Coca Eliminated
from the Chapare, 511-SP05 [On-Line]. Available
http://www.info.usaid.gov/pugs/cp2000/lac/bolivia.html
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Table 2. CORDEP (DAI) post harvest infrastructure improvements (1996)
* Two deep wells for pineapple packinghouses;
* Seven banana/pineapple mini-packing centers (implemented by local initiative with 25 to 35% of total
cost paid for by local resources at a cost of about $ 5,000 each);
*Approximately 1,600 meters  of banana cable transport system to improve field-to-roadside transport;
*Tree water treatment (chlorination) installations;
*One mobile pineapple packing center;
*One multi-purpose packing center;
Source: Picha David, Evaluation of the Marketing Component of the Cochabamba Regional Development
Project, p.29
Table 3. Transport infrastructure built by USAID in the Chapare in Km (March 1997)
USAID Completed On going Approved
Improved Roads (Km.) 642 83 105
Paved Roads (Km.)  58 4.5 84
Maintained roads (Km.) 2,118 180 436
Bridges (units) 71 19 34
Source: Gran Angular, Nº 26, May 1997, p.18
USAID activities through CORDEP, together with UNDCP’s efforts, have actually
accomplished the goals pursued. These are: the development of the production of legal goods
and opening up opportunities for private investment. This is particularly remarkable in the case
of  bananas, pineapples, and  palm-tree hearts (palmitos), as shown in the tables below.
Table 4. Surface and production of  legal crops in compact plantations the Tropic of Cochabamba
(excluding the National Parks area) 1412
Crop (hectares) 1986 1993 1994 1995 1996
Bananas 7,962 10,762 12,408 13,600 14,190
Plantain 3,038 3,484 4,795 5,300 7,442
Yucca 3,400 4,156 5,234 5,900 7,442
Oranges 2,500 5,037 7,227 7,320 12,829
Palmito n.d. 227 309 600 642
Maracuyá n.d. 227 309 600 642
Pineapple 334 2,608 3,335 2,200 3,424
Pepper n.d. 24 31 40 34
Rice 8,500 6,177 7,985 8,100 11,576
Tangerines 500 2,741 3,893 4,100 5,275
Other fruits 2,875 3,977 4,435 4,700 7,519
Pastures (for cattle) 11,500 20,561 20,646 25,000 22,769
Source: Gran Angular, Nº 22, January 1997, back cover.
                                                          
1412Compact plantations are plantations that are harvested in a regular and systematic way and that
occupy a delimited surface for recurrent measurement.
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Table 5. Alternative products main growing and harvesting  features
(ordered according to commercial success)
Crop Plants per hectare Harvesting
Bananas 1,400 First harvest between 10 to 12 months and then progressively up
to one crop per week
Pineapple 47,000  2 harvest in during the life cycle, first harvest after 18 months
Palm-Tree
Heart
(Palmito)
5,500 first harvest after 18 to 22 months and the progressively
Tea 14,000 17 to 24  per year first crop after 25 months
Pastures recovered prairies with
improved pastures as
Brachiarias and Kudzu
 It improves cow milk performance from 2.5 litters of milk per
day to 7 litters of milk per day
Maracuyá 1,200 firs harvest after 9 months and then progressively up to one crop
per week
plantation must be renewed after 24 months
Achiote 625 first harvest after 24 months and then progressively according to
demand
Pepper 1,200 first  harvest after one year and then progressively during 7
years.
Source: Gran Angular, Nº 21, December 1996, central page.
As the next section will show, private investment is slowly arriving to the Chapare,
mainly fruit export companies. There is also an incipient but growing tourism industry that
should be exploited with responsibility.
While visiting those areas that had benefited by the agroforestery project together with
UNDCP-FAO personnel, this author could verify that, in those areas where road infrastructure
and proper commercialization conditions are provided, coca growing is practically non-existent.
Of course this is partly due to the fact that new road systems facilitate the policing of these
areas. But the possibility of cultivating legal products such as bananas--which provide both a
reliable and certain source of cash and a safe and steady market--also act as an incentive for
peasants to avoid the high risks associated with coca-growing by switching to the cultivation of
legal products.
This, unfortunately, is not the case for those peasants who are virtually in the middle of
nowhere, for example in areas bordering the Isiboro Securé Park. In these areas, coca is
everywhere. However, this author has been present in case-by-case, on-the spot-negotiations
carried out by UNDCP officials that have been described before on this dissertation, and their
effectiveness was impressive. It is a simple mechanism of tit-for-tat, based on a patient, daily
work of persuasion and also of course on trust.
The work USAID has done is also remarkable. However, USAID is a governmental
organization. As such it responds to national policies and above all national interests. In the end,
the agency’s goals are subordinated to a drug-control strategy that privileges short-term, highly
effective results over long-term policies. It is also constrained by strong private interest in the
U.S.. The soy case mentioned before is a special case because soy is not being cultivated in the
Chapare (and cannot be produced because of soil and climate conditions).
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Let us now focus on the banana case. As of now the main market is Argentina and
increasingly Chile. The market-share of bananas is very small but it keeps growing and this is
happening partly due to the efforts of USAID as a broker for the opening of markets and
investment.  But how long will it take before “Dole” and “Chiquita” (two American companies
which are among the main exporters of bananas to Argentina) start exerting pressure on the U.S.
Department of Agriculture asking for USAID to stop supporting the expansion of Bolivian
bananas and pineapple?
UNDCP officials like to define their organization as an “honest broker.” And at least as
far as its Latin America section is concerned, UNDCP is indeed an honest broker. In the “fog
war on drugs,” the “blue caps” are perceived as neutral. That is they are not part of the U.S.-
Bolivia bilateral dynamic.
UNDCP efforts in Latin America are financed by Europe. UNDCP could however also
benefit greatly from the technical and economic support of the U.S.. American officials might
think (and this is only a guess) that channeling alternative development through UNDCP could
work against the interests of the U.S.. One must also assume that , naturally, there would be a
lot of bureaucratic inertia and self-defense on the part of USAID against this. In channeling
support for alternative development, the U.S. would certainly be losing a very powerful short-
term pressure tool. However it would be also ensuring a constant and persistent long-term
strategy that has been shown to be successful when the conditions for its implementation are
present. A utilization of USAID resources as part of the case-by-case (that is, peasant sindicato-
by-peasant sindicato) style would be more useful than using USAID as an instrument of
pressure for the achievement of eradication targets. The vicious cycle must be broken.
Interdiction activities have proven to be very effective in forcing drops in coca prices. It is there
that law enforcement efforts have to be focused, and that is a job the police can certainly do. I
have witnessed the pragmatic approach adopted by UNDCP officials in the Chapare.
Pragmatism is an excellent quality for a case-by-case eradication-for-development (roads,
bridges, water, electricity, schools, hospitals) negotiations. However none of these approaches
would actually work when the country is taken as a whole. A highly dependent country such as
Bolivia cannot take the risk of adopting a policy à la “Fujimori Doctrine.” If they did, the U.S.
would simply cut all foreign aid and would lobby in international financial institutions against
Bolivia, and both sides are aware of that. On the other side, the “development for coca”
approach has caused and continues to cause the vicious cycle of violence and frustration that
was thoroughly analyzed in chapter VI. The “development for coca” approach proved to work
fairly well at the local level and it is the approach adopted by UNDCP.
The U.S. government has stressed the need to multilateralize drug control efforts in the
Western Hemisphere several times at the end of the Clinton administration. However, whereas
the Latin American governments stress the need for a multilateral approach that contemplates a
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balance between development and enforcement, the U.S. stressed the need for joint enforcement
operations as a sign of  “multilaterization”. As reported,
“In political terms, however, the United States and the Latin American governments tend to focus
on different aspects of multilateral cooperation. For the countries of Latin America, multilateral
cooperation, emphasizes the acceptance of shared responsibility among the states for the drug
problem, and more equal distribution among states of the financial burden of drug control […] In
contrast, the United States uses the concept of multilateral cooperation more frequently to refer to
joint law enforcement operations. U.S ‘drug czar’ General Barry McCaffrey is strongly supportive
of greater multilateral cooperation, particularly in the military operational sense.”1413
Channeling resources though UNDCP is worthwhile. The UN carries out its drug control
effort and it does this well. The Paz Zamora administration (1989-1993)  adopted the motto
“coca for development” meaning that the country should first  be developed in order to make
eradication viable. The US government’s  answer to this was (in other terms of course) “Nope:
development for coca, that’s how it works”. In other words: “First you eradicate, then we
develop the area”. As seen before, Paz Zamora and his predecessors had no choice but to follow
the option that the U.S. endorsed.
Table 6. Coca harvesting features
• First harvest after twelve to eighteen months.
• Full production level  is reached after three to four years, with good care a coca bush can be
productive for ten to twenty-five years.
• Plants can be harvested up to three to four times a year.
Source: Clawson and LeeIII, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.131.
c) UNDCP’s achievements in the Chapare
UNDCP (at the time called UNFDAC) has been active in the Chapare since 1988. Up to
that year, UN alternative development efforts were concentrated in the Yungas region, a
traditional coca growing area. The goals were of course to reduce coca production and to
prevent a diversion of surplus coca to the cocaine industry. In the late 1980s it was evident that
illicit coca growing was booming in the Chapare and above all that there was a legal framework
for alternative development activities in that region:  Law Nº 1008.
An expert on the coca issue in Bolivia affirms that, also in 1988, apparently UNFDAC
received the tacit permission of USAID to work in the Chapare.
                                                          
1413 Institute for European-Latin American Relations (IRELA), A New ECU-Latin American Dialogue
on Drugs?, Madrid, IRELA, October 1998, p.7.
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“Some USAID officials saw the Chapare as their area of operation and were concerned that 
UNFDAC’s presence presented what some called a ‘wild card’ in the area. Although there is 
better coordination between USAID and UNFDAC [now UNDCP] now, officials of both 
organizations remain privately critical of each other, which some government officials see as 
healthy rivalry, others as unhealthy competition.”1414
If such an “unhealthy rivalry” existed at the beginning of the UN’s operations in the
Chapare, the impression this author had while interviewing UNDCP officials in Vienna and in
the Chapare in 1997 was altogether different. For example, both organizations sponsored the
“Gran Angular” project, a monthly magazine in which the work of both USAID and UNDCP is
displayed and praised. Most surely USAID officials did not like the idea of a new organization
“invading” their territory, but that was more than ten years ago. What indeed appears to be
taking place in the Chapare is a tacit division of labor between UNDCP and USAID
(CORDEP). USAID dominated the “crop substitution” component of alternative development in
the Chapare region before the arrival of the UN, while the latter organization has concentrated
its activities in other components of alternative development – such as infrastructure, marketing,
labor organization (promotion of cooperatives), and agro-industrialization.  It has also
encouraged other fields of production, such  as the economic and rational use of  an abundant
good in the area: wood.
As explained before, UNDCPs approach is also influenced by crop substitution
experiences in Asia, where UNFDAC had been very efficient in replacing opium poppy by legal
crops. However, peasant communities at that time did not have the infrastructure and marketing
capacity to commercialize the products, and thus resumed poppy growing in other areas. In a
sense Bolivia became an “experimental field” for the application of a more comprehensive
alternative development approach.1415
Aside from the goal of reducing coca production, another of UNDCP’s goals is, again,
setting the basis for a diversified agroindustrial economy in the region.
“This strategy not only aims to substitute surplus coca crops to reduce the supply of raw 
materials for drug production; rather the approach involves integral development between rural 
sectors. In other worlds, to create adequate infrastructure upon which a sound foundation for 
diversified agricultural production is built. This will lead to profitable and alternative production 
methods and a reduced dependence on the coca-cocaine ‘sub-economy’ ”1416
It is not the goal of this chapter to analyze all of UNDCP projects in the Chapare region
on a case-by-case basis. These projects and their features have been basically described in the
tables displayed in the previous chapter. Instead, what will be done here is to provide a general
                                                          
1414Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p. 127.
1415See, UNDCP, Alternative Development as an Instrument of Drug Abuse Control, 1993, pp. 39.
1416UNDCP, One More Step Towards a Drug Free Bolivia, Annual Report, La Paz, 1993,p.10.
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analysis of those necessary conditions, fostered and provided by these programs, that have
enabled the development of an alternative economy in the Chapare region.
UNDCP’s achievements can be divided in four areas that at the same time overlap with
the kind type of programs implemented by this agency:
(i)Development of basic infrastructure:
UNDCP’s infrastructure building projects follow the same goals that USAID projects à la
CORDEP: developing basic infrastructure (above all road infrastructure) to allow a legal
economy to take off. UNDCP is a pioneer agency in developing infrastructure in the Chapare.
At the time, the UN (UNFDAC at the time) started its infrastructure building activities in the
Chapare, USAID was concentrating development efforts in the so called “expulsion areas”-- the
highland valleys surrounding the Tropic of Cochabamba (the Associated Valleys).  As a matter
of fact, during the mid-1980s, USAID had stopped any infrastructure construction work in the
Chapare on the belief that it would only help drug traffickers (who were in fact operating in the
Beni and Santa Cruz regions). In that sense, only the UN was developing basic infrastructure at
the time, based on the (correct) belief that this was the only way in which peasants could at least
have a hope of making their living from products other than coca. This in fact worked well
when combined with the later (and more realistic) CORDEP approach.
“In both regions [Yungas and Chapare] the population is highly dispersed and far from the only
existing main road. Any kind of transport is further made difficult by the topography and tropical
climate of the areas [paved roads are essential  since after it rains mud is everywhere]. Because of this the
improvement and maintenance of  a road infrastructure was a prime necessity for development in these
areas [....] In the Chapare region, 306 km. of road have been improved, 201 kms maintained and 120
meters of bridges  constructed. When these were accomplished, the greatest need of the peasants was met:
liking the population with the main road connecting Santa Cruz-Cochabamba-La Paz by means of  a
system of  roads that were usable all the year round. Today 100 communities are connected benefiting
6,156 families. For the peasants there is a secured flow of raw agricultural material to storage centers and
agro-industrial plants which is now easier and faster, thus lowering transport and  improving final profit
margins for the producers. By means of the road infrastructure, new agricultural zones have been
incorporated into the national and international market. Thanks to the extension of the road network, in
the last 4 years, an increase of about 30% has been evident in land planted with alternative crops.”1417
Table 7. UNDCP’s road build work
Improved roads (Km) 322
Maintenance of roads (Km) 340
Bridges (units) 16
Source: “Red de Caminos Vecinales en el Trópico Cochabambino, la más grande en el país,” Gran
Angular: Revista Informativa del Desarrollo en el Trópico de Cochabamaba, Nº 26, May 1997, p. 18.
The provision of electrical energy is also a main component for the development of
alternative economic activities. It is also a condition for an improvement of life conditions in the
area. The table bellow illustrates the progress made by UNDCP projects from 1988 to 1997.
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Table 8. UNDCP´s electrical grid building
Transformation sub-stations 1 located in Chimoré
Transmission lines 349 km
High tension lines 54.5 km
Medium tension lines 100 km
Distribution lines 110 km
Low tension lines 86,48 km
Transformers 24 km
Transformation posts 50
Source: “A poco tiempo de la conclusión del proyecto: Luz en el Trópico Cochabambino,” Gran Angular:
Revista Informativa del Desarrollo en el Trópico de Cochabamba, Nº 23, 1997, pp.8-9.
The project was executed by the national electricity company, Empresa Nacional de
Energía Eléctrica (ENDE), and was transferred to it after completion. The installation of this
power grid has benefited 81 communities (including schools and hospitals), as well as the pilot
agroindustrial plants set up by UNDCP.
(ii) Agro-industrial Development:
This has been one of the most contested components of UNDCP’s projects in the area. In
some cases the critiques were right, while in other cases they were premature.1418 Setting the
basis for development from basically nothing gives some space for mistakes, and mistakes in
this field were a result of a learning process that finally led to successful experiences. UNDCP-
managed production units are now ready to be handed to private investors or to the producer’s
associations.
Agro-industrial projects consist of setting up small “pilot” industrial plants that process
alternative goods produced in the area. It is very important to remember that the fact that these
projects are “pilot” projects means that they were not conceived to be immediately transformed
into permanent productive units. Before transferring them to producers’ associations or to the
private sector, the idea was to demonstrate their viability and to then proceed to the necessary
modifications and reconversions to make them profitable.1419 Ten small agro-industrial pilot
plants were set up: a tea processing plant, a mint processing plant for the distillation of raw mint
oil, a vinegar and glucose plant, 6 dehydration plants that chop and dry manioc and plantain
(products which grow in abundance in the region and are used for  feeding cattle),  and a dairy
                                                                                                                                                                         
1417ibid, p. 12.
1418For a strong critique of agro-industrial UNDCP projects in the Chapare see, Marconi, Reynaldo, El
Drama del Chapare. La Furstración del Desarrollo Alternativo, p.38. For another example see: Clawson
and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry,p.160 for a particularly fulminating critique of a dairy UNDCP set
up plant that however latter developed good perspectives of production, commercialization and
consolidation.
1419Mall, Jean-Pierre, Identification de Actividades de Cooperación del PNUFID en la nueva etapa del
desarrollo alternativo en el Trópico de Cochabamba, Informe de consultoría de la misión realizada en La
Paz, Cochabamba y el Chapare, Barcelona, Estudis S.A., 1996, p.29.
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plant (MILKA). The final goal of UNDCP projects was to transfer these plants to the
cooperatives and producers’ associations once they had reached a productive self-sustained
level.
In terms of the perspectives for consolidation and viability, the two “stars” turned out to
be the tea plant and the dairy plant.1420
“AGROTE del Chapare” (the tea plant) produces 30 metric tons of high quality tea per
year.1421 This represents a about 3% of the 1,000 MT of tea annually consumed in Bolivia. The
other 970 MT of tea consumed in Bolivia corresponds to generally illegal imports (smuggled).
The potential for a local tea industry is very high. In 1995 AGROTE had received informal
requests for 200 to 400 annual MT of black tea by the main distribution firms in the country,
HANSA and FIMEX. The main problem is that at that moment, the production of tea in the
region (50 hectares) was very limited and the maximum production of the company was 80
annual MT. This is a clear example of how the UNDCP’s “pilot” plants worked. It is a risky
approach but it worked for some products. Once a market was found (for experimental crops),
the plant generated its own demand for raw material produced by settlers in the Chapare –who
were grouped in a tea producer’s association (AGROTE).1422 That is, the settlers became
interested in producing tea. It was hoped that black tea cultivation would expand to 163 hectares
in 1998. The plant has been transferred to a joint stock society AGROTEM S.A., formed by the
Association of Tea Producers.1423  It has been estimated that by the year 2004, the plant will be
generating an income of US$300,000 (compared to the US$ 142,789 in 1995).1424
The dairy farm (‘MILKA’ plant) is a typical case of learning by trial-and-error. A project
started in 1988 (AD/BOL/51, Community development and dairy farming- Ivirgarzama,
executed by the Gilead Church), and established a dairy plant in Ivirgarzama with a processing
capacity of some 50,000 liters of milk  per day. The dairy plant was basically a failure due to a
lack of “clearly defined marketing and management plan” in the project.1425 In fact by 1992
the plant could only generate 2,000 liters of milk per day (that of course was not enough to
cover the US$5,000,000 invested in the project; in fact the plant was losing US$ 35,000 per
year).1426
                                                          
1420Malé, op.cit. p. 29.
1421As classified by the London Tea Institute, UNDCP/ONUDI, Proyecto AD/BOL/93/818, Desarrollo
Agroindustrial del Chapare, Informe Final de Actividades, p.18.
142264 farmers from Chimoré, Valle Irviza, San Antonio and other Chapare communities form AGROTE.
Twenty three members are associated shareholders of AGRTEM S.A. the anonymous society that
administers the tea plant, Gran Angular, Nº 15, June 1996, p. 19.
1423UNDCP/UNIDO, AD/BOL/93/818, final report, p.40.
1424ibid.
1425UNDCP, 1994 Annual Country Report, Bolivia, p. 91.
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“In the Chapare, UNDCP built a milk processing plant that turned out to be a ‘white elephant’-
the specific area selected was unsuitable for dairy cattle and lacks the refrigeration to store
milk.”1427
The plant was however “rescued” by another UNDCP project (AD/BOL/94/918/d/21/37,
Rehabilitation of the Milka Dairy Plant, executed this time by UNIDO). This project acquired
adequate equipment, trained plant personnel adequately, reformulated its marketing strategy,
and above all elaborated a “joint venture” strategy that ensured the transportation of milk from
producers in other areas of the Chapare towards the plant.
By 1997 MILKA had an efficient distribution network in the Chapare, with 600
permanent providers of milk (all them former “cocaleros”). The plant also established a market
in the cities of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. In 1996 the plant was in the process of
transformation into an anonymous society owned by the association of milk producers in the
Chapare (AGALE). In August 1996, for example, the plant had sold 57,000 units of yogurt and
250,000 units in April. From a bankrupt plant, MILKA achieved the break-even point and was
already generating profit in 1996.1428
Table 9. Market share for MILKA’s products
Cochabamba (city)  55%
Tropic of Cochabamba 20%
Santa Cruz (city) and north Santa Cruz
(department)
20%
Milka plant  5%
Source: “Quinto Aniversario de la Planta Procesadora de Leche Milka: Una Industria del Desarrollo
Alternativo,”  Gran Angular: Revista Informativa del Desarrollo en el Trópico de Cochabamba, Nº24,
1997, p. 3.
As in the case of the tea plant, the milk plant is getting Chapare farmers interested in producing
dairy cattle. Both plants have brought about a reinforcing multiplier effect that contributed to
attract coca-growing peasants to the legal side of the economy.
iii)Agroforestery:
 This is one of UNDCP’s most interesting initiatives, above all considering the potential
for forestry development in the area. In August 1997, this author was able to visit the areas
covered by the project AD/BOL/92/582 “Management of forest resources threatened by coca
cultivation.” The project is based on the concept of sustainable development, which has been
adopted by the Bolivian government as a general model for development and involves a rational
use of renewable resources without affecting their capability of regeneration.
                                                                                                                                                                         
1426Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, op.cit., p.180 and , Nº 15, June 1996, p.3.
1427Clawson and Lee, Crop Substitution in the Andes,p.46.
1428“MILKA en Pleno Crecimiento y expansión” in Gran Angular: Revista Informativa del Desarrollo en
el Trópico de Cochabamba, Nº 15, 1996,p. 4.
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UNDCP’s main goal is to reduce the dependency of peasants on coca cultivation by
rationally utilizing the forestry present in their plots.  The agroforestery actually consists of the
simultaneous production of legal crops and trees. This author has visited areas where the coca
growing had almost completely disappeared, as in the community of Entre Ríos  where peasants
had combined the production of  palmito and pineapple with the production of forestry trees or
bananas and forestry trees. All farmers visited already had a sure purchaser for their products. It
was evident that presence of coca diminished in areas where transport and production
infrastructure was available. In other areas, such as Primero de Mayo near the Park Isiboro
Secure, where road infrastructure was very poor, coca was everywhere. However, the members
of the UNDCP-sponsored timber producer’s association were very enthusiastic about the
possibility of reducing coca cultivation in exchange for two concrete things: a bridge, and a
portable sawmill. The association of Primero de Mayo has 29 members, and with the support of
FAO/UNDCP they have established a tree nursery for replanting the following species: mara,
ochoa, trompillo, cedro, laurel and almendrillo. All of these species are great sources for wood
of excellent quality.1429 At the time this author visited the area, no electricity was available,
and there were no roads that remained viable under rainy weather conditions.1430 It is natural
then that coca is produced in those areas, as it would be impossible for peasants to take any of
their produce out of the area in order to sell it. However, word has spread that wood might be a
good investment and peasants are willing to give up the cultivation of coca in exchange for
infrastructure. The situation was the same in the distant peasant community of San Andrés, in
the opposite extreme of the region. The main crop there is coca. There are no usable roads but
the peasants were also willing to participate in the agroforestery project in exchange for
infrastructure. Agroforestry is particularly attractive to the settlers because they have the
possibility of making a long term but safe and reliable investment (planting trees and
developing tree nurseries), while planting other marketable products at the same time as bananas
and pineapple or palmito trees. In other words, the risk is reduced and safe cash is always
assured. This is a good idea and it is worth to expand the projects.
Up to 1997 the UNDCP/ FAO project had obtained the following results:1431
• Consolidation of more than 50 highly productive agroforestry modules in more than 250
hectares.
• Development and implementation of eight plans of forestry management.
• Establishment of 60 family tree nurseries and more than 200,000 planted new  trees.
                                                          
1429Interviews in the Primero de Mayo community, August 1997.
1430 When I visited the area it was impossible to reach this community by car. Part of the  team walked in
and the rest went by motocross.
1431UNDCP, FONADAL and FAO, Proyecto “Apoyo al manejo, conservación y explotación de los
recursos forestales en el Trópico de Chochabamba,” Una breve reseña del proyecto, February 1997,p. 18.
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• Creation of five producer’s associations for the production of honey and rubber and two
associations for the production of wood products.
• Marketing and cost/benefit analysis.
• Training of more than 3,700 peasants.
d) The sprouts of development
A private consulting study made in 1996 for UNDCP concluded that “a first phase of
alternative development” had been concluded in the Chapare in terms of the generation of
conditions for a self-sustained economic development in the area. In the view of this author, in
“a second phase of alternative development,” UNDCP should strengthen these conditions
(ensure credit flows, consolidate producer’s associations, educate and train the peasants,
strengthen national and local institutions, convince the “Cocalero Federations” to actively
participate in the development process) in order to make the process of development
irreversible. In this way a process of progressive reduction of coca growing would also be
possible because the peasants would be able to find sources of income other than growing
coca.1432 It should be added that UNDCP should keep enlarging the infrastructure, bringing
projects to more isolated areas of the Chapare, and that it should also maintain its localized tit
for tat approach for coca reduction. Only after the peasants are provided with new viable options
will the eradication of coca be effective.
This author had exactly the same impression while visiting the Chapare. The region is
linked by good road infrastructure to Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, the south of Brazil and
Argentina. The construction of infrastructure within the region is more than impressive, and
several communities have developed a viable legal production culture. The region also has
abundant natural resources. The conditions for private (or public) investment are there and as a
matter of fact private investment is slowly arriving. Again, this is due to both the efforts of
UNDCP and USAID.
(i) ECOBANANA:
Ecobanana is a company formed by Chilean and Ecuadorian investors that started
activities in the Chapare in 1996. The group had already invested US$ 2,000,000 with the goal
of producing the “guayaquil” banana type. Ecobanana has purchased 127 hectares of very
productive land close to Ivirgarzama. In the short term they expect to acquire 200 hectares for
guayaquil banana production. The Ecobanana group already has solid experience in the
production and export of bananas in Costa Rica and Ecuador. The company will build a “cable-
way” system for the transportation of bananas to storage and packing centers, as well as a
nursery for the growing of sprouts. Ecobanana also plans to build its own packing plant. The
                                                          
1432See, Malé, op.cit., second part.
506
main market for the company is Argentina, and Ecobanana already has experience in exporting
bananas from Costa Rica and Ecuador to that country, specifically to Buenos Aires. Ecobanana
estimated that it would be able to export about 2,000 to 3,000 boxes of bananas weekly to
Buenos Aires and cities of the north of Argentina.1433
(ii) WINNEX CHAPARE EXPORT:
Winnex is a private company specialized in the export of fresh fruits from the Chapare to
other countries of the region. It was formed in 1995 by two Bolivian partners. WINNEX
concentrates its activities in the export of pineapple and bananas.
In 1996 the company exported 45,000 to 50,000 boxes of bananas to Argentina
(Córdoba). The company benefited from the 2,618 hectares of pineapple  (with a density of
47,000 plants by hectare), and the 10,875 hectares of banana cultivated in the Chapare.1434 A
customer in Chile, for example, has placed an order for 150,000 boxes of bananas annually.
Winnex Chapare Export has an exclusive contract with the peasants. The company
purchases the product at the door of the chaco (plot) and takes care of the risk of storing and
packaging. Winnex is also responsible for transporting the product. The price per banana box is
US$ 1.98 and the company exported some 4,000 to 5,000 boxes per month. By 1996 the
company was about to reach its break-even equilibrium point. Winnex entrepreneurs planned to
buy 200 hectares for banana production due to the small productivity of small 3 to 4 hectares
owned by farmers. However they are happy the growers are grouped in associations, as this
facilitates the process of commercialization of the product.1435
(iii) BANABOL:
This is another multinational company formed by capitals from Ecuador, Chile and
Bolivia. The company has also imported banana sprouts (meristemas) form Ecuador. About
18,000 sprouts have been planted in 18 hectares, and the first harvest was planned for 1998. The
area has 9 km. of “cable-ways” and the company was building a packing plant with a cold
chamber with a capacity of 2,000 boxes per day.
 The goal of the company is to cover the entire process of production and
commercialization to Chile and Argentina.1436
(iii) “Los japoneses”:
Palmito is also a product with good perspectives. The Association of Palmito Producers
(with 400 members) can sell their production to a packing plant called “Nikey” set up by
Bolivian-Japanese settlers in Senda Tres, and to VASCAL Agroindustrias, a packing and juice
private processing plant established in 1993 in Chimoré.
                                                          
1433Gran Angular, Nº15, June 1996, p.6.
1434ibid, p.7.
1435ibid
1436Gran Angular, Nº 23, February 1997, p.12.
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(iv) Hotels and “el ecoturismo”:
An additional factor that contributed to finally burying the myth of “Wild West” Chapare
is tourism. During this author’s road trips along the main highway (the only route from Chimoré
-where this author was based- to Villa Tunari or Sinahota), there was a permanent flow of 4x4
vans with the inscription “ecoturismo.” Ecoturismo basically means “ecological tourism” or
“adventure tourism,” and consist in visits to the natural reserves in the area. I also saw young
Europeans travelling along the roads with their backpacks. The area is not dangerous at all
(however as has been extensively explained before it could indeed become a very dangerous
area if direct confrontations with peasant federations are provoked).
At the moment of this author’s visit, a five star hotel was being built near Villa Tunari in
an area where there are natural stream baths and scenic cascades abound.
(v) Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivanos (YPFB):
The Bolivian state oil company YPFB is extracting oil in recently-discovered (1992) pits
in Bulo Bulo, Katari, Carrasco and Surubí (in East Chapare). By 1996 the company was
extracting 16,000 barrels per day. The YPFB is paying 7.5 million dollars in royalties to the
Corporación Regional de Desarrollo de Cochabamba (the local government development
office) that favors policies of development in the region.
e) Problems and obstacles that still need to be overcome
Still there are several problems that have to be solved before the region can achieve
substantial development based on private investment. One problem is the potential for political
violence in the region. In a sense this factor depends directly on the type of policies adopted by
the Bolivian government and indirectly on the level of pressure exercised by the U.S.
government over Bolivia for the achievement of immediate results in coca eradication. It is true
that the Chapare is a relatively peaceful when compared to coca producing areas in Peru and
Colombia. However it is doubtful that massive private investment will arrive in the area if
tensions between the state and the peasants over the issue of eradication continue to bring the
risk of armed confrontation. Coca reduction has proved to be a slow process and must be based
on a parallel development process. What is advised here is to follow the guidelines suggested by
the UN in its last special session: limit forced eradication to cases in which coca production is
persistent even if the conditions (basically infrastructure) for other viable economic activities
have been created. In the meantime, an aggressive combination of alternative development and
on-site negotiation for the reduction of coca is advised as a policy that is more viable than
militarized, forceful eradication. There are areas in the Chapare where peasants will resort again
to coca production after eradication simply because they do not have the infrastructure and
market conditions to produce other crops.
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Land tenure and land property rights are two other problems that may also discourage
private investment in the area on a major scale.  The size of land plots poses a problem for the
large-scale production of legal crops. In areas of early colonization, originally the peasants had
an average of 10 to 15 hectares. In the 1970s the government distributed an average of 15
hectares to each settler and land had been distributed earlier, during the agrarian reform in the
1950s. However land was subsequently been parceled out through the sale of land to newcomers
during the coca boom (early 1980s). Inheritance has also caused the land to be subdivided.1437
Currently in zones such as Villa 14 de Septiembre, Eterasama, Insinuta and most of the
Northern Chapare (considered the “Red Zone” where most of the illegal coca production and
coca paste production takes place), the average size of land plots is from 2 to 3 hectares of
arable land. Moving east to areas of more recent colonization, such as Tiraque and Carrasco, the
average size of land plots is 20 hectares. The problem of small property could be solved by the
formation of cooperatives and producers’ associations (as is in fact happening) in order to
increase the productivity of the land and the efficiency of commercialization. However, one
other remaining problem could discourage investment: the almost absolute lack of clarity about
the issue of property rights in the Chapare. According to a prestigious Bolivian newspaper,
about 50% of the settlers of the Tropic of Cochabamba do not hold legal property rights.1438 In
fact, during the coca boom (between 1980 and 1985) when about 40% of the population of the
Chapare arrived, the land was distributed by the local “sindicato” (the basic unit of the peasants
federations). This effectively filled the vacuum left by the state by assigning land plots, building
the first rudimentary roads, and setting up the first health and basic services.1439 The problem
could be solved by a cadastral survey of 600,000 hectares financed by the European Union and
executed by the Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (INRA).1440
“The European Union is to fund a project to assist the alternative development effort in the 
Chapare and in the highland areas of emigration to the Chapare. The expenditure of 30 MECU 
will be divided between: a cadastral survey which will enable farmers to obtain land title and
   will also collect data on coca cultivation  by plot; a revolving credit fund for alternative crops; 
infrastructural improvements, esp. roads, water and sanitation; and agroforestry element.”1441
A clear land property rights situation is one of the conditions that most of the national and
foreign investors would request before settling in the Chapare. Another problem (and this is
                                                          
1437A new agrarian law voted in 1996 (Ley INRA) actually forbids small peasant property to be
subdivided by inheritance.
1438Cochabamba. La mitad the los colonizadores no tienen documentos sobre tierras, El diario [on-line],
available http://www.eldiario.net/diario/990430/enn04990430.html, April 30 1999.
1439OGD, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, p. 108.
1440El Diario, April 20 1999.
1441The European Union, The Council, Report on Latin America, 6879/96 CORDROGUE 25 REV,
November 1996, p.19.
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particularly serious in the case of the potential for growth of the forestry industry) is that
Bolivian legislation does not accept the ownership of big swaths of land. The INRA law voted
in 1996 protects the peasants’ small properties (which can neither be seized nor subdivided by
inheritance). The law allows the private ownership of medium-sized properties, agro-industries,
and cooperatives and imposes several restrictions for foreign private investment (i.e. non-
Bolivian people or companies cannot buy land in areas which are 50 km. or closer to the
borders, and cannot purchase or be assigned fiscal land).
This does not pose a particular problem for production and export of fruits. Production in
cooperatives is quite efficient and companies are increasingly buying medium-sized production
plots (200 hectares each) in the Chapare area , which have very high yields. In the case of
forestry undertakings, however, companies might prefer to buy land in the Beni region, where
there is also high quality wood production and where existing estates of considerable size are
available for purchase for timber extraction. (Neither Beni nor Santa Cruz were affected by the
agrarian reform of the 1950s.) However, there are hopes that an efficient organization in peasant
cooperatives could result in the sustainable timber production from the Chapare’s forestry
resources and its sale to sawmills outside or within the Chapare. It is probably too early to arrive
at any conclusions regarding this matter because forestry development projects are too recent.
One more problem has to do with investment coming from within the region. Peasants’
associations are having trouble in obtaining credits for their activities. One of the major
obstacles to this is that the law prevents their land from being mortgaged for credit. As a second
stage in alternative development, UNDCP should elaborate strategies for the opening of credit
lines for private initiatives in the Chapare. In that sense, UNDCP has experience as an honest
broker between governments and international financial institutions. It could teach the peasants
strategies for obtaining credit or could act as mediator with national and foreign banks.
Last but not least, there is the problem of power rivalries and political power. The leaders
of the coca growers’ trade union federations perceive the producer associations created by
UNDCP and USAID as a threat to their power. They regard them as organizations that can
potentially erode their own base of support. The truth of the matter is that the cocalero
Federaciones have become a political force. They control the local governments in the Tropic
of Cochabamba and they also have representation in Congress. All this has been achieved
thanks to their defense of cocaleros against forcible eradication. A perverse circle seems to have
arisen: coca has allowed some dirigentes to get political power, and coca seems to be perceived
as the way to keep this power. As long as coca is cultivated and forcible eradication activities
continue to be carried out, the dirigentes will retain their base of power and support. Coca must
and can be reduced by non-enforcement means, as discussed above. Some of the peasant leaders
are opposed to alternative development policies and speak very critical of them, without actually
explaining the reasons why they consider them unfeasible and without suggesting any
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alternatives for the reduction of coca.1442 Evo Morales, the leader of the powerful Federación
Especial de Campesinos de la Región del Trópico de Cochabamba (FETCTC), elected in 1997
as representative for Izquierda Unida (United Left), refers to alternative development as a
“fishhook” used to impoverish peasants under the pretext of replacing the coca economy.1443
This rhetorical opposition has manifested itself everyday in the peasant communities,
above all those that are most geographically isolated. UNDCP confronts serious problems to
expand alternative development programs to the “red zone” of the Chapare (northwest) because
of the fierce opposition of the trade unions. This opposition occurs at the personal level. In areas
where the state is not yet present, the sindicatos provide almost all basic services. If they follow
UNDCP (or USAID) projects, peasants run the risk of being ostracized by the rest of the
community, as well as the risk of losing the various services and protection provided by the
trade union (health, access to rudimentary roads, access to credit for purchasing tools etc.).1444
In order to discourage peasants from following UNDCP or USAID projects, trade unions have
been known to resort to pressure tactics that can sometimes reach physical damage. It was
possible for this author to notice that in distant and isolated communities, peasants were
particularly afraid of talking about certain topics when other peasants or the dirigentes were
around. They would not talk about the trade unions, for example, or they would say that they
should consult “las bases” of the trade union before making decisions concerning alternative
development. Courage (and UNDCP persistence) have prevailed, and even in the more isolated
communities there are now small peasant associations for the production of alternative goods,
especially in the case of agroforestry projects.
Peasant leaders should understand that they could eventually become trade union leaders
for activities other than coca production. As a matter of fact, a legally recognized milk
producers’ trade union already exists in the region. Peasants could also turn their political
movement into a lobby for investment and credit for the Chapare. This change will take time
and will only take place if the number of peasants involved in legal production eventually
increases and starts voting for leaders that favor alternative development as an option. Even
though the great majority of trade union leaders are (as is to be expected) opposed to forced
eradication, there seems to exist a clear division of opinion among them: there are those who are
favorable to alternative development as an option, while others have adopted a radical discourse
against anything that could threaten the cultivation of coca in the region.1445
                                                          
1442On this issue the reader can refer to CERID, Desarrollo Alternativo, Testimonios Campesinos,
Comunicación Social para el Desarrollo Alternativo, La Paz, CERID, 1994, 147.
1443CERID, Desarrollo Alternativo, Testimonios Campesinos, p. 59.
1444Interviews with FAO/UNDCP personnel in the Chapare, August 1997.
1445See CERID, op.cit.
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The two major obstacles for breaking the vicious circle of  violence in the Chapare seem to be:
1. convincing the U.S. government of the fruitlessness of forceful eradication strategies without
the simultaneous implementation of alternative development programs; and 2. convincing the
cocalero leaders of the fruitlessness of their policy of exerting blackmail on the government and
the peasants.
C- CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main critiques to alternative development are: even though the income generated by
alternative products has increased since the projects started, and even though the area cultivated
by legal crops has expanded considerably, the income generated by coca is also higher, and the
areas under coca cultivation have also expanded.  The critics also point to the fact that
alternative development projects only cover a small fraction of the total population of the
Chapare.
Both facts are true, however these critiques do not consider the fact that the process of
developing an area from scratch is very slow. Only after eleven years of work have the basic
conditions for private investment in the Chapare been created. There is no short-term solution to
the problem. It takes an industry to fight another industry, and the cultivation of coca will only
be substantially reduced when peasants are attracted to work in the production of other goods,
either as producers or employees. It will be necessary for the established companies to grow and
affirm their markets for this to happen. Further investments are also required. It is very likely
that around the oil producing area, a service-based economy will develop, attracting coca-
growing peasants to work in this area. The number of peasants that abandon coca growing for
the transport sector, for example, is simply amazing. In fact this author traveled from the
Chapare to Santa Cruz (about 300 km) in a collective taxi cab. Supply of transport alternatives
is high, and as a result prices go down.  This made a 300 km. trip in a taxi cab very affordable.
Having detected the need for people (including tourists and academic researchers), to travel to
and from the big cities, these former peasants bought a van and shifted to the services sector.
They had the opportunity to do so thanks to the availability of decent roads; also, demand for
transport is high because increasing economic activities in areas other than coca cultivation
(such as tourism, gas and oil exploitation, and fruit production) have ensured that people are
continuously moving in and out of the area..
It is a mistake for UNDCP to present alternative development as a main tool for the
reduction of coca.  Alternative development is not a main tool. The area reduced by this strategy
is very small when compared to forcible or voluntary eradication. Alternative development
however creates the conditions for voluntary eradication to work. If suitable alternatives are
available, it becomes more likely that peasants will not grow coca again. UNDCP has also done
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a significant amount of work in terms of covering the whole “red area” of the Chapare. It is
doing so slowly, but in the meantime it is also “spreading the gospel.” Peasants are increasingly
becoming interested in activities that ensure them a better standard of living (due to basic
sanitary infrastructure), security (they are not harassed by the police), and safe and reliable
sources of cash (the market demand for certain specific products is assured). UNDCP should
thus change its strategy and present alternative programs as generators of the conditions that
propitiate the reduction of coca-cultivation, instead of portraying them as just “coca
eliminators.”
The production of coca in Bolivia has remained stable simply because efforts have mostly
focused on eradication without enough funding for alternative development projects. More
resources should be channeled through UNDCP for constant alternative development efforts in
isolated areas. This approach can obtain coca reduction results by the use of on-site negotiations
instead of bi-lateral international pressure.
Law enforcement efforts should also be placed on traffickers (interdiction) and not on
peasants (eradication) in order to keep coca prices down and discourage coca production. Once
again: forcible eradication should be only used when the production of coca persists even if the
conditions for the development of an alternative economy are in place.
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CONCLUSION
A – ACCOMPLISHMENTS
The basic question upon which this dissertation is based is: What are the consequences of
the policies implemented by the governments of the South American cocaine-producing
countries against the drug trafficking industry for the national security of their neighboring
countries? This question of course stemmed from a main goal and then led to a core of working
hypotheses that attempt to answer this question. The main goal of this dissertation -as stated in
the introduction- was to analyze what national security problems are created by the
implementation of militarized enforcement policies against the cocaine industry in South
America. I have then sought to show that the implementation of militarized strategies not only
worsens existing security problems in the producer countries but also causes a spillover effect
that creates a national security problem for the neighboring states. My work then focused on the
national security problematic of neighboring countries, specifically of neighboring
transshipment countries. Two case studies -Venezuela as a neighbor of Colombia, and
Argentina as neighbor of Bolivia- were analyzed for this purpose.
The working hypotheses of this dissertation state that the implementation of  militarized
enforcement in producer countries brings about a spillover of drug trafficking activities towards
(or across) these countries’ borders.  Further, it brings an escalation of drug trafficking-related
violence that would also generate spillover effects such as the cross-border activities of armed
groups directly or indirectly linked to drug trafficking activities, as well as a significant outflow
of migrants and refugees. These spillover-induced consequences thus entail national security
problems for the neighboring countries. The hypotheses also established that an increase in
militarized enforcement in producing countries would lead government officials of the
neighboring countries to believe that either the enforcement per se, or the ensuing drug
trafficking-related violence would provoke the above-mentioned spillover effect, and that the
consequences of this effect would threaten their state.
As far as facts are concerned, in the case of Venezuela the hypotheses proved to be true.
All the worst-case scenarios actually materialized in the case of this country. Increasing levels
of militarization in Colombia (under U.S. pressure or by initiative of the government) have
provoked a spillover of drug trafficking activities both towards the border with Venezuela and
within Venezuelan territory. The rise of drug trafficking-related violence in Colombia has also
provoked a displacement of refugees and cross-border activities of armed groups towards
Venezuela. This has created threats that, because of the level of their intensity and their overt
status, can be typified as clear and present threats. The cross-border activities of drug traffickers
and guerrillas, for example, have exacerbated territorial conflicts to the extent that these two
countries have come to the brink of war when traditional military problems overlapped with
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cross-border drug trafficking activities. It is true that these past escalations have provoked a
movement towards bilateral cooperation in border issues, and that this has helped to
significantly reduce the possibility of war.  However, the situation of tension in the Venezuelan-
Colombian border is permanent and these cross-border activities have been officially defined as
a security problem. Also the outflow of refugees towards Venezuela because of the drug
trafficking related violence in Colombia has become a clear and present economic threat
because it worsens the current Venezuelan situation of growing unemployment and poverty. It
has also turned in to a clear and present political threat because of the fact that these refugees
might act, in the view of Venezuelan officials, as rear-support for the Colombian guerrillas.
In the case of Argentina, the hypothesis proved to be partially true. For this country, the
more relevant hypotheses were the ones concerning the beliefs of governmental officials. This
stemmed from two factors. First, Bolivia has been an upstream producer country for a long time
and enforcement in that country has been focused on coca producing peasants and not on
laboratories that could shift across the border towards Argentina. The second factor is that no
Bolivian administration has taken the step of adopting a full-scale militarization of coca
eradication and the use of the army in order to curb the resistance of the peasants’ federaciones.
In this case, the use of cognitive maps has proven to be very useful. Based on the analysis of the
answers to the questions posed during my field research it was possible to draw a line -in both
the Alfonsín and Menem administrations- between officials with “executive” roles in drug
control agencies and those officials who were only nominally responsible for the agencies or for
the elaboration of general political guidelines, instead of the elaboration and implementation of
policies as such. The beliefs of the “executive” officials were of course more concrete, and gave
more clues about their beliefs related to understanding of the consequences of militarized
enforcement in Bolivia for the security of Argentina. There was also a clear difference between
middle-level foreign affairs, intelligence and law enforcement officials, on one side, and all
other interviewed officials on the other side. Due to the nature of their jobs, the first group had
better information and clearer views than the latter. In particular, the law enforcement officials
(especially the Gendarmerie representatives) and the middle-level diplomats assessed a possible
increase in militarized eradication as a possible security problem for Argentina. They expressed
their concern in terms of  political threats; that is, of having a “hot” border with Bolivia in case
of a clash between the Bolivian military and the coca growing peasants. They also expressed
concern over economic threats, in terms of the economic and social consequences of a possible
flow of migrants and refugees to Argentina as a consequence of an increase of drug trafficking-
related violence in Bolivia. This was mainly due to the fact that some of these beliefs were
based on the “highs” of drug trafficking-related violence took place in Bolivia while these
officials were in office. In that sense, a peasant reaction to an increase in militarization could be
considered, in the view of these officials, as the cause of clear and present political and
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economic threats. However, when asked about the possibility of a current full-scale
militarization of eradication efforts in Bolivia, interviewees considered this scenario to be only a
latent possibility, and not an immediate concern. With the exception of the first head of
SEDRONAR  (1989-1995) none of the interviewed officials believed that the spillover of drug
trafficking activities to Argentina could pose a serious threat to the state. They were all
confident of the strong nature of Argentina in terms of territorial centrality and law enforcement
capacity. However the spillover of cocaine production and the establishment of “cartels” in
Argentina was associated with events taking place in Colombia and not in Bolivia. This belief
was based on the increasing number of cases of Colombian organizations trying to establish
transshipment bases in Argentina through the purchase of land estates. However, this territorial
penetration of Colombian cartels has been unsuccessful.
A secondary goal of this dissertation was to analyze the extent to which drug trafficking
per se was a national security problem for Argentina and Venezuela. This was considered useful
in order to show the regional extent of the problem.  Even those states that, within the region,
were peripheral to the process of cocaine production and traffic started playing a role in the
cocaine industry. This inclusion of Argentina and Venezuela into the coca-cocaine dynamics
was caused by several factors.  These included:  the drug market dynamics (the rise of the
European market and the increasing traffic through Argentina, for example), the shifting
patterns of traffic and production due to interdiction in other areas, and the attractiveness of
these countries for illegal capitals due to the soft banking and financial regulations as well as
financial advantages such as a stable and strong currency in Argentina from the 1990s on. In
both cases, drug trafficking has a clear national security dimensions and represents above all a
societal (consumption provoked by a rise in traffic), economic, and political threat (corruption).
In both Argentina and Venezuela, a “movement” towards the weak pole of the weak-strong
continuum rendered these states vulnerable to an increase of drug trafficking activities in
neighboring countries. By this I am referring to the conformation of an important underground
economy in Venezuela and the risk of the formation of an illegal economy linked to drug
trafficking in Argentina. In both cases this threat is reinforced by the situation of high rates of
structural unemployment and poverty in both countries.
Some of the threats analyzed in this dissertation can be defined -in terms of my own
analysis and of the beliefs of interviewed officials- as both “clear” and “clear and present,” and
are therefore likely to be considered national security problems.  Despite this fact, none of the
threats analyzed appeared likely to threaten the survival of the state or of one of its components,
as such. Although drug trafficking represents a national security problem for Venezuela and
Argentina, the threats identified in this dissertation have not reached a level where they threaten
the very existence of these states.
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The fact that the working hypotheses have been tested and have proven to be true in the
case of Venezuela, and partially true in the case of Argentina, gives an answer to the basic
question formulated in the introduction. Militarized enforcement creates spillover consequences
that cause national security problems for neighboring countries, either overtly or in a latent way.
In other words, due to spillover consequences of militarized enforcement in coca/cocaine
producing countries, the security of neighboring countries diminishes, or is perceived to
diminish.  This process was explained in chapters V, VII, and VIII, and a summary of these
explanations has also been provided in the above paragraphs of this conclusion.
Another goal of this dissertation was to attempt to contribute to the knowledge in the field
of security studies through the development of useful analytical tools for the study of drug
trafficking as a national security problem.  In this sense, from a “broadened” security studies
perspective, this dissertation has explained why drug trafficking is a non-military aspect of
security in South America. In Chapter I, a weak-strong state typology was created; the typology
was then applied in general terms to the states of the region in Chapter II, and to the case studies
in Chapters VI and VIII. This typology is an important tool because security -as defined by the
theoretical approach used here- results from the interaction between threats and vulnerabilities
(that is from the strong/weak nature of the state). In that sense this dissertation has refined and
built upon a theoretical tool proposed by another author (Barry Buzan and his concept of weak-
strong state). Also in this dissertation, a typology of threats has been developed in order to
determine when a threat should be considered part of the security problematique of a state. This
has also hopefully enriched the existent analytical tools of the field and contributed to reduce
ambiguity by attempting to provide a criteria for determining which threats should be defined as
national security problems. This typology was specifically applied to the cases of Argentina and
Venezuela and has proved very useful in testing my hypothesis.
It is possible to say that the conceptual goals of this dissertation have been satisfied in the
sense that several instruments for the analysis of  “non-military” security problems (in this case
drug trafficking) have been developed and used, including:
• a working definition of “national security” based on a typology of
“strong and weak states” and a typology of threats according to their intensity, and
overt/latent status;
• a set of variables which can be used to determine the weak or strong
nature of a state;
• a working typology of drug trafficking related violence;
• a classification of countries according to the role they play in a
transnational criminal industry such as the cocaine industry; and
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• the application of the concept “security complex” to the case of non-
military shared security problems between the countries of a region. 1446
Another conceptual goal was  also satisfied:
As a result of intensive field research, it was possible to observe and analyze the beliefs
of Argentine and Venezuelan policy makers concerning drug trafficking as a threat to their
respective states. In the case of Argentina, the empirical material obtained was processed
through the “cognitive mapping” method.
As explained above, in the case of Venezuela, drug trafficking and the spillover
consequences of enforcement in Colombia are already a recognized as clear and present threats.
In the case of Argentina, although the bureaucrats interviewed see the consequences of
enforcement in Bolivia as a distant scenario, they do consider that the increasing transit and
consumption of cocaine can be considered a “national security problem” (or an “internal
security problem” according to the legal working definition used in Argentina).
In both cases, however, one fact is undeniable: in the last twenty years the drug
trafficking issue has evolved in the security agenda, from a public health and a law enforcement
issue to a “national security issue” that requires a national and coordinated strategy.
The use of the cognitive mapping method for the analysis of the views of bureaucrats on a
transnational security issue is indeed innovative in the field of international security studies.
Previous works have focused on the use of cognitive maps for explaining the decision-making
process of bureaucrats who were facing “traditional” military threats.1447 This dissertation,
however, focused on finding out whether Argentine bureaucrats (working on drug control and
security) believed drug trafficking and the spillover consequences of enforcement against drug
trafficking in a neighboring country to be a security problem for their state. That is, previous
works focused on how decisions were made by a group of people facing a tangible and specific
threat. My dissertation, on the other hand, focused on the views of bureaucrats in charge of
dealing with a more diffuse threat such as the cocaine industry, and the policies adopted by
neighboring countries to cope with it. That is, I was not interested in explaining how and why
they acted. Instead, I focused on understanding their views in relation to a problem that started
and continued to grow in importance in the region from the late 1970s onwards. It is hoped that
                                                          
1446 As explained earlier Barry Buzan initially developed the concept “security complex”. However this
author focused on military-political conflicts.
1447 See for example: Axelrod, Robert, “Decision for Neoimperialism: The Deliberations of the British
Eastern Committee in 1918” in  Axelrod, op.cit., pp. 77-95; Bonham, Matthew, G. and Shapiro, Michael,
“Explanation of the Unexpected: The Syrian Intervention in Jordan in 1970”, in Axelrod, op.cit., pp. 113-
141 and Harary Frank, “A structural analysis of the situation in the Middle East in 1956”, Conflict
Resolution, Vol. V, Nº 2, 1961,pp,166 -178.
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this study will aid other researchers in understanding the reactions and positions of countries
whose “security environment” is formed by key and players of the illicit drug industry.
Chapter IX of this dissertation has argued against proposals for multilateral military
enforcement. There is no point, as argued, in involving more actors in the application of
strategies that have proved to be a failure. Chapter IX also introduced the concept of alternative
development - a strategy that consists of providing technical, financial, and technical
cooperation for the development of economic activities in illicit crops and drugs areas.  Chapter
X focuses on the alternative development projects carried out at a multilateral level through
UNDCP in Bolivia. Bolivia was chosen for analysis because is a country that presents the basic
conditions for the success of alternative development strategies. Its main illicit coca producing
area, the Chapare, is  linked by a good road system to potential consumer markets such as the
south of Brazil and Argentina, or Cochabamba and Santa Cruz at the national level. There is an
absence of guerrilla groups in the area and the authority of the state is not challenged by
powerful criminal organizations (as is the case in the Beni region). This physical penetration of
the state was made possible in part by the combined effort of USAID and UNDCP projects in
building vial infrastructure. Other regions such as the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru or the
Guaviare in Colombia have not being analyzed because, as explained, the viability of UNDCP
projects cannot be assured while there is a situation of civil war in the area (Colombia), or there
are guerrilla groups operating in the area with the capacity of sabotaging the project. This
chapter stressed the importance of UNDCP projects in building infrastructure for the
commercialization of alternative agricultural goods and industrialized agricultural products.
Although the bilateral support channeled through USAID does not constitute an object of study
here, Chapter X shows the advantages of the marketing strategies of programs such as CORDEP
that emphasize finding markets and  facilitating the commercialization of legal crops and
industrialized agricultural products. This dissertation suggests that, although this would be very
difficult, the U.S. should channel more resources through UNDCP in order to enhance the
effectiveness and viability of its projects. As stated above, USAID is perceived by the local
population as part of the US “stick and carrot” policy in the sense that aid for alternative
development might be (and actually is) dependent on the total of hectares of coca plantations
eradicated by the Bolivian government. The freedom of action of USAID is also limited, as
noted in this dissertation, by the pressure of U.S. interest groups that may lobby against the
implementation of projects that may lead to the export of competitive goods. The localized
negotiation and quid pro quo strategy of UNDCP was deemed more effective because both sides
(peasants and UNDCP technicians) establish on a case-by-case basis what the peasant
community should do (i.e. eradicating new coca) in order to get a specific benefit in return ( i.e.
a bridge or a paved road, or a sawmill). The strategy consists of giving something (for example,
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a road) and then waiting for results in order to give more benefits in return (like a bridge that
would allow more people to get to the road).
This dissertation has demonstrated that the combined efforts of UNDCP and USAID have
resulted in the expansion of local fruit companies and agricultural industries that are exporting
their goods to neighboring countries as Chile and Argentina. As of 1999, for example, it was
possible to buy palmitos (palm tree hearts) or bananas produced and canned in the Chapare in
almost every grocery store of Buenos Aires.
This dissertation has stated, however, that the U.S. as the main consumer country in the
Western Hemisphere, and also the driving force behind hemispheric initiatives, should adopt a
more balanced approach between support for enforcement and support for alternative
development. The figures presented in this dissertation have shown that the budget for South
American Armed Forces concerning drug control operations far exceeds the budget for
alternative development. Enforcement without development has, in part, generated the vicious
cycle of enforcement, followed by spillover, followed by more enforcement, and so on. The
U.S. government has started to ask for a multilateral approach to the drug trafficking issue in the
Western Hemisphere. However, such a multilateral approach should not leave the European
states out. Western Europe is already a consolidated consumption market for the cocaine
produced in South America. The European states also have the economic resources needed for
the implementation of a  balanced strategy consisting of support and training of local police
enforcement, as well as alternative development. In that sense the ideal forum for discussions on
this issue is the UN, and not the OAS, as suggested by the U.S. government. For the sake of
efficiency, it would probably be good for the United States to leave the Monroe doctrine aside
and cooperate with Europe through UNDCP. As far as  OAS/CICAD is concerned, it has been
argued here that, due both to budgetary restrictions and a self-imposed limited role, this
organization has limited its activities to providing technical support to governments without
directly financing or implementing projects. CICAD is however a valuable OAS agency in the
sense that it produces consensus around model drug control regulations that, if adopted at the
hemispheric level -and particularly in South America-, will greatly simplify the tasks of law
enforcement and legal cooperation.
An aspect that has been criticized in the last chapter is the current approach adopted by
UNDCP projects, which considers alternative development as a main tool for coca reduction.
The same idea is expressed in the declaration and the plans of action adopted by the last special
session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Alternative development has proven to
be a very efficient tool to guarantee that voluntary eradication will take place, that new coca will
not be planted in areas covered by successful projects, and that a legal and viable economic
activity will take place. But alternative development cannot be taken and presented as an
eradication tool. This would be self-defeating: the process of generating an alternative economy
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is slow and it is difficult to estimate the area eradicated as a result of alternative development
projects. As of now, UNDCP does not have statistics concerning the surface eradicated as a
result of the implementation of alternative development projects. This is simply because the
original purpose of the projects implemented during the period under study was not to eradicate
coca but to generate the conditions for the eradication of this crop and its replacement for other
legal crops or agrarian activities. The act of setting flamboyant deadlines for the “total
eradication” of coca, as has been done in the last Special Sessions of the General Assembly of
the UN (the deadline is the year 2008), is equally self-defeating. The process of coca eradication
will be slow because it will require the development of an alternative economy in all the coca
producing areas in South America; otherwise, as long as demand for coca/cocaine exists, coca
cultivation will resume after eradication. If areas like the Guaviare in Colombia or the Upper
Huallaga Valley in Peru are not developed and integrated with the rest of the national economy
(as is the case with the Chapare),  it is very unlikely that there will be no more coca by the year
2008.
B-FINAL THOUGHTS
A final ambitious question (so ambitious that was not posed in this dissertation to begin
with) remains to be answered: is there a solution for the problem of drug trafficking?  The
answer to this question depends on how the term “solution” is defined. If the solution sought is
the total elimination of drug trafficking, then we are talking about an ideal solution. And ideals,
no matter how noble they can be, remain....ideal.  That is, they represent the way we think
reality should be, but not necessarily the way reality is.
The search for pleasure, even at the expense of harm, seems to be a constant in the history
of humankind. As long as there is a demand for a product, the product will be produced and
delivered no matter how high the risk--provided that the profits obtained by the sale of this
products are high enough to compensate that risk. This is the case of the cocaine or heroin
industries.1448 At the same time, the phenomenon of “globalization” has arrived to stay--and it
has its “dark side.” The development of faster and safer ways to deliver people, goods, and
capital in the legal side of the economy is also exploited by organized crime to deliver illicit
goods and launder “illicit” profits. Just think about the possibility of using encrypted internet
communications for negotiating the terms of illicit businesses or to sell illicit goods. There are
                                                          
1448 According to UNCP in 1999, the price of one kilo of cocaine base (in constant 1999 US Dollars )
would be US$900 in Bolivia, US$950 in Colombia, and US$440  in Peru. Once it is transformed into
cocaine, the wholesale price of a kilo of the drug would be an average of  US$22, 348 in the United States
and (to give an example of a European country of final destination ) US$ 51,630 in the United Kingdom.
In the case of heroin, the farmgate price of a kilo of opium would be US$ 200 in Colombia, and the
wholesale price of a kilo of  heroin would be an average of US$ 129,380 in the United States.
See: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2000, UNDCP, 2000, on-line pdf version,
http://www.undcp.org/pdf/report_2000-09-21_1.pdf
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strong incentives for the industry to exist... Trying to eliminate some of these incentives would
mean obstructing the way of human progress.
One can instead make an effort to get close to the ideal. That is, One way to do this is to
attempt to reduce drug trafficking to manageable proportions; that is, to levels in which this
activity does not pose a threat to the population, institutions, and even the territory of our states.
The consumption of hazardous drugs is not a new phenomenon. However, the spread of
this habit seems related to the industrial era, and its seems to persist in the post industrial era,
which has seen the emergence of new powerful synthetic drugs.
Cocaine was first distilled in Europe in the 1850s and its consumption acquired (at the
time as a legal drug) epidemic proportions in the U.S. in the first years of the 20th century and
again in the 1930s when it was finally put under international control. Heroin was introduced at
the end of the 19th century to treat morphine dependant people. In the 20th century the cure
proved to be worse than the sickness....
Also the evolution of transportation, the rise in the volume of intercontinental trade, and
also the rise in migration trends have also facilitated the spread of drug consumption habits. Is
drug consumption (and, as a consequence,  drug trafficking) related to human progress?
Everything seems to indicate that it is. If the same (or more) amount of resources already used
in enforcement is not invested in research about the social and psychological conditions that
lead people to use highly addictive and harmful substances, then any effort to reduce the impact
of drug trafficking on security will be useless.
We know why people grow illicit crops and why people produce and trade illicit drugs.
We still need to know why people consume drugs before we even start thinking about ways to
reduce the scope of drug trafficking.
One could argue that unless the social causes that lead to drug consumption are totally
eliminated, there will always be some degree of drug trafficking in order to satisfy that demand.
The goal should be then to reduce both consumption and production to levels that would not
imply a threat the population, the institutions, or the territory of states. This leads to a final
thought: a “social” alternative development strategy should be also implemented in the main
consumer countries in order to reduce the causes of massive drug consumption. This “social
alternative development” should be parallel and balanced with enforcement and alternative
development in drug producing regions. If demand decreased, the market would shrink and this
would also contribute to reduce the power of drug trafficking organizations and the importance
of  the illicit drug industry in South America.
Production also takes place, however, because of a set of social, economic, and political
conditions prevalent in the producer countries. Organized crime exploits the weakness of the
South American states and helps perpetuate them. Militarized enforcement might go on and on
with more and more firepower each time. But as far as the prevalent conditions that led people
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to consume and produce drugs exist, there will be always an incentive for the illicit drugs
industry to adapt to the new challenges and risks and keep providing the product. After
demonstrating that military enforcement policies provoke more problems than solutions, a final
goal of this dissertation has been to propose alternative strategies to contain the magnitude of
the drug trafficking problem in South America and to gradually reduce the importance of the
cocaine industry to levels that would not threaten the states of the region. Even though
enforcement policies are necessary, they can be carried out by properly equipped and trained
police forces (after all drug trafficking is a criminal problem), and not by militarized police
corps or the army. More firepower does not necessarily mean more efficiency. Criminal
organizations can be disrupted and weakened through the use of police intelligence and
investigative tools. Pablo Escobar was found and eventually killed as a result of the
triangulation of his phone calls through the use of a sophisticated tracing equipment.  The
leaders of the Cali cartel were arrested in 1995 by the police as a result of a police operation.
Enforcement should be applied where it works and using adequate tools. And even though
enforcement it is a valid, necessary tool, it should not be seen  as the main nor the only tool in
drug trafficking control activities.  This dissertation has demonstrated that, in the absence of
alternative economic activities for the people involved in the first stages of production (coca
growing and coca paste production), forced eradication is useless. It creates violence and it does
not stop the cultivation of new coca. Eradication (as suggested in the recommendations of the
1998 UNGASS) should be implemented (by the police) only when there is a persistent tendency
towards coca production even if the conditions for the viable production of legal goods have
been created.   On the other hand, in places such as southeast Colombia, alternative
development will not be possible until FARC guerrillas and paramilitary groups are defeated,
through the use of the military and intelligence, and the rule of law is finally imposed in the
area.  Paradoxically, we have seen that in places such as the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru,
coca eradication had to be stopped first so the army could win the support of coca growing
peasants against Shining Path.
This is to say that although the state can use its military power against non-state actors
challenging its authority (or even its survival), the use of force is not the panacea. If guerrillas
and paramilitaries are defeated in Colombia then the government will have to cope with
reducing the social and economic conditions that lead people to produce illegal drugs.
If totally eradicating the industry is an ideal solution, a pragmatic solution could be
assuming the cost of living with crime and addictions but reducing crime problems and social
health problems to manageable proportions. As suggested here, this would imply not a “war on
drugs” but a “harm reduction strategy” consisting in concentrating resources not only on the
effects of drug trafficking but also on its social and economic causes.
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It is clear by now that all states, no matter how powerful,  are susceptible to threats posed
by non-state transnational actors through non-military means. Transnational terrorism and
transnational organized crime are just a blatant example of phenomena that overcome military
defenses and seriously harm states. The level of harm to a given state will depend on its weak or
strong nature.  This includes its policy capacity to answer the threat with the appropriate
combinations of policies and means.
In terms of academic production, security specialists should be aware of the strong
responsibility they have in explaining and demonstrating that “national security problems” do
not necessarily imply military responses. Or at least they do not imply traditional military
responses or the use of military force. Thinking and acting in traditional ways against non-
traditional threats can end up creating more damage than the threat itself. And there is no worse
danger than consciously perpetuating failure...
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ANNEXES
Annex 1:  Maps
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Source: The University of Texas at Austin, On Line Library, The Perry Castañeda  Library Map
Collection, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/south_america_ref01.jpg
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Source: The University of Texas at Austin, On Line Library, The Perry Castañeda  Library Map
Collection, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/colombia_pol_2001.jpg
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Annex 2:   South America, basic indicators of development
Source for all data:
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical
Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC, Santiago de Chile
1998,1999,2000 and 2001, [on-line pdf versions], http://www.eclac.org/estadisticas/
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Population, Area and Density:
Country: Population (data for
1999 thousands of
persons):
Area (km2): Density (data for 1995
inhabitants per km2):
Argentina 36,578 2766888 13
Bolivia    8,143 1098580 7
Brazil 168,495 8511968 19
Chile 15,018 756950 19
Colombia 41,566 1138910 31
Ecuador 12,411 283560 40
Guyana     865 214970 4
Paraguay 5,359 406750 12
Peru 25,232 1285220 18
Suriname 418 163270 3
Uruguay 3,313 177410 18
Venezuela 23,707 912050 24
Sources: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Handbook of International Trade and
Development Statistics, United Nations, New York/Geneva, 1999 and  U.N. Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean,
ECLAC, Santiago, 1999.
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
Annex 3:  Venezuela and Argentina, law enforcement
territorial deployment
637
Territorial deployment of the Venzuelan National Guard.
Source: Guardia Nacional, Nº 1, 1997, p.36.
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Territorial deployment of the Argentine Natinal Gendarmerie.
Source:  República Argentina, Gendarmería Nacional, Dirección de Policía y Seguridad,
Subdirección de Drogas Peligrosas, Represión Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas, Buenos Aires, n/d, p.15
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Annex 4:  Argentina, field research questionnaires
640
Different questionnaires have been elaborated for members of different
government agencies.  Questions concerning beliefs about drug trafficking as a national
security problem and the consequences of militarized law enforcement in Bolivia
remain basically unchanged. These questions correspond not necessarily in content but
in sequential order to what is defined as “contrast questions” in the ethnographic
interview method. What changes from agency to agency are the descriptive and
structural questions, which of course have been adapted to the different policy making
areas. Different questionnaires also have been elaborated depending on the presidential
term. These are very small changes concerning dates and relevant episodes of drug
trafficking related violence in Bolivia.
CONATON, CONCONAD and CONCONAD II were inter-ministry commissions. In the
case of SEDRONAR there is an inter-agency organ (joint strategy commission) and the head of
this agency assists the Internal Security Council. Therefore it was not necessary to multiply the
types of questionnaires since relevant officials in some agencies either were also part of the drug
control agency or, while part of the drug control agency, took part in multi-agency meetings.
Basically six kinds of questionnaires were elaborated:
* questionnaire for members of CONCONAD;
* questionnaire for members of CONCONAD II;
* questionnaire for members of SEDRONAR;
* questionnaire for officials of the Ministry of Defense (one for 1983-1989 and other for
1989-1995)-specifically tailored for the Minister of Defense, who was not required to
participate in Drug Control Structure decision meetings;
* questionnaire for officials of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Culture (one for
1983-1989 and other for 1989-1995) -specifically tailored for the minister of Foreign Relations,
who was not required to participate in Drug Control Structure decision meetings; and
* questionnaire for officials of the Ministry of the Interior (1989-1995).
 Of course, most of the time the policy was to let the informant talk freely before or after
the interview, and interviews were made as informally and colloquially as possible.  The
following ethical rules have been followed when interviewing the informants:1449
The informant has been considered first and his or her rights, interests, and sensitivities
have been safeguarded. Statements and documentation have been kept confidential when the
informant has requested this. Also, in order to protect the physical integrity of people
interviewed in hostile environments (specifically the Chapare region) their identities have been
kept anonymous.
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The research objectives of the interview have been communicated to all the informants.
The privacy of informants has been protected when they have requested to remain
anonymous.
I hope this dissertation will be a “fair” return to the informants in the sense that it aims to
contribute to advance the state of knowledge in this area and to find solutions to problems
affecting the informants.
The final work (the dissertation) will be made available to informants by sending copies
directly to them or through public libraries or depository offices.
                                                                                                                                                                         
1449For a list of ethical principles in field research see Spradley op. cit. p.34
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CONCONAD AND CONCONAD II:
• Did you participate in the cabinet meeting that decided to create the National
Commission for Drug Trafficking and Abuse Control (1985)?
• Could you describe what was discussed during the meeting?
• Was drug trafficking mentioned as a defense or internal security problem for the
Argentine Republic?
• Did you participate in the meetings where the Commission for the Coordination of
Drug Traffic and Abuse control was created (1988)? (Here, the same two questions
listed directly above would  follow.)
• Could you describe the responsibilities of your ministry’s representatives on the
commission?
• Could you tell me about your responsibilities in relation to drug control polices?
• Was drug trafficking considered a security matter in the agenda of the commission?
• What was your function and hierarchy in the drug control decision structure?
• Could you describe the evolution of the drug trafficking issue(during the period you
were an official in that area)?
• Would you define drug trafficking as a national security problem for Argentina?
Why?
• Which issue areas are the most threatened by drug trafficking in the case of
Argentina? Could you give me a priority order?
- The institutional stability of Argentina (for example, cases of corruption in the
executive/legislative/judiciary powers that could endanger the stability of the democratic
regime).
- The health and quality of the human resources of the nation.
- The control of the totality of the national territory by the national state (this is the physical and
institutional presence of the state). For example: the fact that provincial administrations could
be corrupted or that criminal organizations could establish support bases in Argentine territory.
- The integrity of the environment (i.e. pollution of rivers and sources of potable water linked to
the cocaine production in Bolivia).
• Do you see a relationship between the increase of repression of criminal
organizations in Colombia in the middle 1980s and an increase in drug trafficking
from Bolivia towards Europe? Would the increase of drug trafficking through
Argentina be a consequence of this phenomenon?
• Did you notice a rise in consumption from 1983 on? What do you think were the
causes of that increase?
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• Was there any diplomatic pressure from the United States for the adoption of local
drug control policies? What was the level of involvement of the Argentine
government in that regard?
• During the period you were an official do you think that an increase in militarized
enforcement could have had consequences for the security of Argentina?
• Which consequences could have had the direct involvement of Bolivian Armed
Forces in eradication and interdiction activities in the Chapare? What would have
been the consequences for Argentina?
• Was the possibility of sending Gendarmerie or Federal Police forces to Bolivia
seriously analyzed during the Alfonsín administration?
• Where the possibilities of the rise of a local Bolivian guerrilla movement or the
possibility of an armed conflict between the Bolivian government and the coca-
growing peasants ever considered by the Argentine government? Was this type of
scenario considered as close, in terms of time and space?
• What would happen today in Bolivia if the government finally decides to fully and
openly involve the army in support of forcible eradication? In what way could this
affect the security of Argentina?
• Did the Argentine government receive any kind of pressure from the U.S.
government to adopt sanctions or measures against Bolivia?
• What do you think would be the best strategy for Argentina to control the inflow of
cocaine from Bolivia?
• Was the possibility of a “Colombianization” or “Peruanization” of Bolivia in terms of
an escalation of drug trafficking-related violence seriously considered by the Alfonsín
administration?
• How would you define internal security and defense?
• Would you define drug trafficking as an internal security or defense problem for
Argentina? Why?
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SEDRONAR:
• Did you participate in the cabinet meeting that created SEDRONAR?
• Could you describe the functions and responsibilities of the representatives of the
Ministry of the Interior, Foreign Relations, Ministry of Intelligence and Secretariat of
Intelligence in the Joint Strategy Commission? What is the specific function of the
Joint Strategy Commission?
• Could you describe what was discussed during the meeting?
• Was drug trafficking mentioned as a defense or internal security problem for the
Argentine Republic?
• Could you tell me which of your responsibilities were related to drug control polices?
• Was drug trafficking considered a security matter in the SEDRONAR agenda?
• What was your function and hierarchy in the drug control decision structure?
• Could you describe the evolution of the drug trafficking issue (during the period you
were an official in that area)?
• Would you define drug trafficking as a national security problem for Argentina?
Why?
• Which issue areas are most threatened by drug trafficking in the case of Argentina?
Could you give me a priority order?
-The institutional stability of Argentina (for example, cases of corruption in the
executive/legislative/judiciary powers that could endanger the stability of the democratic
regime).
-The health and quality of the human resources of the nation.
-The control of the totality of the national territory by the national state (this is the physical and
institutional presence of the state). For example: provincial administrations could be corrupted
or criminal organizations could establish support bases in Argentine territory.
-the integrity of the environment (i.e. pollution of rivers and sources of potable water linked to
cocaine production in Bolivia)
• Do you see a relationship between the increase of repression of criminal
organizations in Colombia in the middle 1980s and an increase in drug trafficking
from Bolivia towards Europe? Would the increase of drug trafficking through
Argentina be a consequence of this phenomenon?
• Did you notice an increase in consumption from 1983 on? What do you think were
the causes of that increase?
• Was there any diplomatic pressure from the United States to adopt local drug control
policies? What was the degree of involvement by Argentine government in that
regard?
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• During the period you were official do you think that an increase in militarized
enforcement could have had consequences for the security of Argentina?
• Which consequences could have had the direct involvement of Bolivian Armed
Forces in eradication and interdiction activities in the Chapare? What would have
been the consequences for Argentina?
• Was the possibility of sending Gendarmerie or Federal Police forces to Bolivia
seriously analyzed during the Menem administration?
• Were the possibilities of the rise of a local Bolivian guerrilla movement or armed
conflict between the Bolivian government and the coca-growing peasants ever
considered by the Argentine government? Was this type of scenario considered as
close in time and space?
• What would have happen in Bolivia today if the government finally decides to fully
and openly involve the army in support of forcible eradication? In what way could
this affect the security of Argentina?
• Did the Argentine government receive any kind of pressure from the U.S.
government to adopt sanctions or measures against Bolivia?
• What do you think would be the best strategy to be adopted by Argentina to control
the inflow of cocaine from Bolivia?
• Was the possibility of a “Colombianization”or “Peruanization” of Bolivia in terms of
an escalation of drug trafficking related violence seriously considered by the Menem
administration?
• What was your reaction and the reaction of your colleagues and subordinates when
Option Zero was announced in 1993 in Bolivia?
• How did you react to the first measures taken by the Sanchez de Lozada
administration against coca cultivation at the beginning of his term? Did you consider
the reaction of the coca-growing peasants as threatening to Argentina in any way?
• Do you think that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed with UNDCP,
Bolivia, Peru, and Chile contributes indirectly to enhance the security of  Argentina?
• Do you recall the position of the Argentine government during the MOU preparatory
meetings? Did you have specific instructions?
Was the MOU in the Argentine view a way to “contain” the growth of drug
trafficking in Bolivia?
• How would you define internal security and defense?
• Would you define drug trafficking as an internal security or defense problem for
Argentina? Why?
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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE:
• Did you participate in the cabinet meeting that created
COMCONAD/COMCONDAD II/ SEDRONAR?
• Could you describe what was discussed during the meeting?
• Was drug trafficking mentioned as a defense or internal security problem for the
Argentine Republic?
• Could you describe the responsibilities of your ministry’s representatives on the
commission? (Only  FOR COMCONAD and COMCONAD II.)
• Could you describe the functions and responsibilities of the representatives of the
Ministry of  Defense in the Joint Strategy Commission? (Only for SEDRONAR.)
• Could you tell me about your responsibilities in relation to drug control policies?
• Could you describe the official position of the Ministry of Defense during the
Seminar of Argentine-Brazilian defense cooperation organized in Buenos Aires in
1989? Was drug trafficking considered a national security problem? (Only for
Alfonsín Administration.)
• Was there an internal structure within the Ministry of Defense for cooperation with
COMCONAD/ SEDRONAR?
• Was drug trafficking considered a national security issue in the agenda of the
Ministry of Defense?
• What was your role in the drug control decision structure?
• Could you describe the evolution of the drug trafficking issue (during the period you
were an official in that area)?
• Would you define drug trafficking as a national security problem for Argentina?
Why?
• Which issue areas are most threatened by drug trafficking in the case of Argentina?
Could you give me a priority order? :
-The institutional stability of Argentina (for example, cases of corruption in the
executive/legislative/judiciary powers that could endanger the stability of the democratic
regime).
-The health and quality of the human resources of the nation.
- The control of the totality of the national territory by the national state (this is the physical and
institutional presence of the state). For example, provincial administrations could be corrupted
or criminal organizations could establish support bases in Argentine territory.
-The integrity of the environment (i.e., pollution of rivers and sources of potable water linked to
cocaine production in Bolivia).
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• During the period you were an official do you think that an increase in militarized
enforcement in Bolivia could have had consequences for the security of Argentina?
• Which consequences could have had the direct involvement of Bolivian Armed
Forces in eradication and interdiction activities in the Chapare? What would have
been the consequences for Argentina?
• Was the possibility of sending Gendarmerie or Federal Police forces to Bolivia
seriously analyzed during the Alfonsín administration?
• Were the possibilities of the rise of a local Bolivian guerrilla movement or the
possibility of an armed conflict between the Bolivian government and the coca-
growing peasants ever considered by the Argentine government? Was this type of
scenario considered as close in terms of time and space?
• What would happen in Bolivia today if the government finally decides to fully and
openly involve the army in support of forcible eradication? In what way could this
affect the security of Argentina?
• Did the Argentine government receive any kind of pressure from the U.S.
government to adopt sanctions or measures against Bolivia?
• Did you receive any  suggestions from the U.S. South Command about the
participation of Argentine Armed Forces in a counter drug multinational force? Did
you receive pressure from the U.S. government to involve the Argentine Army in
counter drug operations?
• What do you think would be the best strategy to control the inflow of cocaine from
Bolivia?
• Was the possibility of a “Colombianization”or “Peruanization” of Bolivia in terms of
an escalation of drug trafficking related violence seriously considered by the Alfonsín
administration?
• How would you define internal security and defense?
• Would you define drug trafficking as an internal security or defense problem for
Argentina? Why?
• Do you think that the Armed Forces should participate in drug law enforcement?
Why?
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
• Did you participate in the cabinet meeting that created COMCONAD/ COMCONAD
II/ SEDRONAR?
• Could you describe what was discussed during the meeting?
• Was drug trafficking mentioned as a defense or internal security problem for the
Argentine Republic?
• Could you describe the responsibilities of your ministry’s representatives in
COMCONAD/COMCONAD II/ SEDRONAR ?
• Did you form part of the commission?
• Could you tell me about your responsibilities in relation to drug control polices?
• Was drug trafficking considered a security matter on the agenda of the commission?
• What was your function and hierarchy in the drug control decision structure?
• Did you participate in the meeting that created the Drug Unit of the Ministry of
Foreign Relations? (only for Alfonsín Administration).
• Could you describe the main topics in the agenda of this/these meetings?
• Could you describe the evolution of the drug trafficking issue (during the period you
were a governmental official in that area) on the following agendas:
a)the foreign policy agenda of Argentina;
b) the bilateral U.S. - Argentina agenda;
c) the bilateral Bolivia-Argentina agenda;
d) the multilateral agenda (preparatory meetings for the Vienna Convention of 1988 and
discussion of the convention and London meeting on the “cocaine threat”);
d) the regional multilateral agenda (OAS-CICAD).
• Was there an internal  structure in the Foreign Relations Ministry for cooperation
with CONCONAD/SEDRONAR?
• Was drug trafficking considered a national security problem on your ministry’s
agenda?
• What was your role and hierarchy within the drug control decision structure?
• What kind of consequences would the direct involvement of the Bolivian Armed
forces have had in eradication and interdiction operations in the Chapare? What
would have been the consequences for Argentina?
• Do you think that there is a direct relationship between enforcement against drug
trafficking in Bolivia and an increase in the migration outflow towards Argentina?
• Which issue areas are the most threatened by drug trafficking in the case of
Argentina? Could you give me a priority order?
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-The institutional stability of Argentina (for example, cases of corruption in the
executive/legislative/judiciary powers that could endanger the stability of the democratic
regime).
-The health and quality of the human resources of the nation.
- The control of the totality of the national territory by the national state (this is the physical and
institutional presence of the state). For example,  provincial administrations could be corrupted
or criminal organizations could establish support bases in Argentine territory.
-The integrity of the environment (i.e., pollution of rivers and sources of potable water linked to
cocaine production in Bolivia)
• Was the possibility of sending Gendarmerie or Federal Police forces to Bolivia
seriously analyzed during the Alfonsín administration?
• Where the possibilities of the rise of a local Bolivian guerrilla movement or an armed
conflict between the Bolivian government and the coca-growing peasants ever
considered by the Argentine government? Was this type of scenario considered as
close in terms of time and space?
• Did the Argentine government receive any kind of pressure from the U.S.
government to adopt sanctions or measures against Bolivia?
• What do you think would be the best strategy by Argentina to control the inflow of
cocaine from Bolivia?
• Was the possibility of a “Colombianization”or “Peruanization” of Bolivia in terms of
an escalation of drug trafficking related violence seriously considered by the Alfonsín
administration?
• What was your reaction to the episodes of political violence in Bolivia during the period of
discussion and implementation of the law #1008? (i.e., the massacre of  Villa Tunari). Did you
consider that an escalation of drug trafficking-related violence could have any repercussion
for Argentina?
• How would you define internal security and defense?
• Would you define drug trafficking as an internal security or defense problem for
Argentina? Why?
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (1989-1995) ADAPTED AD-
HOC DURING THE INTERVIEW FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF SEDRONAR
QUESTIONNAIRE FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY
COMMISSION ADAPTED AD-HOC DURING THE INTERVIEW FROM COMCONAD
AND SEDRONAR QUESTIONNAIRES
